

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The Army Quarterly

CONTENTS

	PAGE
I. Editorial	1
II. The North-west Frontier of India Problem (with Maps)	11
III. The Practical Value of Military History	26
IV. The Development of the "New Model" Army. Suggestions on a Progressive, but Gradual Mechanicalization. By Captain B. H. Liddell Hart	37
V. The Future of Intelligence in the Army. By Captain and Brevet-Major B. C. Denning, M.C., R.E.	51
VI. Military Training in the Junior Division of the Officers Training Corps. By Major E. E. A. Whitworth, M.C., Commanding Rugby School Officers Training Corps	58
VII. Some Reflections on the Recent Olympic Games. By Brigadier-General R. J. Kentish, C.M.G., D.S.O. (Member of the International Olympic Council and Honorary Secretary, British Olympic Association)	72
VIII. The Infantry Soldier in the Making. By Major J. C. Burnett, D.S.O., The Duke of Wellington's Regiment	79
IX. Lessons from Experiences with Irregulars (with Sketch Map). By Brevet-Major R. H. Dewing, D.S.O., M.C., R.E.	86
X. Aeroplanes in Future Warfare. By Captain McA. Hogg, M.C., Royal Engineers	98
XI. Battalion Organization in Time of Peace. By Lieutenant F. A. S. Clarke, D.S.O., The Essex Regiment	108
XII. A Letter of Advice to a Newly Appointed Adjutant in the Territorial Army	112
XIII. Tales of Intelligence. No. 6. The Officer's Servant. By "Jabb" (late of the Intelligence Corps)	119
XIV. Incidents of the Great War. No. 4. The Field Companies, R.E., and Pioneers of the 56th Division at the Crossing of the Canal du Nord, 27th of September, 1918 (with Map)	133
XV. The Seller of Cucumbers (Amarah, 1915). By "Majnun"	136
XVI. Some Rambling Notes on War Diaries	141
XVII. "The Greatest Poem of the Great War." By Mark Wardle	146
XVIII. Notes on Foreign War Books	152
XIX. Reviews and Notices of Recent Books and Articles on Military Subjects	178
XX. Parliamentary Notes	187
XXI. Appendix	191

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INDEX TO AUTHORS. VOL. IX.

AUTHOR.	SUBJECT.	PAGE
ANSTEV, Lieut.-Colonel E.C., D.S.O., R.F.A.	The Study of Military History . . .	390
" AVION " . . .	The Evolution of Air Power . . .	348
BEADON, Brevet Lieut.- Colonel R. H., C.B.E. R.A.S.C.	An Operation of War (<i>with Map</i>) . . .	375
BECKWITH-SMITH, Cap- tain M., D.S.O., M.C., Coldstream Guards	Battalion Organization in Time of Peace. A Reply to Criticism . . .	383
BRUNSKILL, Brevet- Major G. S., K.S.L.I.	The Infantry Man-Power Problem . . .	366
BURNETT, Major J. C., D.S.O., The Duke of Wellington's Regiment	The Infantry Soldier in the Making . . .	79
CLARKE, Lieut. F.A.S., D.S.O., The Essex Regiment	Battalion Organization in Time of Peace . . .	108
DENING, Captain and Brevet-Major B. C., M.C., R.E.	The Future of Intelligence in the Army . . .	51
DEWING, Brevet-Major R. H., D.S.O., M.C., R.E.	Lessons from Experiences with Irregulars (<i>with Sketch Map</i>) . . .	86
EDMONDS, Brig.-General J. E., C.B., C.M.G. (R.E. retired)	The German Strategic Reserve in 1917 . . .	270
HOGG, Captain McA., M.C., Royal Engineers	Aeroplanes in Future Warfare . . .	98
HUDLESTON, F. J., C.B.E., Librarian, War Office	Frederick, the Soldiers' Friend . . .	273

AUTHOR.	SUBJECT.	PAGE
"JABB" (late of the Intelligence Corps)	Tales of Intelligence. No. 6. The Officer's Servant	119
" " "	No. 7. Cross-Channel Traffic	387
KENTISH, Brigadier-General R. J., C.M.G., D.S.O. (Member of the International Olympic Council and Honorary Secretary, British Olympic Association)	Some Reflections on the Recent Olympic Games	72
" " "	Some Further Reflections on the Recent Olympic Games	316
LIDDELL HART, Captain B. H.	The Development of the "New Model" Army. Suggestions on a Progressive, but Gradual Mechanicalization	37
"MAJNUN"	The Seller of Cucumbers (Amarah, 1915)	136
ORR, Colonel G. M., C.B.E., D.S.O., Indian Army (retired)	Smutts v. Lettow. A Critical Phase in East Africa, August to September, 1916 (<i>with Map</i>)	287
PENNYCUICK, Captain J. A. C., D.S.O., R.E.	Surprise in Fortification in the Future (<i>with Maps and Diagrams</i>)	342
PIGGOTT, Col. F. S. G., D.S.O.	Intelligence at an Army Headquarters on the Western Front during the Last Phase of the Great War	234
SCAMMELL, J. M., Major, Infantry, O.R.C., United States Army	The Art of Command according to Xenophon	358
"TALIB"	A Matter of Izzat	402
WARDLE, MARK	"The Greatest Poem of the Great War"	146
WHITWORTH, Major E. E. A., M.C., Commanding Rugby School Officers Training Corps	Military Training in the Junior Division of the Officers Training Corps	58
WYNTER, Brevet Lieut.-Colonel H.D., C.M.G., D.S.O., Australian Staff Corps	The Command and Administration of the Military Forces of the Empire in War	260

INDEX TO ARTICLES. VOL. IX.

	PAGE
Adjutant in the Territorial Army, A Letter of Advice to a Newly Appointed	112
Aeroplanes in Future Warfare. By Captain McA. Hogg, M.C., Royal Engineers	98
Air Power, The Evolution of. By "AVION"	328
Appendix I. The Army :	
Army Council	191
Departments of the War Office	191
Commands of the Army at Home	193
Distribution of Regular Units of the Army	199
Tank Corps	208
Appendix II. The Army in India	209
Appendix III. The Royal Air Force :	
Air Council	216
Air Ministry	216
Air Commands	218
Art of Command according to Xenophon, The. By J. M. SCAMMELL, Major, Infantry, O.R.C., United States Army	352
Battalion Organization in Time of Peace. By Lieut. F. A. S. CLARKE, D.S.O., The Essex Regiment	108
Battalion Organization in Time of Peace. A Reply to Criticism. By Captain M. BECKWITH-SMITH, D.S.O., M.C., Coldstream Guards	383
Editorial	1, 225
Empire in War, The Command and Administration of the Military Forces of the. By Brevet Lieut.-Colonel H. D. WYNTER, C.M.G., D.S.O., Australian Staff Corps	260
Foreign War Books, Notes on	152, 408
Frederick, the Soldiers' Friend. By F. J. HUDLESTON, C.B.E., Librarian, War Office	273
German Strategic Reserve in 1917, The. By Brigadier-General J. E. EDMONDS, C.B., C.M.G. (R.E. retired)	270
Great War, Incidents of the : No. 4. The Field Companies, R.E., and Pioneers of the 56th Division at the Crossing of the Canal du Nord, 27th of September, 1918 (<i>with Map</i>)	133
India Problem, The North-West Frontier of (<i>with Maps</i>)	11
Infantry Man-Power Problem, The. By Brevet-Major G. S. BRUNSKILL, K.S.L.I.	366
Infantry Soldier in the Making, The. By Major J. C. BURNETT, D.S.O., The Duke of Wellington's Regiment	79

	PAGE
Intelligence at an Army Headquarters on the Western Front during the Last Phase of the Great War. By Colonel F. S. G. PIGGOTT, D.S.O.	234
Intelligence in the Army, The Future of. By Captain and Brevet-Major B. C. DENING, M.C., R.E.	51
Intelligence, Tales of. No. 6. The Officer's Servant	119
" " " No. 7. Cross-Channel Traffic	387
By "JABB" (late of the Intelligence Corps).	
Irregulars, Lessons from Experiences with (<i>with Sketch Map</i>). By Brevet-Major R. H. DEWING, D.S.O., M.C., R.E.	86
Izzat, A Matter of. By "TALIB"	402
Military History, The Practical Value of	26
Military History, The Study of. By Lieut.-Colonel E. C. ANSTEV, D.S.O., R.F.A.	300
"New Model" Army, The Development of the. Suggestions on a Progressive, but Gradual Mechanicalization. By Captain B. H. LIDDELL HART	37
Officers Training Corps, Military Training in the Junior Division of the. By Major E. E. A. WHITWORTH, M.C., Commanding Rugby School Officers Training Corps	58
Olympic Games, Some Reflections on the Recent	72
" " Some Further Reflections on the Recent	316
By Brigadier-General R. J. KENTISH, C.M.G., D.S.O. (Member of the International Olympic Council and Honorary Secretary, British Olympic Association).	
Parliamentary Notes	187
Reviews and Notices of Recent Books and Articles on Military Subjects	178, 432
Seller of Cucumbers (Amarah, 1915), The. By "MAJNUN"	136
Smuts v. Lettow. A Critical Phase in East Africa, August to September, 1916 (<i>with Map</i>). By Colonel G. M. ORR, C.B.E., D.S.O., Indian Army (retired)	287
"Surprise" in Fortification in the Future. By Captain J. A. C. PENNYCUICK, D.S.O., R.E. (<i>with Maps and Diagrams</i>)	342
"The Greatest Poem of the Great War." By MARK WARDLE	146
The Other Side of the Hill. No. IV. Mametz Wood and Contalmaison, 9th-10th of July, 1916 (<i>with Maps</i>)	245
War, An Operation of (<i>with Map</i>). By Brevet Lieut.-Col. R. H. BEADON, C.B.E., R.A.S.C.	375
War Diaries, Some Rambling Notes on	141

BERTRAND STEWART PRIZE ESSAY, 1925

Subject selected by the Army Council for the third Competition :

“ ‘ Britain’s Frontier is the enemy’s coast.’ Has this dictum been affected by the scientific developments of the last ten years ? ”

RULES OF THE COMPETITION

1. The right to compete is limited to British subjects, who have served, or who are actually serving, as officers or in other ranks or ratings of His Majesty’s forces.

2. The term “ His Majesty’s forces ” includes the Navy and the Royal Marines, the Regular Army, the Special Reserve, the Territorial Army, the Militia, and the Royal Air Force, the New Armies which took part in the late war, and also the Naval, Military and Air forces of India, the Dominions and the Crown Colonies.

3. The essays submitted for the prize must not exceed 10,000 words in length ; they must be typewritten and submitted in triplicate.

4. The authorship of the essays must be strictly anonymous. Each competitor must adopt a motto and enclose with his essay a sealed envelope with his motto typewritten on the outside and his name and address inside.

5. The title and page of any published or unpublished work, to which reference is made in any essay or from which extracts are taken, must be quoted.

6. The essays, which are to be addressed to the Editors of the *Army Quarterly*, must reach the office of the *Army Quarterly*, 94, Jermyn Street, London, S.W., not later than the 1st of March, 1925.

7. The essays will be judged by three referees—two to be appointed by the Army Council, the third to be one of the Editors of the *Army Quarterly*. The decision of the Referees, or of a majority of them, will be final.

8. The referees are fully empowered if in their opinion, or in

the opinion of the majority of them, no essay submitted to them comes up to a sufficiently high standard of excellence, not to award the prize ; or they may, if they consider such a course desirable, divide the prize among two or more competitors.

9. The result of the Competition will be made known in the *Army Quarterly* in July, 1925, and the prize essay will be published in that number of the Review. In the event, however, of there being two or more prize essays, the Editors of the *Army Quarterly* reserve to themselves the right of deciding which of these essays they will publish.

10. The copyright in any essay which appears in the *Army Quarterly* belongs to the Proprietors of the Review.

11. Neither the Proprietors nor the Editors of the *Army Quarterly* are to be held responsible for the loss of, or failure to return, any essay submitted for the Competition ; nor do they incur any liability whatsoever in connection with the receipt of the essays, any dealings therewith, the judging thereof, or the reports thereon.

THE
ARMY QUARTERLY

VOL. IX. No. 1.

OCTOBER, 1924

EDITORIAL

THE Secretary of State for War, when introducing the Army Estimates this year, announced that he had approved the principle of "promotion by merit" for the Army. This announcement has puzzled a good many officers who had been under the impression that in theory, at any rate, no promotion was made unless the officer concerned merited it, and that cases of especial merit were already provided for by the procedure, recognized by Regulation, of "accelerated promotion."

Apparently this has not been the case, and the fact may possibly account for some of the promotions and appointments of recent years which have astonished the Army.

And yet it is not surprising that officers were well satisfied with the nominal system by which the commanders of battalions, brigades and divisions were supposed to be selected. What could be better in theory than the monthly meeting of the Selection Board, a body composed of the military members of the Army Council and the General Officers commanding-in-chief of the various Commands? It was believed that these distinguished officers must, between them, know every senior officer in the Army, and were thus able to judge of their merits. All the same, the results of these meetings have not seldom appeared strange. Young officers who had gained great distinction in the war and commanded battalions have found placed above them in time of peace elderly gentlemen who had passed the war in less exacting employment, or even officers who, on active service, had been definitely less successful than they in similar positions.

Appointments have been made to the command of Regular and Territorial brigades of officers who have previously held no command,

and even of officers who have not been preeminently successful during short periods of command in war. It is true that many excellent staff officers were not allowed to leave the staff during the war and so were unable to gain experience of command on service, and several of these, who have been given brigade commands, have proved to be first-class leaders and trainers in peace. But even for these officers experience as battalion commanders might have been invaluable, as most of them had been away from regimental service for ten years and more.

* * * * *

To the more senior regimental officers this series of strange appointments has undoubtedly caused a lack of faith in the methods of the Selection Board. Such a feeling is most detrimental in every way.

But now the cat is out of the bag : " merit " apparently has not been sufficiently considered ; it is to be taken into consideration in the future. It is understood that this " promotion by merit " is to be extended to the most junior ranks. The young officer is to be made to feel that if he is of outstanding " merit " he is to be promoted above his brother officers not so gifted. And the corollary apparently must be that, if an officer does not possess " merit," he must not expect promotion.

How then is the " merit " to be obtained ? The question is difficult, and, if rumour is true, is worrying the highest authorities a good deal. Many officers have been asked to give their views on the subject. It has been suggested that high marks in examinations and " D's " at courses should be a *sine qua non*. But is the man who gets the best marks necessarily the best leader ? and is failure to get a " D " to stop a young officer's career ? It would be interesting to know how many of the more successful Generals in the last war were " D " men.

It is said that a general list is once more suggested, and that a proposal is again made to promote officers within their own regiment over the heads of their messmates. But these revived proposals have always been held to strike at that *esprit de corps* and family feeling which is vital in the making of a good battalion.

* * * * *

Keen regimental officers were becoming anxious, even before the announcement of the Secretary of State, about their prospects in the Service, and many of them had come to the fixed opinion that, unless they went on staff service and stayed there, they had little chance of

any higher command than that of their units. A glance at the Army List gave them some reason for this view. They noted the percentage of the General Officers commanding-in-chief, Generals commanding divisions, and the Colonels Commandant commanding Regular and Territorial brigades who had commanded their battalions or regiments. They saw that very many had passed straight from service on the staff to high command.

It seemed to them, therefore, that the command of a unit might well be the end of their military career, and that, consequently, if they desired to get on in their profession, extra regimental employment was the more hopeful avenue to advancement. And now these same men feel that in this scheme of "promotion by merit" another pitfall is going to be laid for the regimental officer: the "merit" may come from a staff career rather than from commanding a company with distinction.

It is, however, an exceedingly difficult matter to settle the question of promotion in the Army. There are in the Army, as in every other profession, very good, good and less good officers; there are also a few exceptional men, who should clearly rise high in their profession. The number of such exceptionally brilliant men, in the Army as in any other profession, is very small.

It is clear that an unfit officer should be got rid of. The exceptional men should be pushed up, but without undue speed. The remainder should take promotion in their turn unless reported by their commanding officer as being unfit. How is this to be done?

There is, of course, the system of "accelerated promotion," in existence if not to any notable extent in use. Some more general or more extended use of this system may have been in the mind of the Secretary of State when he made the announcement to which we have referred above. The difficulties have always been, and always will be—first, the right selection of officers of the exceptional merit which deserves accelerated promotion, and secondly, the machinery for giving effect to the system.

As to selection, unit commanders must inevitably be the first source of recommendation. But unit commanders have extraordinarily diverse views, widely differing standards, and *amour propre*. Can any unit commander care to admit that his unit has no officer deserving of accelerated promotion? On the other hand, can any unit commander really enjoy recommending his best officers for promotion which must be accelerated by the loss of such officers to the unit itself? Obviously, units must contain very varying numbers of such meritorious officers; but the tendency must almost

inevitably be towards a uniform number per unit. Moreover, do even civilians imagine that right selection is easy? In many professions it is possible to judge by results, actual results, definitely appraisable or even translatable into pounds, shillings and pence. But in the Army the apparently best soldier in time of peace is often not the actually best soldier in war. Young officers were well and carefully watched and reported on before 1914 by their superiors in the Army—and the Army contained then, as now, at least as many men as any other profession of absolute singleness of aim in the interests of the public service. Yet were all the most highly considered of those young officers found the most brilliant under the test of actual war? Did not some of those who were less well thought of in peace time—perhaps more indolent, more careless, more lighthearted—actually excel their more brilliant peace colleagues as leaders when the great trial came?

It is a question than which none is more difficult, this of the selection of men for tasks in which they cannot be tested except by being given the task itself; of selecting men for war by a judgment of them in the utterly different conditions of peace. For peace conditions can never be made in the least like war, in point of fact. Only where there is an actual war record on which to form a judgment can there be any certainty of an approximation to justice.

If, however, it is possible, there is little doubt but that more use of accelerated promotion would be to the advantage of the Service. (It is not to be forgotten, of course, that in many cases *esprit de corps* is too strong for accelerated promotion outside the unit to be even acceptable to the subject of it; nor are junior officers glad to see "accelerated" officers brought in to their unit, over their heads, from elsewhere.) Perhaps standardization and sifting of the unit recommendations might be arrived at by arranging that the officers recommended should be carefully watched and tested at training by brigade and divisional commanders. They might be attached to the staffs of higher formations for short periods, in order that they may become personally known to the commanders. If they passed this test, the officers might then be promoted into some other unit than their own. A regiment, which lost any such exceptional officer, might receive an officer of the same class from another regiment. Staff officers anxious for such promotion should return for a period to their regiments to be tested as leaders.

It should be made an absolutely unalterable rule that all staff officers should return to their regiments for at least a year after each appointment on the staff. Not only would this keep staff

officers in touch with regimental feeling and ideas, but it would also do much to dispel the idea now prevailing in the Army that there is a great gulf fixed between staff and regimental officers.

Generally speaking, no officer should be given command of a brigade unless he has had the command, or been second-in-command, of a battalion ; and it is obviously essential, for the efficiency of the Army, that the greatest care should be taken in the selection of commanding officers.

* * * * *

The task of the Selection Board is admittedly not an easy one, for it must be guided largely by an officer's confidential report. It would be a serious breach of faith if any other course were adopted. It would be unfair, for instance, to disregard the claims of an officer to an active command merely because he had been employed in an administrative capacity during the war, provided that he had excellent reports. But, nevertheless, when such an officer's claim to the command of a battalion is under consideration, much should depend on the character and judgment of the men who reported upon him, and all the circumstances of such an officer's career should be closely studied. With our small Army in which everything really depends on the efficiency, the experience, the training capacity, of its leaders, we cannot afford to have any but the ablest commanding officers. Only the best men who have proved their capacity during the war should be appointed as leaders.

* * * * *

Commenting on the decision by the British Government not to construct a Channel tunnel, the *Militär Wochenblatt* in a recent number said : " the British have done many stupid things, but they are not foolish enough to destroy their isolation." From Lord Wolseley downwards, military experts have always been opposed to the idea of a tunnel under the Channel. No doubt such a tunnel would have been most useful in 1915-1918, but its existence in 1914 might possibly have tempted the enemy to make a raid in order to secure its entrances. The mention of the name of Lord Wolseley reminds us that he once said : " We are too inclined to found our changes on the experiences of our last war instead of looking forward to what we shall require in the next." So possibly the less said about 1914-1918 the better. We are concerned with the future.

The commercial value of a Channel tunnel seems more than doubtful, for with the charges that it would be necessary to make, even without those of railage, to its entrances, such a tunnel would

hardly be able to compete against the cost of water transit for merchandize from the French ports. It must be borne in mind that it would only be by the securing of the bulk of the goods traffic that the tunnel could be made a paying concern.

Turning now to the military aspect, if the tunnel were sited at the narrow part of the Channel near Calais, it would obviously be too close to the French frontier to be safe from the first dash of a continental enemy. To construct it farther to the west would of course add enormously to its cost.

Next arises the question of how deep below the floor of the Channel the tunnel should be constructed in order to make it safe from large explosive charges placed on the floor of the sea. There is no experience to guide us, but the disturbing effect even of a small charge with 120 feet of water tamping over it is tremendous.

Once made, the protection and, if necessary, the demolition of the tunnel must be considered: protection not only from open enemies, but from ill-disposed persons in time of peace. The entrances, pumping plant (for drainage) and demolition chambers would require protection from artillery and bombs, and guard against attack. In a time of domestic disturbance and when there is danger of war, it might be found necessary to examine every package in transit before allowing it to proceed through the tunnel; for a charge of a couple of hundred pounds of high explosive fired by a time apparatus in the tunnel would easily wreck it, and possibly let in the sea. On the other hand, the difficulties of ensuring the destruction of any bridge or tunnel exactly when military requirements demand it are well known from our experiences in France in March, 1918. The persons charged with the duty may become casualties; the fuse, wire, current and detonators may fail; the enemy may reach the demolition chamber before it has been fired.

The military disadvantages would appear, therefore, completely to outweigh any commercial advantages which might be obtained by the construction of a tunnel under the Channel; and, if money is available, it would be better employed in developing train ferries and improving the comically obsolete accommodation on the Channel steamers and at the various Channel ports—not forgetting the supply of refreshments offered to sea-sick passengers on their arrival in England.

• • • • •

The article entitled "The Practical Value of Military History," which appears in this number of the *Army Quarterly*, advances rather unusual ideas, but should be of interest to our readers. Its

author, like most controversialists, overstates his case and, in so doing, materially weakens his argument. It is, of course, perfectly obvious that a student of military history when studying a campaign must bear in mind the conditions under which it was fought. The methods of transport and the armament of armies in the past were as different to those of the present time as ours will be to those of the armies of the future. But the main principles of war will remain the same. However much scientific developments may alter the actual conduct of a campaign, it will always be the object of a commander so to manœuvre his army as to destroy or to outflank the enemy's main forces with the least possible loss to his own troops. In order, therefore, to derive useful instruction from the study of military history, a student must strive to appreciate the main lessons of the past in so far as they assist him in solving the problems of the present, duly bearing in mind the changed conditions of his own time. He must notice cause and effect. The motives which influenced the action of a commander are always interesting—but "in making use of military history in order to solve tactical problems," it is not so much the psychology of the generals of the past that is worth studying as the course of action pursued by them and the results which followed.

* * * * *

Very few officers of the Army—and certainly no non-commissioned officers or soldiers—have been entitled to wear both the Kandahar Star, 1879, and the 1914 Star; and of these few we have just lost Lieut.-General Sir Ronald C. Maxwell, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., Colonel Commandant, R.E., from January, 1915, to December, 1917, Quartermaster-General of the B.E.F. His early career seemed to give little hope of his rising to such a position. Born in 1852, he entered the Royal Engineers at the age of nineteen, but, although he served in the Afghan War, 1879-1880, and the South African War, 1900-1902, he received no brevet or accelerated promotion, and reached the rank of Major-General only a few months before he was due for retirement for age. A first-class regimental officer and field engineer, he had been regimental adjutant at the School of Military Engineering; but he had been unlucky, for after his return from India when competing at the Staff College entrance examination at his last chance, he was incapacitated by a severe bout of fever. His Corps again gave him the most important appointment of his rank, and as Colonel he was appointed A.A.G. for Royal Engineers at the War Office.

Here at last his capacity and industry came under the notice of the

higher authorities, and on the completion of his turn of duty, he was successively Brigadier-General in charge of Administration, Western Command ; Major-General in charge of Administration, Southern Command ; and G.O.C. of the Coast Defences, Eastern Command, a post he was holding when war was declared. Summoned to the War Office, he was selected by Lord Kitchener to be one of his personal assistants in the raising of the new divisions, but within a few weeks his administrative capacity was required in France, where he was appointed Inspector-General of Communications. In January, 1915, when Sir William Robertson was made Chief of the General Staff, Maxwell succeeded him as Q.M.G., a post he retained until December, 1917, when he was badly injured whilst riding alone one evening, and was forced to return to England. Thus he was responsible for the " Q " work and the supply of the B.E.F. throughout the period of its great expansion.

Although one of the oldest, if not the oldest, officers in France, with his upright, always smartly dressed figure, he looked much younger than his years, and his energy was that of a man of half his age. With a phenomenal capacity for detail, he had an equally colossal memory, and was inclined, therefore, without losing sight of broad issues, to concern himself with small matters which might well have been left to subordinates. But with his industry, he had time for everything, and he often said that no man was really happy until his whole interest was in his work. He strongly opposed the introduction of an independent Transportation Department under a civilian head in 1916, and his judgment was justified by a military Director being appointed in 1918, when the railways and other branches of transportation were placed under the Q.M.G. He received many honours for his services ; but a greater reward than any of these was the respect and affection with which he was regarded by every officer who served under him at every period of his career.

* * * * *

We have been asked to draw the attention of our readers to a scheme which has been launched to provide and to endow a Club at Murree, of a similar character to the Union Jack Club in London, for the benefit of British soldiers all over India.

An appeal was made towards the end of 1921 to all who were interested in the welfare of the British soldier in India, and the response to this appeal has been most gratifying. Up to the present date over a lakh of rupees has been subscribed.

The erection of a suitable building at Murree has already been

begun, and one block of the Club will be ready for occupation next April.

There were considerable difficulties in obtaining a suitable site, but they were overcome largely owing to the public-spirited liberality of Mr. S. H. Dhanjibhoy, who presented "Curzon House" for the use of the Club, as a memorial to his father, the late Commodore F. Dhanjibhoy Nawab, Khan Bahadur, C.I.E.

Now that the Club has been definitely launched on what, it is hoped, will be a successful and useful career, it seems a suitable opportunity of emphasizing once again its real value to British soldiers.

Very few British troops are sent to the Hills as complete units during the summer months, and of those who remain on the Plains, there are many who do not even send a *dépôt* or details to the Hills. Thus thousands of our soldiers in India do not get a single day away from barrack life with its necessary military restrictions and never get a real holiday.

"The object in view, therefore, is to provide a Residential Club, where the soldier may spend his leave in comfort away from such restrictions, and enjoy the privileges of an ordinary citizen at a cost within his means.

"For the scheme to be of real benefit to the soldier, it is necessary that he should only have to pay the bare cost of his meals, etc., at the Club, leaving him with the balance of his furlough pay for his outside amusements.

"It is necessary, therefore, to raise sufficient funds to erect the required buildings, to provide complete equipment, to lay out tennis courts, etc., and to have a balance large enough to endow the building permanently.

"The money already so generously subscribed allows for the erection of a central block containing thirty cubicles, a restaurant, etc., and a smaller building with a billiard room, library, and bedrooms for warrant officers and staff sergeants. But at least another lakh of rupees is required to complete the scheme by adding another block—with seventy more cubicles—by making a recreation ground, and by providing an endowment.

"It may be mentioned that individuals or units in India, or in any part of the world, may endow a cubicle and dedicate it to any person or unit. That can be done by a special subscription of Rs. 1000, or Rs. 1500, for a warrant officer's cubicle, and the gift will be recorded permanently by a suitably inscribed tablet placed in the cubicle.

“ Every one will realize what a boon this Club will be when it is finished.”

Those who are responsible for the erection of the Club confidently hope that by the end of the year the necessary funds will have been raised, and that the last buildings will be well in hand by the summer of 1925.

All donations should be sent to the Hon. Treasurer, Soldiers' Residential Club, Murree, c/o Rawalpindi District Headquarters. No amount is too small—or too large.

12th of September, 1924.

THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER OF INDIA PROBLEM

(With Maps)

THE problem of the North-West Frontier of India has of late become one of great interest to military students, and questions on the subject have been asked in examination papers. The problem has for many years past been a source of much controversy, and a great deal has been published on the subject. Most of these publications, however, have been written by those who advocate one policy to the detriment of the other.

In this article an attempt is made to explain the problem and the various solutions to it which have been tried or suggested, giving as far as possible the reasons put forward by those who advocate a particular policy. At the end of the article the policy which has now been adopted by the Government of India is set forth. It is hoped that by setting down the facts in this manner a greater insight into the problem may be afforded to those who are interested in it.

To understand the question fully, it is necessary to have some idea of the terrain of the frontier. Throughout practically its whole length the frontier runs through mountainous country, the possession of which has been the bone of contention of nations from the earliest times. Over thirty invasions of India, before the advent of the British, were made. Assyrians, Persians, Greeks, Arabs, Afghans, Tartars and others have invaded the plains of India, advancing through these mountains. In this frontier, therefore, are found the "Gates of India."

The Indo-Afghan frontier, known as the Durand Line, does not mark the limit of the Government's control. A line which runs roughly along the foot of the mountains as far south as the Gomul river, and known as the "Administrative Border," is the limit up to which full control is exercised. Between this "Administrative Border" and the "Durand Line" lies "Independent Territory" which is unadministered.

Four rivers cut their way through the mountains of the frontier, the Kabul, Kurram, Tochi and Gomel. Their valleys form the

four main thoroughfares between India and Afghanistan, apart from the route through Quetta to Kandahar. The main line of communication between India and Afghanistan is the Khyber. Farther south is the thoroughfare *viâ* the Peiwar Kotal at the head of the Kurram Valley. The third route is *viâ* the Tochi Valley, running through the northern portion of Waziristan, and the fourth follows the Gomal river in Southern Waziristan.

All the main routes with the exception of the Kurram Valley run through independent territory, where the inhabitants are not controlled or the country administered in any way by us.

The frontier problem may be said to be in two parts, civil and military. The former is one of peace time and affects only the welfare and control of the tribes. The military problem, however, is governed by the fact as stated above—that in case of war with an enemy beyond the frontier the main lines of communication run through unadministered and uncontrolled country where the inhabitants cannot be relied upon to remain friendly or even neutral. This means that too large a proportion of the fighting force is needed for the protection of the L. of C. to the detriment of the striking force.

From the point of view of the solution of the frontier problem it is necessary to divide the frontier into three sections : (1) Baluchistan and Zhob ; (2) between the Gomal and Kabul rivers ; and (3) north of the Kabul river.

In the Baluchistan and Zhob section the problem was solved by Sir Robert Sandeman, who made the Administrative Border and the Durand Line one and the same.

North of the Gomal River, which is the boundary between the Baluchistan Agency and the N.W.F. Province, there is a wide belt of independent territory pierced, however, by narrow fingers of administered territory, the Tochi and the Kurram.

The dividing line between the two sections is the Kabul river. North of this the problem is purely a " civil " one. From a military point of view the Administrative Border in this section is a strategically sound one, and in the case of operations beyond the frontier no line of advance exists through the independent country. Another factor in this section is that here there are powerful rulers like the Nawab of Dir, the Mehtar of Chitral, the Mian Gul of Swat, etc., who are friendly to Government and also control their people. Of the other independent tribes in this section, the Bajauris are far from the Administrative Border and the Mohmands have too many interests in Indian territory to lose by giving serious trouble.

The frontier problem, therefore, from the military point of view may be said to apply only to that section which lies between the Kabul and the Gomal rivers. This section is populated by very strong tribes—the Afridis and Orakzais in the north and the Wazirs, including the Mahsuds, in the south, with the Kurram Valley as the dividing line between them. This section, however, is subdivided. The Afridis and Orakzais, like the Mohmands, have many interests in British India. The Afridis also are daily becoming more wealthy from contracts in the Khyber. For these reasons this sub-section does not at present form a serious problem. The Wazirs and Mahsuds, on the other hand, have no interests in British India, are poor, and live in a country which is at present unable to support them. Here, then, in Waziristan is the problem which has to be solved first of all.

In order properly to understand the problem it is necessary to consider its development since the British took over the Punjab from Ranjit Singh in 1849.

At that time and for many years afterwards the frontier ran along the foot-hills where various posts were established. The "close-border" policy was adopted by the Punjab Government. This policy included the restriction "that district officers were never, without special sanction, to risk their lives beyond the border, or to dream of its extension beyond present limits."

At this time the border was peaceful and many tribesmen were coming in to administered territory to settle or to join the Army, service in which was very popular. Nevertheless, raids were carried out by the hillmen into the fertile plains and as these became worse it was found necessary to punish the offenders. The first expedition into Waziristan, where even then the Mahsuds were the chief offenders, was carried out in 1860. This was in retaliation for an attack on the town of Tank by some 3,000 Mahsuds. This expedition under General Chamberlain advanced as far as Kaniguram and Makin, the latter place being destroyed. The force then returned to Bannu *via* Razmak; but, although the Mahsuds had been defeated in every action, they did not submit.

THE SANDEMAN POLICY

In 1866 Sir Robert Sandeman began his work in the Dera Ghazi Khan district, where he found the tribal organization in decay and the various tribal sections at loggerheads with each other, while the headmen and chiefs no longer had authority over

their people. Sir Robert Sandeman decided to break loose from the "close-border" policy then in force. He first re-established as far as possible the power and authority of the chiefs and headmen within his own border. His next step was to get into touch with the tribal chiefs across the border. This being accomplished, he started the "tribal service" by engaging tribal horsemen for service under him. This "tribal service" forms an important feature in the Sandeman policy.

Peace was obtained on the frontier and free intercourse was started between the people on either side. Tribunals on the Pathan model were organized to deal with disputes. These were composed of chiefs and headmen. This system was later elaborated by Sir Robert Sandeman as it was considered by him to be the keystone of his policy. He travelled freely across the border escorted by and under the protection of the headmen. With a view to increasing his influence over the Marris and Bugtis, he selected as his summer headquarters a place 25 miles beyond the border.

This policy of Sir Robert Sandeman naturally met with opposition, both from the Punjab and Sind authorities, who resented his new methods, but in 1875 and 1876 he was sent on missions to the Khan of Kelat. This Khan was an independent ruler of the State of Kelat which commanded the trade route between Persia, Afghanistan and India. It was, therefore, imperative that he should be on friendly terms with Government and that the internal situation of his State should remain undisturbed. At the time of the missions the Khan was fighting with his own sirdars. As a result of the two missions a treaty was made between the Khan and the Indian Government by which the Khan accepted British suzerainty, though his State remained independent. The Government was allowed to have an agency at Kelat, to station regular troops at Quetta, and to construct railways, roads and telegraph lines through the country.

Such was the first result of the Sandeman policy of controlling the tribes on the frontier, opening up the country for trade, stopping inter-tribal fighting, employing tribal levies to protect the communications and incidentally locating regular troops in healthier localities from where they were able to deal with Afghan incursions. The importance of this last result was amply proved during the Second Afghan War, when our lines of communication through Baluchistan were kept open by the tribes which had just been brought under control.

At the conclusion of this war in 1881 Sir Robert Sandeman, who was then Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan, was permitted, not without opposition, to annex the Pishin and Sibi districts which previously had acknowledged the suzerainty of the Amir, though the latter's influence had been very small.

In 1883 Thal-Chotiali was incorporated into British territory under the designation of British Baluchistan, while the following years saw the gradual development of the Sandeman policy in Baluchistan. Peace reigned where previously to 1876 there had been constant raids and fighting. Gradually and without serious military aid, except in 1884 in Zhob, more tribal territory was brought under control, until by 1889 the whole of Baluchistan and Zhob was administered up to the Indo-Afghan frontier.

In 1890 Sir Robert Sandeman was entrusted with the opening of the Gomal. This was done successfully, although the Punjab Government, in whose sphere of influence it was, had failed in an attempt two years before.

Unfortunately for India, Sir Robert Sandeman died during the following year.

His policy was summarized by Sir Hugh Barnes as follows :—

“ The method adopted by Sir Robert Sandeman is generally known as the system of ‘ tribal service.’ It has been said that it can only succeed with the less fanatical Baluch tribes among whom the fanatical spirit is less strong, and who usually acknowledge and accept the authority of their tribal chiefs.

“ The latter objection has been effectively silenced by the success of Sir Robert Sandeman's arrangements with the Wazirs and Sherannis, two Pathan tribes who have for forty years successfully resisted all attempts from the Punjab to open the passes through the hills. The policy on the Punjab border was locally known by the name of the ‘ close-border ’ system, and discouraged all attempts on the part of officers to cross the border and make friends with the tribes.*

“ Outrages were prevented, as they were in the old days on the Marri and Bugti border, by the watchfulness of the military and militia frontier posts. When outrages occurred the tribe was fined, though there were rarely any means of realizing the fine imposed. When fines accumulated to an unbearable extent the tribe was punished by blockade or a military expedition, only to offend again when the effect of the punishment had worn off.

“ Now if a payment is made to a tribe solely to induce them to be of good behaviour, and outrages are punished by merely deducting the fine from this payment, that is a system of blackmail pure and simple. But

* Since Sir Hugh Barnes wrote this, the policy has of course changed as regards the relations between Political Officers and the tribes. He is speaking of the time when the frontier was the responsibility of the Punjab Government.

this system is removed as far as possible from the methods by which Sir Robert Sandeman worked."

"It was one of Sir Robert Sandeman's favourite sayings that you could not tame a Pathan or Baluch tribe merely by coercion and threats, backed up though they might be by the spasmodic force of repeated military expeditions. There are many examples of the truth of this saying in our North-West Frontier history. Sir Robert Sandeman, therefore, first encouraged his officers by every means in their power to make friends with and secure the confidence of the neighbouring tribes, just as he made friends years ago with the Marri chiefs when he was Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ghazi Khan. Secondly, he never assumed as a matter of course that an offending tribe was solely the sinner and never sinned against, and he always made known his readiness to settle by tribal jirgas any grievances they had against those whom they had attacked. Thirdly, he was always ready to offer the headmen allowances to maintain a certain number of armed horsemen and footmen by whose means he expected them for the future to keep order in their tribes."

"These methods were based on two assumptions. The first was that in every Pathan and Baluch tribe, however democratic, there do exist headmen of more or less influence and a system of tribal authority which, if effectively supported, can compel obedience. In a Baluch tribe this authority is easily recognized and is usually vested in one man. Among the Pathans the authority is more subdivided and less powerful. Owing to the democratic feeling of the race it is often the case that the headmen, if unsupported, cannot enforce authority over the more unruly spirits, and, in order to preserve the influence they possess, are compelled to follow in the path where the unruly spirits lead. But the balance of power is turned directly the headmen are given the means to entertain armed servants of their own, and, when supported by suitable allowances and the prestige of connection with our power, they both can and do exert themselves successfully to keep the tribes in order.

"The second assumption was that it is absurd to expect any man, least of all a wild frontier tribesman, to do work for us without being paid for it. This assumption seems scarcely to need support by argument, but nevertheless it has been attacked. It is all very well to say, as has been said, that the British Government expects frontier tribesmen to behave themselves without any *quid pro quo*. They ought to do so possibly, but to expect them to do so with the many opportunities for loot close at hand and their impregnable hills to take to when pursued is ignoring human nature."

Sir Robert Sandeman maintained that the "close-border" system was of modern growth, the offspring of exaggerated notions and irresolute councils and the administration of frontier affairs from a distance by men with no practical knowledge of the border. He realized that to maintain order you must remove the causes of lawlessness and gradually introduce civilization and supply the people with the means of earning an honest living by developing the resources of the country to the utmost. The principal of these

were (1) the opening up of roads ; (2) railways ; (3) hospitals and dispensaries ; (4) irrigation ; (5) forest development ; and (6) mineral development and encouragement of trade.

Having dealt at length with the Sandeman policy and its results, it is necessary to look at the situation in 1892.

Since the accession of Abdur Rahman as Amir of Afghanistan in 1881 to early in 1892 our relations with that country had slowly deteriorated. In 1892 there were many causes of friction between the two countries, and these were in the main undoubtedly due to the uncertainty as to the Indo-Afghan border. This led to friction as to the spheres of influence over the border tribes by the Amir and the Government of India. The chief bone of contention was the country between the Kurram and the Gomal. At the Peiwar Kotal at the head of the Kurram Valley and at Gul Kach on the Gomal we were in touch with Afghanistan, but there was no dividing line between. The tribesmen in this area, the Wazirs, were divided in their allegiance to Afghanistan or India, while others resented the influence of either.

In 1893 Sir Mortimer Durand went to Kabul, where he arrived at a satisfactory agreement with the Amir and arranged for a demarcation of the frontier which was at once begun. The frontier in Waziristan was demarcated in 1894.

Prior to this agreement the Amir of Afghanistan, in 1884, made a determined attempt to extend his influence over the Wazirs and Mahsuds. In this he was not over successful, as the tribesmen turned out his emissaries. Throughout the following years the replies of the Government of India to the Amir's claims to Waziristan were not over clear, and as a result Wana was occupied by Afghan troops. Strong representations were made to the Amir by Lord Lansdowne, then Viceroy, and the troops were withdrawn.

At this time, in addition to the strained relations between India and Afghanistan, there was the fear of a Russian invasion of India. All military authorities agreed that to meet this threatened invasion we must do so on a line running through Afghanistan beyond our frontier. This necessitated all lines of communication across the frontier being open. Between the years 1892 and 1894 both the Wana Wazirs and the Dauris in the Tochi made repeated applications to be taken under British rule, chiefly to obtain protection from attacks by the Mahsuds. The Mahsuds themselves, although unwilling to come under our rule, were still more unwilling to be under the suzerainty of the Amir. Although they did not want a military post in their country, yet their Malik at this time stated

that they would welcome some form of control which would enable them to keep their bad characters in hand. To obtain this they were willing to cooperate in a system, such as was in force in Baluchistan, by which routes would be protected by tribal levies.

After much discussion it was decided, at the end of 1895, to occupy posts, one in the Tochi and one at Wana in the Gomal, in order to keep the two routes open, to comply with the wishes of the Dauris and Wana Wazirs, and also to overawe the Mahsuds, whose country lay between the two lines and which could be reached from either.

Thus a slight break away from the old "close-border" system was made.

In 1898 Lord George Hamilton, then Secretary of State for India, laid down the policy to be followed on the frontier. This was briefly that :

(1) No new responsibility was to be undertaken unless absolutely required for the protection of the Indian border.

(2) Any unnecessary interference with the tribes should be avoided.

This policy has been summarized as "stationary where circumstances permit and a forward one only when necessity compels."

In March, 1898, Lord Lansdowne, in describing the policy followed on the frontier, said in the House of Lords :

"You have months, perhaps years of lawlessness and misconduct, until the outrages become too numerous. A fine is inflicted, which is usually paid by the most respectable section of the tribe. If not, you have a blockade which means that the laborious, hard-working part of the community are prevented from following their business. Then comes the expedition. The villages of the wretched people are destroyed, their wives and children are turned out on the hillside and their fruit-trees are cut down. The troops then go away. They leave behind them a legacy of hatred and contempt. The policy is neither dignified, becoming to a great Power, humane, or economical."

Lord Curzon, who was at this time Viceroy of India, advocated a policy of withdrawing all regular troops to stations in rear, while the frontier posts were held by militia. He had no faith in the tribal levy system.

Sir Hugh Barnes, the Foreign Secretary, differed from the above views, and recommended that the following should be introduced :—

(1) Cantonments and a *pied-d-terre* for our Political Officers behind the Wazirs, *i.e.* between them and the Afghan frontier.

(2) Tribal service. Our officers to have a very free hand in the matter of extending our influence and enforcing jirga decisions.

(3) A complete chain of levy posts between the Waziri hills and the Afghan border, so as to leave no way open for raiding and to prevent the tribes from acquiring arms.

In 1899 the North and South Waziristan Militia were formed, and replaced the regular troops in the Tochi and at Wana.

In November, 1901, the North-West Frontier Province was separated from the Punjab and a Chief Commissioner appointed.

The policy laid down by Lord George Hamilton in 1898 was continued until 1919. This policy is known as the "close-border" policy, as opposed to the "forward" policy carried out by Sir Robert Sandeman.

Previous to 1898 both the "close-border" and the "forward" policies had been tried. As the "close-border" policy was the first, it will be dealt with first here.

THE "CLOSE-BORDER" POLICY

What are the reasons which the advocates of this policy give to back it against the "forward" policy?

To begin with, it may be best to quote Lord Curzon's proposals in 1899 in regard to the military policy to be followed. The principles on which this was based were as follows:—

(1) To avoid locking up regular garrisons in costly fortified positions far from their base.

(2) To replace the regular garrisons in outlying posts by tribal levies and Militia.

(3) To keep regular forces within the administrative border, but ready to assist or relieve outlying posts if necessary.

Some of the other reasons given for the policy are:—

(1) The defence of India does not necessitate the holding by the military of the mountainous regions bordering on the passes into India on the N.W. Frontier.

(2) The presence of regular troops in tribal territory, where the people value their independence before all else, merely tends to induce trouble.

(3) Raids into the plains can best be dealt with by people on the spot.

(4) The trans-frontier regions hold out no prospect of being able to support or pay for the civil and military forces required for their administration.

(5) The expense incurred is a great deal less than that of the

"forward" policy, the expense of the latter being out of all proportion to the revenue of India.

(6) The frontier was quieter from 1898 to 1919 than ever before.

(7) The old fear of a Russian invasion no longer exists.

THE "FORWARD" POLICY

To turn to those who are in favour of the "forward" policy. To begin with, they refute all the reasons given by the "close-borderites," and in addition give other reasons why the forward policy should be adopted. First to take the refutations :

In refutation of what Lord Curzon said in regard to the military policy to be followed it is pointed out that, as Sir William Lockhart said at the time :

"In the event of offensive operations on a large scale having to be undertaken, the tribesmen along the frontier may remain well disposed, in which case the present scheme (*i.e.* Lord Curzon's) will undoubtedly strengthen our Field Army. Or they may assume a hostile attitude while the levies themselves remain loyal. In this case our military position is strengthened to the extent of the auxiliary force which the levies supply ; but it will hardly be possible to reduce the supporting garrisons by withdrawing troops therefrom for the Field Army. Or finally, the tribesmen may be hostile and the levies may become disaffected, in which case the demands on the Regular Army for keeping the frontier under control would be increased rather than diminished by the levy system."

In regard to the other reasons given by the "forward" school of thought it is argued that :

(1) (a) Strategically the forward slopes of the mountains are the best for defence ; (b) the loss of prestige and the blow to the moral of the troops by an enemy advancing unopposed through our territory would be too great ; (c) an enemy advancing unopposed through the tribal territory would carry with him the tribes whether they wished to remain loyal or not ; and (d) the position of British subjects living in the frontier districts must be taken into consideration, as they have the same claim on Government for protection as others in India.

(2) Provided the country is controlled, administered and developed, the people would settle down to peaceful occupations as was the case in Baluchistan.

(3) Under the "close-border" policy raids increased until the situation became unbearable, and punishment in the shape of a

blockade or expedition had to be meted out to the offenders. Since 1919 the number of raids into the plains has greatly decreased and is decreasing yearly.

(4) No proper survey of the country has been carried out ; but if this were done, it is probable that copper, coal and oil would be found which on development would repay all expenses of administration.

(5) Between 25 and 30 crores of rupees have been spent on frontier expeditions north of the Gomal between 1895 and 1920, while during a similar period only a little over 2 lakhs were spent on similar expeditions in Baluchistan and Zhob.

(6) In 1898 was the great " blaze " along the whole frontier which was put out by military action. This naturally had a damping effect on the tribes ; but, even so, expeditions were made against the Mahsuds in 1900, 1901, 1902 and from 1917 onwards, while there were also the Mohmand and Zakka Khel expeditions in 1908. During the whole period the frontier districts were constantly raided. During the Great War there were no troops available for punishing the Mahsuds, while the quietness of the rest of the frontier was greatly due to the attitude of the Amir of Afghanistan.

(7) The fear of a Russian invasion is not so strong as of old, but there is still a fear that the Bolsheviks at some future date will attempt to extend their influence southward. Another factor which must always be considered is war with Afghanistan or the tribes.

To turn to the " forward " party's constructive reasons.

(1) It is pointed out that by the Durand agreement the Government made itself responsible for the welfare and the control of the tribes on its side of the Indo-Afghan frontier. These responsibilities can only be carried out by taking over the administration of the country right up to the Durand Line.

(2) The lines of communication between India and Afghanistan must be free from tribal molestation in the event of war.

(3) The highlands are healthier spots for cantonments than the present ones in the Indus Valley, where the loss from sickness is excessive.

In regard to (2) above, it is pointed out that during the Second Afghan War Lord Roberts had 18,000 men in Kabul and 75,000 on his lines of communication to India. The importance, therefore, of having the tribes within our borders under control cannot be exaggerated.

THE POLICY SINCE 1919

Having set forth the two policies as briefly as possible in a question which has always caused so much controversy, with a few of the arguments for and against each, together with a brief history of how each policy worked, up to the outbreak of the Third Afghan War in 1919, it is now necessary to examine events from that date onwards.

When the Afghan troops crossed our frontier at Torkham in the Khyber it was tantamount to a declaration of war. From the point of view of the frontier problem what was the result of this Afghan move? Our militias in the Khyber and North and South Waziristan could not for the most part resist the call of "jihad," with the result that, as Sir William Lockhart prophesied in 1899, "the demands on the Regular Army for keeping the frontier under control would be increased rather than diminished by the levy system."

The Wazirs and Mahsuds, however, were the only tribes which gave serious trouble at this time, and as a result, at the termination of the Great War, steps were taken to punish them. After a great deal of heavy fighting, our troops advanced into the heart of the Mahsud country, where they remained in order to bring about the subjugation of the tribe.

At this time the Government of India was once again faced with the old problem. The alternatives were (1) to make peace with the tribesmen on lenient terms, which, if not accepted, would be followed by a punitive expedition and a subsequent withdrawal from the country, or (2) to occupy and administer the country up to the Durand Line.

In addition to the Mahsuds the Tochi and Wana Wazirs had to be dealt with. The Tochi Wazirs complied with our terms at once, but an advance of the troops to Wana was necessitated before the Wana Wazirs surrendered. Meanwhile, the expedition against the recalcitrant Mahsuds was in progress. In March, 1920, the Indian Government accepted in principle the necessity of the permanent occupation of the central Mahsud country near Makin, based on a new road to be built connecting the Tochi with Southern Waziristan. This policy was outlined and defeated in the Legislative Assembly on the 5th of March by Mr. Dennys Bray, the Political Secretary.

In his speech Mr. Bray said the partial occupation of Waziristan which had continued since 1894, *i.e.* the occupation of the Tochi

and Wana, left the real crux in Waziristan untouched. The crux was not the Wazirs, whom that occupation directly affected, but the Mahsuds, who live in the strategical heart of Waziristan, separated from Afghanistan by the Wazirs and from the British districts by the Bhattanis. In their inaccessibility lay their strength and also the root cause of the persistence in utter barbarism which had made the Mahsuds a byword among other Pathans. When the military, after the hardest fighting ever known on the frontier, were in occupation of the heart of Mahsud country, it was thought the time had come to bring the Mahsud country finally under military domination. This task, though not beyond the power of the Army, proved beyond the financial resources of the country at the time. Hence, though Government was determined to bring the Mahsud country under control, it was not on the military occupation of the Mahsud country that its policy was based. On the contrary, the military occupation of the Mahsud country was to cease and be replaced partly by informal control through Scouts and Khassadars, and partly by the domination of the Mahsud country from two posts held in force on the edge of, but outside, the Mahsud country itself, and linked together by a connecting road. In the south there was the post of Jandola which had been occupied for years, and in the north, at the renewed invitation of its Wazir owners, the Razmak plateau had been occupied. Between the Tochi and Jandola *viâ* Razmak a mechanical transport road was to be completed. The protection of this road would be entrusted to the Mahsud tribe itself by means of locally enlisted Khassadars, reinforced by irregulars at Sorarogha and Kotkai. The Mahsud is a natural strategist of no mean calibre, and he would feel that he lay within a grasp which could be tightened at any moment. The consciousness of this fact would have a sobering effect on him. In future he would be robbed of most of the inaccessibility in which lay his strength, and, if he again gave trouble, Razmak, lying above and behind his natural defences, formed an advanced base, the possession of which would enormously facilitate the task of quelling the trouble.

The policy, however, was not merely designed to provide a preventive menace to the Mahsuds or to serve as an insurance against the abnormal frequency of expeditions or against their abnormal cost. It was in marked contrast to the old "close-border" policy, and the central feature was the raising of tribal levies or Khassadars, providing their own rifles and ammunition, to police the country. This was the same system as that adopted by Sir Robert

Sandeman and was perhaps the most potent agency in the work of civilization, of giving the tribe a stake in the administration of law and order, of controlling the tribe as far as possible by local government, of keeping alive that spirit of responsibility which was the basis of the relations with trans-frontier people. But the levies could not be expected to do their work properly if they were left without some form of external force within reasonable range to keep them up to the mark. The most economical form of outside force which could be devised was the irregulars.


But irregulars again could not be safely employed in the trans-frontier area, unless they were within effective range of military support in the case of emergency. Hence the necessity for roads suitable for occasional mechanical transport linking up a minimum number of irregular posts in the trans-frontier area with the military posts in the rear. These roads were, therefore, an alternative to military occupation and a very much cheaper alternative. They were also civilization carriers and complementary to the arrangements in the trans-frontier area itself. The policy included a cis-border road about 100 miles in length, providing much-needed lateral communication for the immediate defence of the sorely harassed inhabitants of the Dera Ismail Khan District.

The policy of Government in Waziristan, therefore, was the control of Waziristan through a road system, of which some 190 miles lay in Waziristan itself and 100 miles along the border of Derajat, and the maintenance of 4,600 Khassadars and 5,000 irregulars.

Wana, although held by regulars or irregulars since 1894, was now to be held by Khassadars; but Sarawekai was to be held by irregulars as had been done for years.

The policy was a forward one in the real sense of the term, being a policy of progress. It was a big step forward on the long and laborious road towards pacification through civilization of the most backward and inaccessible, and therefore the most truculent and aggressive tribes on the border.

In the year that has elapsed since the above announcement was made, regular troops have been established at Razmak, with regulars on the line of communication to the Tochi, while the regular troops have been withdrawn to Jandola and their place taken by Khassadars and Scouts. The circular mechanical transport road has been built from the Tochi *viâ* Razmak to Jandola, while work is progressing on the mechanical-transport road from Jandola to Sarawekai and the internal lateral communication road from Draband to Ghazni Khel.



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
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No conclusions are drawn as to which is the correct policy to be followed in order to solve the problem, as it must be remembered that whatever policy is laid down by the Government of India, it must be carried out wholeheartedly by all its servants.

It will be seen from the foregoing that a policy has been laid down for Waziristan only. The reason for this is that at the present time this area of the frontier presents the most urgent problem to be solved, and advantage was taken of the presence of troops in the country to put the new policy into action.

As frequent reference has been made by writers to a "General-Staff Policy" on the frontier, it may not be out of place here to say that this is a mis-statement. On the frontier, as in every country with which the General Staff has to deal, politics form a part of that Staff's work. In working out schemes in case of war it is essential that the political aspect should be taken into consideration. It cannot be said that for this reason the General Staff is "politically minded" or that it has an "official policy." All that the General Staff may do is to advise the Government, when asked to do so, as to the policy it recommends from a military point of view, after due consideration has been given to the political aspect of the case.

THE PRACTICAL VALUE OF MILITARY HISTORY

"To the devil with history and principles! What is the problem?"—*Verdy du Vernois on the battlefield of Nachod, 1866.*

IF there is one dogma with which the vast majority of intelligent soldiers may confidently be expected to agree, it is that the study of the campaigns and battles of the past is of the utmost value as a course of training for those of the future; and that a sound and extensive knowledge of military history is indispensable for an adept in the profession of arms. Any number of great men of the past have given their blessing to this belief. Bismarck, who, though he wore military uniform throughout the war of 1870, was not a soldier—any more than was Mr. Winston Churchill by reason of his appearance at Antwerp in October, 1914, in another kind of uniform, a sailor—but who none the less talked some sound sense in his time, said that he left it to fools to learn from their own experience; he himself had always managed to learn from the experience of others. Napoleon, a much greater man, advised us to read and re-read the campaigns of the great captains, as the only method of surprising the secrets of the art of war. Marshal Foch (who at the time of writing was, be it noted, only a lieutenant-colonel), quoted some one else as saying, "The history of war is in peace time the true means of learning war and of determining the fixed principles of the art of war." Lastly—to descend from the sublime to the ridiculous—Major-General Stanley could proudly say of himself:

"I know the Kings of England, and I quote the fights historical
From Marathon to Waterloo, in order categorical,"

thus deservedly calling forth the enraptured joint encomiums of his daughters and also of the pirates that:

"Still in matters vegetable, animal and mineral,
He is the very model of a modern Major-General."

In face of this overpowering weight of opinion the present writer, in venturing to give voice to his doubts, feels like Ajax defying the lightning.

First, it must be said that in seeking inspiration for the future in the remote—or even the less remote—past, the soldier stands almost alone among the learned professions. Generally speaking, professional men tend to regard the present and the future almost entirely, with merely a cursory and probably impatient glance at the past. Aspirants for membership of the Surveyors' Institute spend little time in the study of Domesday Book. The constructional details of the Tower of Babel have little immediate interest for the budding architect. The medical student no longer believes in the universal panaceas of bleeding and leeches, sanctified as these are by centuries of tradition and practice. Only to the lawyer is “Wil. and Mary VI. cap. 17” of moment; only clergymen still spend time, ink and paper on endeavouring to identify the exact location of the crevasse that enshrines the mortal remains of Dathan and Abiram; and only for the soldier is a thorough study of the Peninsular War regarded as desirable, if not essential, for the securing of rapid and profitable advancement.

Why is this? Let us get down to bedrock facts and discover, if we can, in what ways the study of the past can be said to advantage the present-day soldier.

That battles of bygone years with their atmosphere of gaily-clad and brilliantly accoutred combatants, prancing steeds and tossing banners, push of pike and crash of volleys, of thunder of charging cuirassiers and measured tread of Imperial Guards, breathe the very spirit of picturesque gallantry and martial panoply, cannot be denied, and for those who delight in transporting themselves back in imagination into the past, military history must always be a treasure-house of fascinating interest. So for that matter must all history, of which the annals of warfare are but one, and by no means the most important, part. But it is not to be believed that the mere allure of the past should have so dazzled all our mentors as to induce them to advocate its study for no better reason than this alone. Fretwork is, we believe, a pursuit of great interest and occasional utility; the study of the less virulent bacteria, such as the influenza germ, must be of the greatest benefit to any man—are we not all possible victims of influenza?—and is no doubt of interest to some. Yet neither of these subjects of study forms part of the curriculum of Sandhurst, or even of the Staff Colleges. If military history is taught at these seats of learning, it must be that it is considered useful, if not indispensable, to the soldier who wishes to rise in his profession. Again, we ask why?

General von Verdy du Vernois, at a date subsequent to the

battle of Nachod, when the emotions then aroused in his inexperienced mind had been well and truly forgotten, came round to a firm belief in the value of military historical study, and in the preface to a little work on "The Battle of Custoza" (translated into English by Lieut.-Colonel G. F. R. Henderson), clearly expounded his ideas on the subject. The student, he declared, who wished to get good value out of his reading might adopt one of two courses. First, he could devote himself to the criticism of facts; and secondly, he could set himself concrete problems based on the actual events of the campaign or battle under consideration.

Well, now let us imagine our student, Captain Attaboy (a name such as this should be a sure guarantee against a libel action), settling down before his books and maps, resolutely determined to read up a campaign and to improve his military aptitude by the first of these methods—the criticism of facts. Let us give him an easy job—the French operations in the battles around Metz in August, 1870. Here, with the magnificent volumes of the French Official History at his disposal, he will find more data for this purpose than he is likely to get for most campaigns. He will have plenty of maps, and good ones; all the reports and orders timed and dated; orders of battle and strength returns, accurately and painstakingly rendered. What more can he want? A good deal, if he is to come to any sort of just and reasoned opinion as to the course of action—or perhaps it would be better to say, of inaction—pursued by Marshal Bazaine. He must read other books, and many of them, before he is in a position fully to realize, and effectively to place himself in, the situation of that unlucky commander. This additional study alone can disclose to our friend Attaboy the political situation at the time of the Metz battles; the attitude and ideas of the Emperor Napoleon III.; the relations between Bazaine and his subordinates, commanders of higher formations, staff officers and administrative officials; the instructions of the Government of the Regency in Paris; the moral of the troops, officers and men; and many other cognate matters, diverse and complex enough, yet all alike in two things—their influence on Bazaine's mentality and actions, and the necessity of some knowledge of them for any one who wishes to pass a fair and reasoned criticism on the operations under discussion.

Clearly Captain Attaboy has a big job on hand, for one assumes it as axiomatic that hasty and one-sided criticism is not only valueless *qua* criticism, but the reverse of beneficial from the point of view of professional progress. To criticize any given course of action, it is but lost labour to say that because it ended in failure it

was therefore faulty and blameworthy ; the failure in question may well have been due to quite other causes. One can conceive many of these variegated causes for one's self ; there is no need to enlarge on them. Even admitted that failure was a direct consequence of some given blunder, a student must seek to discern in turn the motives for that blunder and ask himself why the general in question erred as he did ; in a word, put himself in the place of the man on whom he is passing judgment. But, in order to do this successfully, he must himself be steeped in the spirit of the times. He must follow the general's career from a youth up to know what manner of man he was ; he must form a more or less definite idea of the characteristics and state of mind of that general's army, to know with what manner of tools he was working ; he must be acquainted with the military ideas and doctrines and the strategy and tactics of the time to understand the methods the general employed. In a word, no one has any right to criticize Bazaine from the point of view of Field Service Regulations, 1920, which the poor Marshal never had the advantage of reading. One might as well say that Chaucer is not such an interesting author as Rudyard Kipling because of the strange words he uses, or that if Homer had written the Iliad by electric light he would never have gone blind. To be fair to Bazaine, one must not judge him by the lights he had not got ; but to realize exactly what his lights were, will necessitate an enormous expenditure of time and labour on Captain Attaboy's part, and it is quite a question whether it is really worth while for the latter's purposes to undertake it. That officer might do better to devote an equivalent amount of energy to the study of the military methods of the present day rather than those of fifty years ago. A knowledge of the Japanese, or even the British, soldier of 1924 might prove more useful to him in the long run than the most exhaustive acquaintance with the French soldier of 1870 ; and the labour necessary for appraising the military talents of a dead and damned Marshal of France might be better spent on doing the same kindly offices for Captain Attaboy's sergeant-major or his junior subaltern, or even—at suitable times and occasions—his colonel.

So much for von Verdy's first method of dealing with military history. His second, and, be it said, the one which he himself prefers, "consists," to use his own words, "in making use of military history in order to solve tactical problems." The system is that one takes a given situation at a given moment in some historical campaign or battle ; places oneself in the position of some commander called on to make a decision, and then makes the said

decision for oneself. *Voilà tout !* "Military history," states our guide, "is at hand to supply these situations in abundance. . . . We are dealing with facts which have all the stubbornness of reality ; and the comparison between the dispositions we lay down in the exercise we set ourselves and those actually taken will lead us to recognize which of the two combinations is the better."

Let us, then, take two historical situations, as suggested, and arrive at our own solution of the problems which they present, and then compare them with what was done in the actual event. Let us first take the case of the British Commander-in-Chief at the opening of the campaign of 1793 in the Low Countries. We shall need to consider, if we are correctly to appreciate the situation, the forces available, both our own and those of our numerous half-hearted allies, and the extent to which this half-heartedness is likely to affect our joint operations. Then we must look into the question of the reinforcement of our forces ; how many gentlemen Mrs. Mary Ann Clarke can persuade to buy Commissions ; how many recruits Mr. Pitt can induce to enlist by the offer of colossal bounties ; and other cognate matters. After that, we must deal with the opposing forces and their leaders, not forgetting the possibility that the former may be thrown into some confusion at any stage of the campaign by the generalissimo guillotining, or being guillotined by, the chief representative on mission. Finally, after an exhaustive study of climate, terrain, politics, economics, sea-power and the force of gravitation, we decide for an advance on Paris, or a retreat on Antwerp, or a crabwise movement to our left on Givet or to our right on Dunkirk, or what you will ; and then we turn to history for our comparison, and what do we find ? On this and nothing more :

" The brave old Duke of York,
He had ten thousand men ;
He marched his army up the hill,
Then marched them down again."

On this occasion one may safely say that a comparison between the hypothetical and the actual solutions of the problem is considerably to the advantage of the former.

However, lest we should be accused of bias, let us take another example. Towards the close of a fine summer's day a victorious army is engaged in the hot pursuit of a beaten enemy flying through the gorges of the Syrian mountains. Both sides are weary after many hours of fighting in the full glare of an eastern sun ; the vanquished are only little more exhausted than the victors, a respite from pursuit may well give them the chance to recover themselves

and take up a fresh position to oppose the further advance of their foes. Yet the leader of the victorious host knows well how difficult and dangerous a thing it is to press on in the dark, venturing his forces in an unknown and hostile country and laying them open to all the disadvantages of surprises and night combats.

There is our historical problem. What should the "Red General" do? Fifty out of every hundred of us would say, "Halt, put out outposts and set off again at dawn." The other fifty would vote for pushing on, by moonlight, starlight, or any other light, and exploiting the victory to the utmost. What does history say? For which side will she give her casting vote? History, when two courses are open to her, chooses a third. These are the orders given by the "Red General," one Joshua: "Sun, stand thou still upon Gibeon; and thou, Moon, in the valley of Ajalon."

This time—let us admit it like sportsmen—history has beaten us all ends up.

Putting aside flippancy, however, one must confess that the utilization of military history as a mine for the unearthing of tactical problems seems to be a matter of considerable difficulty and delicacy. Out of von Verdy's own mouth let him be judged. The solutions propounded by him to the historical problems based on the events of the "Battle of Custoza" would qualify him for an instant and well-deserved "plough" in any present-day promotion examination. Yet in their day they were no doubt models of all that wisdom should be. The main disadvantage of basing tactical problems on the events of past battles is that the student finds himself from the outset of his study placed in a series of impossible and ludicrous situations—if they are to be considered from the only useful point of view, that of present-day armament and tactics—from which escape is only possible by methods which would—under modern conditions—infallibly lead to a succession of terrifying and unavailing holocausts. Nobody wishes to learn the tactics of a hundred years ago, and yet, if one wishes to deduce tactical or strategical problems from the events of, say, the Peninsular War, which was set not long ago as the "special campaign" for the Army promotion examination, the attempt to adapt these problems to present-day conditions lands one immediately into the most inconceivable absurdities.

"But, of course!" one will be told, "only the most recent campaigns are of any value for this purpose." Putting aside the fact that accurate and detailed accounts, suitable for the unearthing of the necessary historical bases for one's problems, are not normally

available for many years after the event, one must point out that modern methods of warfare tend to change and develop so rapidly that the last war is often but a poor guide for the next one. Indeed, if one may put it so, the war that is on to-day is but a poor guide to itself. The industrious and painstaking American who in 1914, before President Wilson had told him that he was too proud to fight, set to work to prepare himself for the eventual intervention of his country by studying the war methods of the various belligerent Powers, would have found on his landing in France three years later at the head of a company of United States infantry, that his previous efforts savoured of love's labour's lost. In all these problems drawn from history, conditions, armament, numbers, terrain and methods are so different from those of the present day—with which alone the student is concerned—that a true parallel between them is impossible, quite apart from the fact, adverted upon above, that deficiency or incompleteness of evidence as to the exact circumstances of the given case, such as the wording of the orders received, the contents and time of arrival of reports and messages, the nature and reliability of the available information as to the situation, and even the terrain as it was at the date in question, makes it difficult, if not impossible, for any one to place himself in the exact position of the commander whose actions are to be compared with his own hypothetical procedure. It seems, therefore, preferable to have recourse to one's own—or some one else's—unaided genius for the devising of tactical problems for solution.

Let us now turn for a brief space to some other pleas that are frequently put forward to justify the time and labour devoted by budding soldiers to the study of military history. One of the best worn of these is the dictum that such study gives "a knowledge of war." This, of course, is true, up to a point. If we study the "De Bello Gallico" we shall know how Cæsar made war; much good it may do us. A perusal of Froissart will give us, for what it is worth, a good idea of mediæval military affairs. Napier is always readable and entertaining, and while delving into his classic pages we may live the Peninsular War over again, always pre-supposing that we desire for any good reason to do so. And so *ad infinitum*. "'And what good came of it at last?' quoth Little Peterkin." Shall we see a modern Q.M.G. to a desert column go about hitting rocks with his walking-stick on the chance of emulating the feats of Moses, and striking water from them? Is it of great value to us to know that if we were in command of a company of archers, armed with the long bow, and were attacked by mounted knights,

our front could easily be rendered unassailable? How often are we likely to be asked by some inspecting general the proportion of pikemen to musketeers in our battalion? Is the old problem "cuirassiers or dragoons" of imminent and pressing importance to-day? And need we spend much time in discussing exactly how close to the enemy's centre—whether at three hundred or five hundred yards—we can place in position our "massed battery" of Wagram? Soldiers too often tend to talk of "war" in the same way as the newspapers talk of "woman" or "the proletariat," or any other of the formidable but non-existent abstractions that fill their pages. There is no such thing as "woman"; there are many millions of women, and all different. Abstract war does not exist; there have been since the history of the world began an innumerable quantity of wars, all as different each from the other as can be, except in the fact that some one collection of men fought with another collection of men and called it war. Every conceivable factor that has ever influenced the outward face of the earth or the inward heart of man has played its part in modifying methods of warfare; and at no period of history have these modifying factors been as various, as radical, and as swift to take effect as now in this third decade of the twentieth century. And just as the man who writes and talks so airily of "woman" has only to deal normally with one woman—his wife, whom it takes him all his time to understand and know—so the soldier is, or should be, concerned not with "war," but with one particular war—the next war. The last war and all previous wars are past and over; history's pen has written their tale.

"Nor all our piety nor wit
Can lure it back to cancel half a line,
Nor all our tears wash out a word of it."

And history herself teaches us her own vanity. Could we from the result of the battle of St. Privat have correctly estimated that of the Marne? What is the exact similarity between the campaign of Arbela and that of Kut-el-Amara? It yet remains to be proved that the most encyclopædic knowledge of past wars is going to be of real assistance to him who strives to unveil the hidden face of the warfare of to-morrow.

The one plea of the advocates of the study of military history which remains for discussion here is based on the theory of the unchangeability of human nature. "Weapons, strategy and tactics change," we are told, "but one thing in warfare is constant. Man is the same throughout the ages, and this constant factor in war is

also the deciding factor. The man behind the gun is what counts, and he is the same man from the first beginnings of time up till now."

Now, first of all, this argument of what may be called the "Ardant du Picq" school is based on a fallacy. Human nature has, as a matter of simple fact, changed throughout the ages in exact measure with the changes in human environment and ways of life. Less than two hundred and fifty years ago the Scotch were notorious throughout the world for what was politely called "a fellowship with vermin." Who would dare assert that they are the same now? An eminent foreign observer of the period of the Wars of the Roses stated of the English, whose main political fault to-day is an indolent and contemptuous acquiescence in petty governmental interference and incompetence, that they were the most turbulent, inconstant and rebellious race under the sun. We may still usefully call to our minds the error of some of our pre-war ideas as to the kindly, homely German; the fickle, scatterbrained Frenchman; and the laborious, patient Russian. Yet all these fictitious beings were once real enough; they merely died a good many years ago and we were too short-sighted or preoccupied to notice it. Human nature, in truth, is anything but a constant, abiding thing; and it would speak ill for the progress of mankind and for its hopes either of this world or the next if it were otherwise. Most of us would dislike being called "lousy barbarians," though a few otherwise sane and respectable people have been known to be flattered at being termed "cave-men." And though many modern thinkers and writers have come—correctly—to the conclusion that we all could be happier and better off if we were living in mediæval times, they will hardly deny that we should require considerable adaptation to our changed conditions before we could be really comfortable therein.

One would, therefore, in any case assume that the soldier, like his twin brother, the civilian, had altered in character for better or for worse with the centuries. And so it proves. The historian of the British Army states * that in the Seven Years' War a large number of officers of all ranks knew nothing of their duty; that the British troops were extremely negligent in the matter of patrols, outposts and guards, and that taken as a whole they were men of inferior character—save the mark!—to the Germans. One may be forgiven for hoping and believing that in these respects we are better than our fathers that begat us. But the main contention of the "Ardant

* See Fortescue, "British Army," vol. ii. pp. 558-59.

du Picq " school is, that however much human nature may change in outward seeming throughout the ages, and however much accretions resulting from civilization and peace may cover and conceal our true selves, in the searching test of battle all this will slip from us ; we shall revert to type and fall victims to the one over-mastering emotion of fear. Putting aside the undoubted fact that if this were really to happen, battles and warfare would cease to be, because both sides would be engaged, not in fighting, but in running away from each other at top speed, there still seems reason to believe that fear and the reactions of human nature to it may vary in nature and degree with particular circumstances. One would naturally be less alarmed by a savage who attacked with a club than by a German who attacked with a 5'9 howitzer. If the present writer were armed with a Lewis gun, he would fear no foe in shining armour, whereas if he had no other weapon than a modern sword he might be excused for executing a strategic movement to the rear. Ardant du Picq stated in his book that in ancient times the rearmost ranks of the phalanx or the legion had to be composed of the best soldiers, owing to the strain on the nerves caused by the prolonged wait while the foremost ranks fought out their series of duels. The only useful deduction which can be drawn, it seems, from this practice for our present purpose is that in the next war all our best and bravest should be sent to the base and kept there as a sort of strategic reserve to be thrown in when all the cowards had been killed. But one is ready to wager that this will not be done—at least, not as a settled policy.

The value of these pseudo-scientific dissertations on the reaction of " human nature " to war are further invalidated by the fact that armies, like nations, are made up of individuals, who behave in accordance with their manifold characters and temperaments, in defiance of such theories as " mass impulse " and " the crowd-mind." The Emperor Napoleon I, when under hot fire at Lützen, sat his horse unflinchingly, calling out to his wavering conscripts—" Courage, children ; the bullet is not yet forged that can kill me." The conduct of that famous commander, the Duke of Plaza Toro, was very different :

" When to evade destruction's hand
To hide they all proceeded,
No soldier in that gallant band
Hid half as well as he did."

What is true of these eminent men is true of all ranks of every army. How can one say, then, that the history of past wars teaches

us " the immutable law of behaviour "—which is always changing—" of human nature "—which does not exist ? This so-called constant factor changes with all sorts of varying factors which influence and modify it ; and all collections of men such as armies, are made up of individuals who all act differently in accordance with their different natures.

In such a fluctuating tide of circumstances, he will be either over wise or over foolish who hopes to find any constancy, or any consistency, or who will venture to lay down laws for this ever-changing and uncharted sea.

It would seem that, as the result of our concentration on a study of the past—even if by good fortune it be only a very recent past—we lose something of that widened eager habit of ever looking towards the future, with which alone we as soldiers are concerned. It is on the stage of the coming years, not on that of the days dead and gone, that we shall have to play those fateful parts which may make or mar for generations the future of our country and of all that we hold dear. Let us therefore cast our minds not backward but forward ; let us cast our eyes far and wide throughout the world of science and invention to find and to utilize everything that can be turned to our purpose, rather than content ourselves with the fly-blown and outworn paraphernalia of war that was good enough for our grandfathers or even our fathers. No doubt we shall fumble and blunder at first amongst our latest acquisitions, but let us remember, while so doing, that it is not the new weapon, but our clumsy and 'prentice handling of it which is at fault, and turn a deaf ear to the voice of the dotard wearisomely iterating what happened at Ypres and Koniggrätz, at Agincourt or Thermopylæ. Let the dead past bury its own dead with their cuirasses and sabres, their round shot and their smooth bores. To the armies of this generation belong the happy future when wars will affect not nations but empires, not countries but continents ; when it will be no safer to be a civilian than to be a soldier, and when at the end of it all there shall lie not only officer and private, but generalissimo and prime minister, aye, not only men but women and children, " in one red burial blent."

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE "NEW MODEL" ARMY

SUGGESTIONS ON A PROGRESSIVE, BUT GRADUAL MECHANICALIZATION

BY CAPTAIN B. H. LIDDELL HART

So far as may be judged from the views expressed by the advocates and opponents of the mechanical warfare school, the point in dispute is not the ultimate probability of a mechanicalized army, but rather the time factor—the date at which its fulfilment is likely. The ardent military reformer absorbed with his vision of the ideal, is apt to overlook the practical difficulties in the way—both of design and finance. He is impatient of half measures, and wishes to see the ideal become a reality at once. The more conservative student of war, averse to staking our present security on a gamble in "futures," is as a natural consequence apt to enlarge on the practical problems in the way, to such a degree that perhaps he blinds himself to the ultimate goal. Difficulties, as the great captains have repeatedly told us, are made to be overcome, and there is always a danger that by undue concern with the risks of a new policy, we may fail to put our full energy into the task of overcoming them—and so find ourselves outstripped by a rival who has not lost sight of the end in his concern with the means.

Rome was not built in a day, nor will be the "new model" army. But since the history of the material world is a tale of the replacement of the human muscles by the machine, even the most obstinate reactionary cannot put back the hands of the clock of progress.

Civil developments in mechanical science have repeatedly and continuously influenced and altered the methods of warfare. The longbows of mediæval England had to give way to the musket; the "wooden walls" that were later our bulwark on the sea yielded to the ironclad; the sailing ship was replaced by the steamship, and swift victorious concentrations on land are no longer effected

as were Napoleon's "by the legs of his soldiers," but by the railway and the motor.

The replacement of muscle-power by machine-power is the cardinal fact in every department of material life, and it would be absurd to pretend that warfare can hold out against this tendency or remain "in splendid isolation."

But while we concede that the end is inevitable, we cannot be sure of the exact shape it will assume. The claims both of national economy and security warn us against revolutionary changes. We must advance gradually, aiming at a progressive increase in hitting power—the compound interest from greater mobility, concentration effect, and fire-power—without sacrificing any appreciable degree of our security.

While, as we have said, it is impossible to foretell the exact shape that the armaments of the future will take, it is both safer and wiser, in the light of history, to assume a development along existing lines, through the overcoming of technical difficulties already half solved, than to anticipate the employment of means yet undiscovered or untried, such as germs or electrical rays. Accepting the evolution of existing means as a rational basis for our speculations, any scheme of transition is still conditioned by the factor of financial stringency and the necessity of avoiding any leaps in the dark which might jeopardize our present degree of security.

It is proposed, therefore, to discuss the evolution of our Home organization in a series of bounds, involving progressively less detail as the stage becomes more remote in point of time. We are handicapped in some measure by the fact that the establishments of our post-war organization are still in a state of flux, and have not been finally settled—nor, it is to be hoped, are they likely to be, for progress is much more possible when even a temporary consolidation of organization has not yet taken place. Thus, such figures as are introduced in this article will be purely approximate, so that inaccuracies of detail shall not invalidate the general scheme of the proposals.

FIRST PERIOD

The evolution of our organization should step by step fulfil the law of economy of force and the three governing principles of hitting-power, mobility and security. Thus every step should tend to bring an improvement in speed and power of concentration, simplify cooperation and staff work, and, at least, not diminish

secrecy and protection. Moreover, we cannot—for some years to come—consider as possible an increase in the Army Estimates, and must ensure, therefore, that any fresh outlay is balanced by a corresponding cut in some branch shown by the test of the foregoing principles to be the least necessary and efficient for the probable conditions of a major war—that is, one in which our existence and not merely our local interests are at stake.

There are at present four divisions, which we may take as a basis for our evolution.

First Stage

The first step suggested is that the divisional transport should be mechanized. At this stage we must still depend on the railway for our main communications, and therefore the load-capacity of the actual vehicles must necessarily be restricted to the limits imposed by rail carriage. Even then the road space would be decreased by fully 20 per cent., the *personnel* equally, whilst speed would be multiplied three or four times as a minimum. A division could be equipped in the near future with a complete fleet of mechanical transport of the tractor type for an approximate outlay of £150,000, averaging £750 per lorry. These caterpillar or multi-wheeled vehicles would enable the road space and effective transportation speed to be increased still further owing to their high individual road speed as well as by their power of increasing frontage by movement off the road.

To balance this outlay, there would be the reduction in *personnel*, the disposal of horses and wagons, and the fact that maintenance costs are not incurred except when in use. Excluding the non-effective vote from consideration, at least £200,000 should be saved by these measures, leaving £400,000 to be met.

It would be for authority, after careful investigation, to decide whether this should be balanced by a reduction in the infantry, or in the cavalry and R.H.A. as seems suggested by the fact that the development of aircraft reconnaissance is generally conceded to have rendered obsolete the strategical advanced guard, with its large requirements in cavalry.

The slight decrease in fire-power resulting would be more than compensated by the large increase in absolute hitting-power due to the gain in speed and concentration, as well as the relatively greater indirect protection which the faster moving mechanical transport, and particularly the trackless variety, enjoys over horse-drawn transport.

But while modern war may be making the horse obsolescent for offensive action, the need for the cavalry spirit, with its imagination, and initiative, is more vital than ever—for the instant exploitation of opportunities is the key to success in battle to-day as of old.

Second Stage

The second step would spread the mechanicalization to the battalion transport. The battalion reserve of S.A.A., grenades and tools could be split up among the companies. Each company would have four cross-country tractors; in these would be carried its light automatics, S.A.A., grenades and tools, its cooker, rations and iron rations. Each tractor would be lightly protected over its vital parts by armour plating, and would draw a trailer, also lightly plated against splinters, one trailer for the men of each platoon. The headquarters wing would have one tractor for machine guns and their ammunition; one for signal equipment, medical stores and anti-aircraft light automatics; and one for supplies. As the rôle of machine guns in attack can be executed far more effectively by tanks, they would normally be reserved for holding the ground, and in attack would follow the advance at a discreet distance, arriving at the objective directly after it had been gained, and there dismounted. The water-carts would be replaced by water-tanks fixed in trailers.

The battalion would be moved in this manner until it reached its position of assembly, where the trailers would be detached, and the packs, blankets, and greatcoats deposited in them. The cooker tractor would also remain behind. The battalion would move forward from this point on foot, accompanied by the machine-gun and signal-medical tractors, and by four company tractors bearing their light automatics and S.A.A. At the position of deployment, or at any rate at the last possible moment, light automatics would be dismounted and taken over by their sections. During the attack each company would be followed by its ammunition tractor.

By this means the security of the battalion would be improved indirectly by the smaller and more mobile target it would offer to aircraft and artillery during the approach, as well as by the direct protection that it would enjoy. Its hitting-power would be increased by the facilities for ammunition supply, as well as by the freshness of the men. Its mobility would be multiplied during the approach by being carried, and during the attack owing to physical freshness and lightened load of equipment. The road-space occupied would

be reduced from over 800 yards to under 200 yards when halted, and, though roughly equal when in motion, the increase of space would be compensated by its quadrupled speed.

The initial outlay involved would be under £30,000 per battalion, taking an outside figure. This cost would be partly met by the complementary reduction in the *personnel* of the headquarter wing. Any deficit outstanding might be balanced by the disbandment of a few battalions, the loss of whose fire-power would be outweighed many times over by the aggregate gain in hitting-power through the increased speed and concentration power of the majority. It may be pointed out that the French have recently cut down 117 battalions, in order to increase the tank and aviation arms.

During the whole of this period a gradual reduction in infantry would be taking place, together with a proportionate increase in the Tank Corps.

Third Stage

The third stage might well be the complete mechanization of the Field Artillery, the majority tractor-drawn, but a proportion mounted permanently on caterpillar transporters, with collapsible armour-plated all-round protection. These "mobile" guns would gain immensely in mobility and concentration by rapidity of movement; could be camouflaged—so gaining secrecy of position when in static action; and would obtain direct protection for the gun crew during movement. Here, again, the initial outlay would be balanced by the reduction in drivers, horses and first-line transport, for they would carry their ammunition on the transporter. A necessary complement of this step, without which the increased radius of action could not be effective, would be the mechanization of the D.A.C. and all ammunition echelons as far back as railhead.

Fourth Stage

As a fourth step would come the replacement of the infantry trailers by better armoured caterpillar transporters, each carrying a platoon. The trailers might still be used for carrying the men of the platoons as far as the position of assembly—because they afford greater comfort than the transporters. The infantry platoons would be borne up to, and even beyond the position of deployment, passing through the artillery zone and disembarking the platoons under cover, where their deployment would be shielded

from machine gun and light automatic fire. The transporters would follow their respective platoons during the attack, supplying them with fresh ammunition and tools directly the objective had been gained—before withdrawing to a position under cover. By this period the rifle and light automatic would probably have been superseded by a light automatic-loading rifle, of no greater weight than the present magazine rifle.

The initial outlay to provide these caterpillar transporters should not come to more than £6,000 to £8,000 per company.

If financial stringency or pacifist economy still restricted so small an increase in the Estimates, the battalion might be reduced to three companies. In any case the continued expansion of the Tank Corps would probably dictate such a course. Augmented speed, concentration and protection during the opening phases of the infantry attack would result in an increase of actual hitting-power which would fully offset the reduction in effectives.

This change would complete the First Period of evolution.

Let us sketch the organization of a typical division of the new model. It will be observed that we have not made the tank part of the actual infantry battalion, as a good number of writers have advocated. The advantage of such a step lies in the fact that it facilitates cooperation—a very important factor. Our reason for refusing to adopt this measure lies in the speed of the tank. If the tank were still of the Medium C. or Mark V. composite pattern, the incorporation of the tank in the infantry battalion would be fully justified. But to tie the modern tank (which has already a maximum speed of 28 m.p.h. and an average speed across country of roughly 10 m.p.h.) to even the super-mobile battalion of foot which we have sketched, would infringe the paramount principle of war, and in fact of any other department of life, which is economy of force—of which cooperation is but a part. As well yoke a race horse to the plough. To sacrifice the speed potentialities of the tank by supplying a low-horse-powered slower-pattern tank to the infantry battalion would be the negation of hitting-power, surprise and security. What chance would such a tank, presenting a slow moving target, have against the hostile tanks or even against the anti-tank redoubts, with their armour-piercing guns or machine guns. No, the fighting tanks would be better divided into two echelons on the lines visualized by the French tacticians; a first echelon of heavy tanks, armed with an armour-piercing gun or light howitzer, to advance before the infantry deployment

and clear the way of hostile tanks and anti-tank forts ; and a second echelon of light tanks, armed with machine guns and possibly mortars, to be launched concurrently or just subsequent to the infantry deployment. The latter echelon, zigzagging and manœuvring, would coincide with the infantry advance, concentrating on the destruction of centres of resistance which trouble the infantry. The seizure of all opportunities afforded, rather than rigid combination with the tanks, would be the keynote of the infantry.

NEW MODEL DIVISION OF THE FIRST PERIOD *

1. Three Composite Brigades.

Each Brigade to comprise :—

One battalion of heavy tanks (3 companies each of 12 tanks ; primary armament, 1 18-pdr. gun or 4·5 howitzer ; secondary armament, 3 light automatics).

One battalion of medium tanks (3 companies each of 16 tanks ; armament, 1 3-pdr. and 5 light machine guns).

One brigade of mechanized artillery (2 batteries of 18-pdrs. ; 1 battery of 4·5 howitzers, 1 battery of 60-pdr. artillery tanks).

Three battalions of transporter-borne infantry (each of 3 companies of 4 platoons, each of 4 sections of riflemen ; 1 machine-gun platoon).

One transporter-borne signal company.

One mechanical workshop section (for " first aid ").

2. One independent battalion of pursuit tanks (3 companies, each of 16 tanks ; armament, 1 3-pdr. gun and 5 machine guns).

3. One squadron of divisional cavalry.

4. One field company R.E. (It is a moot point whether an increase might not be necessary.)

5. One tank bridging battalion.

6. One mechanical workshop battalion.

7. Divisional transport battalion.

(1 ammunition company	} caterpillar traction).
1 supply and baggage company	
3 field ambulances	

8. One battalion of gas projecting tanks. (If and when it is realized that a weapon is not barbarous just because it is novel.)

* The various headquarters, and auxiliary sources, such as sanitary section, traffic control, employment company, Provost staff and postal services, are not enumerated as their effect is negligible on the essential considerations of road space, man-power, and fire-power.

APPROXIMATE COMPARISONS

<i>Strength in personnel</i>	= under 60 per cent. of present division.
<i>Road space</i>	= 70-80 per cent. of present division.
<i>Speed</i>	= 3-4 times as great (minimum) as present division.
<i>Fire-Power</i>	= roughly $3\frac{1}{2}$ times the gun-power and 10 times the machine-gun power of the present division, exclusive of concentration increase.

SECOND PERIOD

Evolution will now become revolution. The tank is likely to swallow the infantryman, the field artilleryman, the engineer and the signaller, while mechanical cavalry will supersede the horseman. If the Services have not already been combined under a single Ministry of Defence, their amalgamation at this juncture is surely inevitable. The logical sequence of events points to the land, or rather over-land forces being composed principally of tanks and aircraft, with a small force of siege artillery, for the reduction and defence of the fortified tank and aircraft bases, and of mechanical-borne infantry for use as land-marines.

On land the railway will necessarily be abandoned in the zone of the armies, owing to its exposure to air attack.

While this will free the development of both the fighting and supply tanks from the tonnage and size limitations imposed by rail conveyance, no great increase is possible, because of the restricted load that road bridges can bear. Recent experience here and in America suggests that the tank-amphibian may some day be perfected, but the difficulty of building a shelving bank to enable it to get out of the water must limit its action.

Although land warfare will take on a close resemblance to sea fighting, it is improbable that we shall see land "Dreadnoughts." The obstacles and surface friction met with on land will impose a limitation on the size of land ships, as well as the consideration of damage to property, and the advisability of using the road systems so long as possible until in the neighbourhood of enemy forces. Roads provide a smoother surface and an already cleared and graduated path through and over obstacles, be they woods, hills, walls, houses or rivers. Even then the limits of height, length and width can be expanded to such a degree that we may expect to see

tanks carrying an armament similar to that of the medium artillery of to-day.

Tanks will probably crystallize into three main types : light and very fast scout tanks of, say, 6-8 tons, armed with machine guns and armoured over the vitals only ; fast cruiser tanks of about 20 tons, well-armoured and with an armour-piercing gun as primary armament ; heavy battle tanks of 35-50 tons, carrying one or more 60-pdrs. or 6-inch howitzers, sacrificing some degree of speed to gun-power and protection. Track improvement will alleviate the surface pressure.

To these will be added signal, workshop, bridging, supply tanks, etc.

A division of this period might comprise a battalion of scout tanks, a battalion of gas-projecting tanks, two brigades of cruiser tanks and a brigade of battle tanks, together with a train of 30-ton supply tanks. Several squadrons of aeroplanes would make up the division, consisting of long-range scouting aeroplanes and well-armed fighting aeroplanes for the protection of the tanks. Similarly, in the case of the air formations for long-range bombing and gas projecting, these would, if acting beyond the radius of their home or sea base, be provided with tank supply trains and tank escorts for the protection of their convoys and bases.

It may be presumed that the land forces would, after disembarking on the continent, move forward by a series of bounds, establishing behind them as they progressed a chain of fortified dépôts, garrisoned by siege artillery and tank marines. A proportion of tank marines would also probably accompany each tank battalion in special armed transporter tanks. These would be used as "landing" parties to clear land fortifications and hill defences under cover of the fire from the tank fleet.

THE TRAINING OF THE "NEW MODEL"

In discussing the subject of training it is essential on the one hand to avoid general detail, the value of which, under such altered conditions, must be purely speculative, and on the other hand to shun platitudes which are of no practical value. Our actual methods of training to-day when conscientiously applied by commanders and instructors, have reached so high a standard that improvement can only come in the two extremes of principle and detail.

To lay down a complete system would involve an unnecessary repetition of much that is to be found in the textbooks. Instead,

it is proposed merely to touch upon certain avenues of development suggested by reflection on the unchanging principles of war.

Economy of Force.—If one lesson stands out above all others from our study, it is that simplicity is the keynote of the military evolution outlined; that from the complexity of existing weapons and arms we shall gradually evolve, first, an army in which the weapons of each arm are reduced in variety, and then the arms themselves, until finally we have an army of tanks and aircraft. Unity of organization demands unity of training; we cannot hope for a thoroughly trained mechanical army until we cease to expect isolated detachments of isolated arms to become efficient for combined operation in war.

During the training season, each new model division should be concentrated in some large area where combined training and frequent battle practice can be carried out. Salisbury Plain, though not ideal, is the only existing training area which might serve. Another should soon be possible at Catterick. Wales could provide one or two, the neighbourhood of Llanfyllin, in the north, and of Llandovery, in the south, being examples. These areas would provide every form of terrain.

To ensure that each division has full advantage of the varying conditions in each area, the divisions would spend the training season in a different area each year. With the development of mechanical movement, two areas might be visited by each division—the complete moves being made by road, so saving the cost of rail transport.

A further suggestion under the heading of economy of force is an increase in the Territorial Army establishment of officers and non-commissioned officers, and a greater concentration on the training of these leaders to form a cadre for expansion in time of national emergency—the cost, if necessary, being offset by a reduction of the infantry rank and file who could be intensively trained in numbers on mobilization. In the technical and mechanical branches, which will increase with the progressive mechanicalization of the Army, there is, however, need to tap the civilian reservoirs of skilled tradesmen. These would in many cases as recruits find themselves with a basis of knowledge which would render them fit to fill their rôle in the war-machine even after a spare-time training.

Cooperation.—The essential unity of training, the need for which was emphasized above, would appear to demand the creation of a combined junior commanders' school. At this school the

young officer and non-commissioned officer would learn the elements of combined tactics, the methods and necessity for close cooperation in battle, and gain an appreciation of the qualities of other arms, thereby quenching early any tendency to develop a narrow outlook.

At the same time Woolwich and Sandhurst might be merged in a single Military College, at which the cadet straight from school should learn the groundwork of soldiering and develop and broaden his intellect along military, scientific and historical lines. Under present conditions, while at the most plastic age, he passes from the comparatively narrow mental channels of school life direct to the technical grooves of Woolwich and Sandhurst, the result being, in a number of cases, that he tends to become in intellect and outlook a representative and partisan of one particular arm before he has even become a soldier. One of the greatest dangers with which every profession is faced is the loss of mental elasticity by those who give up their lives to its service.

While we are producing technical experts from our Military Colleges, we should not lose sight of the fact that man is master of the machine, and that the power of leadership is as important as technical qualifications. But whereas we instructed our budding leader in every other branch of military knowledge, in the past we neglected to help him to develop those powers of leadership which are often latent in the most unpromising material. Although a considerable advance has been made in this direction, there are still channels which might be worth exploring.

We cannot rely solely on his public school experience and natural intuition to teach the young officer how to get the best out of his men. Incidentally, it may be pointed out that the boy has hitherto gone into the Army at an earlier age than to Oxford or Cambridge, and so in many cases never attained to prefectorial responsibilities. For the boy who develops late, a little guidance in the art of leadership might often suffice to bring out his capacity while still a cadet, and so preserve for the benefit of the Service many a career of great possibilities which at present comes to an untimely end.

The rudiments of psychology should, it is therefore suggested, form part of the curriculum of the military cadet, together with a more advanced course for the young officer at the Junior Commanders' School.

Surprise.—In past centuries the scientific development in weapons was so slow and the military hierarchy so conservative that comparatively few wars have been determined by the possession

by one side of a superior weapon. But the majority of wars have been decided by some new development in the science of war, most frequently in means of movement or tactics. Philip's Macedonian phalanx, Hannibal's tactics of surprise, Nero's use of interior lines, resulting in the Metaurus victory, Cæsar's use of a reserve, the English longbow of Crécy and Poitiers, Cromwell's Ironsides, Marlborough's development of manœuvre, Frederick's oblique order, Napoleon's *bataillon carré* and swift concentrations, Moore's light infantry, Wellington's defensive-offensive tactics and line formation, Moltke's staff system are but a few examples of how the instrument forged, or the tactics thought out, in peace have decided the fate of nations.

As changes in weapons now succeed each other so rapidly, the task of assimilating the lessons which they bring with them becomes more and more difficult. Yet the nation whose military advisers grasp most quickly the truth behind every new development has an advantage which grows more decisive with the increasingly greater effect of each successive new weapon.

The very zenith of surprise is to obtain one at the outset of a war. Research, accordingly, becomes a matter of the most vital importance to the security of a nation. An expansion of technical research and design establishments is a need so urgent as to brook no delay.

But to possess a new weapon is of little value unless we also know how to exploit its advantages to the utmost when we use it. Because of the failure to ensure that progress in tactics kept pace with progress in weapons, the Germans threw away their chance of decisive surprise on the introduction of gas, and we were similarly at fault with the tank. It would seem essential, therefore, that a tactical research department should be created to work in close cooperation with the technical branch. At the same time, we need to maintain an experimental formation, commanded and staffed by the pick of our military talent and assured of continuity of composition, in order to test out practically the application to the troops of new tactical and technical ideas.

The principle of mobility indicates that training should be directed to develop an efficient man and an efficient unit in the least possible time. The idea that it took seven years to produce a trained soldier was surely dissipated by the experience of the last war. It is not suggested that the uncut stone was polished to its highest possible pitch of brilliancy at the end of the intensive training courses during the war, nor that the finished article was

even efficient for the varied conditions of war for which the British Army is normally expected to be prepared. Nevertheless, a mean is surely possible.

One truth at least the war proved : that the more the recruit's intelligence had been educated and developed beforehand, the quicker he could be trained. The more mechanical an army as a whole becomes, the more emphasis this lesson will receive. It is suggested, therefore, that on joining his *dépôt*, a considerably increased portion of the recruit's time should be devoted to education, both general and mechanical. This education should not, however, be divorced from the man's military life. Every problem set and every subject studied should bear on his military training, so that almost unconsciously he is absorbing and developing the elements of his military work.

Our next suggestion towards speed and efficiency of training is that the manuals should be divided into standards, just as the school textbooks are graduated. Manuals such as the present F.S.R. are in many ways excellent for senior officers, although a comparison with the French suggests that there is still room for improvement in clearness and classification of matter. But the normal junior officer is apt to shun the manuals. How often does one hear the confession made, as if it were a source of pride, that the speaker never reads a military manual or book. Yet the manuals should be an epitome of military wisdom, and a "pillar of fire by night" to the aspiring junior leader. Is it not probable that the trouble is partly due to the manner of presentation? Quality, not quantity, should be the motto of their compilers, with whom, however, the fault does not always lie. It would greatly help if the authorities withdrew their veto on any breaking away from General Staff language. A clear and definite tone should replace vagueness and reservations; metaphor, word picture and sketch should lighten the path of the leader; the impersonal "it will be done" might be substituted by the more vivid "You will do this." By the ruthless "axing" of repeated reservations and superfluous details, the manuals should be made as short as they could be simple to understand. A small octavo page and larger print would also inspire the subaltern with more desire to study them.

EPILOGUE

In conclusion, let it be reaffirmed that the note which rings throughout this article is that of all qualities in war it is speed which is dominant, speed both of mind and movement, without which

hitting-power is valueless and with which it is multiplied, as the greatest of all commanders realized in his dictum that force in war is mass, or as we should better interpret it under modern conditions—fire-power, multiplied by speed. This speed, only to be obtained by the full development of scientific inventions, will transform the battlefields of the future from squalid trench labyrinths into arenas wherein manœuvre, the essence of surprise, will reign again after hibernating for too long within the mausoleums of mud. Then only can the art of war, temporarily paralyzed by the grip of trench warfare conditions, come into its own once more. History, even recent history in the more open theatres of war such as Palestine, shows us that as a race we need not fear the result if skill in leadership is liberated from these fettering conditions.

THE FUTURE OF INTELLIGENCE IN THE ARMY

BY CAPTAIN AND BREVET-MAJOR B. C. DENING, M.C., R.E.

FIVE years have now elapsed since the Great War came to an end, and there has been time for the Army to shake itself clear of the organization especially created for that war. It is possible to-day to see the Army in its new form and to detect the lines on which it is intended to develop, and, therefore, to examine the important matter of Intelligence and to speculate on what its future organization may be.

In order to understand better the position to-day, a glance at the history of Intelligence in the British Army is not out of place.

A permanent Military Intelligence Section was first started about 1874, some fifty years ago, when a group of officers was appointed under the Q.-M.-G. to collect information in the War Office. This section, which was subsequently brought over to the General Staff, has remained in the War Office ever since. The first attempt at an Intelligence organization outside the War Office on any appreciable scale was made in the South African War. In that war an Intelligence Corps was formed with the specific duties of reconnaissance with advanced troops, examination of persons and documents, secret service and contre-espionage work. The experiences gained were embodied in a short official pamphlet. After that war, however, the organization of Intelligence outside the War Office was not seriously considered until the outbreak of the Great War. The extent to which modern war requires Intelligence, an inkling of which was obtained in the South African and Russo-Japanese campaigns, was not sufficiently appreciated by any of the combatants before 1914. It was not possible to foresee that by the end of the Great War we should be using twenty Intelligence officers in each division.

In August, 1914, an Intelligence Corps was hastily created. It was mainly composed of civilians, especially engaged on account of their knowledge of French and German. This Corps went

overseas almost at once. Its members carried out most valuable work, but were handicapped, at first, by a lack of knowledge of the Army and its methods.

In the course of the war, the British Intelligence was worked up into a state of great efficiency. With the use of aeroplanes and wireless on a large scale, with the advent of sound-ranging and flash-spotting, and with the conditions inseparable from position warfare, fresh fields were opened to Intelligence and a large expansion of the Corps was necessary. In many directions the obtaining of information was reduced to a fine art and the British Intelligence Service was, in 1918, quite the equal of any other.

When the war ended, the Intelligence Corps was disbanded, staff and regimental officers employed in it returning to other duties. The School of Intelligence, created during the war for the teaching of Intelligence officers, was broken up. The great organization brought into existence in the war ceased to be. But it had been amply proved that the requirements of a first-class Intelligence Service are: (a) skilled officers at the head to make the correct deductions; and (b) ample sources from which to supply the information required.

Let us now look, therefore, at the prospects of Intelligence in the Army from the point of view of these requirements.

(a) THE GENERAL STAFF

The skilled officers at the head of any future Intelligence organization will be found from the General Staff. If the supply of such officers trained in peace is sufficient to fill all General Staff appointments in war, the requirement in skilled senior officers would appear to be met. It is open to question, however, whether enough trained staff officers will be available to fill all appointments in a big war, when the Army may be expanded to ten or twenty times its present size. If there are not, junior officers will have to be found from the Regular and Territorial Armies to fill the gaps, and the training of these officers in peace is one matter for consideration. It must never be overlooked that Intelligence is just as much the concern of every General Staff officer as Operations, and that every General Staff officer should be as competent to fill an Intelligence appointment as an Operations one. In the last war there was often a tendency for "O" and "I" to run separate courses, with separate offices and specialized officers in each, resulting in an inevitable loss of efficiency. Thus the information available in

the "I" branch was not always the first factor considered by "O" in forming a plan. Similarly, the practical value to "O" of any information gained was not always the first thought of "I" in its search for information. "I" sometimes became rather academic in its studies, a fact directly attributable to a lack of contact with the practical side of "O." Excellent examples of the working of a General Staff which utilized its Intelligence section in close cooperation with its Operations section are to be found in Ludendorff's conduct of his offensive campaign on the Western Front in March, April and May, 1918. Before launching his great attack, Ludendorff's "I" informed his "O" of the weak spot in the Allied line, the junction between the French and British, and of the weak and extended state of General Gough's divisions. In the next German operation, the Lys offensive, the work of "I" is discernible in the focussing of the initial attack on the weak Portuguese front.

In the third attack, in May, on the Chemin des Dames, the selection for operations by the German "I" branch of the front held by the tired and decimated British divisions, placed there to rest after heavy fighting in the north, was most noticeable.

(b) THE SOURCES OF INFORMATION

In modern warfare information is rarely, as is sometimes supposed, obtained in a big or conclusive form. The days in which the spy could produce first hand the plans of the enemy's commander are gone. Where civilized nations are concerned, contre-espionage methods have been developed to such an extent that agents usually cannot obtain direct information in sufficient time to be of value, and rarely can any of the other sources of information touched on below give news that can be described as "big." The big conclusions upon which the General Staff can act are more often based on information supplied in scraps. It is exceedingly difficult to prevent scraps of information reaching an enemy. Conversely, there are always scraps of information available to us. The true test of an Intelligence Service is its ability to collect innumerable scraps and to piece them together into a mosaic from which it should be possible to fix the location, to ascertain the rôle and to predict the probable move of each hostile formation.

These scraps are obtained from the following sources, to which no doubt in the future scientific discoveries may add others: statements of prisoners, deserters, civilians and agents; captured

documents ; hostile and neutral press ; censorship ; intercepted wireless, telegraph and telephone messages ; ground reconnaissance ; reports of troops in contact with the enemy ; air observation and aeroplane photographs.

Intelligence thus made available cannot be utilized to the best advantage unless the General Staff is alive to the relative importance of the various sources of information. There must also be an efficient organization for the coordination and comparison of all the scraps of news which are received. A sufficient supply of trained junior officers, therefore, should be available for Intelligence work from the beginning of a campaign.

The last war proved that two types of officer are required, which, for want of better terms, may be described as the " military " type and the " civilian " type.

The " military " type is that which will fill the appointments of Intelligence officers with divisional artillery, cavalry brigades and regiments, and infantry brigades and battalions. This type will be principally concerned with obtaining information from ground reconnaissance and from troops in contact with the enemy. It is possibly not realized to what an extent the information from these sources does assist the General Staff. The " military " Intelligence officers will be required to have a general knowledge of what has been obtained from other sources of information, particularly from air observation and air photographs, in order to extract and to apply such of it as can help their unit or formation in attack and defence. In fact, as regards the reading of air photographs a " military " Intelligence officer should be an expert. He will be responsible to his commanding officer that the security measures—the measures ordered by the Higher Command for the prevention of leakage of information to the enemy—are observed by his unit or formation.

In regiments and battalions, these officers will be in charge of the scouts and it will be their duty to initiate special patrols. It can be seen from the nature of their duties that these Intelligence officers cannot be civilians, brought into the Intelligence Service on the outbreak of war, but that they must be soldiers, and must form an integral part of the unit with which they serve in war. On the basis of one officer per divisional artillery, artillery brigade, infantry brigade and battalion, nineteen such officers are required for an infantry division.

The " civilian " Intelligence officers, in every way as important as the " military," have rather different duties to perform. They

are concerned with tasks in which either language or technical qualifications are necessary, qualifications which sufficient Army officers do not possess. They will examine prisoners, deserters and civilians, translate documents, read the neutral and hostile press, carry out censorship and secret service duties, or apply their scientific knowledge to the intercepting and the deciphering of the enemy's wireless, telegraph and telephone messages. They will be required in large numbers. For a force of one cavalry division and six infantry divisions on present establishments, eighty-two such officers would be required. Though civilians to begin with, the greater their knowledge of the Army and its methods, the greater will their value be.

In our Army of the future, how can provision be made for these Intelligence officers ?

A permanent Intelligence Corps for peace and war has little to recommend it. It would prove an additional expense. As far as the "military" type is concerned, the officers can render better service by being, in peace and war, on the establishments of units and formations. Thus the Army itself will have to provide the "military" Intelligence officers

The "civilian" type, it is clear, will be enrolled on the outbreak of war. For purposes of rapid training, organization and administration, these officers are best formed then into a separate Intelligence Corps. The idea, however, that they consequently belong to a different Service to the "military" type is to be deprecated, and for the same reason, in the opinion of the writer, the marking, in the late war, of the one type with green tabs and not the other, was a mistake, for it tended to belittle the importance of the "military" type.

There are of course many civilians with the necessary qualifications to fill this Intelligence Corps in war. The difficulty is that they will probably be lacking in military knowledge when they join the Army, and yet may be expected to take their place in the field at once and to form part of a delicate military machine.

Experience in the late war, as has already been pointed out, proves that the raw material wherewith to form an Intelligence organization in the field will be available in the next war, but what does appear to be lacking at the present time is any organization or training system in time of peace to make the best use of this material should the occasion arise.

There are no appointments in time of peace for "military" Intelligence officers. If it is not possible for reasons of economy

to provide such appointments, it should yet be possible to train the officers destined to fill them.

As regards the "civilian" type, the demobilized Intelligence officers of the late war form a reserve for the present, but this reserve will dwindle with time. Further, if we are engaged in the next war against a Power other than Germany, say Russia, most of the reserve officers will have no value, having no knowledge of the Russian language. The difficulty of maintaining a list of civilians with language qualifications to meet each different Power should not be great. But there is a difficulty in devising a method of training such persons for the tasks they will have to undertake in war.

Admitted that training is necessary for the "military" and "civilian" types, what should be the method of training? Before the war, both at home and abroad, short Intelligence courses for junior officers were held under arrangements made by Commands. Apparently it is intended that this practice should be resumed. But is this desirable? Surely such a system would result in a divergency of instruction in the different Commands. It may be compared, perhaps, with instruction in machine-gunnery being given to the Army by arrangements made by Commands. The latter suggestion could not be entertained for a moment.

The solution to the problem, in the opinion of the writer, would be the reestablishment of an Intelligence School. In no other way does it appear possible to ensure any uniformity of training throughout the Army. If there were a permanent school of Intelligence, records could be kept and the subject continuously studied. The lessons learnt in the late war would not be lost with the passage of time, while the methods of Intelligence could be kept up to date with the new developments of science as they affected the conduct of war. The instructors would of course have to be carefully chosen, and, in addition to their work at the school, they could lecture at the Staff College and other centres of military study, thus maintaining that general interest in Intelligence work which is essential if it is to be of any practical value to the Army.

The school could be conducted by quite a small staff—possibly a commandant and two other instructors would be sufficient—and could be run at a comparatively small cost in some existing military station. By means of a suitable arrangement of courses the main principles of Intelligence and its practical value in warfare could be made clear to students. Regimental officers, who might be required to serve on the General Staff in the event of a great war, could thus be given some training in this important branch of staff work.

If the "civilian" Intelligence officers, who would be required on the outbreak of war, could be drawn mainly from the Territorial Army, it would be possible for them also to attend the courses at the school, and the problem of teaching these officers their duties and the methods of the Army would be considerably simplified.

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By the end of the last war, the Army generally had come to appreciate the fact that Intelligence was not only a question for the experts, but was the concern of every officer and man. It came to be realized that, down to the smallest unit, the section, the question of good or bad Intelligence was a matter of vital importance. In mounting our big surprise attacks towards the end of 1918, every man had to play his part in defeating the enemy's Intelligence. There is a danger, with the percentage of Great War officers in our Army becoming daily smaller and smaller, that these facts will not be remembered much longer.

It is sincerely to be hoped that the general interest in Intelligence will not be allowed to sink to the level of before the war. There have been many recent developments in the conduct of war, and the future is pregnant with more. If we do not keep pace with these developments, in our next big war we shall fail to deceive our enemies and be, perhaps, deceived ourselves—the penalty will be paid in lives.

MILITARY TRAINING IN THE JUNIOR DIVISION OF THE OFFICERS TRAINING CORPS

BY MAJOR E. E. A. WHITWORTH, M.C., Commanding Rugby School Officers Training Corps

THE ultimate object of military training in a school contingent is the creation of potential platoon commanders for the future.

The percentage of cadets who will adopt the Regular Army as their profession or take Commissions in the Territorial Army is very small, and for the remainder there is no immediate objective for which military training appears a necessity. The vast majority of cadets at present serving will in fact never be called upon to act in the capacity of platoon commanders, except in the event of war on a scale, which will make a greater demand on the manhood of the nation, than can be met by the Regular and Territorial Armies and their Reserve of Officers. All hope, and many believe, that the present generation will be spared such an experience; yet even if this proves to be the case the time spent in military training at school will not have been wasted. Many are the lessons taught in a school contingent of equal value to the contemporary life of the school and to the future of the individual, whatever career he may subsequently adopt. The responsibility of power to control others and the achievement of success by winning their confidence and loyal cooperation, are learnt in some degree by every platoon and section commander who understands his work. An unselfish ideal of public service is presented to all in the opportunity of throwing heart and soul into work, not as attractive or as interesting as other school activities, from a sense of duty to the society which the contingent represents; an ideal not lived up to by all, for although there are in every school some with excellent reasons for not joining the contingent, there are also others whose unwillingness to join, or early resignation, are solely due to selfish individualistic motives. The Public is desperately ignorant of the work of the Officers Training Corps, but, if the military necessity for such an organization ceased to exist, there are many

who would regret its abolition for such reasons as these, supported by the ill-defined feeling of the majority of parents that it is good for the boys.

Others, however, claim that there is nothing of real educational value, secured by military training, which cannot be developed by other means ; these would regard the disappearance of the O.T.C. from the life of a public school as definitely progressive, once it is admitted to be no longer a military necessity. Such a point of view must be vigorously contested, but in doing so it must be admitted that the *raison d'être* for the expenditure of public money on military training is for the military purpose of creating the potential platoon commander. By this means a second line to the Regular and Territorial Reserve of Officers is being brought into existence, from material that has been proved unequalled in value for this purpose ; this will remain a national necessity at least until the ideal of a brotherhood of nations, with a guarantee of national security through a League of Nations, whose organization is stronger than nationality itself, has become a practical proposition.

The object of this article is to consider some aspects of military training in the junior division of the O.T.C., omitting, though recognizing, its educational value.

In military training the personal influence of the instructor is of vital importance. Schoolmasters should make good instructors, and the training of contingents has always been in the hands of men who are schoolmasters first and soldiers only in a second degree. Exceptions are few : Eton has an adjutant from the Regular Army, probably owing to the fact that no schoolmaster could undertake the command of a contingent of such strength without this assistance. Cheltenham and Wellington have commanding officers from the Reserve of Officers. For financial reasons alone it is not likely that such exceptions will increase in number ; the additional expense involved in the employment of Regular Officers is borne by school authorities no grant being made from public funds. In a few cases also a grant is made by the Governing Body to the schoolmaster in command of a contingent for his military work, but the principle on which the O.T.C. has developed and flourished is that this work of the schoolmaster officer is a labour of love and of genuine enthusiasm. No remuneration is received or expected, except pay, granted by the War Office for the annual training in camp or on courses of instruction which are held in school holidays. In taking a Commission the school-

master must be drawn by two motives : he believes in the military value of the work to the country, and through the work he sees a glorious opportunity of widening his opportunities as a schoolmaster. He must honour the profession of soldier and schoolmaster alike. He must belong to the type of schoolmaster, who recognizes that his work is not finished in the schoolroom, but that in out of school hours it is his privilege to contribute in whatever way he can to the life of the school. So long as this ideal is suggested by headmasters in their appointments and is recognized by the whole of the staff, there will be no lack of schoolmasters of the right type to carry on the work and traditions of the O.T.C.

At the present time contingents are fortunate in having a large number of officers and a very high percentage of commanding officers, who have had the privilege and experience of soldiering on active service ; this is only a temporary phase. The future rests with the schoolmasters now joining under the same conditions as their predecessors, whose work was tested in 1914 and not found wanting.

Sound organization is the basis of all good military training and all non-commissioned officers in a contingent must be instructed in its importance and use. To have worked as a platoon or section commander in a well-organized contingent, where the system known as the chain of command is consistently employed, will have far more permanent value than the detailed knowledge of drill movements or of musketry, necessary as these are at the time.

The strength of the platoon, which is the unit of supreme importance, must be partly determined by local conditions, and partly by military considerations. If the school organization by houses or dormitories can be applied to the platoons of a contingent, whether the house or dormitory is represented by one or more platoons, an invaluable motive power for creating the *esprit de corps* of the platoon is secured. A platoon without genuine *esprit de corps* is as ineffective in a contingent as in a battalion ; yet in view of the very limited time available for military training in schools, it is extremely difficult to secure this spirit in an organization, which has little significance apart from its appearance on parade once or twice a week as the case may be, and not always in uniform. Moreover, the *esprit de corps* which is developed in a battalion through the personality of the subaltern and his wholehearted interest in the welfare of his men when they are off parade, is not possible in the same degree in a contingent whose platoons are commanded by cadet officers or non-commissioned officers whose

activities as such are limited almost entirely to parade work. The creation of platoon *esprit de corps* must be the basis of a contingent organization : this secured, careful attention must be paid to the strength of platoons. The ideal strength is midway between 28 the battle strength, and 35 the normal strength of a platoon as laid down in the War Establishment of an infantry battalion. If platoons are larger, a great loss is involved in that the percentage of cadets in a contingent who benefit by their training as platoon commanders, platoon sergeants or section commanders is greatly reduced, and the platoon is too large for tactical training, especially on Field Days. If, on the other hand, platoons are organized according to battle strength, they are inconveniently small for purposes of close order drill, which must form a large percentage of work done in a contingent : and although all platoons are now organized with rifle and Lewis-gun sections, the guns can only be carried on parade for tactical work.

Platoons should always be commanded by cadets, whether as under officers or non-commissioned officers ; whatever the size of the contingent, the standard of efficiency should be such as to produce a permanent supply of cadets capable of commanding all platoons. In some contingents under officers are promoted to command companies, but it is a policy only to be used with extreme caution. The training of platoon and section commanders in a company commanded by an officer of experience is bound to be more valuable than in a company commanded by an under officer of really the same rank and standing as his platoon commanders. Many under officers can command a company on parade in company drill, and all should be given an opportunity to do so ; but to launch a company on a Field Day entirely under the control of cadets is often to court disaster, and is a reason why many Field Days are pure waste of money and time. From the point of view also of training the commissioned officers, it is essential to give them commands for which they are responsible ; to be constantly in the position of technical adviser to the cadet in command is demoralizing and tends to slackness, while the chain of command from the commanding officer to the cadet as platoon commander, is greatly strengthened by the inclusion of the commissioned officer as the connecting link.

Yet the training in organization, valuable alike from the civil and military point of view, in that it involves decentralization of responsibility combined with supervision which secures efficiency, is often sacrificed through the mistake of carrying to a ludicrous

extreme the meaning of the term "O.T.C." or through the desire to make the boast, which may impress some inspecting officers or distinguished visitors on Field Days, that the parade or operations are entirely under the control of the boys.

Great as is the variety in different schools as regards the time available and the facilities for military training during the school terms, two aspects of the work of the O.T.C. are common to all, Field Days and the Annual Training in camp.

Field Days.—To the outside world, to many with an intimate knowledge of the O.T.C. and it must be admitted with regret, to many cadets and ex-cadets as well, Field Days are nothing more than glorified picnics. The complete break which is afforded by these days in school routine is naturally hailed with delight by the contingent, while for the small proportion of the school left behind the work cannot be of a very serious nature ; most welcome of all are these days to those of the staff who find themselves left with a whole holiday for two rounds of golf, or at the worst with one period in school, and who greet their soldier colleagues the next morning as if they too had been engaged in what was nothing more than "a jolly good day," neither more instructive or more strenuous than their own particular form of amusement.

If Field Days are merely holidays or picnics, the sooner they are abandoned the better, for military efficiency and discipline will be weakened, and the waste of a large amount of money will be involved. For such days are one of the most expensive items in the annual expenditure of the contingent, as the following figures illustrate, showing the expense of one of these days held in an area 24 miles away from the school :—

			£	s.	d.
Railway fares for 7 officers and 353 cadets	44	13	0
Expenditure of blank ammunition	20	0	0
Tea	19	15	0
Total excluding small incidental expenses	84	0	0

Such expenditure is only justifiable if Field Days are made, as they undoubtedly can be, instructive as well as enjoyable. Granted a reasonable standard of efficiency within the contingent, their value depends on the special preparation and preliminary instruction given for each day, and on the control exercised during operations.

A good area and scheme are the first essentials. Except in the case of fortunate schools within reach of government ground, the O.T.C. is dependent for its areas on the goodwill of the landowner and tenant farmer, which can only be secured by a friendly liaison

between the commanding officer and the farmers in the neighbourhood. The number of troops employed must be in proportion to the size of the area, and early disaster is certain if the ground is too limited for the numbers engaged. The waste of energy, of opportunity for tactical instruction and of ammunition, all of which are so frequently experienced, are nearly always due to congestion of troops. The success of a Field Day depends on how long the opposing sides can be kept apart, and prevented from becoming too closely engaged, if possible by natural means owing to the development of the operations, if not by blowing a "stand fast." Two platoons or two sides searching for each other within an area of reasonable size is always instructive, giving ample scope for training of scouts, map reading, selection of positions, sending back written information, maintenance of organization through platoon, company and contingent headquarters. Two platoons or worse still two sides at close quarters, eager to charge each other regardless of tactical considerations, is a scene of confusion and chaos, sometimes feebly excused on the ground that the boys like it, which they do not in a contingent where non-commissioned officers have been trained to regard a Field Day as a reasonable tactical exercise. Such a situation may be inevitable at the end of a day's operation, or even justifiable as the only means of rewarding a platoon or company, whose commander has made a plan, which has been well executed by his unit, so long as the umpire is there to see that success is given to the side which has earned it. Yet it remains true that the most instructive part of operations is before close contact is obtained, and the first essential for this is ample ground for manœuvre.

That the success of a Field Day depends on a sound and reasonable scheme is obvious ; yet it is often not realized that more important than the contents of the scheme, is the fact that it must be thoroughly explained before operations begin. The ideal method is to assemble the whole contingent on the evening before the Field Day and to throw on a screen by magic lantern a map of the area. An explanation should then be given of the tactical features of the ground, the story leading up to the position at zero, the task of each company, and the position of each platoon at zero ; it is only by such means that the Field Day can be made really intelligible to every cadet in the ranks, who will have something to look for the moment he enters the area. If this method is not possible, a conference must be held before operations between officers and all non-commissioned officers down to section com-

manders, where the same information would be given ; at this conference all non-commissioned officers will be issued with a sketch map of the area on a fairly large scale, preferably six inches to the mile. On this map he will mark company and platoon frontages in the attack, or areas in the defence, inter-dividing lines, headquarters, etc., and by constant reference to it during operations he will be enabled to send back valuable written information to platoon or company headquarters as the case may be. A reason why Field Days in camp, especially the brigade Field Day which generally terminates the training, though very instructive for commissioned officers of the O.T.C. in command of battalions or companies, fails from the point of view of the cadet non-commissioned officer, is the fact that facilities do not exist for the reproduction of sufficient maps without which operations are not intelligible, and adequate preliminary instruction cannot be given.

On reaching the area ample time must be allowed from the arrival at the rendezvous until the opening of operations ; this part of the day's work, which can be made most instructive, often scarcely exists, or owing to bad staff work is hurried through. The deployment of a contingent for the attack is too often a bolt into the blue from the rendezvous where lunch has been hurriedly eaten, and the taking up of a defensive position is too often the haphazard collection of units in long lines, regardless of defence of areas in depth. If a Field Day is to be instructive there must be an interval of at least one hour between the arrival of a contingent at the rendezvous and zero hour. If the contingent is taking up a defensive position or fighting a rear-guard action, this interval is a unique opportunity for the commanding officer, if mounted, to go round all the positions. He should hold a friendly conference of a few minutes with every platoon commander, discussing with them their tactical plans, and making alterations if any of their dispositions are really unsound. Time also should be available for him to question section commanders, and even men in the ranks, to see if the scheme is really understood, and that the necessary information has filtered down to the cadet private through his section commander. Meanwhile, the platoon commander should have sent back a written report that his platoon is in position, communication established with both flanks, enclosing a sketch map of his dispositions : the arrival of these reports at headquarters will also be a proof that the organization is sound, and that company and platoon headquarters have been properly established. This interval before zero hour is equally important in the attack if chaos is to be avoided ; for Field Days

would be infinitely more profitable, if operations from zero hour were limited to two hours instead of three, and the hour saved devoted to a complete overhaul by contingent and company commanders before operations begin.

After zero hour the problem of control becomes more difficult ; it is only possible at all if the commanding officer takes up his position at headquarters and remains there. If he finds himself occupied with a continuous stream of written messages coming in through company commanders who have received them from platoon commanders, he will feel that his contingent is taking part in a battle and not in a picnic, an impression he will never have, still less suggest to anyone else, if he rides about the front line encouraging the boys ! The examination of written information after the battle is the best proof of intelligible operations.

The development of the situation after zero is controlled by the umpires, whose rôle is a very difficult one. If mounted an umpire should be able to get into touch with the platoon or company commanders immediately opposing each other : if the plan of the attacking unit is inadequate in view of the strength of the defence, or if a good plan is spoilt by bad execution, the attack must be held up. Public school boys do not like being put out of action, but if, as is so often the case, an advance is made regardless of the enemy's fire, umpires must be ruthless. The tragedy of nearly every Field Day from the instructive point of view is not lack of energy, but misdirected energy. The small boy, after a three miles' march with a Service rifle, will still gamely double if necessary till the end of the day ; but Field Days will never be as instructive from the tactical point of view as they should be, until all contingents of the O.T.C. learn that energy alone will not win battles, but only energy which is directed by the intelligent control of platoon and section commanders.

Tactical instruction must not, however, be regarded as the only criterion of success : if it is, many Field Days will appear disappointing to those who are responsible for the scheme, and the administrative arrangements. An inspecting officer could have an excellent opportunity of testing the general efficiency of a contingent by being present at one of these days from the morning parade until the contingent is dismissed on the return home in the evening. The day's work should begin with the inspection of the contingent by company commanders or part of it by the commanding officer. The occasion of meeting other schools should be the opportunity of demanding a higher standard of turn-out than is probably

demanded on a weekly parade. There should be no hesitation in leaving behind a cadet who has made no attempt to clean his buttons : it may be due to slackness of the platoon commander in the conception of his duty in looking after his men, or it may be that the cadet has not learned to distinguish between picnics and manœuvres ; in any case the best guarantee that Field Days should be seriously regarded is that at the commencement of the day a standard of turn-out should be exacted, as for a ceremonial parade. There is room for a great improvement in this respect, for the sight is not uncommon at a Public School field day, of a cadet with hair hanging over his collar, a coloured handkerchief round his neck, equipment thrown on and dirty buttons. Failing in any one of these matters should be regarded as a crime of the same seriousness as the case of the professional soldier who parades for guard duties, unshaven and with a dirty rifle : for both the cadet and the soldier are equally unfitted for the duties in front of them.

Unique also are the opportunities offered on a Field Day for the exercise of discipline by platoon and section commanders. What better test of this can be provided than when a contingent is split up into a large number of isolated units in a train with only a lance-corporal in charge of some of the carriages ? Is it surprising that Field Days are not regarded as serious manœuvres if the railway journey is made the occasion for the deliberate toleration of smoking ? Another valuable test of discipline is in the percentage of empty cartridge cases not returned at the end of the day, owing to the failure of cadets to pick them up : this may appear a small matter, but it is a point which, if allowed to slide, produces slack habits, careless supervision, the holiday atmosphere ; some wastage is inevitable, yet it is no uncommon sight to see a party of cadets aimlessly firing blank ammunition, ignoring altogether the fact that it is their business to pick up the empty cases, if for no other reason than out of gratitude to the best friends of the O.T.C.—the farmers who lend their land.

Lastly, Field Days provide in a simple way one of the opportunities, which are so rare in the O.T.C. until the annual training in camp, of teaching the platoon commander the supreme duty and privilege of the British officer, the care of his men. One glance at the issue of tea to a contingent is sufficient to see if this duty is appreciated or not : in one case platoon commanders and sergeants seizing their rations and tea and clearing off as quickly as possible to enjoy it, leaving their platoons to shift for themselves, pushing each other about as boys inevitably will ; in the other case platoon

commanders and sergeants carefully supervising the issue to their men in an orderly manner, entirely regardless of their own tea, until they are satisfied that every man in their platoon has been comfortably fed.

Such are some of the values of a Field Day for the training of the potential platoon commander : values which are sometimes lost sight of in the emphasis which is rightly laid on the main object, tactical instruction. Field Days should be among the happiest recollections of the O.T.C. in the opportunity they give of seeing new ground, and meeting other schools, and, above all, for the day in the fresh air in the middle of the term : all these can be enjoyed to the full, and yet in addition, Field Days can, next to the annual training in camp, be the most valuable part of the training of the cadet.

Annual Training in Camp.—The first object of this training, as defined by the instructions issued by the War Office, is “to afford every cadet more advanced instruction in work in the field and in the duties in camp of a soldier than it is possible for him to receive elsewhere. It should also be remembered that the training in camp is intended to play a leading part in fitting every cadet to become an officer.”

In tactical training great progress has been made in post-war camps by making demonstration the basis of instruction, whether the demonstration is carried out entirely by regular troops, or by a cadre platoon, formed of cadets with regular non-commissioned officers as platoon sergeants and section commanders, and with a regular officer in command of the platoon.

The advantages of the latter method lie in the exceptional opportunity of training provided for the very small percentage of cadets, who are actually included in the cadre platoon, and in the fact that these cadets provide a small though valuable nucleus for introducing the system of demonstration into the normal work during the school year which follows camp. On the other hand, from both these points of view the percentage who profit is so infinitesimal that the advantages of this method are probably outweighed by the fact that greater efficiency in demonstration is secured by work carried out by regular soldiers under their own officer and non-commissioned officers. The nearer a demonstration reaches perfection the greater its value, in painting a picture to make a permanent impression on the spectators, especially as the faults usually made in the object of the demonstration by inexperienced troops are in most cases illustrated as well. Wonderful

results have been produced by the cadre platoon in the very short time available after arrival in camp, before the first demonstration is given. In sectional training the main lesson of different formations can be adequately demonstrated by cadets under regular non-commissioned officers, but incidental lessons which add so much to the value and interest of the work are lost. There can be no comparison in the standard of turn-out, and in the handling of arms of the regular and the cadet, points of special value for the O.T.C. to bear in mind in field work : or, again, the individual skill of the regular trained soldier in the use of ground, which can only be acquired by months of hard work, and is only acquired under the best regimental officers, cannot be demonstrated by the cadet, however skilful the coaching of his regular instructors in the few hours at their disposal. Most important of all, although the cadet who is a spectator, watches with mingled feelings of amusement and amazement the transformation of perhaps his study companion in the cadre platoon, he watches with greater eagerness and seriousness the professional at work. Contact with regular soldiers is one of the great interests of camp to the Public School boy, and should be the supreme reason why instruction in camp is of greater value " than it is possible for him to receive elsewhere." The system of demonstration has done much to make this true of the tactical training in camp since the war, for it is the only method which makes clear to the cadet in the ranks what he should aim at in close order drill or field work. It can be utilized on short parades during the school term, by a five minutes' demonstration by non-commissioned officers at the beginning of parade, of two or three of the simplest movements in close order or arms drill, or the correct carrying out of a fire order with blank ammunition to illustrate fire control and fire discipline. The interest and the value of the parade which follows will be increased a hundred per cent. It is equally valuable on an afternoon's field work carried out by a contingent working by itself : though more time in preparation is necessary, a platoon can demonstrate the attack to the remainder of the contingent, and each platoon in turn carry it out as a demonstration before the remainder of the company. One caution is needed in its use : it must be constantly emphasized that demonstrations are only justifiable as an incentive to harder and more efficient work. The work done by cadets in camp since the war has been much reduced ; the afternoon work often consists of nothing more than watching a demonstration ; if this is preparatory to the work of the following day, it would be much better

if the demonstration was given in the evening immediately after tea, cadets being allowed to parade in any dress, and that the afternoons were utilized for work actually carried out by cadets themselves. The Public School boy, unlike the Territorial soldier, has seven weeks' holiday in front of him after camp, and the appeal that camp is a fine holiday is neither necessary nor effective : he does not believe it, nor is camp likely to compare as a holiday with shooting or yachting, golf, tennis tournaments or cricket weeks. Yet camp, where hard work is done, is thoroughly enjoyed by the majority as is proved by the large percentage who go a second or third time. The holiday side of camp does exist, as can be proved by a visit any evening to camp, when it is crowded with cadets happily doing nothing very definite, watching guard mounting with critical eyes, jealous of the reputation of their own contingent, listening to tattoo played by the massed bands of the O.T.C. or by some regimental band stationed in the area, or enjoying one of the many rough and ready games with equipment that would be laughed to scorn during school term. These hours of complete freedom and leisure are only really enjoyed if a genuine day's work has been done and cadets have not been left to loiter with long hours on their own hands, as when the afternoon's work of watching a demonstration is ended at 3 p.m.

Such is the importance attached to demonstrations to-day, that it might be inferred that the tactical training before the war was of relatively little value : such is not the case, for then as now there is a factor of infinitely greater importance than any principle or method of instruction, namely the personality of the battalion commander and his staff : this factor is the most permanent recollection of every camp in the minds both of the O.T.C. officers and cadets. A proof of this is to be found in questioning the heroic pioneers of the O.T.C., now headmasters, housemasters, or retired schoolmasters, who commanded contingents in the 'nineties, and it will generally be found that in referring to camp of any year, that the answer is given in terms of the name of a battalion commander. After two days in camp a cadet has a very definite opinion, not necessarily a correct one, of the battalion commander, the second-in-command and the adjutant. After two days' field work he is as clear in his own mind whether the battalion commander can teach tactics and make soldiering reasonably interesting, as whether Mr. Jones at school can do the same for mathematics. " Carry on section commanders " was the nickname given to a battalion commander, who at the end of the first morning's work of the

battalion in the attack, closed the battalion in mass, and called up all section commanders. He had no criticisms to offer, even in a battalion formed of five or six contingents working together for the first time. "Control jolly good, boys; carry on section commanders," and the conference was at an end. Infinitely greater is the respect and quickly stimulated affection for the battalion commander, who explains the mistakes and ends his conference by saying, that the battalion will march back and do the whole thing again and do it better—if he has the personality to carry this through with success. It is easy to criticize, and the case quoted is the rare exception, but the exception which resulted in a wasted camp from the point of view of tactical training. It is infinitely more difficult to appreciate—it would be almost insolent to analyse—the great debt of the O.T.C. to many battalion commanders in camp to-day and in the past.

Tactical instruction though officially recognized as the first, is not the only, or the most important object of the annual training in camp. On Field Days, in Certificate A, and during the normal military routine of the term, opportunities for tactical instruction are provided. The training in camp is only unique in giving the opportunity of living the soldiering life, and for acquiring knowledge by personal experience of the problems of interior economy for which the platoon commander of the future must be prepared.

On sound interior economy depend the comfort, health, and happiness of the men in a battalion; and for these the officers of a contingent are responsible in camp as schoolmasters to the parents of the cadets, and as officers to the cadets themselves whom it is their privilege to command. Three factors are essential for success in these respects whether in a regular battalion or a contingent of the O.T.C. Officers must have the instinct, which recognizes as their first duty the welfare of the men; the chain of command must be developed, from the commanding officer to the lance-corporal; the men or cadets must understand and accept the principle that every man must do his own job, and not leave it to the more energetic men in his section, still less to fatigue men. If these three factors are working realities in a contingent, good interior economy will be the result; lines will be kept clean and tidy without difficulty; rations will not be short and meals will be comfortably served; washing up will be quickly done without grumbling and without wasting an unnecessary number of men; kits will be laid out and tents rolled up before morning parade; the contingent will be cheerful with time to prepare themselves

properly for each parade and time to enjoy their leisure ; officers and sergeant-instructors will not be seen constantly shouting about the lines for paper to be picked up or hurrying cadets unto parade, who a few minutes before have started to clean buttons ; on the last morning in camp the contingent lines will be left spotless and all camp stores will be handed in correct ; above all cadets and especially non-commissioned officers will have learnt " the duties in camp of a soldier," by the most thorough and permanent method, personal experience, and on lines which will be of value for their guidance as future platoon commanders.

In interior economy each contingent must have its own method and organization, but these three principles should be recognized by all. Although a contingent officer must be present at every meal it is absurd for him to attempt to help the whole contingent, even if it be only one platoon, to porridge ; a deplorable sight, yet common enough, is to see the employment of the sergeant instructors during Church parade on the Sunday in tidying up the kits of the contingent for the commandant's inspection ; still worse, if the contingent pride itself on its knowledge of soldiering, if it happens, which is unlikely, to gain success by this method ; but the height of folly is reached in the suggestion that civilian servants should be brought to camp to wash up for the cadets, which would produce a situation almost as absurd as the sight of cadets enjoying pipes in their lines, ready to produce voucher from their pocket that the parents' permission had been given ! The suggestion of the latter indicates as feeble a conception of discipline, as the former of the value of training in administration and interior economy.

No better conclusion to the subject of this article can be found than an expression of gratitude, however inadequate, for the friendly guidance of the O.T.C. by S.D.3.b at the War Office ; for its wise administration which has made successful the difficult transition from war to peace conditions ; above all, for its sympathetic understanding of the problems of the schoolmaster as well as the soldier, in which is to be found alike, the ultimate reason for all past progress in the training of the O.T.C., and the best guarantee for its future development.

SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE RECENT OLYMPIC GAMES

BY BRIGADIER-GENERAL R. J. KENTISH, C.M.G., D.S.O. (Member
of the International Olympic Council and Honorary Secretary,
British Olympic Association)

"Sport which still keeps a flag of idealism flying is perhaps the most saving grace in the world at the moment, with its spirit of rules kept and regard for the adversary, whether the fight is going for or against. When, if ever, the fair play spirit of sport reigns over international affairs, the cat force which rules there now, will sink away and human life emerge for the first time from the Jungle."—JOHN GALSWORTHY, "International Thought."

IN writing at the request of the Editors of the *Army Quarterly*, the following impressions of the Olympiad recently celebrated in Paris, I have been animated by two main and principal reasons: first, my desire to help by any means in my power any Army institution—and the *Army Quarterly* by this time must be considered, and has every right to be considered, an Army institution—and, secondly, my desire to make known to the public the true conception of the Olympic Games, for by so doing I can best defend and uphold a movement which I am convinced already has an influence, and will in time have an even greater influence, for good throughout the entire world.

I have still another reason for writing this article, and it is this: previous to retiring last year from the Army I had devoted all my spare time in trying to improve the lot of the private soldier, with a view to making him a happier, a more contented and a more willing servant of the State. I very soon discovered that there was one outstanding flaw in the routine of his daily life, namely, that while great attention—I used sometimes to think rather too much attention—was shown to him during his working hours, very little, if any, attention was given to him during his leisure hours. The result was that the moment he was left to himself by his officers his one aim and object was to get his pack off his back, to consume as much food and beer as was possible, to indulge in a long and heavy sleep; then to have a wash and brush up, to put on his bright red tunic

and to go off to the town with its fascinating but at the same time health-destroying allurements.

In the early days of my soldiering it seemed to me a strange thing that whereas the officers found it so necessary to take some form of exercise daily, the same necessity in the case of the soldier apparently did not exist, the result being as I have already stated. I do not for a moment suggest that thirty years ago no soldiers indulged in any game ; certainly they played football, and they boxed and they ran, but those who did so were in the minority, just a few picked men in each regiment. And so the first great reform which a band of enthusiasts, of whom I had the honour of being one, started to bring about at Aldershot in 1908, was the placing of the soldiers' sports and recreation on the same sound basis as that on which the General Staff had placed their military training. To-day those of us, who were the pioneers in this movement, can look back with pride on the accomplishment of a task which we were told at the time was impossible of achievement. What was that task and in what respect does it bear on the subject of this article ?

First, the task we have accomplished, or nearly have accomplished, is as follows : (a) sufficient recreation grounds on which the men can play their games have been provided in practically every station, where British soldiers are quartered ; (b) every Army competition is conducted on the " team " system, as opposed to the old-fashioned and long out-of-date " individual " system, with the result that the spirit of playing for the side dominates everything else throughout the Army ; and consequently (c) sportsmanship, as those of us who have had the good fortune to be educated at Public Schools understand the meaning of the word, is to-day as deeply rooted in the life of the Army as it is in any Public School.

Those who doubted us in the early days of our movement—I speak of my Aldershot days some sixteen years ago, when I first raised the whole question of the hopeless inadequacy of the men's recreation grounds—and who complained that we were taking the training grounds away for recreation purposes and in other ways interfering with the military training, etc., of the men, to-day admit that we had method and reason in our madness. In any case, I do not suppose that there is another country in the world in which a section of its people is so well catered for in this respect as is the British Army, and I am equally sure that the standard of sportsmanship amongst the rank and file will bear comparison with that existing in any other community in this or any other country.

But how, it will be said, do these facts bear upon the Olympic Games and the Olympic movement generally? The answer is that the Olympic movement is striving for exactly the same ends, viz. : (a) to impress upon the Government of every country the necessity of providing proper and adequate recreation grounds for its people; (b) to introduce the "team spirit" into every country in the world; and (c) to inculcate sportsmanship and the meaning of the words "It isn't Cricket" into the life of every nation.

This is the movement which a great English newspaper has attacked. Personally I feel that there has been a great misunderstanding of the aims and objects of the movement on the part of its Special Correspondent—a man of great ability and of established repute in his profession. On the other hand, the fault may rest with the Council of the British Olympic Association for not having made clear its policy, or with the International Olympic Committee for not having taken greater pains to explain to the world what it has been and still is striving for. But whether the fault rests with the Special Correspondent of the newspaper referred to or with the Council of the British Olympic Association, or with the members of the International Olympic Committee, is at the moment immaterial. The fact remains that the Olympic movement is one with very great and noble ideals, and this being so, it is the duty of every one, who is interested in the movement, to ascertain the policy of those directing it, and especially is this the case when individuals put pen to paper to criticize it.

The great English newspaper to which I have referred above is the *Times*, and such is its world-wide reputation that every word that comes from the pen of any of its Special Correspondents is read to-day as expressing, if not the actual opinion of this country, at any rate the opinion of an influential section of it. And there is no doubt that the words written by the Special Correspondent of the *Times*, as well as the article which appeared in the Editorial columns of one of its issues during the Games, have found their way into the club-rooms and houses of many people of influence in every corner of the globe. And naturally these same people of influence to whom the poorer classes appeal to support every kind of athletic movement, are wondering to-day whether the support, both moral and financial, which they have in the past been prepared to give and have given to the Olympic movement—the greatest athletic movement in the world—is justified.

In Holland, where the Games are to be held in 1928, this

situation confronted me on my arrival in that country at the beginning of August, and it took up a great deal of my time in explaining to the many people of influence, whom I had the pleasure of meeting, that the International Olympic Committee had not even discussed the abandonment of the Games, and that Great Britain had no intention whatever of withdrawing.

Without doubt certain incidents occurred in two of the many world's championships, which comprised the Olympic programme, but not one of those regrettable and at the same time exceedingly discreditable incidents escaped the notice of the strong Executive Committee, which was composed of members of the International Olympic Committee, and which watched the Games very closely from start to finish. Each incident has been the subject of the most searching inquiry, and when we are privileged to publish the findings of the Executive Committee, the heart of every sportsman in this country will, I know, be gladdened. Drastic action has been taken, and the effect of our action will be felt in every country in which athletic games and sports of all kinds form part of the national life of the people. The countries which offended have been separated into two categories, namely: those which have been long at the game, and those which have just commenced to introduce sport into their national life. To the former we have said: "Your countrymen have disgraced the name of sport; we will not tolerate such conduct for a moment, and we have taken such action as we hope and trust will bring home to them the enormity of their offence." And to the latter we have made it equally clear that such conduct will not in future be countenanced, and that it is the duty of those directing sport in their respective countries to institute some method of inculcating into their young men the principles of sportsmanship.

In the Army, as I have already said, we have the spirit of sportsmanship and playing for one's side deeply ingrained in every young soldier, be he officer or man, and with the help of the best in this country—and I include in this category, those who write on sport in our great newspapers—I feel convinced that in time we shall get the same spirit into the youth of every country in the world.

And so I say again to those who have criticized certain incidents, which we all admit were most discreditable, to have patience and to support us in the great effort we are making to bring into the world a great League of Sportsmen, which, working in conjunction with that equally great League, the League of Boy Scouts, will support and strengthen the greatest of all Leagues, namely, the League of

Nations, in the efforts which it is making to-day to prevent war and all the horrors which go with it, from ever again overtaking the civilized world.

A word more as to the future. The statement has been made that the Games are doomed or that if they are not doomed, Great Britain, at any rate, will take no further part in them. With regard to the former statement, I can only say that the suggestion has been received with the utmost ridicule by the forty-five countries which are now affiliated to the International Olympic Committee, and which have already begun their preparations for the next Olympiad in Holland in 1928. At the end of the Games, and shortly before leaving for the Hague, I attended an influential meeting, which consisted of members of (a) the International Olympic Committee, (b) the International Federations, and (c) the National Olympic Associations, a gathering of about sixty persons. And we were met together to draw up an agenda for the International Congress which is to be held in Prague in May next year. To this agenda were added such matters as (i) the curtailment of the programme by the elimination of certain sports, which it was felt were not of sufficient importance to retain ; (ii) the prevention of regrettable incidents ; (iii) the provision of adequate recreation grounds for the youth of every country ; (iv) the definition of an amateur, and numerous other matters of lesser importance. But at this gathering no mention was made of the discontinuance of the Games.

After the meeting I went to Holland, where I made the acquaintance of many people of influence in Dutch political, professional, commercial and athletic life. I found all whom I met without exception enthusiastic and looking forward already to the Games in Amsterdam in 1928, and as the Americans, to whom we have allocated the Games in 1932, are equally enthusiastic, this question of the discontinuance of the Games may well be dismissed now and for all time, for it is quite certain that the Olympic Games will be continued for all time.

As to Great Britain's withdrawal, we heard a similar cry after the 1908 incident. If we had withdrawn then, I am quite sure we should not have seen our country—or, at any rate, the sportsmen of our country—so closely associated with Americans in sport and all that springs from such an association. No, thank goodness, we did not then embark upon a policy of splendid isolation in sport, and, so far as I can see, such a policy will never be adopted by the sportsmen and athletes of this country, no matter how much a small, isolated and short-sighted section of our countrymen may desire

that policy to prevail. We, who fought through the Great War, fought for something greater than splendid isolation—we fought for a better world, and we shall have a better world if we encourage our young men to go abroad and to mix with and meet the young men of other countries on the field of sport as well as in the fields of politics and commerce. We most certainly shall not, if we go back to the self-centred and aloof policy of the days before 1914.

During the recent Boy Scouts' International "Jamboree" held in Copenhagen, a series of international scout competitions were held, and I notice that the Americans won the first place, Great Britain being second. There has as yet been no mention of any regrettable incident having occurred between the scouts of this country and those of America or of any other country, but I have written to Sir Robert Baden-Powell to ask him what his line of action would have been had any such incidents occurred and had the Press given prominent notice to them. I have not yet received a reply, but I think that I can hear him saying, "Our mission is a world-wide one: we, the Boy Scouts of the British Empire, are out to learn from others, and we hope that others will learn from us. If in the course of our National Jamborees, some incident of a regrettable nature should occur, we should immediately set to work to put it right—we certainly should not cry out from the house-tops, 'Let us break up the movement and disband.' And the same would apply to similar incidents in International Jamborees; we most certainly should not pronounce the doom of the movement or withdraw our scouts, because certain scouts of other countries uneducated as yet to the meaning of the words 'Playing the Game' had not conducted themselves along the lines of the scout movement. . On the contrary, we should feel it our duty to stick by them in order to teach them the meaning of those words, for therein lies the true scout spirit." This is how I can hear Sir Robert answering my letter, and this is how our British athletes have answered the suggestion that Great Britain should withdraw from the Olympic Games. And with this statement of my views I leave the suggestion that we should withdraw from the Games—a suggestion which seems to me utterly unworthy of our great country.

I have said nothing about the performances of our men during the recent Olympiad, and I have only very briefly referred to the steps which the International Olympic Committee has already taken to deal with those officials, teams and individuals, who in Paris offended against and transgressed the tenets of sportsmanship, but

I propose, with the Editor's consent, to deal with this side of the Games at greater length in a subsequent number of the *Army Quarterly*.

In conclusion, I should like to draw the attention of my readers and also of the *Times* to the quotation from John Galsworthy which prefaces my article, and which I recently came across in the *Journal of the Overseas League*, where it was used by Mr. F. C. Yardley, in an article dealing with the "Rodeo" at Wembley. I feel that the sentiments expressed by Mr. Galsworthy so ably answer the *Times* suggestion that this great world-wide Olympic movement should come to an end, that all that I have written in this article might very easily have been omitted. He supplies us with the most cogent and powerful reason why we should continue the movement. I can only add that I prefer to take the wider and more international view on the Olympic movement and all other kindred movements than the narrower one championed by the *Times*, and I prefer to take it because I believe that it carries out our ideal of the "team," as opposed to the "individual," spirit—the individual in this case being the country and the team the world. In other words, I prefer to see the young men of my country going out from their homes to foreign countries to work for the common good, rather than to see them staying at home and keeping to themselves and for their own benefit those qualities which, by an accident of birth and up-bringing, they have inherited, and which, I feel convinced, have been given to them to be passed on to others for the good of the whole world.

THE INFANTRY SOLDIER IN THE MAKING

BY MAJOR J. C. BURNETT, D.S.O., The Duke of Wellington's Regiment

The Problem of increasing Individual Efficiency.—Two important factors which influence the question of training in the Army of to-day, and which, therefore, should be constantly in the mind of every one concerned with the progress of the young soldier, are : (1) that the Regular Army, through reasons unnecessary to go into here, has been very considerably reduced although our military commitments are in no sense any less than they were in pre-war days ; and that therefore there is all the greater need for increased efficiency ; and (2) that the evolution of modern tactics calls for a higher standard of initiative and moral character in the individual soldier if success in battle is to be assured.

The problem, therefore, of making the best of the material available is one that calls for constant thought by those more junior regimental officers who command companies and platoons, and are in a position directly to influence those whom they command.

The Raw Material.—In a voluntary army like ours it is always an interesting study to try and discover the motive which prompts men to enlist. An infantry depôt commander has every opportunity for doing this, and the writer, after eighteen months' experience in this capacity, has formed the opinion that those who enlist may be divided into two main classes, *i.e.* (a) those who are attracted by the life ; and (b) those who are driven to enlistment as a last resort, because they cannot get employment in civil life. He considers that the proportion of those under (a) to those under (b) is roughly as one to seven.

It is natural that the outlook on a military life of those under (a) is entirely different to that of those under (b). The former enter as enthusiasts, looking forward to the life and the prospects of seeing the world ; the latter, if they have considered the question at all, are probably at the best only inspired by such optimism as can be associated with a desire to make the best of a bad job. The case of

a man joining the Army with any serious professional intent is very rare, and is usually confined to those individuals connected with families which have traditional association with the Army. Those concerned with the making of the soldier are faced, therefore, at the start with the need for creating an atmosphere of professional keenness among the raw material as soon as it comes to hand.

Brain Development.—It is only by a complete understanding of the why and the wherefore of everything taught that real efficiency in the detail of training can be attained. To take for granted the necessity for learning anything only induces an attitude of boredom towards the subject taught.

For instance, one of the earliest drill lessons every infantry recruit has to learn is that of marching in slow time ; unless the recruit is told the reason for teaching him to do this, he will regard it as a dull performance which he can in no way connect with any useful purpose to which a soldier can be put ; but when he is told that to march well in slow time necessitates tremendous control over the body, and that control over the body demands concentration of mind, and that concentration of mind involves development of brain, and that brain counts for more than muscle in modern battles, he sees the need for this form of training, and, seeing the need, takes an interest in it.

Every instructor who has the handling of young soldiers, if he is to get quick and lasting results, must make sure, therefore, that the object of all his instruction is firmly impressed in logical sequence on the brains of his pupils.

Further, he must teach them from the start to see and to understand the relative connection which each subject they learn has with others, so that their minds may gradually associate everything they assimilate with one main object, and that is to win battles.

Thus they must be told that certain exercises which they do in the gymnasium develop the muscles that are called into play when marching order is worn, whilst others develop digging muscles. Exercises over the " horse " give dash in bayonet fighting, balancing exercises develop steady nerves which are necessary for good shooting, and so on.

For the same reason they are told that the primary object of " education " in the Army is to develop their capacity for thinking and thereby to make them better able to apply the lessons learnt to their own benefit in the stern test of war, or in competitions against other similar men in peace.

It is a mistake to let young recruits think that they go to school

for one hour a day just in order to get eventually a parchment certificate of education and nothing else, any more than to let them think that they go to the gymnasium with the sole object of keeping physically fit and active. However proficient they may become in each individual form of training they undergo, if their brains are allowed to store knowledge of each subject in separate water-tight compartments they will not develop the chief essential qualities of the modern soldier, which are confidence, self-reliance and initiative. These are derived from a man's power to reason and to deduce intelligent decisions for his own use.

Depôt Training.—The infantry recruit gets well started on the road of learning during his period of twenty weeks' training at the regimental depôt.

He has, to begin with, every facility for concentration, he is studied continuously by experts in everything he does, his exercises are never interrupted, he moves progressively day by day, week by week, through a thought-out syllabus of training ; he is bound to be interested because all who handle him are interested in him ; there is no monotony in his work ; there is always the spirit of wholesome rivalry to inspire him ; he works, plays, feeds and sleeps in the company of twenty-odd others who have joined the Army with him and have a similar outlook on life.

Therefore, when the time comes for him and those trained with him to move as a draft to one of the battalions, they have a reasonable feeling of confidence in themselves combined with a not unnatural anticipation that the next phase of their military career will be just as plain sailing as the first.

The Critical Time.—It is at this stage in a young soldier's career that the crisis arises. There are many antagonistic influences at work and, unless care and thought are bestowed on the problem of his further training, there is a risk that he may go back instead of forward along the road of learning and may be disillusioned in much of the wholesome thought which he imbibed at his depôt.

It must be realized that the object of the twenty weeks' depôt training is to train a man to a standard of efficiency which will enable him to take his place in the ranks of a platoon and carry on without further training outside that which his company and platoon commander would, in the ordinary course of company and platoon training, give to him. This extent of military knowledge has been acquired in twenty weeks, and this means that in the average man it is superficial knowledge, and that unless the work of progressive teaching is continued in the battalion, the young soldier suddenly

transported to new surroundings, handled by new people, mixed with new associates, confronted with new difficulties, is apt to forget what he has learnt.

The Difficulties.—Let us examine and set out what these antagonistic influences may be : (1) separation to some extent from comrades with whom he has begun his military life, entailed by the splitting up of a draft into dribblets posted to different companies ; (2) a sudden change from a regular daily programme to quite possibly no programme at all ; * (3) the change from the hands of an organized staff of expert instructors to those of officers and non-commissioned officers who have many other duties and cannot concentrate their efforts on new arrivals ; and (4) contact with older men who, through being failures themselves or from apathy, discourage keenness and ambition among their younger comrades.

The Possible Remedy.—These seem to be the difficulties which the trainer has to contend with, and the following suggestions are put forward for remedying them : (1) adopt a principle of drafting squads intact to companies in turn and post them in their company as a platoon ; (2) put each new squad as it joins the battalion through the battalion training cadre for a month's course as a platoon, together with its own platoon commander and section commanders ; (3) arrange subsequently that each platoon in the company shall have one or more days each week devoted entirely to training as circumstances allow ; that the men go on leave at the same time ; and (4) fill casualties as they occur in platoons from the men of longest service in the company and thereby never introduce any one who has less experience and training than those in the platoon to be filled. This would have the added advantage of not disturbing young draft platoons before they are more completely trained units.

Promotion.—The question of promotion to the non-commissioned-officer ranks is not one of the least important points which the regimental officer must seriously consider.

The sooner keen and promising young soldiers are started climbing up the ladder of promotion, the more advantage will there be to the Service. Early promotion creates ambition and enthusiasm ; both these qualities are infectious, and the more this infection spreads among the junior ranks, the more driving force will there be behind ; first, because competition promotes effort, and secondly,

* This is no reflection on any battalion's training curriculum. The difficulties of finding men to train in weak battalions, except at certain defined periods, are well known to the regimental officer, especially in stations where garrison duties are heavy.

because enthusiasm in the lower ranks has a stimulating effect upon the higher ranks. Keen pupils demand keen teachers.

Most infantry dépôts have now adopted the system of selecting the two most promising recruits in each squad in its fourteenth or fifteenth week of training and making them lance-corporals (unpaid)—a system initiated in the Northern Command by General Sir Ivor Maxse when he reorganized the infantry dépôts in that Command.

These young lance-corporals are retained at the dépôt for one month's further training after their squad has been drafted, and during this month they receive further training as section leaders as well as instruction in the normal routine duties which fall to the lot of young non-commissioned officers with a battalion.*

The crisis in the career of these young non-commissioned officers arises when they join a battalion and are confronted with difficulties and obstacles owing to the fact that they are thrown with private soldiers of greater age and experience, who look on them with no great approval or esteem. There is doubtless a great deal of value in the test to which they are subjected at this stage, for it gives them an opportunity to show what strength of character and personality they possess; but it is necessary that they should also be given encouragement and assistance if the best that is in them is to be brought out and developed.

The writer would like to advocate that these recruit lance-corporals, for such they are, should be posted as supernumerary section commanders in the platoon which was the squad they originally joined at the dépôt, and that, as soon as possible after joining the battalion, they should be put through a junior leaders' course in the battalion training cadre.

It is generally recognized that a system of accelerated promotion, irrespective of date and seniority, should prevail in battalions if good non-commissioned officers are to be made. It is a system which can, however, be abused, and in a good unit where the company and platoon commanders are training their non-commissioned officers on the right lines there need not be a great number of cases where it is necessary. The fact that a good youngster is occasionally pushed up over the heads of those senior to him in rank will often have a salutary effect.

The Young Officer.—Having considered the question of the young private soldier, it would perhaps be appropriate to add a word or two about the young officer.

* Since this article was written, this system has been done away with.

The newly-commissioned Sandhurst cadet, as soon as he joins his regiment, is faced with the heavy responsibilities of a junior leader, and, consequently, of a trainer of men ; he is trained himself in as much as he has undergone a thorough individual training, but he has little or no experience of handling men. It would seem, therefore, that he would have a better chance of tackling his task with success if he went through an intermediate process between the date when he leaves Sandhurst and the date when he joins a battalion, which would give him facilities for realizing and becoming *au fait* with his task of leadership before embarking upon it.

The writer would suggest that every young officer should join the regimental *dépôt* and go through the recruits' six months' course with a squad as a supernumerary instructor in each grade, and that his squad at the *dépôt* should ultimately become his platoon in the battalion.

A scheme of this sort would appear to have many advantages ; the young officer would understand for what purpose a *dépôt* existed and would always associate it with the regiment ; he would see the first training of the very men he would afterwards command, and he would join his battalion an infinitely more useful person than he would by going direct to it from Sandhurst.

Moreover, the standard of squad training at the *dépôt* would be improved by occasionally having the trained and drilled Sandhurst cadet introduced.

There is perhaps one disadvantage to a scheme of this nature. Some *dépôts*, owing to a large proportion of the officers on their strength being married, have great difficulty in maintaining in their Officers' Messes the customs which are traditional in the Messes of their battalions.

To put a young officer fresh from Sandhurst into a Mess where there are, perhaps, only one or two other dining members, is no doubt to deprive him of a great deal of the right kind of influence and environment which he ought to have at this stage in his career, and possibly for lack of these he may get erroneous impressions of Mess life which may make his subsequent *début* with his battalion more difficult. If, however, the *dépôt* commander and his officers are alive to this risk and lay themselves out to make sure that the Mess customs of their battalion are taught and expounded to such young officers, even though it may not be possible actually to exemplify them, no harm should be done.

It may be argued, too, that the young officer from Sandhurst should not need six months in which to acquire the experience

which the writer claims the dépôt would give him. Possibly this may be true ; a three months' course devised on a system of rapid promotions from squad to squad might produce as good results. But this is only a detail in expediency.

Coordination between Battalions and their Dépôt.—If it be agreed that the first six months of a soldier's training is the most important period in his career, it will also be admitted that steps should be taken to ensure that those who handle him subsequently understand the system which has obtained in his first six months' training.

In other words there must be a better understanding and more cooperation between the regimental officer in the battalion and the regimental officer on duty at the dépôt.

Battalion commanders now visit their dépôts about once a quarter, and these visits are eagerly looked forward to by the dépôt commander, but greater advantage would be gained by going one step farther and by arranging for visits for company commanders to the dépôt to see recruit training at first hand. If the plan of retaining each dépôt draft as a platoon, to which the writer has referred, were ever to materialize, a company commander who received a draft would undoubtedly reap benefit by seeing it from time to time in the making.

Frequent references to dépôt training have been made in this article, but the writer, although a dépôt commander, does not apologize for what might seem an exaggerated idea of his own importance. The article is entitled "The Infantry Soldier in the Making," and the parable of the seeds appears to justify such references.

LESSONS FROM EXPERIENCES WITH IRREGULARS

(With Sketch Map)

BY BREVET-MAJOR R. H. DEWING, D.S.O., M.C., R.E.

IN a campaign in an Eastern theatre the problem of controlling areas outside those in which actual military operations are taking place often assumes great importance. Among a people grouped in semi-independent tribes there are always many who, though nominally neutral, are ready to throw in their lot with whichever side appears to hold the upper hand, or offers the bigger bribe. There may be war-like tribes which raid and harass either belligerent indifferently as opportunity offers, simply for the sake of the loot which they can secure. A long line of communications becomes peculiarly vulnerable when flanked by such tribes. It may happen that some outlying tribe, either through motives of hereditary hatred of our enemy, or encouraged by the expectation of our support, takes up arms on our behalf, and finding itself exposed to retaliation, appeals to us for support.

The detachment of troops to meet these dangers, or to assist these allies, constitutes a drain on the numbers available for more important military operations which, in a campaign in which comparatively small forces are engaged, may soon become serious. To meet such a situation the raising of native irregular forces often appears the natural solution. The tribes have the reputation of being good fighters ; they can be employed to fight in the manner and under the conditions to which they are accustomed, so that they should need little training to make them fit to undertake their duties, and release regular troops for more important work. They already have their native leaders, and, with the addition of British officers who have a natural aptitude for handling Orientals, their value should be greatly increased. Then, too, the supply question would be simplified, for irregular troops of this kind should be able to live on the country. It all sounds very plausible and easy ; officers are called for, and a careful selection is made from the

numerous names that are eagerly sent in ; a War Establishment for the unit is drawn up so that all may be in order, and the " Irani Irregulars " come into being.

It is plausible enough, and so far it is easy. Indeed, it is because of this plausibility that it is important that the problems and difficulties which confront any officer who is commissioned to raise the irregular unit should be realized.

A short account of two attempts made during 1918 to raise irregular units will serve to illustrate the sort of conditions which may be met.

KURDISH HORSE

In the early spring of 1918, our troops in Mesopotamia pushed forward from Kifri and occupied Kirkuk, on the main route between Mosul and Suleimanieh, thereby closing a road into Persia which had been freely used by Turkish and German agents. (*See Sketch Map.*) Though our occupation of Kirkuk effectively closed the road in most general use, access to Suleimanieh was still possible for small parties, and a further check on their penetration into Persia was still desirable. With this object it was decided to control the valley of the Diyala up to the mountains north of Halebja, thus leaving only difficult mountain routes open.

To control the eighty miles of the valley between Khanikin and Halebja without detaching regular troops for the purpose, it was decided to raise a force of 600 Kurdish horsemen under British officers, assisted by a proportion of British non-commissioned officers. It was intended to recruit the greater part of the Kurds from the Jaf tribe which inhabited the Suleimanieh-Halebja valley.

There was no difficulty in finding British officers keen to be accepted for the work. A commanding officer and an adjutant were appointed very soon after the project had been decided upon, and, while the details necessarily preliminary to the opening of recruiting were being settled, they had a few weeks at their disposal in which to acquire such knowledge as they could of the material with which they were to work. The remaining British officers joined at Khanikin direct from their own regiments, after the formation of the unit had been commenced. So, also, did the British non-commissioned officers, the majority of whom were drawn from British cavalry regiments and were of an excellent type.

Among the British officers and non-commissioned officers there was not one who knew anything of the Kurdish language. Outside a small group of officers who have been employed on political work

among the Kurds, there can be very few Europeans with any knowledge of the obscure Kurdish dialects. Persian is understood to some extent by the Kurds, more especially by those of better birth, and it was early decided to make Persian the basis of communication within the unit. A smattering of Persian is far more easily acquired than a smattering of Kurdish, and it was anticipated, as indeed proved to be the case, that some sort of *lingua franca*, the child of a Persian phrase book and a Kurdish dialect fostered by the wit of the British soldier in a foreign land, would grow up and serve the needs of the irregular unit.

Knowledge of the ways and habits of the tribesmen was as absent as knowledge of their language. The commanding officer had, a month or two before official sanction to the formation of the unit had been accorded, accompanied a Political Officer on a tour up the Diyala valley, staying in the tents of various minor chiefs, and meeting some of the leaders of the Jaf. He and his adjutant, too, had accompanied a small British force which had supported a confederation of Persian border tribes against the Sinjabis in the country to the north of Qasr-i-Shirin, hoping thereby to learn something of the ways and methods of the hillmen in their inter-tribal wars. The rest of the British officers and non-commissioned officers possessed no more experience qualifying them for commanding and training undisciplined Orientals than could be derived from their previous contact with Mesopotamian Arabs.

As soon as the details regarding the unit had been decided upon, recruiting was opened in Khanikin with the object of raising a nucleus of about a hundred Kurds in that locality, with which to move out towards the Jaf country, where it was hoped to raise the full numbers. Meanwhile, negotiations with the chief Jafs were conducted by the Political Officer with the object of ensuring their support for the project.

To attract recruits at Khanikin good pay was offered. The recruit had to bring his own horse and saddlery, but was equipped with clothing, rifle, bandolier and ammunition, and both he and his horse were rationed. The rifles were old Turkish Mausers, of which an adequate supply was available from Baghdad. Many of the difficulties of recruiting were got over by the close cooperation of the Political Officer at Khanikin, who was often able to find security for the good character of recruits who offered themselves. Rifles and ammunition carried a high value, and the strictest precautions for their safe guarding were poor security if the very sentries might turn rifle thieves.

As soon as about a hundred men had been recruited and equipped, this nucleus was moved out from Khanikin up the Diyala valley to within twenty miles of Halebja, with the object of developing the unit to full strength by recruiting from the Jaf. At this moment instructions were being received at Baghdad from the War Office, which were destined to make the realization of this project impossible. Shortly afterwards, the British forces were withdrawn from Kirkuk, and the road to Suleimanieh was left open to the Turk. The Turk was not slow to take advantage of this opening, and before a single Jaf recruit had been secured for the irregulars, two battalions of Turkish infantry were in occupation of the Jaf country.

For two months the nucleus band of irregulars remained in occupation of the lower part of the valley, separated from the Jaf country by a mountain range, and supported by the hope that some fresh change of fortune would force the withdrawal of the Turks. This period was occupied in training the small force, and in reconnaissances of the country. Though the friendliness of the Kurds in the neighbourhood was always in doubt, and rumours of a coming attack by pro-Turk tribes from the north were frequent, no fighting occurred.

The training was mainly directed towards developing discipline, increasing mobility, improving marksmanship and teaching the care of the horse. In the matter of discipline complete freedom from rule and regulation made it possible to suit the punishments to the mentality of the men, and to use those which, while being appreciated by the majority as just, had the desired deterrent effect. Desertion was naturally very easy, and unjust or excessive punishment would have been met by the melting away of the unit.

The Kurds were accustomed to shoot from the saddle, and took great pride in this accomplishment. As it would have been of practical value in the type of action in which they might have been engaged, pains were taken to develop this form of fire. Patrols often found a suitable target for musketry practice in the gazelle which were numerous in the foothills.

The Kurds displayed complete indifference to the condition of their ponies. They would not hesitate to continue riding an animal suffering from the most ghastly of sore backs ; pity for the misery of an animal was a feeling which was incomprehensible to them, and it was useless to try to instil such a sentiment. The struggle against this indifference was, perhaps, the most heartbreaking of the tasks of the officers with the irregulars. In the course of time some improvement in the men's attitude towards their ponies was

effected, but it was only by practical demonstration of how sores could be cured, and of the increased usefulness of a pony which is kept fit.

The difficulty of living on the country was realized very soon, even though it was only a question of feeding a hundred men and their horses. The offer of fair prices brought in a limited amount of fodder for the animals, but practically no supplies for the men could be purchased in that thinly inhabited country. While the camp was stationary it was clearly impossible to depend on local resources, and even had it been possible to move camp every few days, and to resort to requisitioning, it is doubtful if the result would have been much better. The supplies had, therefore, to come up from Khanikin, by a route only passable for pack, and the only pack animals procurable were donkeys. Escort duty with a herd of some two hundred donkeys, laden with food, ammunition, boxes of cash and even rifles (for rifles for the prospective five hundred Jaf recruits were carried forward), on a long two days' march through country in which every inhabitant was a potential thief, was no light matter.

The transport problem was always serious for the irregulars. Having no transport of their own, such as was required had to be hired locally. Actually transport of some kind was always secured when required, but the probability of being without transport was always greatest when the air was thickest with rumours of danger.

Under these conditions the irregulars remained for two months, while the Assistant Political Officer who was with them devised scheme after scheme for enlisting the support of the Jaf. Finally, it became apparent that no assurance on his part could weigh against the physical presence of Turkish battalions in the Jaf country. The Jaf were being asked to throw off one master whom they knew, in favour of another whom they knew not, while the troops of the former were within a few miles of their fields and villages. The answer was inevitable, and the days of the Kurdish Horse were ended. The men who were to have been dashing cavaliers became frontier foot police, and the British officers and non-commissioned officers were transferred elsewhere.

THE ASSYRIAN CONTINGENT

The scene of the second example was in Persia. To the west of Lake Urmia lies a country where, since the days of the fall of Nineveh, the descendants of the Assyrian race have found a home.

Before the Russian Revolution these Christian people fought under Russian officers against the Turks. After the Revolution they fought for many months under their own leaders in defence of their homes. They were for a long time buoyed up by the hope of help from the British, but their country lay far from the spheres in which British troops were operating. At last, in the summer of 1918, when Assyrian leaders were actually meeting British officers at a rendezvous between Lake Urmia and Hamadan, to arrange the form British assistance should take, the faith of the Assyrians in British promises broke down, and, believing themselves deserted by their own leaders, the whole people abandoned their homes and fled southward with their women and children and such household goods as they could carry with them. Through two hundred miles of wild hill country, harried by Turks and robbed by tribesmen, these fifty thousand refugees made their way towards Hamadan. For the last few marches of their way a detachment of British cavalry was able to cover their rear and give them some protection, but few reached Hamadan with any remaining possessions, and many had died of exposure, or at the hands of tribesmen on the way. From Hamadan the majority were passed down the Persian road, through Kermanshah to a refugee camp at Baqubah in Mesopotamia. Some four or five thousand men, fit for military service, were retained at Hamadan to be formed into battalions and trained as irregular troops, the group of four battalions so formed becoming known as the Assyrian Contingent.

The British officers and non-commissioned officers for the Contingent were found mainly from members of "Dunsterforce," which about that time was broken up after the evacuation of Baku. Some had already had some months' experience with Persian levies, and all were men who had volunteered for work with just such material as they were to find in the Assyrians.

Ignorance of the Assyrian language was inevitably just as general as had been ignorance of Kurdish in the previous example. Among the Assyrians were a few who had learnt English in America, and a few others knew French, learnt from missionaries in Urmia. There was no basis on which to form a *lingua franca* here, and work had to be carried out by using the English or French-speaking Assyrians as interpreters.

Ignorance of the mentality and character of the people proved an even greater handicap than ignorance of their language. It was natural to expect a people, who had fought together against the Turk, who had fled under a common impulse from their own

country to take refuge with the British, and on whose lips there was ever talk of national rights and national aspirations, to prove a united people when they found themselves refugees in a strange country. It did not take long to discover that on religious and family or tribal grounds they were split into a hundred groups. The bitterness and jealousy which existed between rival religious sects, and the mistrust felt by the men of one village for those of another, were quickly apparent ; but easy as it was to realize the existence of cleavages, it was impossible for the British officers to fathom their ramifications. No sooner had men been allotted to companies and platoons in a way which was believed to separate out the discordant groups, than some fresh feud would be revealed, destroying the unity of the platoons.

In settling difficulties of this sort, much help was expected from those who had led the Assyrians in their earlier fighting. These men were made Assyrian officers in the battalions, but the lack of understanding between British and Assyrian, which, with the best will in the world on either side, was really inevitable in the circumstances, prevented very much value being got from them at first. The very anxiety of the officer commanding the Contingent to learn all he could about the Assyrians increased the difficulties, as it made him welcome advice from all quarters, and the policy adopted at the instigation of one authority to-day might be reversed a few days later in consideration of the views expressed by another.

There are, undoubtedly, many stout qualities in the Assyrians' character. They showed them in their fighting against the Turks before their flight from Urmia, and they showed them again in 1919, when the surviving Assyrian battalion, after a year's embodiment, acquitted itself most creditably in action against the Kurds in cooperation with British troops.

Yet it is very questionable whether any of the Assyrian battalions would have earned any credit had they been engaged in action within three months of their formation. Starting as they did completely unfamiliar with their men and unable to speak to them directly, the British officers were, for several months, far from having acquired real sympathy with them.

The Assyrians, despite their good points, possessed many characteristics which were the reverse of admirable to British eyes. They seemed to lack the stamina and heart to surmount the trials of inclement weather and hard conditions. They lacked all ability or will to act together ; and in time of hardship one man would

seldom give a helping hand to his fellow, even though it were his own brother.

Without blinding themselves to these shortcomings, British officers needed time and experience to learn that underneath all else lay a pride of race, and a fierce hatred of Turk and Kurd which formed the basis of the fine fighting qualities which the Assyrian undoubtedly possessed.

Such was the material of the Assyrian Contingent. When first taken over by its British officers a battalion consisted of some twelve hundred men, of whom about four hundred were mounted. Very few of the men showed any sign of previous training or discipline. Gradually men and horses were weeded out, and the unit was finally organized in three strong infantry companies and two squadrons of mounted men, each about 150 strong. For two or three months they were trained near Hamadan, while efforts were made to get clothing and equipment manufactured for them in Teheran. The training was confined to such drill as was calculated to establish the rudiments of discipline and controlled movement, physical training and the care of their horses. In their attitude towards their animals the Assyrians differed very little from the Kurds.

Discipline grew gradually as the men grew accustomed to the new conditions in which they found themselves, and began to realize the object of their new organization. The state of discipline varied with the moral of the men, and their moral was most unstable. It was originally hoped to employ the Contingent against the Turkish forces which in the autumn threatened to advance from Tabriz on Kasvin. This prospect the men were ready enough to face, and moral rose. The collapse of the Turkish threat and the conclusion of the Armistice with Turkey, finally disposed of this hope. For a time there then appeared to be a chance that the Contingent might be dispatched back to Urmia under its British officers, to re-establish the Assyrians in their forsaken homes. Even a rumour of this intention raised the men's moral to its highest. This hope too was short lived, and visions of adventurous marches through the wild country towards Urmia were dispelled by orders that the battalions were to march down to Baqubah to the refugee camp. The men's moral vanished like a pricked bubble.

With this dispiriting two hundred miles' march the career of the Assyrian Contingent, as such, closed. Soon after their arrival at Baqubah all but one of the battalions were disbanded.

PROBLEMS OF THE OFFICER RAISING IRREGULARS

The officer who undertakes to raise and to train an irregular unit, under conditions similar to those under which the Kurdish Horse and the Assyrian Contingent were to have been formed, finds himself confronted by a variety of problems, many of which will be rendered more difficult of solution by the necessity of making the unit of service in the shortest possible time. Given adequate time it should be easy to make good irregular units from any race possessed of fighting qualities.

The first and most important problem is to discover a bond, either material or moral, which will assure the allegiance of his men and will create in them a spirit of loyalty to each other and loyalty to their officers. Without such a bond neither the discipline nor the moral of the unit can possess any stability. The rapid formation of New Army units during the war was possible because such a bond existed ready to hand. Regimental tradition was inherited with their names, patriotism and the ardour inspired by national peril were live forces in the blood of the majority of the men. If tradition, patriotism or ardour exist among the material to be formed into irregulars, these qualities must be discovered and moulded into new shape. Too often they will be sought in vain. Unfortunately, advantage cannot be taken of the one motive which can be counted upon to appeal to all Orientals ; looting and the hope of loot must be repressed from the outset.

Personal attachment between the men and their British officers will often prove the only bond which can hold the unit together. Happily justice, honesty and straight dealing can very soon invoke loyal support from the Oriental, and we, as a race, are blessed with the ability to understand and appreciate the qualities of Eastern races to a degree which is at least sufficient to enable us to reciprocate their loyalty. Mutual knowledge and understanding must, however, be developed before the bond of personal attachment can have any real strength, and when men and officers start from a state of mutual ignorance of each other, time must elapse before stability of moral or discipline in the unit can be hoped for.

As soon as some degree of unity on the basis of this personal bond has been attained, it should be possible to strengthen this tie by cultivating pride of race and pride in the unit. The former will often appear as boasting and bravado to European minds, but its value is appreciable.

Another problem which demands an early decision is the extent to which native leaders are to be incorporated in the unit, and the position they are to occupy. These leaders will usually be better educated than their followers, and will be able to give valuable information and advice on all questions demanding local or tribal knowledge. On the other hand, their preconceived ideas are apt to be rather rigid, and if they conflict with what is required for the irregular unit, they are liable to cause trouble. The presence of local leaders in the unit is also likely to accentuate and keep alive the mutual jealousies and dissensions which nearly always prevail among a people bred in a tribal form of life. Whatever the decision in regard to this problem—and it is useless to lay down what that decision should be without consideration of the special circumstances of each case—it is always of the utmost importance to handle the leaders with tact so that their support may be secured. They will often be in a position to make or mar the success of the projected irregulars by their influence on recruiting and on the popularity of the service.

Of the many minor problems of pay, equipment, organization and training, little can usefully be said. They are questions so closely dependent on local conditions that generalities have little value. In deciding them, the necessity for making the service sufficiently attractive to bring in recruits, and to hold them in spite of the ease of desertion, must often be given more weight than is necessary in the case of regular troops.

THE COOPERATION OF SUPERIOR AUTHORITIES

It lies in the power of the military authority under which irregulars are raised to assist the officers commissioned with the work in a very great degree. The extent to which the success of the unit will depend upon the original selection of its officers, needs no emphasis. Where personal influence plays so prominent a part the character of the officers must often be decisive. It is often the case that the officer who is to command the unit is given a large measure of discretion in the selection of his officers, and it is important that this should be so, as therein lies the best hope of a congenial group of officers being formed. The conditions under which irregulars serve will usually be such as to place the officers out of all touch with other white men, and under these circumstances dissensions easily grow acute and react unfavourably through the unit.

In the hasty raising of a new irregular unit many minor questions connected with pay, establishment and conditions of service arise, on which the decisions will ultimately require authorization by higher authority. The prestige of the commanding officer among his men will very soon be weakened if every small point raised by them has to be deferred until a ruling can be obtained from headquarters. The delegation of some degree of financial responsibility to him would usually enable the commanding officer to make these small decisions himself ; and as his men learn that they may expect a prompt and definite answer to their petitions, his position will be strengthened.


It is not to be expected that the standard of discipline in an irregular unit will be high. The attainment of a degree of discipline which will enable the officers to control movements in the field, and will ensure order and system in camp is all that can at first be aimed at. The training should be carried out well away from the neighbourhood of regular troops ; for there will be many minor misdemeanours which, when they occur in the vicinity of standing camps, must be checked, though they might better be allowed to pass unnoticed in an independent camp.

Where a political service is in existence the close cooperation of the Political Officer will be essential to the successful raising of an irregular unit. The officer raising the unit will at first depend almost entirely upon him for knowledge of local conditions and personalities ; and it will only be through him that recruiting can be effective. When men desert it will be through the Political Officer that the commanding officer will endeavour to recover them ; and it is to him that he will turn for information as to the attitude of neighbouring tribes or the movement of hostile forces. It is well to realize from the first the extent of the help which will be required from the Political Officer.

In the raising of irregulars, as in so many other spheres, the help which superior authorities can give, depends upon their ability to realize the situation and difficulties of the officer who is actually raising the unit. Appreciation of the great part which the personal influence of the officers must play, of the importance of freedom from restraint and convention, and of the value of a definite and consistent policy, will go a long way towards ensuring helpful action.

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Of the two examples which have been given, neither was a great success ; and throughout this article the difficulties and trials



[To face page 96.]

of the officer employed with irregulars figure more prominently than do the attractions of his life. Both the difficulties and the trials are too easily overlooked at the outset. The "A" Staff, wrestling with the problem of man-power, sees an easy solution in the raising of irregulars. The officer, tired of the rigid monotony of life with his battalion, thinks only of freedom and adventure when names are called for for service with irregulars. It is as well that the other side of the picture should also be appreciated.

Given time, the right type of officers and fair conditions, irregular troops can be raised who will acquit themselves with credit and pull their weight. As for the life, it possesses all the freedom from convention and all the possibility of adventure that ever an officer, tired of a monotonous existence, could desire. It will, perhaps, carry him into almost unexplored country, it will give full play to his individuality, and resource, it may fulfil his most romantic dreams, but there will also be a few nightmares !

AEROPLANES IN FUTURE WARFARE

BY CAPTAIN MCA. HOGG, M.C., Royal Engineers

"So whosoever shall entertain high and vaporous imaginations, instead of a laborious and sober inquiry of truth, shall beget hopes and beliefs of strange and impossible shapes."—BACON.

I. A BASIS OF DISCUSSION

THERE has been much controversy concerning the effects upon future warfare of an increased use of aeroplanes. Unfortunately, much of the discussion has been based upon two sets of ideas so widely separated that no progress has resulted. On the one hand, bigoted conservatives with little knowledge of, and less curiosity about, the powers of aircraft, refuse to consider the possibility of any fundamental changes in our present and past methods of waging war. On the other, enthusiastic radicals, strong in their knowledge of the capabilities of aeroplanes and drawing freely upon their imagination, propound fantastic theories which bear small relation to facts. The zeal of the latter strengthens the obstinacy of the former. Each is a danger.

It is the purpose of the writer of this article to find a common ground of agreement by basing all deductions upon accomplished facts, which have not yet received the attention they appear to merit. The more obvious and generally accepted uses of aeroplanes, therefore, will not be discussed, and the writer will direct his argument mainly towards the effects of aeroplanes upon land warfare. Little will be said of visionary schemes for the replacement of armies and navies by air fleets.

II. THE CHARACTERISTICS OF AEROPLANES

Advantages.—The chief advantages of aeroplanes are, first, speed; secondly, immunity from interference by hostile land and sea forces when flying at a height; and thirdly, great radius of action from a base without land or sea communications.

Disadvantages.—Their chief disadvantages are, first, the necessity of suitable spaces of ground for their taking off and alighting; secondly, their inability to remain motionless in the air; and thirdly, their limited weight-carrying power. In addition, aeroplanes depend

upon the existence of ground establishments which must be securely guarded by ground troops and generously supplied with ground methods of communication. These ground establishments are very lacking in mobility.

It will be advisable to specify these limitations more definitely.

Landing Grounds.—An area of fairly smooth and level ground, five hundred yards square, is required for taking off and for landing. It is not essential that it should be a prepared aerodrome. A narrower strip of ground will serve the purpose, provided its length be in the direction of the wind.

Efforts being made to perfect the helicopter encourage the belief that the capacity to hover will be gained before long, but this is not yet an accomplished fact.

Weight-carrying Capacity.—For the purpose of this discussion, the limit of weight-carrying capacity of an aeroplane will be taken as the equivalent of twenty fully-equipped infantrymen or 2 tons of bombs or other stores. Actually, these figures are well within the powers of modern aeroplanes.* It is important, however, to realize that the imposition of a limit upon the capacity of a single aeroplane does not affect the number of aeroplanes that can be employed. It is proposed to consider the contingency of a nation employing one or more fleets, each consisting of 200 heavy aeroplanes, in addition to a great strength of aeroplanes of the lighter types.

Radius of Action.—The radius of action of aeroplanes will be taken as being 250 miles from their aerodromes. This figure, also, is well within the limits of present-day performances in a temperate climate.

It will be advisable at this stage to meet two objections that suggest themselves to the possibility of employing aeroplanes in these numbers. The first is lack of ground space on the aerodrome. It is clear that the home aerodrome presents no difficulty. The difficulty of lack of space on the distant landing ground can be overcome by organizing the landing in accordance with a timetable. The second possible objection is on the ground of the large output of aeroplanes and pilots entailed. To any who care to study the British output during the Great War, the invalidity of this will be apparent.† It would be a sad state of affairs if, in the

* In the U.S.A. an aeroplane bomb weighing 10,000 lbs. is under construction. See "The Fighting Forces," March, 1924, "Britain's Air Problem."

† According to the "Statistics of the Military Effort of the British Empire during the Great War," 10,938 aeroplanes were dispatched to the various British fronts in 1917. The wastage for 1917 is not given, but for the first eleven months of 1918 British aeroplanes in France lost about 7 per cent. per week of machines that went up. Figures for the output of pilots are also given.

next war, we were to fall short of the standard of 1917 and 1918.

Definition of Air Superiority.—Finally, before the writer proceeds to deduce the powers of aeroplanes, he must define what is meant by air superiority, upon which these powers will largely depend. In its widest sense command of the air is no more obtainable than is absolute command of the sea. Air superiority may be defined, therefore, as that degree of predominance over hostile aircraft which will enable its possessor to establish practical command of the air, for a limited period, in any region within the radius of action of his aeroplanes.

III. FUTURE USES OF AEROPLANES IN WAR

As Bombers.—Given air superiority, it is possible to bomb an enemy's *personnel* or material, using explosive, gas or incendiary bombs, whichever may be the most suitable. The effect of bombing on ground troops depends upon their degree of concentration and upon the available cover from view or against air attack. Gas bombs, however, will usually be a useful weapon for the denial to an enemy, either partial or complete, of areas of ground. In gas bombing accuracy is not essential, and the direction of the wind, also, is of minor importance. Against the civil population, especially among civilized states, far-reaching results are to be expected. The civil population mostly dwells in large concentrations, it is unorganized and undisciplined, and it usually includes the less hardy elements of the nation. The severe bombing of a large town, say 300 tons a day for several days, can scarcely fail to produce complete panic, coupled possibly with food riots and revolution.* While it is not always advantageous to a nation that its enemy's government should be overthrown, it will be admitted that the disadvantage lies mainly with the victim of revolution. Notable examples of the effects of revolution occurred in the Great War.

Of the effects of bombing on material targets it is possible to speak with some certainty. Between the 31st of May, 1915, and the 20th of May, 1918, the Germans carried out air raids over the London County Council area with forces estimated at 13 Zeppelins and 128 aeroplanes. From our present knowledge of the capabilities of these aircraft, it can be deduced that the total weight of bombs dropped can scarcely have exceeded 300 tons. This is less than the weight that could be dropped in a single raid by a modern air fleet.

* The figure 300 tons allows for 25 per cent. of the bombers failing to penetrate to the objective. A fleet of 200 machines is assumed,

Some interesting figures, relating to the air raids of the period mentioned, have been compiled. The number of bombs dropped is estimated to have been 355 of the incendiary type and 567 of the explosive variety. The results were, 224 fires, 174 buildings completely destroyed and 619 buildings seriously damaged. The money value of the damage done is estimated at somewhat over £2,000,000 sterling, but, as this damage was spread over a period of three years, we are inclined, perhaps unwisely, to disparage the effects of aerial bombing.

Of the effects of bombing, upon the output of munitions, we can be equally certain. A recent writer * has stated :

"In 1916, hostile aircraft approached the Cleveland district in thirteen different weeks, which reduced the year's output in that district by 390,000 tons (of pig iron), or one-sixth of the annual output. In certain armament works it was observed that on the days following raids, skilled men made more mistakes in precision work than usual, the quality of work done was inferior, while air raids made a constant output impossible."

It must be emphasized that these German air raids were insignificant in comparison with the air raids of the future. Bearing in mind the effects upon the operations of the Expeditionary Force in France caused by minor industrial troubles in England during the Great War, it is easy to picture the results of any wholesale stoppage in the output of munitions as will almost certainly result from the air raids of the next war.

The objection will perhaps be raised that the situations depicted make no allowance for the anti-aircraft defensive measures of the victim, or for the offensives which he may be launching with his land and sea forces. The answer to the first of these objections, as the Great War showed, is that the only effective defence against air attack is a vigorous air offensive. The enemy's aeroplanes must be sought out and destroyed, either in the air or on their aerodromes. During the Great War it was found that no passive defence could deter resolute raiders. On an average, 75 per cent. of the attackers could penetrate a highly organized defence.

The present writer, moreover, has pre-supposed the possession of air superiority by the attacker, and the consequent power to establish local command of the air over the objective for a limited period.†

The reply to the second objection is that offensives cannot be

* See "Some Reflections on Air Warfare," *Edinburgh Review*, January, 1924.

† It must be remembered that air superiority, once gained, will have to be retained by constant air offensives.

undertaken successfully by armies that lack munitions, as was shown by the Russian Armies during the late war which, even before their moral had been sapped by propaganda, were constantly defeated by inferior forces, largely owing to their lack of munitions. The necessity of secure bases and assured munition supplies for the successful prosecution of naval operations does not admit of argument.

To sum up this aspect of the problem, the intensive bombing use of aeroplanes will so paralyze the activities of the defender's forces by land, sea and air, as to render him an easy prey for the attacker's forces. The latter will be free to operate in the same three elements, unhampered by shortage of munitions, disorganization of higher command and lack of bases.

As a Means of Transportation.—The utility of aeroplanes in transporting troops depends upon the existence of a practicable landing ground near the desired destination. In a military operation it will be essential that the destination be so chosen that the troops can be landed and given time to form up with comparative immunity from hostile interference. Within these limitations, a nation which is well provided with troop-carrying aeroplanes will often find the opportunity to transport a brigade of infantry, in one trip, to an area where its presence may be decisive. Such operations may be combined with offensives by land and sometimes by sea. The possibilities which this opens up are evident in such operations as an opposed landing on a beach, the forcing of a river crossing, the cutting of an enemy's lines of communication, and the attack on a highly organized defensive position. The last mentioned is of particular interest after the experiences of the Great War. On the Western Front, the right flank of the German position rested upon the sea, and its left flank upon a neutral country which it was not intended to violate. Neither flank could be turned and a deadlock ensued. The future use of aircraft on the lines now being considered will open up a third flank, the air. The side which possesses air superiority will be secure on this flank, but its enemy will be peculiarly vulnerable. In a position of wide extent, moreover, the particular portion of the air flank that will be turned will be unknown to the defender except by conjecture.

It may be argued that a force of a single brigade will have little effect in a theatre of war where a hundred divisions are employed. On the other hand, unless the distance to be covered is great, the air fleet will be able to make several trips in a day. If more than

one fleet (of 200 aeroplanes) is available, it will be possible to move the infantry of several divisions in a single day. Apart from this, the effect of landing even a small force will be out of all proportion to its strength if its objective be well chosen.

The landing of a force of this nature, without artillery, in an isolated position in hostile territory, will perhaps seem to be a sacrifice of doubtful value. Nevertheless, a surprise attack on the enemy from an unexpected direction is in complete accord with the principles of war, especially if the objective be of vital importance. Napoleon once said that "the secret of war lies in the communications." Hamley amplified this by saying that :

"when two armies are manœuvring against each other's flanks or communications, that army whose flank or communications are most immediately threatened will abandon the initiative and conform to the movement of its adversary."

If these two statements are accepted, it must be admitted that an army on the offensive which lands a detachment at a vital point in its adversary's rear, has a considerable prospect of success.

The absence of artillery support will be partly compensated for by aerial bombing. The air-borne detachment will be maintained in food and ammunition by air transport. Wireless inter-communication will enable its operations to be coordinated with those of the main army. In such cases the decision will be gained by the action of the main army, made easier by the action of the air-borne detachment.

The employment of aeroplanes for the transport of stores must now be considered. It must first be realized that the influence of the force of gravity precludes air transport from ever supplanting sea and land transport as a permanent measure. Still, a lift of 400 tons is enough for the essential needs of two or three divisions for a day.* Air transport is thus capable of maintaining appreciable forces for short periods. Smaller detachments, operating at the end of a difficult line of communication, may well be maintained for weeks on end by air. Stores, moreover, can be dropped by parachute, and a landing ground is not therefore essential.†

Necessity of Caution in accepting Advanced Doctrines not based upon Facts.—In picturing the influence of an extended use of air-

* With the progress of mechanicalization, the daily tonnage required by a division will decrease.

† The landing of stores by parachute is a practicable method of procedure. Perfection will come with practice.

craft in land warfare, it is necessary to be chary about accepting the dangerous doctrines put forward by impatient extremists, doctrines based upon imagination, and not upon facts. Such persons would have us believe that land armies are already obsolete, and that air services alone are of value.

Apart from the dependence of aircraft upon ground establishments, it has yet to be shown that a Great Power will admit defeat until compelled by the advance of hostile armies to do so. It is true that there are certain countries such as Great Britain, which, not being self-contained, could be starved into surrender. There are no grounds at the present time, however, for supposing that this could be effected by aircraft alone.

The control of Iraq by the Royal Air Force affords us a modern example on a small scale of the powers of aircraft, coupled with its limitations. The Air Officer Commanding has at his disposal a small force of ground troops and a relatively large number of aeroplanes. Of the latter, the greatest concentration is near Baghdad. The main artery of communications by which munitions reach Baghdad is the railway from Basra. It is evident that the efficiency of the Air Force depends ultimately upon the maintenance of this railway. Should this railway be cut at any time, nothing short of ground activity could restore it, however great the punishment which the aeroplanes could inflict on the offenders.

It is of interest, moreover, to notice the course adopted by the Air Officer Commanding in the winter of 1922-1923, when he undertook operations against the adherents of Sheikh Mahmoud in the Kurdistan hills. Had there been any truth in the theory that aeroplanes can carry out all the duties hitherto assigned to ground troops, except the actual guarding of aerodromes, we may be quite certain that an officer of the Air Vice-Marshal's knowledge and experience would have put this theory into practice. He would have used his ground troops solely for protective duties, and would have attacked with his air forces.

Actually, he concentrated two columns of ground troops, and with them, carried out an offensive by normal methods. At the same time he made full use of the relatively strong air forces at his disposal in close cooperation with the two columns. The speed and ease with which the objectives were gained was largely due to the fine work of the Royal Air Force, but nevertheless ground troops were necessary. But for the presence of a strong force of aeroplanes, the operations would have necessitated the use of a much stronger force of ground troops and would have lasted a great deal

longer; casualties, mainly due to sickness, would have been heavier and the cost of the expedition much increased.

Among the many interesting features of this campaign were the uses of aeroplanes for personal reconnaissance by commanders, for effecting personal liaison between commanders who were mutually inaccessible by land, for the evacuation of casualties and for transport purposes. These features are undoubtedly precursors of future developments on a larger scale.

Anti-Aircraft Measures.—While it is to be expected that the purely passive measures of anti-aircraft defence will continue to develop, still, as has been pointed out, practical experience has shown that no passive defence will stop determined aviators. If the present writer is to confine his arguments to what can be deduced from established facts, it will be unprofitable to consider what anti-aircraft measures may be invented in the future. From the point of view of the rivalry between the aeroplane and the anti-aircraft gun, the advantage has always been with the aeroplane. The force of gravity and the fact that the aeroplane is a moving target, whereas the gun is a stationary one, render it improbable that the advantage will ever be transferred to the gun. The aeroplane can always rise out of effective range; the anti-aircraft defence enjoys no corresponding advantage.

It is questionable whether an efficient passive anti-aircraft defence, if it should ever be devised, will be as economical in *personnel* and material as an air fleet of the same defensive value. Before the advent of aeroplanes it had been admitted that the true solution of the problem of coast defence lay in the destruction of the enemy's fleet at sea, and not in the passive defence by coast artillery. The problem of surface defence against aeroplane attack seems to offer a close analogy. Again, the solution lies in the vigorous offensive and in the destruction of the enemy's forces at a distance. In both cases, certain points will be of such importance as to justify the maintenance of arrangements for passive defence as an additional precaution.

Until the present radius of action of aeroplanes has increased, nations will find it advisable to locate their most important industrial establishments, docks and other vital centres as far as possible from the frontiers across which air attack is most probable. Under present conditions this will be an effective measure of safety.

The construction of underground hangars from which aeroplanes will emerge by elevators, or by ramps which will enable them to reach the air at flying speed, appears to be a probable

development. It is certainly a possible one. It is not difficult to picture a hillside from which tunnels will lead into an underground hangar. The same idea applies equally to essential factories, but expense will probably limit developments in this direction.

The effect of incendiary bombs will be lessened in course of time by the tendency of modern engineering practice towards fire-proof reinforced concrete construction.

There is another aspect of the anti-aircraft defence problem which deserves mention. Consider a country over which an enemy has gained air superiority. The commander of the ground troops will be ever apprehensive of air-borne attack in his rear. The guards of important points, such as railway bridges, will have to be increased above what would normally suffice, and reserves will have to be placed to meet this new threat. It follows that the possession by one side of air superiority will impose on its enemy a considerable dispersion of troops at the expense of the armies on the ground front.

IV. CONCLUSION

The attempt which has been made to forecast some aspects of the next great war leads logically to a statement of the preparatory measures which should be undertaken in peace time. Financial stringency will, as usual, be an obstacle.

The first necessity, upon the outbreak of war, will be the establishment of air superiority. This will demand the maintenance in time of peace of a fleet of aeroplanes of the lighter types (day bombers and fighters), of a size adequate to deal with every likely hostile combination within striking distance of the British Isles and of vital portions of the Empire. The details of such a fleet, and the proportions which should be maintained as active and reserve units, are points upon which only the expert is qualified to speak.

The second necessity, once a certain degree of air superiority has been obtained, will be fleets of heavier aeroplanes. It will be convenient if, as seems probable, these can be built so as to be readily adaptable for use as heavy bombers, troop-carriers and transporters of stores. It is unlikely that finance will permit the maintenance of these machines on a scale approaching the needs of war. There are two methods of overcoming this difficulty. The first consists in the preparation of detailed plans in peace time for the immediate expansion, on mobilization, of our aeroplane output,

by the adaptation of existing engineering factories to this purpose. This method is particularly suitable for an industrial nation such as Great Britain. The alternative lies in the payment of subsidies to commercial air transportation companies, in return for which they will guarantee to build their machines to Air Ministry specification and to give the Air Ministry the right to impress them in emergency. This method, though attractive at first sight, does not, on closer examination, appear suitable for the British Isles. Commercial aviation tends towards the adoption of long routes and the rejection of short ones. It prefers overland routes. Short routes do not offer any prospect of saving time, which in civil life is the main inducement to the use of air transportation. The time taken by passengers and cargo to move from their original position to the departure aerodrome, added to the time taken to move from the arrival aerodrome to their ultimate destination, more than counter-balances the saving of time by flying over ground methods of transportation. There is, therefore, no great demand for internal air routes in the British Isles. Furthermore, we are placed at one end of a limited number of external long overland routes. Commercial aviation, then, seems to have greater prospects of success in continental countries where numerous long routes radiate in all directions.

Whichever method is adopted as a basis for expansion for heavy aircraft, it is advisable that we should maintain in peace time as great a strength of these machines as financial conditions permit. With these heavy aircraft we must practise troop-carrying, transportation of stores (including dropping by parachute) and bombing of targets representing industrial areas. The Army and the Air Force will need training, both from their respective individual points of view and from a combined point of view.

BATTALION ORGANIZATION IN TIME OF PEACE

BY LIEUTENANT F. A. S. CLARKE, D.S.O., The Essex Regiment

AN article bearing this title by Captain Beckwith-Smith appeared in the July number of the *Army Quarterly*, on a subject which is of great interest to officers of units serving at home. The present writer is of opinion that whilst officers generally will agree with the contentions expressed therein, it appears that certain statements require examination and that the solution of our difficulties advocated is not entirely sound.

The author of the article puts the question—"What, then, it may be fairly asked, is the use of an organization which for the major part of the year is purely a paper one?"—and then proceeds to answer it in a manner which leaves no room for doubt as to the necessity for the existing organization. He then goes on to state that the organization becomes a farce in certain circumstances owing to a shortage of non-commissioned officers and men. Surely the organization is not to blame for this, but rather the way in which it is administered and the large numbers of men who are taken away from duty throughout the year for employments, not only in the garrison but in the unit as well. It should be noted, however, that the formation of a headquarters wing has not relieved companies of employed men.

It is not only in the training season that the shortage is felt, during the winter the company probably gets most of its men for a month, after which most of its non-commissioned officers and men are not seen again on parade until company training, as they are filling the jobs vacated by men of other companies on training or furlough. A month is all too short for the many things a man should be taught during individual training,* weapon training absorbs the bulk of the time, as owing to the short time spent at depôts many men have a very imperfect knowledge of the various weapons.

In the conditions prevailing at the present time only one company at a time can be struck off for training during the winter, as allowing for one on furlough, the other two are required to find the various regimental and garrison fatigues, duties and employments. But it

* See "Infantry Training," vol. i., section 7.

is not so much the organization of a battalion which is to blame for this as the system that allows so many men to be employed on work which is not training for war. Can it be said that we make the best use of our man-power? Major-General Burnett-Hitchcock, in a lecture delivered in the Aldershot Command, asked: "How many of our men do a job for about an hour daily?"—and regimental officers could give him a good answer.* The shortage of men on parade is not entirely attributable to either lack of numbers or to the organization of the battalion.

So far the present writer is in general agreement with Captain Beckwith-Smith, but now comes the question of the caderizing of weak units. Captain Beckwith-Smith made three suggestions, viz.: (i) to caderize a certain number of sections in platoons; (ii) to caderize a platoon or two in each company; and (iii) to caderize one or more companies.

If sections are to be caderized, which of them are to be retained—both light automatic, or one rifle and one light automatic? We are not told. The platoon is the tactical unit, on the efficiency of which depends the value of the battalion. Why, therefore, should it be desirable partly to caderize it and so to destroy its entity? With regard to platoons in a company, if one be caderized and consist of a commander, four section leaders and a runner, it can take part in collective training with the use of pole targets or flags. The practice for the leaders, whilst not so useful as the command of men, can include all the problems of ground formations and fire which will confront them in war, and they will be required to make decisions as if actually in command of men, in cooperation with the other units of the company. Caderizing companies, Captain Beckwith-Smith states, is preferable to the other methods owing to administrative reasons; why is not obvious. The pay, equipment, clothing, etc., of three platoons of twenty or twenty-four other ranks and one of six, presents no more difficulty than the administration of four of approximately the same strength. Captain Beckwith-Smith, moreover, does not tell us what part this cadre company or companies is or are to play in battalion and other collective training. The command and administration of four pole target platoons on training and manœuvres does not appear to ensure an effective preparation of a company staff for war.

* One cause of the shortage of men on parade is due to the method of dealing with sick. In some stations a man reporting sick with a trifling complaint parades before the medical officer at 9 a.m. and returns about noon, thus missing all the morning parades, possibly in order to receive a pill bearing a familiar number,

The use of a cadre company for instructional purposes impinges on the duties and responsibilities of company commanders and on that of the battalion training cadre, which now performs such excellent work. Furthermore, it would appear to be a dull existence for the four platoon and sixteen section leaders of this company to learn how to command for half the year, and, then to command nothing.

The present writer suggests that, taking everything into consideration, if caderization has to be resorted to, the best method is to caderize one or two platoons per company according to its strength. Much of our trouble will pass when some solution of the employment problem is found, and signs are not wanting that the matter is under consideration.

Captain Beckwith-Smith, in a further attempt to convince those who still might remain unconverted, points out some further defects in the organization :

" Under it," he writes, " a company commander has to a great extent to train his officers and non-commissioned officers ' how ' to command at the same time as they are actually supposed to be ' in command.' Thus, for instance, in an advanced stage of company training, a company commander may find himself deprived—owing to sickness or some other cause—of a platoon commander. The place of that platoon commander may have to be taken by some young sergeant who has never received any instruction in ' how ' to command a platoon, the result being that the company commander, instead of being able to devote the whole of his time to the training of his company, has to attend partly to the training of the platoon commander concerned. Much more is this the case if a casualty occurs, as it more frequently does, to a section commander."

Now, in such a case the fault is hardly that of the existing organization, but rather of the company concerned. Is it not laid down in " Infantry Training " that before troops are employed, the scheme should be considered on the ground and the leaders required to give their solutions, which are criticized and the correct action explained ? * What are we to do in war if in time of peace we are thrown out of gear by the sickness of a platoon commander ? If this young non-commissioned officer is the understudy to the platoon leader, he should be capable of commanding the platoon,† if he is weak, he requires more practice, and, in any case, should not have reached the rank of sergeant without the necessary training for the responsibilities of that rank. If the platoon commander is

* See " Infantry Training," vol. i., section 135, para. 10.

† See " Infantry Training," vol. i., section 4, para. 4 (vii).

away, his place should be taken by the next senior, even if only a corporal ; it is training for war. Surely it is contrary to the principles of infantry organization to borrow a leader from another unit, as is suggested by the writer ; as a matter of fact it is practically forbidden in " Infantry Training."

The battalion instructional cadre is criticized by Captain Beckwith-Smith who contends that it suffers from the following disadvantages : (a) it instructs mainly in weapon training and not in the art of commanding a section or platoon as a whole ; (b) it only carries out its functions during the furlough season ; and (c) it withdraws still more officers and non-commissioned officers from the already understaffed companies. The present writer maintains first, that this is not the case ; the cadre is intended to instruct in weapon training and section leading, platoon leading is best learnt by tactical exercises which should be held during the winter months, and in the actual handling of the unit during company and other training ; secondly, it is only required to function during the furlough season as at other times there should be nobody available ; thirdly, it should only withdraw one officer and four or five other ranks from companies, one of whom is probably the C.S.M.I.M., and that at a time when they can best be spared.

The present writer also dares to claim to be a practical soldier and yet to disagree in some respects with the article under consideration, and to state that except in extreme cases, such as that of a battalion under three hundred strong, the present organization is quite workable. In extreme cases the caderization of two platoons per company is suggested.

Few infantry officers will fail to agree with Captain Beckwith-Smith's desire—

" to draw attention to the effects of the shortage of men in that branch of the Army where that shortage is probably greatest, and to emphasize the necessity for recognition in high places, of the difficulties which this shortage, combined with parsimonious peace establishments, creates for the regimental officer."

The present writer has perhaps been somewhat critical of the solutions of our difficulties suggested and of certain statements made by Captain Beckwith-Smith, but his object is the same, with the added intention of drawing attention to the necessity of reducing the number of non-commissioned officers and men employed on duties other than training for war or the necessary services which enable a unit to keep the field.

A LETTER OF ADVICE TO A NEWLY APPOINTED ADJUTANT IN THE TERRITORIAL ARMY

DEAR M—,—I have just been selected for service with the Territorial Army, and am to take up my new job next month. I know nothing whatever about the Territorials, as although I am serving with my regiment at home one seldom sees or hears anything of them. You have been with them some time I believe and I would be very grateful if you could tell me something about them, and give me a few hints as to the best lines to work on. I know all about their conditions of service, liabilities, etc., as this is all contained in the T.A. Regulations; but I know nothing whatever about their training, and this is what I should chiefly like your advice about.—Yours sincerely, "X."

DEAR "X,"—I will certainly do what I can to assist you. I have given great thought to the problem of how best to train the Territorial soldier, and I am convinced that he should be trained on similar lines to those adopted in the Regular Army. Some people will not agree and will urge that the Territorial Army requires special treatment, but the main principles of training apply equally to all types of soldiers, the important point being to ensure that the methods adopted are varied to suit the special conditions of each case.

I will try and explain to you the general lines on which we work; we are getting quite good results and each year should show added improvement.

When I came to this Division I found a new Divisional Commander; neither of us had ever had anything to do with the Territorial Army before.

It appeared to us that our units were trying to do what is not really possible; they went to camp in the summer and tried to do collective training without having first carried out any individual instruction of the leaders, *i.e.* the officers and non-commissioned

officers. On arrival in camp training was considerably hampered because the leaders were unable to instruct their men, and the first few days had to be spent in trying to effect some improvement in this respect. Now, as you know well, the underlying principle of all training is the instruction of the leaders before they in turn teach their men. A well-known corps commander in France used to go about saying: "Teach the teachers how to teach before they try to teach the Tommies," and he was right.

The first thing we had to do was to make an attempt to organize some form of individual training of the leaders during the winter; it must be done then, as in the spring and summer the men attend for their "drills" and the leaders are required to assist in their instruction.

It was not easy to get this going; there was no precedent for it and all ranks of the Territorial Army are very conservative. However, once we got them to realize that it was a good thing, they took it up and got down to it splendidly. Every drill-hall was provided with a sand-table and evening classes were formed for officers and non-commissioned officers; it was made quite clear that attendances at these classes did not count as "drills," since that would have defeated our object. By-the-bye, the word "drill" is really a misnomer, as the fact that a man has to attend so many drills is apt to be taken too literally. "Periods of Instruction," or some such term, would be better, I think, as there are many other things besides drill which the Territorial soldier has to learn. Don't think that I discourage drill; on the contrary, I think it is most valuable. But any high standard of drill in the Territorial Army is almost impossible and it is really waste of time to try and obtain it. We encourage a certain amount of drill during the annual camp, especially to start with, as it is a great assistance in getting rid of that "sloppy" look which the Territorial has when he first turns out for his annual training. It is, however, quite possible to obtain a reasonably high standard in tactical training, and to my mind it is better to concentrate on that and not to devote too much time to drill.

But to return to the subject. I have told you how we try and train our leaders in the winter. The collective training season begins in the spring; it is commonly called the drill season, since it is the period during which the men attend to put in their required number of "drills."

The ideal during collective training is that the fire unit leader, who has himself been trained during the winter, should train his

own unit and learn to work in cooperation with other units. Unfortunately, this ideal is not always possible of attainment, since it rarely happens that all the members of a section attend at the drill-hall on the same night. But it is the ideal and so we aim at it, although up to date we have not had any great success in this respect. It is important that self-reliance and the habit of command should be developed in our junior leaders, and this will not be brought about unless we can devise some methods of conducting our collective training which are based on this principle. You will be told at first that it is not possible, but don't believe it. With good organization, and, more important still, with hearty cooperation on the part of all ranks, it can be done; but unfortunately there is no precedent for it and so it will take time.

My General considered it important that there should be a common tactical doctrine throughout the Division; every unit ought to sing the same tactical song and to the same tune. Probably the best way of inculcating this doctrine is by means of exercises without troops. We have a Divisional Exercise every year which is attended by all unit commanders and adjutants; it is held in the place where we are going for our annual camp as all the commanding officers and adjutants can then reconnoitre the camps and training areas and prepare their training programmes in advance. Brigade commanders hold similar exercises at intervals throughout the year, in their own areas, and battalion exercises are also encouraged; by this means the doctrine permeates slowly but surely throughout the Division, and officers learn the correct interpretation of the principles laid down in the training manuals.

We encourage the use of the sand-table and have provided one in every drill-hall in the Division. It is just the thing for the Territorial Army, in which most of the training is done at night-time; also in our area most of the drill-halls are in towns, where no ground is available for tactical work. In order to show officers how to teach on the sand-table I went on a lecturing tour throughout the Division last winter. I gave a series of four lectures to the officers of each battalion, and officers of units of the Divisional Troops attended at the most convenient centres. The lectures were all given round the sand-table and I had a précis of them printed in order to save officers having to take notes. I took advantage of this tour to inculcate our tactical doctrine, and I think there is no doubt now that every unit in the Division is working on similar lines. It was an exhausting task and I was completely "done in" at the end of them; but it was well worth it.

I do not know if you are up to date regarding the reorganization of infantry dépôts. These have now a definite responsibility with regard to assisting in the training of T.A. officers and non-commissioned officers, and the closest liaison should exist between dépôts and their Territorial battalions. Whenever the dépôt training cadre is unemployed it is available to conduct a class for officers or non-commissioned officers in weapon training or in tactical subjects ; here, then, is one of the best means you have of improving the efficiency of your leaders, and every advantage should be taken of it. You will no doubt have several tactical exercises without troops during the year. Whenever you do so, try and get the dépôt commander to send one of his officers to attend it, or, better still, to come himself ; a whisky and soda is said to be one of the best aids to liaison, and week-end exercises can be very cheery shows if well organized.

The annual camp is really the culminating point of the whole year's training. The training in camp should be mainly tactical as it is difficult to carry out any real systematic tactical work at the home stations. The ideal we aim at in camp is that by the end of the period every officer, non-commissioned officer and man should have a clear idea as to the action of his unit in the various operations of war. We attempt nothing in camp beyond company training, except that each infantry brigade has one brigade day ; similarly each battalion one battalion day, which is spent in rehearsing the part it is to play in the brigade day.

With troops that are not highly trained, such as the Territorial Army, the tactical training in camp is best carried out by means of set pieces ; each scheme is carefully gone through on the ground beforehand by the leaders and a picture is prepared which is unveiled when the scheme is carried out as an operation. In this way mistakes and faults are reduced to a minimum, and the men are not taught false lessons ; it is excellent training for the officers and non-commissioned officers and they are, after all, the most important people. For example, suppose that three days are allotted to the attack. On the first day the company commander takes his officers and non-commissioned officers out to the ground and goes through the scheme with them as an exercise without troops ; each phase is carefully considered and explained and the whole operation is worked out in detail. The men stay in camp and do drill or other work under the permanent staff instructors ; they are not required on the ground as it is the leaders who are being brought into the picture in order that the men may not be taught false lessons.

On the second day the whole company, leaders and men, go out to the ground and carry out the scheme as a drill ; platoon commanders instruct their platoons and frequent pauses are made during which formations, situations, etc., are pointed out and explained.

On the third day the scheme is carried out as an actual operation by the whole company. It is best on this occasion that the company commander should direct the operations, handing over the actual command of the company to the next senior ; he will then be in a position to be able to make good and useful criticisms at the final conference.

To my mind the above method of training gives the best results when troops are not highly trained ; all ranks learn progressively and mistakes and faults are reduced to a minimum. In reality it is merely working on the same principles that were used when we were at school, when we were never given riders in Euclid until we first knew the propositions on which they were based.

There is one further point I should like to mention. The Territorial Army has certain difficulties to contend with which are peculiar to itself, and it may help you if I give you a few points about the most important ones.

First, you must realize that the Territorial Army is a voluntary organization. Theoretically, the orders that you issue have to be obeyed ; but in practice it is not quite so easy as it sounds and there has to be considerable give and take. The main point is to gain the goodwill of all ranks under you ; once you have got that everything becomes quite easy and they will do anything you like. But you have to get their goodwill yourself, and no one else can get it for you ; if you try to drive them, you will fail. Above all, be human with them and remember that they are for the most part busy men in civil life who are voluntarily giving up their spare time to soldiering.

The next difficulty is the officer question. In the first place many units find it very difficult to get young officers to join ; it seems that the present younger generation is somewhat inclined to disregard its responsibilities regarding national defence and is not prepared to give up its spare time to the service of the country, preferring rather to dance and enjoy itself. But having got the officers the next difficulty is to train them. There are certain initial courses which a young officer has to undergo on joining ; he is probably at a very critical period in his business career, struggling to make good against keen competition, and often is quite unable to get leave to attend the courses or perhaps does not like to ask

for it. Such cases require very sympathetic treatment, and it is a mistake to insist on the officer in question attending the course at once ; if you do, he will have no alternative but to resign and you may lose a good officer. In most cases he will be able to give you an approximate date in the future when he can attend, and you will find that the higher authorities will always accept this if you assure them that the case is a genuine one.

Then there is the question of the training of the non-commissioned officers. I have already mentioned that one of the best means you have of training them is the *dépôt* training cadre, but you will find that it is very difficult to get hold of your best non-commissioned officers for such courses. The reason is that as a general rule your good non-commissioned officer is also a good man in civil life, whose services the employer is loath to lose even for a short period ; the non-commissioned officer who is unemployed and out of a job is always available for *dépôt* courses, but this type is usually not your best non-commissioned officer. The result is that you can rarely send your best non-commissioned officers to the *dépôt* to get them made better ; instead, you have to send the mediocre ones who will not benefit by the course to the same extent, and who may be unable to pass on the knowledge they have gained. Against this, however, you must always remember that you are gradually raising the general standard of the non-commissioned officer in your unit, which in itself is an excellent thing.

The last difficulty I will mention concerns the specialists, such as machine gunners, signallers, transport *personnel*, etc. My own view is that in the Territorial Army the specialists should always be kept up to strength and a high standard aimed at ; they take a long time to train, time which may not always be available on mobilization, whereas the men in the rifle and Lewis-gun sections can be trained in a far shorter period. A battalion with a good establishment of trained specialists, and in which particular attention has been paid to the efficiency of the officers and non-commissioned officers will be fit to take the field in a very short time after mobilization ; it is the specialists and the leaders who take the time to train, and, if their training is neglected in peace, the unit will suffer on mobilization. It is not easy to get good men for training as specialists ; a high standard of intelligence is required and this does not always exist. It would seem at first sight that the standard of intelligence among the rank and file of the Territorial Army is certainly as high as that existing in the Regular Army, but I am not

so certain that this is the case. It has to be remembered that on joining the Regular Army a man is made to continue his education until he obtains a 2nd class certificate ; it is far easier to find good material for specialists among such men than it is in a Territorial unit in which the bulk of the men have probably had no educational training since they left school on reaching the age limit laid down by law. Good instructors are a further difficulty ; it is easy to get vacancies for courses but difficult to get good men to fill them. When you can, always send to a course a man who has already a good knowledge of the subject in question ; such a man gets the best benefit from the course and will be returned to you a far better instructor than one who goes to a course with only sufficient knowledge to pass the entrance examination.

I find the Territorial Army most interesting. The officers, as a general rule, are keen and most appreciative of assistance in improving their military knowledge. The chief point to remember is that this assistance must be given in their time and not in yours ; if they see that you are simply out to help them and will subordinate your convenience to suit them, they are most grateful. I often wonder why they join the Territorial Army ; they get nothing out of it, in fact it costs them money. It is really the old Volunteer spirit still existing ; some of our units are very old and have a tremendous *esprit de corps*.

All this is, of course, excellent. The Regular Army should without doubt give of its best to the Territorial Army ; unfortunately this is not always the case, as service in the Territorial Army is regarded by many as a backwater. I always tell our Division that there is only one Army in England, and we all belong to it, whether we are in the Regulars, Territorials or O.T.C. In that Army there are two categories : (1) those who devote all their time to soldiering, *i.e.* the Regular Army ; and (2) those whose main work is some other profession, and who only soldier in their spare time. Personally, I take off my hat every time to those in the second category. And I think that it is up to those in the first category to help them all they can ; for this reason I was glad to see in your letter that you say you have been " selected " for service with the Territorial Army, as that is without question the right principle.—Yours sincerely, " M."

TALES OF INTELLIGENCE

No. 6

THE OFFICER'S SERVANT

BY "JABB" (late of the Intelligence Corps)

LIEUTENANT MONSON * had only been in possession of the Military Cross for two or three weeks, when a paragraph appeared in the orders of the Intelligence Corps, dated the 20th of November, 1916, whereby he was promoted to Staff Lieutenant, 1st Class. The fact was welcomed by him, not so much on account of the enhanced status involved, as by reason of the rise in emoluments accruing therefrom. Yet more was to follow. During the ensuing week Colonel Mainwaring sent for "Mungo." After a friendly greeting, Mainwaring informed his visitor that a further change in his fortunes was imminent.

"Monson," he began, "G.H.Q. Intelligence has sent us a wire posting you to Seventh Army Headquarters for 'I.b.' duties. I congratulate you, for there you will be far more your own master, and you will find, I think, a lot of routine work to be systematized. That'll give you a better chance of getting yourself known. I wish you good luck. I'm extremely sorry to lose you, for I know better than anybody else what excellent work you've done." He scrutinized Monson's face for a second; then interpreting aright the look of disappointment that swept over that odd conglomeration of lineaments, he went on in a less official manner.

"My dear boy, I believe you don't care about the change; well, no more do I! You see, if you will go bearding eminent generals and get a Military Cross for your presumption, these things may happen. Then, look at yourself! Here you are going about as a reformed character in 'posh' boots and faultless new breeches; I call that asking for promotion! No, my good fellow, this order's signed by the General—go, you must. Besides, I'm

* This officer was the hero of a previous story in this Series which appeared in the *Army Quarterly*, January, 1923.

not entitled to keep you here as a 1st Class Intelligence officer. You'll have to start to-morrow—no help for it ! ”

Monson, looking yet more dejected, began to plead :

“ It's not that I mind promotion, sir ; rather not ! But I do find it so hard to get on with some people, sir, and I know that Seventh Army staff. I'm certain I shan't get on with them. Can't I chuck the promotion and stay here with you ? Then, sir, it seems such utter foolery. I know the old Hun and his language really well—better than most. . . . No, sir, honestly I do ! I know you're laughing at what you think is rotten swank ! But what's the good of me going to any Army Headquarters where I shall be issuing motor passes and dog licenses and investigating impossible rumours ? I hardly know French and still less French people. . . . ”

“ Now then,” interrupted Colonel Mainwaring, smiling, “ look here ! you're giving yourself away. I was at G.H.Q. when you joined the Intelligence Corps early this year, so I remember your knowledge of French is not so bad as you make out. You've lived in Paris, too, studying chemistry, haven't you ? ”

“ Only a short time, sir ! ” weakly objected Mungo, slowly recognizing that nothing more remained to be said. He was astonished at Mainwaring's memory, and had to admit that for once the “ brass hat ” had bested the Intelligence officer, so he sorrowfully shook hands and went out.

Four days later Lieutenant Monson was installed in ‘ I.b. ’ at Seventh Army Headquarters. There he was left much to himself, for Colonel Samborne, his new chief, besides taking little interest in ‘ I.b. ’ matters, did not feel much sympathetic attraction for his new assistant ; unfortunately, he knew him by reputation only. Notwithstanding, he soon had cause to establish a business connection with him.

From G.H.Q. there had come to Seventh Army Headquarters a summons to investigate a matter described as of some importance. On the 25th and 26th of November—so ran the first G.H.Q. missive, dated the 2nd of December—particulars concerning the losses incurred during the summer fighting by the Seventh Army had appeared in certain foreign papers. This fact pointed to some neutral and allied press representatives having gained information in an irregular manner. The offending journals were : *Le Citoyen de France* and *La Liberté Civique*, both of Paris for the 25th of November ; the *Journal de Lausanne*, published in Switzerland, and the Dutch *Nieuwe Amsterdamsche Courant*, both of the 26th of

November. The details thus revealed no longer possessed much real military value, since they referred to battles then three and four months old. But the awkward truth remained that the figures quoted by all these journals were not only identical, but also tallied precisely with those given in a secret Seventh Army report, which had been signed by Sir Charles Rokeby, the Commander of that Army, on the 19th of November.

Colonel Samborne was now summoned to interview Sir Charles, then in consultation with Major-General Manford, the Chief of his Administrative Staff. Colonel Samborne, on entering his Chief's sanctum, instantly recognized that Manford seemed somewhat nettled at the imputation that lay below the surface of the G.H.Q. communication. In fact, he found his friend in the act of stating his case with some decision, if not with asperity.

"No, sir," he argued with the Chief, "I don't see that we can accept the G.H.Q. story like that. In the first place this is a censor's job and, if that branch chooses to let facts of this kind slip through, it's not our fault. Then, sir, the allied and neutral journalists are under G.H.Q. supervision, and, if they misbehave, I don't see that it has anything to do with us—not in the slightest degree. I would, therefore, suggest that a stiffish reply should be made to G.H.Q. and that it be couched in that sense, but in the most tactful possible way. Shall I or the General Staff take up the matter, sir?"

Sir Charles disliked the episode even more than his subordinate, for it seemed to him unquestionably an aspersion on his staff. Yet he could not agree to let the matter end in the fashion suggested.

"Yes, Manford, I agree with you. But see: in the last paragraph of the G.H.Q. letter it is clearly admitted that the censorship was at fault. What they now want, I think, is some explanation as to how our figures can have been quoted by these foreign papers. There, I think, we must comply. Then, this letter's been to the Chief of Staff; look at the initials. You've got to be very careful. . . . Much as I dislike it, Manford, your branch will have to submit to an investigation. I'm very sorry, but that's my decision."

"Well, sir," struggled Manford, unwilling to yield more than he could, "might I propose, then, that we should answer in a still more conciliatory tone. We can state that the desired investigation is going on and promise a further report. Speaking from experience I fancy that will do the trick." And he smiled sardonically at Samborne, "Perhaps it would be more likely to please G.H.Q.

that Colonel Samborne, as head of I.b., should take in hand the investigation and the reply. My office is at his disposal, if he wishes to go through it, sir."

Shortly after, both officers left the General. Outside Manford was not slow in stating his opinion.

"Look here, Sammy, the sooner we get through this job the better! Will you come round to my office and see how we treated that and all other secret documents. The only people who saw it in my office were myself and Elliot, my sergeant-major. You trust *me*, I suppose; and I will guarantee that Elliot is as straight as they're made—perhaps he's even more methodical and conscientious than either of us. He typed my rough copy, and then, after the chief had signed it, I sealed, registered and sent it off myself. I expect that Elliot can at once put his hand on the G.H.Q. receipt brought back by the despatch rider."

By this time the two had reached the D.A.G.'s, that is, Manford's, office. Colonel Samborne saw Elliot, the warrant officer confidential clerk, asked him a few questions, looked at the safe and the registers. No question but that the office was managed in a highly practical and conscientious manner. Convinced that there could have been no wilful negligence, Samborne withdrew to compose the reply to G.H.Q. It expressed regret, stated that an investigation was in hand, and hinted blandly at a further report. The next day Sir Charles Rokeby signed the document, complimenting Samborne on the tactful and clever answer.

All went well, and the incident was nearly being forgotten, when like a bolt from the blue on the morning of the 18th of December, there came into Samborne's office one Captain Barnsby bearing a letter from the Brigadier-General, Intelligence, at G.H.Q. The missive was terse: on the 15th of December there had again appeared in certain foreign papers a statement concerning an impending reorganization of a number of British divisions; this step, so it was alleged, was necessitated by the battle casualties suffered during the summer fighting. Captain Barnsby was charged to impart all further details of the matter verbally to Sir Charles Rokeby himself, as there were one or two facts which it was thought more prudent not to state too categorically on paper. Accordingly, with some misgivings, Samborne went round to the D.A.G. before facing the Chief. Manford was much put out, since it was his own document that again seemed to have been winded by the foreign papers. The trio were soon in Sir Charles' room. Captain Barnsby was requested to state the case in detail.

The papers, which had published the objectionable matter, were again *La Liberté Civique* and *Le Journal de Lausanne*; the new offenders were *L'Echo Provincial* of Rouen and two Dutch evening papers. Now G.H.Q. had, on the previous afternoon, been able, with the help of the French Press Service, to prove that these reports could only have reached the papers in question through the agency of two particular journalists, who were already being removed from G.H.Q. It was believed that the indiscretions had been achieved by a clever evasion of the censorship. This, however, might be difficult to prove, since the foreign papers would never reveal their channels of information. The French journals, also, were distinctly antagonistic to the censorship and had in the past connived at evading its regulations. The matter was not considered at the French Ministry of War to be of sufficient importance to institute serious legal proceedings against the papers. But the graver aspect of the case, as affecting the Seventh Army, was that both journalists in question had frequently visited that Army's area. At Army Headquarters they had listened to conferences and seen maps concerning the late operations. Lastly, they were obviously quoting facts contained in secret Seventh Army memoranda.

Sir Charles Rokeby listened impatiently, interrupting the speaker with some sharp questions. But Captain Barnsby was never at a loss, since he himself had handled the entire case at G.H.Q. Moreover, the Field-Marshal, Commanding-in-Chief, had himself got to hear of these episodes, and it was his personal desire that the Seventh Army Commander should investigate the case and furnish a full report thereon. Sir Charles soon saw that he could not kick against the pricks. Captain Barnsby then withdrew, whereupon the Chief, after some slightly pungent remarks to his two assistants, ordered Samborne to set his I.b. branch to work on the matter and to report daily as to what could be ascertained. Neither Manford nor Colonel Samborne dared say a word more, for the Chief made it clear that the incident displeased him. So they retired to Samborne's office to discuss the matter.

"Well," began the D.A.G. moodily, "here's a mess! This may cost me a mention and a C.B. Curse it! But look here, Sammy, what about your blinking investigation? Am I going to have your fat-fingered Intelligence police nosing around my place for the next week? or are you going to stick microphones into my clerk's office? or shall I have the Provost Marshal coming in daily to check all my letters, or what? Don't mind my feelings; I can

already hear the sentence of the Court reducing me to the rank of corporal ! So fire away, let's hear the worst ! ”

“ I can only do what old Rokeby ordered,” answered Samborne. “ Needless to say, I loathe doing it ; but I can't help it, old boy ! I shall have to put Monson on to it. . . . ”

“ What ! ” groaned Manford, “ have that fellow in my office investigating *me* ; that dyspeptic-looking centipede disguised in uniform crawling over my table and my papers. Oh ! save me, Sammy ! and I've been a good friend to you ever since we were at Sandhurst together ! ”

“ I'm frightfully sorry, old thing ; I can't help myself ! They say the fellow's jolly good in the Intelligence line. Personally, I hate the sight of him. But, look here, we must send for him and set him going about the business straight away now. ”

“ No ! bring him round to me in an hour's time. I'll have had a long drink to brace me up for crucifixion by then. But warn the fellow that if he's going to be rude or tactless, I'll kick the trousers off him. So long, old chap ! ”

The same afternoon, after lunch, Mungo found himself in the D.A.G.'s office. As usual, he did not shine in the company of a strange staff officer ; he was gauche ; often did not look the speaker in the face ; in short, he made a hopeless impression. The interview was coming to no good. Impatiently General Manford asked him what he intended to do. Mungo, glad to avoid further conversation, suggested that he should like to sit in the sergeant-major's room next door and observe his routine. With mutual relief the plan was adopted. Mungo disappeared next door, taking with him a few papers of his own. Whilst thus occupied, from time to time he asked a question or two of Sergeant-Major Elliot. The open answers he received gradually revived his confidence and much stimulated his interest in the case.

“ What are you doing now, sergeant-major ? ” he asked after several desultory queries.

“ Typing a report for the General, sir. ”

“ Oh ! What's it about ? ”

“ Well, sir,” hesitated the man, “ I'm not supposed to say ; it's secret, you see, sir. ”

“ How do you manage to keep it so ? ” went on Mungo, thoroughly on the warpath.

“ Well, sir, I do four copies from the General's draft, then take all in to him. Two copies he'll seal up for wherever it's going—this is sure to be G.H.Q. Then two copies go into the safe, one

for himself and one for the Chief, in case he should ask for one for his own use."

"What do you do with the MS. and the used carbons?"

"The MS., sir, that goes back to the General; he destroys it. The carbons, sir, well I never take new ones for secret things, and then I tear them up small, keep the bits together and burn them."

"Where?" went on Mungo, looking round the room.

"Outside, sir; you see there's central heating here. It's a big school in peace time, so they've got no fireplaces."

"Oh! D'you ever touch the papers inside the General's safe?"

"Never, not since I've. . . ."

The bell rang; Elliot picked up his typescript, now finished, and all his other documents. He went in to General Manford; Mungo followed. On seeing him the D.A.G. frowned. "What do you want?" he rapped out. Mungo's courage was equal to the test.

"May I sit down with my papers by the window, sir?" he asked.

Manford sniffed assent.

The sergeant-major produced his letter and files. "The routine papers for signature, sir. Then four copies of the secret report, sir, with your draft underneath. Then here are the three files you want for your conference to-night, sir. Will you sign the papers now, or shall I bring them to your quarters, sir? It's already getting on for conference time."

"Well," said the D.A.G. as if reflecting aloud, "I'll sign them early to-morrow. They're not urgent. Meanwhile give me my dispatch case . . . Thanks. Let's see; here are the files for conference. Yes: reinforcements due till the 31st of March, that's one; reduction of batmen and stretcher bearers; and this . . . Oh, yes! that's right. Then let's see: I must take that draft to destroy. Then I also want to go through those two War Office memoranda before the morning. That's all. Keep the routine papers till 8 a.m. to-morrow. Now give me the secret things for the Chief."

Monson watched closely as the safe was being opened. He could see the contents. They seemed in apple-pie order. General Manford checked the copies of the secret letter, put them in a separate cover, then locked the safe once more. The keys were chained to his waist belt.

"Right, sergeant-major! I'll bring the notes of the conference, to-morrow. You've warned Gibbs to be present for shorthand? . . . Well, good-night,"

Without a word to Monson he walked out, carrying his dispatch case. The sergeant-major then glanced round the room, looked into the waste-paper basket, took up the used blotting paper, tore it up. Then he prepared to lock up, still waiting for Monson to go.

"Pardon, sir, but I've got instructions to leave nobody in here, sir, when I go."

Mungo, absorbed in his thoughts, scarcely appreciated the hint.

"Where's the General gone? What's he up to now?" he asked abstractedly.

"Why, sir, he's got a conference at 5 o'clock at his billet, the 'Hôtel de la Cloche d'Or.' That's where the 'A' and 'Q' staffs live, sir. You won't catch him now, sir; not till after the conference, anyhow."

Without a word Mungo went out—apparently in a hurry.

Elliot, looking after him, reflected: "That's what they call an Intelligence officer, is it? What on earth is he here for? The General didn't fancy him, did he? Neither do I, and the General's usually right, too." Then he collected his scraps for combustion, locked up, and went off to his billet for tea. He had not told Monson that he intended returning later.

Mungo meanwhile began looking for the "Cloche d'Or." Manford had got five minutes' start of him. Before finding the place—for he was still a stranger in the odd, little French town—these ten minutes had grown to over fifteen. At last he found the hotel.

Inside the door—for it was a cold evening—stood a military policeman. Two field officers on the staff were speaking to him. "Yes, sir," Mungo heard the policeman replying to an inquiry, "the General's got 'is conference at five. There's two rooms reserved for yourself and Major Stanstead . . . (looking at a paper list) Numbers 24 and 25. Your batman's bringing your kit in about an hour. Right, sir, I'll direct 'im to take it up." Then, turning to Mungo as the pair walked in: "Are you for conference, sir? . . . Not, sir; well, sir, I'm sorry, you can't see General Manford till the morning. He's busy all the evening." At this juncture Manford himself came down the stairs into the vestibule, carrying a bundle of papers and making for the conference room that lay on the ground floor at the back. At the sight of Monson he stopped, and in a tone of angry impatience turned on him:

"What the devil are you doing here? I won't have you sticking your nose in at my conference. That's nothing to do with your job, so get out! In fact, I won't have you in this building, that's

an order ; d'you understand ? You can come to my office to-morrow at a quarter to eight—till then, clear out ! ”

At the sound of this tirade officers, waiters and orderlies in the vestibule, all stared at the Intelligence officer. Mungo flushed and, burning at this humiliating reception, went out. Sullenly he turned his steps towards the General Staff mess. There, after changing his boots, he had some tea in silence and ruminated over the problem before him. Step by step he traced the incidents of the afternoon. But, after Manford's paralysing outburst at the “ Cloche d'Or,” it was some little time before his thoughts would collect themselves calmly once more. Suddenly an idea flashed through his brain. He must get into the “ Cloche d'Or.” Soon he was striding back towards the hotel. But on reaching the entrance the sight of the policeman made him pause and he shrank from the door. As the hotel stood at a street corner, he slowly turned his steps down the side lane. At that moment a motor car was disgorging some kit bags at a gate which Mungo recognized as opening out of the ill-lit kitchen yard. Passing the car he waited. As it drove off he darted through the gate. Then, seeing an open coal shed to the right, he slipped into it and made it his observation post. A few batmen, orderlies and kitchen assistants were coming in and out of the hotel. The day's dirty boots were being brought out, scraped and polished on the other side of the yard, in a long open shed where two motor cars were also being washed down.

Of a sudden Mungo made up his mind. Removing cap, jacket, collar and tie, he rolled up his shirt sleeves. He had already shed his new field-boots and breeches at his own billet. The disguise was surely adequate. Then, darting over to the other side, when the shed was left empty for a moment, he picked up a newly-polished pair of field-boots and boldly made his way into the hotel. He was very shortly accosted by a waiter. “ Hi ! look 'ere, we don't allow no field-boots in the pantry, so clear out ‘ too sweet,’ d'ye hear ? . . . Well, what are you looking for ? ” he added, as he saw Mungo hesitate.

Rising to the occasion, Mungo played his part well : “ Sorry. Lost m'way. My blokes 'ave come 'ere for the conference and I'm lookin' for quarters . . . ” and he retreated farther into the building.

“ Oh ! ” called the waiter to him, “ that's so, is it ? Well, turn to the right and go up the first stairs on yer left. That's your way. They're on the first floor, I expect.”

Mungo stumbled up the dark stairs. The passages were

scarcely illuminated, for the lighting regulations appeared strictly applied. At last he saw a light shining from an open doorway. Instinctively, he went towards it. He was still trying to read the name written on a card tacked to the door, when a voice suddenly made itself heard.

"What d'you want? What are you doing here?" and an officer, about to go out, in fur-collared overcoat and gold-laced cap, stood before him.

Again Mungo's presence of mind proved his salvation. "Beg pardon, sir, I'm with the officers come for conference. Looking for Number 24."

"Oh!" came the softer answer, "that's not in this passage. There's only the D.A.G. and two 'Q' officers besides myself along here. You try on the left or upstairs." . . . Mungo, very much relieved began moving off. . . . "Here, young man, haven't you got my boots there?"

"No, sir," glibly invented Mungo, already three yards away, "they're Major Stanstead's." And he slipped into the darkness.

Thankful at his escape, Mungo darted up the nearest stair, stopped and watched the suspicious colonel go out. After closing his door the latter went along the passage, but Mungo heard him calling downstairs: "I say, Jackson, are you below there? . . . Well, just look and see: there's the servant come with some of the strange officers staying here to-night who may have got hold of my field-boots by mistake."

"Right, sir," came the answer from a distance below, "I'll see to it, sir, as soon as I've done your uniform."

Mungo's courage began to be chilled. He had run into a trap. After a moment, however, he ventured down again, quietly placed the dangerous boots outside their suppositious owner's door and resumed his quest. An instant later, in the dim light, he spied a card on a door inscribed: Major-General T. M. Manford, C.M.G.—D.A.G., Seventh Army. He knocked softly, preparing to bolt in case of answer. Silence reigned within. Stealthily he pressed on the handle: he was inside. A small stove was alight in the fireplace, an oil lamp, turned half down, stood on the table; boots, overcoats, brushes, sticks, and the normal clothing of a British officer were displayed round the walls and on the furniture. Manford loved system and order. But no writing-table, no books, no papers were to be seen. For a moment Mungo was perplexed. Then, seeing another door opposite and on his right, he divined the true state of things. Slinking across, he again tried the handle

and he peeped in. It was a *cabinet de toilette*, such as are to be found in many old French hotels. It had been converted by the General into a study. Another small stove stood in the chimney ; another lamp was alight on the table. With a thrill of satisfaction Mungo spied the General's despatch case on the table. Disregarding the danger signal of the dirty tea things by the case, he made straight for the object of his quest. Opening it, he carefully turned over the papers until he came to the bottom. There he saw the manuscript of the secret letter lately typed by Elliot. His suspicions were correct ! General Manford had *not* burnt that draft on returning home to his billet. . . . He was exultant at his discovery. . . . But he had hardly settled what to do with it before there came a knock at the outer bedroom door. His heart thumped as though in echo to the sound. He quickly looked round. Seeing the heavy, musty old curtains drawn across the window recess, he plunged behind them. Steps gradually came towards the inner study. Not daring to look out, Mungo listened in suspense. After attending to the stove, the new-comer tidied the room and put the tea things together on a tray. Then he stopped ; there was a slight rustle of paper. Mungo, taking heart and at length comprehending that it was not Manford, peeped between the curtains. To his utter amazement he saw a man—obviously an officer's servant—with the open despatch case, glancing methodically through the papers which it contained. Still more did Mungo burn with excitement, when he saw the stranger take up the secret draft that lay beneath the other papers and rapidly make a few notes with a pencil, on a scrap of paper that he picked up from the table.

At that instant there was a call in the passage outside ; steps approached. With a spasmodic movement the man crammed the papers back, shut the case and picked up his tray with his own note held beneath it. He quickly left the room and Mungo heard him at the bedroom door :

" Oh ! it's you, sergeant ; you want me for mess duty to-night. Right oh ! I've finished up here," and the voice went down the passage.

Fortified by this stroke of fortune, Mungo emerged from his lair. But then the demon was awakened in his soul. The rudeness and humiliation of the afternoon still made him tingle. He forgot the prime reason of all his dangerous manœuvre. He made straight for the despatch case, intending to take out the copy of the secret draft and take it direct to Colonel Samborne. He would yet expose this impeccable staff officer, his tormentor ! He almost laughed

aloud at the triumph which he felt might soon be his. No sooner had he found the draft once more, than a sudden footstep sounded in the bedroom. It came rapidly nearer. Startled by the snap of the inner door lock, Mungo tried to close the despatch case and vanish in the window whilst still retaining his loot. But his movements were too hurried. With a crash the despatch case lay emptied on the floor. He fled to the curtains, but his distracted fingers let drop a tell-tale trail of paper to his hiding-place. The new arrival paused in astonishment at the scene. Then he picked up some papers. But before completing his task, he had realized what had happened. With two strides he was on the curtains. Mungo felt a strong grip on his right arm and found himself looking into the hardening face of General Manford.

"So," dimly heard Mungo, "not content with disobeying my orders, you've had the audacity to come and play the spy on me and tamper with my papers! What's that?" and he snatched the tell-tale draft from Mungo's trembling fingers. "Ho!" the voice of Nemesis went on, "this is a serious matter, young fellow; purloining a secret draft. You'll go to Court Martial for this. Are you a Hun spy yourself, by any chance?" He let go of Mungo. Going to the door, he called his neighbour, Major Gainsleigh, of "Q" branch. "Gainsleigh, just find Sandars, the Provost-Marshal. He's downstairs, I know. Tell him I want him urgently!"

Mungo, beside himself with his failure and remembering the open window which gave on to the yard below, tried to bolt. But Manford was too quick; he rushed back and soon pulled the Intelligence officer back into the room with such a powerful grip that the miserable Monson's resistance collapsed instantly.

"I'm not spying on you, sir!" weakly muttered Mungo; "I only came just in time to find some man getting at your papers. I'm not after your secret reports!"

Manford scorched him with a glance. "You young liar! stop your canting humbug!"

Tears of fury and vexation trickled down Monson's face. He could no longer struggle against fate, and fell into a chair close at hand.

But Manford had no mercy and lashed him with bitter words: "You snivelling young hound! Stroke of luck that I suddenly wanted that War Office letter to show to Vaughan down below! So you thought I was going to let that blighted conference run on for more than an hour, did you? Not much! you young spy!"

Set a spy to catch a spy ! You take *me* for a spy, don't you ? you young vermin ! Call yourself an officer ! Just because you know German, they picked you out of the gutter and expect you to go about among gentlemen and behave like one ! But now, thank God, I fancy I've cooked your goose anyway ! ”

The Provost-Marshal appeared. Monson, speechless with humiliation, was removed.

Next day, at noon, Lieutenant Monson appeared before the Commandant of the Intelligence Corps. A written statement, signed by Sir Charles Rokeby himself, lay on the table. The Brigadier-General, Intelligence, at G.H.Q., had added thereto a note to the effect that Lieutenant Monson was to be discharged from the Intelligence Corps as from that day. But the miserable culprit was too much dejected to say a word in his own defence. So on the morrow he found himself at Bourgival beginning a course of musketry pending his return to his battalion.

A weary fortnight ensued. Even then Mungo was too angry and too resentful against his fate to say or to do anything. The Christmas festivities could not arouse him. He made not a friend. He was threatened with a bad report, but was too listless to care. Then, a day or so after the New Year, to his intense surprise, he received orders to proceed to G.H.Q. to speak to the Commandant of the Intelligence Corps at eleven o'clock next morning. On going in to him, he was greeted in a most friendly manner, both by that officer and by Colonel Mainwaring. For the first time since that evil day at the “ Cloche d'Or ” he felt some interest in life return.

“ Monson,” began the Commandant, “ the General wishes to see you in a few minutes. Meanwhile, just listen to what Colonel Mainwaring has to say to you.”

The latter, with a suppressed smile, addressed poor Mungo with words that soothed his battered soul.

“ Look here, my boy, you've been making an ass of yourself ! I can see that you were perfectly right, and I'll tell you why. But you set about things in a thoroughly mistaken way and in the wrong spirit ! However, you've had your punishment, so we'll let bygones be bygones. General Manford was in the habit of taking his written drafts back to his billet to burn, as you discovered. Sometimes he left the job till late. His batman, Steevens, was a wrong 'un and used to go through his master's papers. We've found out that he used to be a racecourse tout and dishonest, too. Three days after you were dismissed from Intelligence, Steevens pleaded

urgent reasons to go home on five days' leave. Manford, being kind-hearted, pulled the strings and let him go. Well, at the end of his furlough, the man never reappeared. The police in England think that he must have somehow managed to get himself re-enlisted under a false name. But only two days ago the whole truth came out. A despatch rider employed by the Press Section at G.H.Q., had been taking money from those two accredited journalists, who've been sacked, to provide them with such inside information as he could pick up. Well, this fellow was a friend of Steevens, and he got into touch with him and the pair of them went shares over what they could squeeze out of General Manford's papers. Manford does a good deal of work in his quarters at night, so Steevens thus managed to see a fair lot. It was after the last scoop of theirs, the one Steevens and his friend made out of Manford's secret draft some three weeks ago, that those two beauties quarrelled over the sharing of the money, some five hundred francs, which they then received from the journalists. Steevens took fright at his accomplice's threats to give him away, and went off home on furlough. The other fellow went on his way until last Monday, when he had a bad smash. He's lying critically ill in hospital now. Well, there he's just made the confession of which I've now told you. So, you see, you were on the track, but what a pity that you should have acted as you did ! You nearly ruined yourself into the bargain. Now for something more pleasant. I've come to see the General as I'm going to take over Intelligence at Sixth Army Headquarters, and I've asked for you to come with me. You'll have to begin as Staff Lieutenant, 2nd Class, I'm afraid. Are you ready to come back to me ? ”

Mungo revived still more, and beamed. The General then sent for him. After receiving a very severe “ wiggling ” for taking the bit between his teeth, not asking his superiors' advice and for disobeying orders, he found himself reduced from 1st to 2nd Class Intelligence officer. But the General trusted that he would soon retrieve the higher grading. Something that Mungo treasured still more was a letter he shortly received from General Manford. Like the gentleman he was, the D.A.G., Seventh Army, not only apologized handsomely to Lieutenant Monson for unjust suspicions and words, but even thanked him for having taught him a lesson that might perhaps save him (Manford) from a dire set-back in his professional prospects.

INCIDENTS OF THE GREAT WAR *

No. 4.—THE FIELD COMPANIES, R.E., AND PIONEERS OF THE 56TH DIVISION AT THE CROSSING OF THE CANAL DU NORD 27TH OF SEPTEMBER, 1918

(With Map)

WHEN the Third and First Armies attacked on the morning of the 27th of September the 56th Division had to wait upon events: its outpost line of observation, facing east about Baralle, looked down upon marshland and the Canal du Nord which, together, formed an obstacle adjudged too difficult to permit of a frontal attack. Here the advance was to depend upon the success of the Canadians, who, after securing the crossings near Mœuvres, were to sweep northward east of the canal until they reached a line some two thousand yards beyond Marquion. When this was accomplished the 169th Brigade of the 56th Division, with a brigade of the 11th Division on its right, would cross the canal, wheel to the left, pass through the Dominion troops, and take up the attack.

The battalions of the 169th Brigade were to advance on both sides of the Arras—Cambrai road, the Field Companies and Pioneers (1/5th Cheshire) of the Division being responsible for throwing the necessary bridges across the canal and the Agache river.

At twenty minutes past five the Canadians launched their attack, and were soon reported to be making good progress. The first of the London battalions was not due to leave its assembly position before 9.20 a.m., but a company of the London Rifle Brigade was started forward as soon as the British barrage permitted in order to make sure that the western bank of the canal was clear of the enemy. This company soon came under machine-gun fire.

Then the sappers and pioneers went to work. The 512th Field Company, R.E., operated south of the Cambrai road and one subaltern with his section was dispatched from Baralle before ten o'clock to reconnoitre the crossings, although the enemy was still in Marquion and was holding positions in the swamps on both sides

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of the canal. Coming up to assist the sappers a company of pioneers arrived east of Baralle Wood towards eleven o'clock, and was saluted with machine-gun and artillery fire. Hurrying on at once, "through the advancing infantry," the pioneers were in time to reinforce the engineers who were now in extended order and fighting their way forward. The two Lewis guns of the 1/5th Cheshire came into action with good effect, and before midday the line of the canal had been reached and was held. The engineer subaltern, who had had two of his men wounded, reported to his commanding officer that he was short of ammunition, but that he thought he could continue to hold on "as the infantry were only about 400 yards behind."

During this little action, a preliminary to the day's work, one officer and eighteen other prisoners were collected by the pioneers who lost three men wounded. No time was lost in throwing the bridges. The necessary material having already been dumped about four hundred yards behind the fighting line, a cork raft footbridge was soon in position across the canal just south of the lock, while a plank footbridge ensured a tolerable passage over the worst of the swamp. The next work to be taken in hand was the selection of a practicable route forward to the Agache river. This track was marked out with green flags, and, by 2 p.m., the river had also been bridged for infantry—just one hour after the line of the river was reported clear of the enemy.

The Canadians seem to have persuaded the enemy to relinquish Marquion about noon, and the pioneers were soon at work "flagging" a track across the marshland from Baralle to Marquion. Before retiring into reserve the 512th Field Company carried out a reconnaissance of Wancourt Farm with a view to converting it into a brigade headquarters when circumstances should permit.

North of the Cambrai road a subaltern and a small party of the 513th Field Company, R.E., made an early investigation of the wooded swamps and pushed forward towards the canal. There were Germans here also, with machine guns, but although three men were hit the canal bank was reached, well in advance of the infantry, by about 11.30 a.m. Parties of the enemy could be seen fleeing northward along the opposite bank. A place was found where the canal was no obstacle and the 416th Field Company, assisted by pioneers, at once pushed forward a track to the Agache river, bridging another stream on the way. The river itself was bridged by about two in the afternoon. During these operations a mounted patrol proved very useful in sending back reports.

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The infantry of the 169th Brigade began to cross the canal as soon as the bridges were ready, first the 2nd London advancing south of the Cambrai road, and then the Queen's Westminsters who used the northern route and were followed by the London Rifle Brigade. All three battalions reached their allotted positions and were able to launch their attack from the Canadian line at 3.28 p.m.—only forty minutes later than the time originally fixed, in spite of the obstinate resistance which had delayed the Canadian advance and consequently the forward movement of the troops of the 11th and 56th Divisions. It is satisfactory to be able to add that the Londoners secured all their objectives by an early hour next morning.

The 513th Field Company had now to throw a bridge for the passage of artillery across the canal. The guns were to come forward along the Baralle—Sauchy-Cauchy road and an engineer officer found a site late in the afternoon as he reconnoitred northward behind the advancing line. He sent back for timber to make a trestle bridge, but it was soon decided that the drop from the bank to the water was not too great to prevent the use of pontoons. So the pontoon section was ordered up. Half an hour after midnight it arrived at the cross-roads north of Baralle Wood, whence the wagons went forward at a fast trot. The company had the bridge ready by five o'clock on the morning of the 28th, by which time two platoons of pioneers had finished the heavy work of cutting the approaches through the banks.

THE SELLER OF CUCUMBERS

(AMARAH, 1915)

BY "MAJNUN"

FOR many hours the narrow dusty streets of the desert town had been left to the fury of the sun : nothing moved in them except here and there a mangy dog, routing in the filth of the open drains, or slinking dejectedly on his way in search of shadow. Absolute silence had reigned behind the blind, windowless walls of the houses with their iron-studded doors—a silence of mystery ; even the screaming children had not been heard.

But now across the river the sun was sloping down towards the desert, the scorching breath of the " shimal " had grown less fierce and the town was bestirring itself for the evening resurrection.

More dogs collected in the streets and sat down to scratch, while small girls and boys, clad in dirty little rags of cotton shirts, began to appear at the doorways in the mud walls and throw stones at the dogs ; the dogs and the children were the first signs of life.

Presently down the bazaar came a water seller, his little donkey with the two dripping water skins on either side ambling in front of him ; every few yards were punctuated with a resounding blow from his stick and a volley of rude remarks concerning the donkey's parentage and habits, which doubtless encouraged the animal to better efforts.

Abdullah, the seller of cucumbers, fat and sleepy, sitting in his little box-like shop, was roused by the water seller's noise and lazily bestirred himself.

He wiped off his face the flies which had been playing there for the last three hours, and stared at the reed-baskets of cucumbers, that lay in front of his shop in the street ; then he picked up his rosary of amber beads with a look of resignation, and drawing it rapidly through his fingers prepared once more to face the activities of life.

He was angry at being disturbed by the water seller's racket : all water sellers are low fellows and their trade is a mean one and

without honour ; so the prophet declared and it is written in the Koran. And this water seller had disturbed him : not that he had been asleep ; no, in spite of the stillness and the heat he had been awake, but he had been enjoying "*Kaif*"—that peculiar and fascinating system of quiescence, that conscious enjoyment of peace, which to the Occidental is unknown.

Peace ! There was no peace now in the town, no peace at all.

The Feringhi were everywhere, the soldiers of the Feringhi had come, always in a hurry, for ever marching through the bazaar on some errand or other : and there were laws and regulations ; and things written up everywhere ; and men with rifles who stood all day at the corners ; and other men who told him he must keep the street clean in front of his shop.

Clean ! Dogs ! Abdullah spat deftly over his cucumbers into the street.

Besides, these soldiers were for ever wanting him to sell cucumbers ; of course, he was a seller of cucumbers ; but to have a crowd always troubling him to sell, asking for cucumbers, as if there was nothing else in the world for him to think of !

Yes, rupees are good money and these buyers were fools—but no peace, no peace. What would come of it ? "God's will," sighed Abdullah, and cleared his throat and spat again.

By now the bazaar was filling with the usual crowd of evening strollers. Knots of men stood round the little shops and looked in and chatted and passed on, swinging their yellow rosaries slowly as they talked ; in front of the coffee shops, others squatted on the high benches, sipping from little cups and glasses, and sucking at the nargiles as they were passed round. Arab women, swathed from head to foot in voluminous black, shuffled through the dust in their long robes ; Jewesses in bright silk "*abbas*" drifted through the press looking like animated tulips. The seller of hot cakes shouted from beside his brazier, children screamed, dogs yelped, the professional reciter yelled and bellowed on his mat, and the donkey men shouted *Barluk ! Barluk !* to the obstructing crowd. The little town had come to life again.

At the end of the bazaar, where a narrow by-street crossed it, the crowd was suddenly swayed and parted as the head of a small column of British soldiers pressed through.

In front were two officers, a captain and a subaltern. Then came a sergeant, and two buglers, followed by a few sections of fours carrying a stretcher covered by a Union Jack ; two more men carrying an empty stretcher brought up the rear.

In a moment the little procession had crossed the bazaar and had passed on down the by-street, and the crowd closed in again ; but the curiosity of some of its younger members had been aroused by this new sight—especially perhaps the bright flag had attracted them.

And so Nasr-ed-Din, the son of the sweetmeat seller, who was a cousin of Abdullah, a tousled-headed little imp six years old, in a blue cotton shirt that reached not quite half-way down to his knees, took the lead of a small band of inquirers and followed at a safe distance.

Through the stifling lanes between the crowded houses, in ankle-deep dust the funeral party, with the draped stretcher swaying between them, went on its way, heading towards the town wall and the desert beyond.

The two officers leading set a quick pace, for it was advisable to get out of the hot, fetid streets as soon as possible. It seemed somehow wrong to hurry the dead man so on his last journey, to swing the loaded stretcher over the uneven roads and through the thick yellow dust, which was beginning already to settle on the flag ; to cheat him of the pomp and peace of the " slow march."

But the temperature here in the narrow alleys was appalling, every wall radiating heat : not a breath of air ; they must get out of it as soon as possible.

Presently a man in rear stumbled from the ranks, dropped his rifle with a thud in the dust, and, after standing a moment swaying with blindly staring eyes, crumpled up and sank down on the ground. The column stopped, the bearers set down the flag-covered stretcher, and the captain came and knelt beside the fallen soldier.

These sudden collapses were quite in the ordinary course of events—indeed, they were always provided for : hence the spare stretcher in rear. No one except those who were tending the man took much notice ; they waited weary and listless.

The captain turned the man on to his back and unbuttoned his shirt ; the face was grey and convulsed, the hands twitching spasmodically.

He beckoned to the stretcher-bearers. " Heat stroke, as usual, I suppose," he muttered. " Here you men, take him to hospital as quick as you can ; then go back to your billets. Stop a minute—give this chit to the M.O."

He scribbled a note quickly on a leaf of his note-book, and handed it to one of the men : then they lifted the still form on

the stretcher and went on their way, and the procession trailed off again.

At last the close streets were left behind and the open desert appeared ; here and there patches of salt shimmered like silver and in the distance a blue haze was gathering round the camel-thorn bushes. On the edge of the horizon in the far distance an opalescent veil covered the lonely emptiness.

The column was heading towards a square barbed-wire enclosure and some three hundred yards from it a halt was called ; then it moved on again, but this time very slowly, with a solemn measured pace. Little Nasr-ed-Din and his followers observed this change with wonder, as they stood watching in the distance.

The soldiers moved through a gate into the enclosure, the flag-draped stretcher was set down and the captain, standing beside it, read from a book.

Presently two men stepped forward, the flag was taken from the stretcher, ropes were passed under the blanketed form and it was slowly lowered into the grave ; then the two buglers raised their bugles, shining like gold in the setting sun, and the Last Post rang out over the silent desert. The final triumphant notes hung long upon the still air.

The dead was buried and the grave covered in and a mound of earth smoothed over it. Just as the work was finished one of the diggers reeled and fell across the grave and lay still. A man stooped down and sprinkled some water from his water-bottle over his face ; he opened his eyes and tried to rise, but sank back again. " Can't you walk ? " asked the captain. " Rest a bit and then have a try, you're only a bit faint." But the man looked at him with uncomprehending eyes.

" He's been bad with fever, sir," said the sergeant.

" Well, we must carry him back ; put him on the stretcher."

The party fell in again ; the sick man was laid on the stretcher which had brought his friend to the grave, and the flag was carefully folded and put under his head as a pillow. Slowly the procession headed back to the town.

A wonderful change had come over the face of the earth. The desert was lit by the setting sun ; the desolation was touched with the colour of faded rose leaves, broken by pools of deep purple shadow, veiled with shifting skeins of blue mist ; in the distance the once tawny river was a band of amethyst and gold.

The town which had looked so grey and squalid in the glare of day was changed too : what then were mud roofs and walls now

appeared like towers and pinnacles of golden-pink marble, raised in fantastic piles against the darkening blue of the clear sky ; the dead palms brushed the stars with fronds of burnished copper ; even the dust which eddied round the marching column, shone like clouds of golden mist, and the shadows in the distant streets were of the colour of far-seen hills.

The world was changed.

Up in the twilight bazaar, as the stars began to gleam through the broken matting roof, trotted little Nasr-ed-Din. He came to Abdullah's shop, where the seller of cucumbers was just closing the sliding shutters.

He saw the little boy and called him. "*Ya Wallad*,—Oh boy, —where hast thou been ? "

" I have been with the Red soldiers."

Abdullah grunted. " So ! and what did'st thou see, oh wise one ? "

" Oh, my uncle, I feared to go close to them ; but I think that one of their number had died and they buried him out there—*bil chol*—in the desert."

" Allah rest his soul," muttered Abdullah the seller of cucumbers ; and he took Nasr-ed-Din's small hand, and the two disappeared up the dark bazaar.

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SOME RAMBLING NOTES ON WAR DIARIES

A COMPLAINT was recently made of a history based on war diaries that "official documents are cold and colourless." This may possibly be true of the war diaries and documents of technical and administrative units, though even these have their interest ; but to apply such a description generally to the military documents of the war is to convey a wrong impression, for they are often intensely human, humorous and, alas, tragic.

Rows of figures in a printed balance sheet convey little to the average investor, who is only interested in seeing whether a dividend warrant is enclosed with the statement of the company's affairs ; but to the student of finance or to an accountant each and every figure of that sheet tells its story. So with war documents, the student cannot fail to be fascinated by what he can read into them and the deductions he can make.

Take the operation orders issued for any big attack or defence scheme, follow the arrangements worked out by an army for corps, by corps for divisions and so on through the chain of formations down to platoons. Each instruction is carefully and simply worded, yet provides for every detail, nothing either of a tactical or administrative nature is left to chance. Study a " Q " operation order and note the arrangements for the moves of divisions on a very limited railway system and few roads, and one marvels at the care and foresight displayed and how tens of thousands of men and all manner of transport, supplies, guns, ammunition, etc., can be daily conveyed from point to point, and almost invariably without the slightest hitch.

The war diaries themselves form even a more fascinating subject, written as they were in all manner of places, trench, barn, château ; under all conditions of weather and by all types of men. One can almost picture the writers of some of them ; the irregular writing, the short snappy sentences make one think of an officer " carrying on " under great strain. Another, easy of style, written in a firm hand, conjures up a picture of a cosy mess far away in

rear, and a compiler who is momentarily at peace with himself and his fellow men.

Many of the entries in the war diaries are tragic. One recalls the entry in an infantry battalion's diary for the month of March, 1918, which reads :

"Very few men have got through to the transport lines; nothing has been seen or heard of A and B Companies, but they would fight to the last."

Another diary for the same period says : "the battalion is practically wiped out."

Quite a different form of tragedy, but still a tragedy to an individual officer, is contained in the following entries :—

"19th March, 1918 : 2/Lt. Blank proceeded on leave to U.K."

"24th March, 1918 : 2/Lt. Blank reported from Base. Leave stopped."

One can imagine the feelings of that subaltern after feverishly packing his haversack, rushing off with his leave warrant and sugar ticket, jumping on a lorry, the long crawl in the leave train, and his look of consternation when he heard the fatal words : "leave stopped," the miserable journey back, the struggle to find his unit, then the line and, perhaps, the end.

Battalion diarists have often indulged in gentle irony at the expense of the higher command, as witness the following :—

"October 5th.—Corps warning—big German attack expected. All quiet on our front.

"October 6th.—German attack reported to be imminent. Enemy quiet on our front.

"October 7th.—German attack still imminent. No activity on battalion front."

On the 10th of October warnings of an imminent German attack were still faithfully repeated, and the peaceful character of the battalion sector was still insisted upon.

The diaries of most units expand when a move is made to a back area, and there would appear to be more joy over one trophy secured at the divisional Horse Show than over three lines of trenches taken from the Germans. This, of course, was not so. Nor can the report of an inter-battalion football match as a "blood-thirsty affair" be taken literally.

Humour, conscious and unconscious, makes frequent appearances in the diaries. One diarist informs the reader that "the battalion terrier had pups to-day"; another that

"for the first time in the history of the Brigade *one* kidney was issued with the meat ration. This extraordinary escape of a kidney from the back area seems worthy of record."

Then there are the following :—

"O.C. had toothache to-day."

"Enemy counter-attacked in great force to-day. O.C. went on leave."

"We got away from the line in good time so as not to be in the way of the big attack."

"Billets are being specially cleaned up to-day for Corps Commander's inspection."

"Brigade settled down to make the best of a cold night out of doors."

"Some desultory shelling took place during the afternoon and the *personnel* of Brigade headquarters were frequently driven to the cellars."

"The Gas Alarm caught the company commander at a very awkward moment in his bath."

"A and C Squadrons, having been seized with a sudden sense of duty, donned their box respirators. They were very relieved when ordered to take them off, as most of them were on the verge of suffocation."

"G.O.C. went to Venice, poured with rain all day."

"G.O.C. returned from Venice. Thunderstorm."

One adjutant of an over-seas battalion * possessed a bright style, and used particularly crisp phraseology in compiling his diary.

"28th July.—We had just issued instructions for a repeat order of our 500-man working party, when the chill voice of the 'Beer Emma' over the wheezy phone advised of the working party being cancelled. 'You will move by train to-morrow, where I know not, when I know not.'

"The evening was spent in preparation, anticipation and manufacture of rumours. First, it was south we were bound, then rearward, then north and, finally, to Russia. About 10 p.m. we were informed that our destination was Arneke, and that we were to be moved by strategic train. Well, what was to become of us? What is a strategic train, and how can a train show strategy?

"29th July.—The G.O.C. Division and G.O.C. Brigade were there to wish us *bon voyage*. The remainder of our brigade stayed behind; in fact, so far as we knew, the Canadian Corps and the whole of the dependable military world.

"No, there is no brigade operation order attached. We moved on

* One of the two Canadian battalions which were hurriedly moved up to the Kemmel sector on the 29th of July, 1918, and went into the line on the 1st of August. They were ordered "to prepare the front for attack pending the arrival of the remainder of the Canadian Corps." The Canadian Corps, however, was moved to the Fourth Army front for the Amiens attack on the 8th of August, and the ruse of sending the two battalions north completely deceived the German Army.

pink signal forms and faith. No one knew to whom we belonged, but no doubt some kind staff officer would claim us at our destination.

"The train did better than most troop trains in France. We travelled *via* St. Pol, Aire and St. Omer, and reached Arneke at about midnight. The R.T.O.—a very meek, pious, dyspeptic-looking spectacled youth—detained us with the assistance of a still more promising one—'pipped' Town Major. We were told we were in the X Corps and that we would be billeted.

"30th July.—A very promising map, in two colours, a list of billets as long as your arm, and the freedom of the area were presented to the Commanding Officer. We were to move in the morning and the Town Major knew of a good field and a kind farmer, so we carried on—to the field. We found a really hospitable farmer who got out of bed, turned over his barn for the officers and tucked every one away splendidly."

The diaries written in the late war differ greatly in value as material for history. Many are excellent in every way (particularly those of some of the Dominion units, Tank Corps and a few units of the original B.E.F.), and their high standard shows that diaries can be compiled which fulfil the objects for which they are kept. To compile a diary calls for carefully balanced judgment, great accuracy, power of description and method. The following few suggestions may be of use to the rising generation of staff officers and adjutants :—

1. Avoid general phrases such as : "At daylight" (time should be always given). "Advanced a little further" (give distance as near as possible). "5 officers joined" (give names). "Relief took a long time" (give time).
2. Exact indications of places are essential. An entry in a diary "In the trenches," "Loos Sector," or, worst of all, "In the field," is clearly inadequate. If the place name is not given, then the map reference should be.
3. Brevity can be over done. F.S.R. say : "A war diary will include a concise and accurate record"; but too much insistence on conciseness involves loss of clearness and accuracy—"In labouring to be brief one may become obscure."
4. Always, if possible, give a sketch map, however rough, with the report of any operation.
5. Give a daily list (or numbers) of casualties, feeding strength and fighting strength. If it is not possible to do so daily, these figures should be copied from our old friend and nightmare, A.F.B. 213, and given in the diary weekly.
6. When a unit has been engaged on a period of training, a short

summary of the chief features of the course will be helpful in tracing the development of tactical ideas and methods.

7. Briefly describe weather conditions, visibility, etc. This is very important when dealing with operations.
8. Always mark on copies of operation orders and messages time of issue (not the hour they were sent to be typed or copied), or time of receipt. Many things turn on these times.
9. See that all appendices and maps enumerated in the war diaries are attached to the top copy of the diary. In many cases the diaries of the late war refer to appendices not with the diary, *e.g.*, "For narrative of operations, 31st of July, 1917, see Appendix II.," and Appendix II. is absent.

It is unfortunate, but true, that a unit which writes a good report is more likely to stand well with the higher commanders and fare better in history than one which fights the good fight and writes little or nothing about it. It is impossible to write an account in heroic style of a day of which there is no further entry in the war diary than "General attack. In action from 5 a.m. till midnight, when relieved."

‘THE GREATEST POEM OF THE GREAT WAR’

BY MARK WARDLE

I HAVE lately had with me a friend who, leaving the armies of the Great War as a captain, has experienced the all too common difficulty of finding a suitable place for himself in the more fortuitous strife in time of peace.

Last year he found temporary employment as a guide to the battlefields, where there came to him an exciting adventure—an adventure endowed with this admirable quality, that any one, to whom it is related, can experience it at first hand for himself. I am most anxious to hand on so good a thing— But let my friend tell it in his own words, so far as I can remember them.

“ Well, as I told you,” he said, “ I was mostly on the Marne and the Aisne. For my usual trip we fell in at 8 a.m. at the Place de la Madeleine. A car held sixteen—fourteen ‘ clients,’ guide and driver. The tourists were almost always Americans. First day—Meaux, Belleau Wood, Château Thierry, lunch ; Fère-on-Tardenois, Reims, dinner, sleep. Second day—Berry-au-Bac, visit craters on Côte 108, Craonne, climb hill if time, along Chemin-des-Dames (Shimmied Dim in the languages of California, Arizona and New Mexico) by lower road—the actual ‘ Ladies’ Way ’ wasn’t cleaned up—turn north at Vailly, run up to Fort de Malmaison, and down to Soissons, lunch ; Villers Cottérêts, La Ferté Milon, Chambry, Claye, home.

“ You don’t know the Chemin-des-Dames—*et tu n’est pas d plaindre*. It is very dreadful, especially by Craonne and Craonelle. Even the most bloodthirsty pilgrim to the Western Front always avowed that ‘ This was the Goods—the very stuff of war.’ It is a long low ridge, running east and west, and looks flat-topped and regular when you are well to south of it, though it is really broken by several ridges running down to the Aisne ; there is a neck between the main ridge and the Craonne height. You’ll get an excellent idea of it if you think of the Chemin-des-Dames ridge

as a sleek flat leopard, lying on its left side, tail to west, head to east, and legs stretched right out southwards. The rump is the plateau of Malmaison, with the fort at the point of the hip bone ; the tail can be the Laffaux-Soissons road ; the legs are the ridges running down towards the Aisne ; the head is the Craonne height ; and between it and the front paw you have the Craonelle valley running up to the neck. The famous system of caves known as the Dragon's Grotto, where the Germans had a large hospital and all sorts of things, is on the front point of the right shoulder-blade, but the whole of the head is a warren of caves and tunnels, improved with ferro-concrete—a regular Gibraltar. Bodies are still found there, and always will be. I imagine that Craonne, in April and May, 1917, was one of the most terrifying battles of the war. A driver of one of the touring cars who'd been, as a 'biffin' (*la biffe* is French for P. B. I.) in the capture of the Craonne *massif* by the French on the 4th of May, told me that just before the French barrage lifted it was so intense that the whole hill seemed to disappear in one blinding simultaneous sheet of flame. The 'cemetery' of French tanks near by is a melancholy witness to the need for drastic methods. It's a marvel how the place was ever taken. But of course it's the man you're really always up against, and not his defences. Any house in the world may be spoiled if once you succeed in striking fear into the heart of the strong man armed who keeps it.

“ Well, one day, on Craonne hill, I found a haversack. I looked in it ; there was nothing in it that could serve for identification. But it contained something that has come to be, for me, the very synthesis and result of the spirit of this war ; and to stand for—well, about the most interesting type of dead it has produced—I suppose I mean the most interesting type of man it killed.

“ Here it is, anyhow, a poem, on a few sheets torn out and pinned together. I read very little poetry, but what I do read I read a great deal. Every one says there's hardly any good war poetry been written, but this is *the* poem of the Great War. Beside it, Brooke's sonnets are bred by perfunctory platitude out of pious aspiration.

Now let's go through it, and you shall know my nameless friend of the lost haversack, and many a brave soul besides.”

* * * * *

He spread the stained and crumpled sheets on the table. I leant over his shoulder, and following his finger we both read ; he

breaking the silence, whenever he was afraid I might miss something, in a running commentary much as follows :—

My first thought was, he lied in every word,

“ That’s the first week in August, 1914—could hardly realize or believe in war.”

. . . mouth scarce able to afford
Suppression of the glee that pursed and scored
Its edge at one more victim gained thereby.

. . . ensnare
All travellers that might find him posted there,
And ask the road ? . . .

. . . ’gin write my epitaph
For pastime in the dusty thoroughfare,

If at his counsel I should turn aside
Into that ominous tract which, all agree,
Hides the Dark Tower.

“ Yes ! how’s that for the War ? But wait ! ”

Yet acquiescingly

I did turn as he pointed ;—

“ Joined up what ? ”—

neither pride
Nor hope rekindling at the end descried,
So much as gladness that some end might be.

“ How many who felt that there was something ‘ somehow wrong ’ with them and with the world before the war, took it, with its sudden simplification of life and ideals, in just that spirit ? ”

. . . I had . . . been writ
So many times among “ The Band ”—to wit
The knights who to the Dark Tower’s search addressed
Their steps—that just to fail as they, seemed best,
And all the doubt was now—should I be fit.

“ Are there many who didn’t have that doubt, before their first action—and before many a battle after it, too ? ”

So, quiet as despair, I turned . . .
Into the path he pointed. All the day
Had been a dreary one at best, and dim
Was settling to its close, yet shot one grim
Red leer to see the plain catch its estray.

For mark ! no sooner was I fairly found
Pledged to the plain, after a pace or two,
Than pausing to throw backward a last view
To the safe road, ’twas gone ! grey plain all round !
Nothing but plain to the horizon’s bound.
I might go on ; nought else remained to do.

“ Wasn’t that just it ? ”

So on I went.

“ Now for the battle fields ! ”

I think I never saw
Such starved ignoble nature ; nothing throve :
For flowers—as well expect a cedar grove !
. . . a burr had been a treasure-trove.

No ! penury, inertness, and grimace,
 In some strange sort, were the land's portion. " See
 Or shut your eyes,"—said Nature peevishly—
 " It nothing skills : I cannot help my case :
 The Judgment's fire alone can cure this place,
 Calcine its clods and set my prisoners free."

If there pushed any ragged thistle-stalk
 Above its mates, the head was chopped . . .
 . . . What made those holes and rents
 In the dock's harsh swarth leaves—bruised as to baulk
 All hope of greenness ? 'tis a brute must walk
 Pashing their life out, with a brute's intents.

As for the grass, it grew as scant as hair
 In leprosy ; thin dry blades pricked the mud
 Which underneath looked kneaded up with blood,
 One stiff blind horse, his every bone a-stare . . .

Seldom went such grotesqueness with such woe . . .
 I shut my eyes and turned them on my heart . . .
 Think first, fight afterwards—the soldier's art. . .

Better this present than a past like that—
 Back therefore to my darkening path again.
 . . . when something on the dismal flat
 Came to arrest my thoughts and change their train.

A sudden little river crossed my path
 As unexpected as a serpent comes . . .
 So petty yet so spiteful ! All along,
 Low scrubby alders kneeled down over it ;
 Drenched willows flung them headlong in a fit
 Of mute despair, a suicidal throng. . . .

Which, while I forded,—good saints, how I feared
 To set my foot upon a dead man's cheek,
 Each step, or feel the spear I thrust to seek
 —For hollows, tangled in his hair or beard !
 It may have been a water-rat I speared,
 But, ugh ; it sounded like a baby's shriek.

" Remember the rat-spearing contests in the trenches at Wieltje,
 in ' B ' Company ? "

Glad was I when I reached to other bank.
 Now for a better country. Vain presage !
 Who were the strugglers, what war did they wage
 Whose savage trample thus could pad the dank
 Soil to a plash ? toads in a poisoned tank,
 Or wild cats in a red-hot iron cage—

The fight must so have seemed in that fell cirque.
 " Didn't it just ? "

What penned them there, with all the plain to choose ?

" That's what we wanted to know by October, 1916, in the first
 Somme battle, and by September, 1917, in third Ypres. And the
 official histories will be hard put to it to find a plausible explana-
 tion ! But hear our poet on why staffs don't break actions off . . . "

No foot-print leading to that horrid mews,
 None out of it : mad brewage set to work
 Their brains, do doubt . . .

"Now for a derelict tank!"

And more than that—a furlong on—why, there
What bad use was that engine for, that wheel,
Or brake, not wheel—that harrow fit to reel
Men's bodies out like silk?

"I've seen bodies a tank has been over!"

with all the air
Of Tophet's tool, on earth left unaware,
Or brought to sharpen its rusty teeth of steel.

Then came a bit of stubbed ground, once a wood,
Next a marsh, it would seem, and now mere earth
Desperate and done with; (so a fool finds mirth,
Makes a thing and then mars it, till his mood
Changes and off he goes!) within a rood
Bog, clay and rubble, sand and stark black dearth.

Now blotches rankling, coloured gay and grim,
Now patches where some leanness of the soil's
Broke into moss or substances like boils;
Then came some palsied oak, a cleft in him
Like a distorted mouth that splits its rim
Gaping at death, and dies while it recoils. . . .

"My tourists loved to spot, as we sped by, roadside poplars
that had stopped shells in mid air and still held them in just such
clefts. . . . But here comes a hostile aeroplane."

. . . A great black bird, Apollyon's bosom-friend,
Sailed past, nor beat his wide wing dragon-penned. . . .

"The attack progresses. What used to seem a big plain
through a trench periscope seems now only a platform before those
hills to be assaulted."

For looking up, aware I somehow grew,
'Spite of the dusk, the plain had given place
All round to mountains—with such name to grace
Mere ugly heights and heaps now stol'n in view . . .
. . . half I seemed to recognize some trick
Of mischief happened to me, God knows when—
In a bad dream perhaps. Here ended, then,
Progress this way. When, in the very nick
Of giving up, one time more, came a click
As when a trap shuts—you're inside the den!

"He knows he's for it!"

Burningly it came on me all at once,
This was the place! those two hills on the right
Crouched like two bulls locked horn in horn in fight—
While to the left, a tall scalped mountain . . .

"Obviously Craonne heights and the Chemin-des-Dames ridge;
but one must resist the temptation to be too literal. This is poetry,
not a military despatch!"

What in the midst lay but the Tower itself?
The round squat turret, blind as the fool's heart,
Built of brown stone . . .

"Of course, they were built of ferro-concrete really, and only
covered over with brown rubble. I think it was one of these pill-
boxes did him in. There's a double line of them just in front of
Craonne, where the Hindenburg Line passed."

Not see ? because of night perhaps ?—why, day
Came back again for that ! before it left,
The dying sunset kindled through a cleft : . . .

" I told you it was all lit up by the barrage like a flaming sunset—it was a ' dying sunset ' that was kindled for our friend."

The hills, like giants at a hunting, lay—
Chin upon hand, to see the game at bay,—
" Now stab and end the creature—to the heft ! "

Not hear ? when noise was everywhere ! it tolled
Increasing like a bell. Names in my ears,
Of all the lost adventurers my peers,—
How such a one was strong, and such was bold,
And such was fortunate, yet each of old
Lost, lost ! one moment knelled the woe of years.

" That is a very wonderful description of an advance under a heavy artillery barrage. But we must see how he fell just before the barrage lifted from the hill."

There they stood, ranged along the hill-sides—met
To view the last of me, a living frame
For one more picture ; in a sheet of flame
I saw them and I knew them all. And yet
Dauntless the slug-horn to my lips I set
And blew. " *Childe Roland to the Dark Tower came.*"

We were both silent, thinking of our own friends, the strong, the bold, the fortunate, who " yet Dauntless the slug-horn to their lips had set," blown their challenge, and passed within the Dark Tower.

I have a first edition of " Men and Women." I took the first volume from its shelf, showed my friend the date, 1855, and then opened it at " Childe Roland to the Dark Tower came."

Before looking at it he said " Of course this " (tapping his crumpled sheets) " is very much pre-occupied with *la vie intérieure* of a particular type of soldier of the Great War—it is very modern in outlook, in fact—but . . ." Then he saw what I had given him. He smiled ruefully. " Well, that proves me a very ignorant person. But what a genius it proves Browning ! I've never read him much—frightened by his reputation for obscurity. Ye gods ! you couldn't have anything much plainer than this, could you ? May God forget the ' Eye-witnesses ' and all their writings ! "

" No ! " I told him. " It's not you who are convicted of ignorance. I have read Browning since I was ten, and not often found him obscure. And I've always known his ' Childe Roland.' And yet I never knew what it meant till you showed me. I used to think it a great poem of the greatest war—*la guerre intérieure*—but now I agree with you that it is more : it is the greatest poem of the Great War."

NOTES ON FOREIGN WAR BOOKS

[THE most important book of the quarter is that of General Baron Arz, in 1917-1918 Chief of the General Staff of the Austro-Hungarian Army. Very interesting tactically are those of Commandant Grasset on the action at Ethe, the 22nd of August, 1914, and of General von Poseck on the operations of the German cavalry in Lithuania and Courland.]

WESTERN FRONT

Commandant A. Grasset, of the French Historical Section, who has already given us a most interesting study of one of the opening combats of the war in *Une bataille de rencontre, Neufchateau*,* has followed it up by another entitled *Ethe, le 22nd aout 1914 au 4^e corps d'Armée* (Paris: Berger-Levrault, 7.50 francs). It is a most complete and fascinating account, enlarged from an article in the *Revue Militaire Française*, of a most curious action of the 7th Division, in which the author himself took part as a company commander, and was wounded. We cannot help envying the French Army, for it can purchase this book, of 133 pages, with a general map and 15 situation maps in black and white, for less than 2s.

The action described forms part of what is officially called "The Battle of the Ardennes." At the outbreak of war the 7th Division, under General Trentinian, together with the 8th, formed the IV Corps (General Boëlle) in the French Third Army. This Army was deployed facing the frontier from Briey, north-west of Metz, to south of Montmédy. In the great offensive which General Joffre ordered for the 22nd of August it was to advance in the general direction of Arlon.

"The country in front was covered with forests into which the cavalry do not penetrate and where aviators see nothing."

The intelligence of the enemy provided by G.Q.G. was "*assez vague*,"

* Reviewed in the *Army Quarterly*, January, 1924.

and stated that the region in front of the Third Army "*paraît toujours inoccupée.*" Inhabitants, however, reported that the woods had been full of Germans for days, and a curé gave the information that they formed an Army of 300,000 men (German Fifth Army, 200,000 men); but the French orders were to advance, and they were obeyed. Only tourist maps of Belgium on the 1/200,000 scale—although 1/80,000 maps of the Rhineland provinces had been provided—were issued, and these were not in sufficient quantities to go beyond battalion headquarters.

The IV Corps moved forward at 5 a.m. on the 22nd of August in divisional columns on two roads six miles apart, covered by a cavalry regiment; the corps troops with the 8th Division on the left, the 7th Division on the right. The 7th Division consisted one-third of soldiers of the Active Army, and two-thirds of reservists. Owing to lack of ground, it was not well trained; it was short of regular officers—many companies had only two—and still shorter of re-engaged non-commissioned officers. General Boëlle was sixty-four years of age, General Trentinian, sixty-three. Of the four brigade commanders, three had been less than four months in their appointments. In general, the thinking officers of the Corps did not feel too happy about its state, though its moral was good.

The only road available for the 7th Division first led north, but on reaching Ethe it turned eastward across the enemy's front and ran in the deep valley of the Ton. General Boëlle protested against this route, and asked that he might use the road east of it, but was informed by the Army that this belonged to the V Corps.

Opposite the French Third Army, the German Fifth Army, exactly covering the same front, was wheeling slowly forward, pivoting on Thionville, and, on the 22nd, expected to isolate Longwy. The V Corps and half the XIII lay across the front against which the French IV Corps was directed.

The morning of the 22nd of August was very foggy. The cavalry regiment leading the advance, on reaching the valley at Ethe, was held up, and drew aside to let the advanced guard of the 7th Division come up and make a gap for it. It may be added here that the lieutenant-colonel commanding the cavalry, who notoriously considered inaction the greatest crime a cavalry officer could commit, about 8 a.m., as the fog lifted a little, proceeded to charge nothing in particular, lost two-thirds of his men and was himself killed.

Gradually the whole of the leading infantry brigade, the 14th, with a group of artillery and the divisional commander, became involved in Ethe, a long village, at right angles to the road by which

the brigade had come, and as the fog cleared, the troops were partly caught in column of route. Beyond the village there were Germans in position on the ridge, which had two open spurs, but was otherwise heavily wooded, and other Germans coming down on the brigade's right flank. Eventually, another party of the enemy pushed forward from the ridge and appeared on the French left. The 14th Brigade in the course of time found Germans on three sides of a square round it, and some of them began to creep behind it. General Trentinian summoned his other brigade, the 13th, to his assistance ; but, on emerging from the woods on the south side of the Etche valley, it was stopped by artillery fire, and when the general made a dash, mounted, out of Etche and escaped he found the guns of his Division had gone back, and the 13th Brigade about to retreat to escape envelopment. Only eighteen companies were available to succour the 14th Brigade in Etche, and after he had made a vain effort to get forward, General Trentinian, now seeing the danger of envelopment, ordered them back. Meantime, an heroic combat had gone on in Etche, the 14th Brigade resisting stoutly. As the author says, if only one battalion had been well established in the houses directly the advanced guard arrived there, it could have stopped the Germans just as well as the six did and at far less cost ; but the imperative orders to push on landed the whole brigade in a trap. One French company which had gone into the woods beyond the village, actually got in among the German batteries and destroyed two, and killed 300 horses. Finally, fortune came to the help of the valiant 14th Brigade : the chief of the staff of the German 10th Division and the colonel of the 6th Grenadiers, who were arranging a final attack, were killed by the same shell ; no order was given for an advance, and at 6 p.m.,

“ summoned by bugle calls, the Germans flowed back everywhere in great haste. Their battalions assembled, as if on an evening of grand manœuvres, out of range of our machine-guns, and thanks to our lack of ammunition, untouched by our guns,”

whilst, to cover the movement, every German gun was turned on Etche. The 14th Brigade was left master of the field. After dark General Félineau commanding it retired with the survivors, actually passing close to a village occupied by German cavalry. His two regiments had lost 54 officers and 3,449 men, the division 124 officers and 5,200 men. The Germans seem to have imagined that the troops in Etche were merely holding a false front, and that the real French line was beyond. The author is very scathing in

his closing remarks on the conduct of the cavalry of both sides ; for as at Neufchateau, they permitted the opposing infantry to collide without any information of the presence, far less the strength or direction of march, of the enemy.

M. Hanotaux's fifteenth volume of the *Histoire illustrée de la Guerre* (Paris : Gounouilhou, 25 francs) is concerned with the close of the year 1916 and the greater part of the year 1917—that is to say, the end of the battles of the Somme and the fighting at Verdun, the plans for 1917, the fall of Joffre, the appointment and failure of Nivelle, and the revival of the French Army under Pétain. It is a political rather than a military account ; the British successes of the period at Vimy, Messines, in pursuit of the Germans to the Hindenburg Line and the Ypres-Passchendaele offensive receive mention, but little more ; by assertion and innuendo, the impression is given that Sir Douglas Haig was disinclined for action and had to be spurred on to it by the French Government. It can, however, be deduced from the author's own text that the French, feeling certain that the enemy had been badly perhaps decisively shaken by the fighting on the Somme, were out to gather the profits for the special glory of their troops, and to reduce the British participation in the victory to a secondary rôle. Of the Calais Conference and the attempt first to place the British Armies directly under General Nivelle without the intervention of a British commander-in-chief, and, failing in this, to get command of them by the machinery of a special British Mission at French Headquarters, M. Hanotaux however says nothing.

On the other hand, he is convinced of the far-reaching results of the battles of the Somme, which he calls an " interrupted battle," and leaves us to imagine what would have happened had Marshal Joffre's plans been realized for its continuance early in February, 1917 ; for the Allied attacks would have taken place simultaneously with the first movements of the Germans in retirement to the Hindenburg Line.

M. Hanotaux lays great stress on the intrigues initiated by Germany. Recognizing as early as September, 1916, the serious situation which the defeat at the Somme had brought about, and the impossibility of remedying it by force of arms, she set in action three separate political campaigns. First, peace manœuvres in order to gain time to reorganize the submarine campaign ; secondly, a pacifist agitation to disunite the Allies and overthrow their Governments ; and thirdly, definite revolutionary propaganda. The

death of the old Austrian Emperor in November, 1916, only made her the more desperate, and the unjustified depression which affected both Britain and France after the heavy casualties at the Somme and Verdun, at first gave her great hope of upsetting the verdict of arms by underhand means.

Joffre's plan for 1917 contemplated a continuance of the battles of the Somme, the French forces on the right of the British being commanded by General Nivelle, in view of his Verdun successes, in place of Foch ; elsewhere the French were to make only subsidiary attacks. Thus the brunt of the fighting would fall on the British ; for, as was an open secret at the time, the generalissimo felt that the French infantry had played its part and little more could be expected of it. This pessimism appears to have given the French Government the lever that they had long been looking for to oust Joffre from his place. We are told—

“ a hot campaign was gradually opened against the General Staff of Chantilly (French G.H.Q.) and against General Joffre. In this campaign there were such factors as the ever-present remembrance of the opening of the campaign, Charleroi, the Ardennes, Morhange, Alsace ; the grief at the abandonment of national territory, notably of the Briey Basin, which furnished the enemy with the minerals necessary for the manufacture of shell ; the reiterated complaint of the *limogés*, that is to say, of the commanders placed on the retired list ; the emotion caused at the insufficient results of the battle of the Marne, gained, it was said, by chance and insufficiently exploited ; the discouragement resulting from the costly offensives in Artois, Champagne, and at les Eparges ; and a host of other grievances : insufficient utilization of the troops of the reserve, lack of heavy artillery, mistakes as to the power of German resistance, dangerous privileges of the envoys of G.H.Q., and intrigues of the ‘ Young Turks,’ the political prejudices of G.H.Q., gradual gain of authority by the party of young thrusters who surrounded the C.-in-C., and finally, insufficient subordination to the civil power, and somewhat distant attitude in dealing with members of Parliament.”

These criticisms the author condemns as mainly contradictory and unjust ; but, to save his ministry, M. Briand threw General Joffre over.

Nivelle was nominated to command the French Armies of the North and North-East on the 12th of December, 1916 ; he took over on the 17th and produced the plan for his famous offensive on the 19th. Possibly he had been elaborating it for some time, and it was known to his Government. His kindest critics now say that his mistake was only an error in psychology, and that he did not understand the *poilu* as Joffre did ; and certainly the mutinies in the French Army were brewing long before they broke out in May.

Most unfortunately for Nivelle there was a change of ministry in March, 1917, and the new Minister of War, M. Painlevé, opposed the idea of attack, thinking that as the Americans were coming into the war, French blood might as well be spared. The author is not kind to M. Painlevé in regard to his interference with the Commander-in-Chief, his frequent summoning of him to Paris, his questioning of subordinate generals as to the Chief's plan, and his taking action on private letters sent to him by friends at the front. The moral of the men was already low, that of the officers now fell also.

M. Hanotaux is inclined to ascribe the mutinies to intrigues behind the armies rather than to trouble among the troops, but he admits they were partly due to the poor pay given to the soldier as compared with what was earned in munition factories.

The volume closes with an account of the battle of Malmaison, the 22nd of October, 1917, the first fruits of Pétain's reorganization of the French Army after nearly six months of quiescence. It was a battle of limited objectives round a salient, and after six days of continuous bombardment, the three corps employed were able to secure all that was asked of them with small losses. As at Messines there was no attempt to exploit the victory.

There are many illustrations and good sketch maps.

The sixteenth volume of M. Hanotaux's history, which begins at the battle of Cambrai, November–December, 1917, and ends with the German offensive against the Chemin des Dames, May–June, 1918, is by far the most interesting that he has written. It is of especial value from the eminence and position in France and in literature of the author, and the views he expresses are undoubtedly those of the vast majority of better-class Frenchmen. Cambrai, we are told, was fought by the British in order to keep control of the direction of the war, which seemed likely to revert to France after the revival of her Army by Pétain. She recovered it, thanks to Mr. Lloyd George, who, however,—

“showed himself favourable to undivided command [under a Frenchman], because he sought above all a means of diminishing the prestige of Haig, whom he detested. A sort of contempt for the Commander-in-Chief emanated unceasingly from the Prime Minister, and created an atmosphere of suspicion and mistrust, and was a deep and serious cause of weakness. This sentiment was translated into deeds by the holding back of unemployed divisions in England, and it left Haig with a deficit of 200,000 men.”

The fine British Army of 1917 now appeared to be "emaciated and worn out." General Kiggell, the Chief of the General Staff, and General Charteris, the head of the Intelligence, were sent home, we learn, because they were "terribly anti-French." Had it not been that the French Government did not wish to see a British General covering Paris, they would have demanded from Mr. Lloyd George even a greater extension of the British front than they attained. Nevertheless, the defeat of General Gough's Fifth Army is definitely stated to have been due to the error of Lloyd George in refusing reinforcements.

Pétain's delay in sending help to the British in March, 1918, is considered to have proved an advantage in the end; but he is described as giving

"an impression of coldness and circumspection almost of discouragement. None of his auditors was very much at his ease or very convinced."

M. Hanotaux, quoting from German books, accepts the view that the German failure was mainly due to the Crown Prince advocating that Hutier's Army, after driving Gough back, should be allowed to exploit its success and to drop its original task of holding the line of the Crozat Canal and Somme defensively. Henceforward, Ludendorff hunted two hares. We are glad to find that the loss of Kemmel is not attributed to the British. In fact, taking it all round, the narrative is the most accurate account of the spring of 1918 yet available.

Chronicle de la Grande Guerre (1 Février-31 Décembre, 1914), by the late Maurice Barrés (Paris: Plon-Nourret, 16 francs), is a reprint of the articles contributed almost daily by the author to the *Echo de Paris*. It is a record of the times, of events and sensations, and literature rather than history.

Le Sac de Montdidier (Offensive Allemande de Mars, 1918), by C. Binet (Paris: de Gouradenex, 4 francs), is an eyewitness's account of the systematic pillaging of Montdidier by the Germans. By Article 47 of the Hague Rules "pillage is expressly forbidden." The Germans on entry endeavoured to collect and evacuate all the civilians, but some of them remained hidden and the author was made "syndic" and responsible for them. The doors of the houses were opened with false keys, or broken open by parties of Germans accompanied by "expert officers" and the German

commandant in person. Anything of value or use was brought to the ground floor rooms and later removed in lorries ; the houses were then fired.

L'Armée Belge dans la Guerre Mondiale (Brussels : Bertels, 125 francs), by Colonel Tasnier of the Belgian General Staff, lecturer at the *École de Guerre*, and Major van Overstraeten, orderly officer to the King and professor of Military History at the *École Militaire*, is a beautifully got up book of 484 pages, with 26 coloured maps and over 500 illustrations from photographs, including a large number of portraits. Among the illustrations is one of the British Naval Brigade at Antwerp in a long straight trench without traverses.

The authors provide not only an authoritative narrative of the operations of the Belgian Army, but give the reasons for the various decisions taken by the King : why the Army was concentrated on the Gette ; why it retired to Antwerp (because the fortress was unfinished and of the small value of the garrison) ; why it retreated thence to the Nieuport area. They claim that the days gained at Antwerp saved the strip of Belgian territory near the Yser, Dunkirk, Calais and possibly Boulogne. There is a chapter on the campaign in East Africa.

La discorde chez l'Ennemi, by Capitaine de Gaulle (Paris : Berger-Levrault, 6 francs), is one of those instructive but entertaining books that can only be written in French. With a light hand that gently distributes ridicule, the author shows how the Germans handicapped themselves by discord among their living leaders and slavish regard for the precepts of their dead ones, and tells a story of conflict of principles, clash of personalities, press campaigns, intrigues and cabals, which rendered vain the sacrifices of an infatuated though valiant people.

The sections of his book are entitled : the disobedience of General von Kluck, the declaration of unrestricted U-Boat warfare, the relations between the enemy allies, the fall of Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg, and the rout of the German people.

In the first he shows how the Germans, in 1914, began the war determined not only to imitate the successes of their ancestors, but also their methods. As in 1866 and 1870, communication between the Armies and G.H.Q. was expressly neglected ; Kluck, in particular, was out to exhibit the independence and disobedience of Steinmetz and Prince Frederick Charles, and win victories not planned by the Chief of the General Staff. The system that by

good luck won Sadowa and Saint Privat was the cause of the defeat on the Marne.

The section on submarine warfare, the accuracy of which is proved by the admissions in Volume IV of the German official naval history reviewed below, tells the story of the two years' contest between the German Government and the admirals. The author considers that the victory eventually gained by the sailors against the head of the Government, the Chancellor, who alone was in a position to know all the factors, was the direct cause of the German defeat ; for it brought America into the war and wrecked the

"endeavours in London of Lansdowne and Ramsay MacDonald to arrange peace by negotiation by the help of the mediation of President Wilson."

In "the relations between the allies" are described the constant divergence of views of Falkenhayn and Conrad, and how those commanders went different ways in 1916. When, as a consequence of the Brusilov offensive and Hindenburg-Ludendorff succeeding Falkenhayn, the Germans got the upper hand and a written convention was drawn up, Franz-Joseph died, and

"the young Emperor shook off the guardianship of Hindenburg, and sought by secret paths to break the political bonds that entangled him with Germany."

The author might also have shown the objections of Turkey and Bulgaria to German tutelage, as evidenced in the Baghdad, Palestine and Salonika campaigns.

The intrigues of Ludendorff to get rid of Bethmann-Hollweg and instal a puppet in his place, already told by Erzberger and others, lose nothing by the author's relation of them. The Chancellor's successor Michaelis is summed up as "*functionnaire expérimenté et consciencieux mais sans relief . . . un personnage de second plan.*"

The final section, and perhaps the best, describes the stupor, discouragement, and finally panic that came over the German people in August, 1918. After the victory of Caporetto and the Treaties of Brest Litovsk and Bukarest, the whole German nation was certain of victory and united in the desire for the final great offensive in France ; its deception was all the greater because March, 1918, gave it at first the simulacrum of a success. It was not bad news but the sight of the innumerable trains of dead and dying, evacuated at the end of August from the hospitals of Northern France, Belgium and Alsace-Lorraine that struck terror in the German hearts.

"For fifteen days the public saw the stations blocked and the lines encumbered with hospital trains innumerable and cattle trucks packed with wounded. . . . The Emperor, the ministers, the political parties, the newspapers, the people, the military chiefs, abandoned themselves to destiny, vanquished in advance in their hearts."

AUSTRIA

Zur Geschichte des Grossen Krieges, 1914-1918 (Vienna : Rikola), the war reminiscences of General Baron Arz, the successor in February, 1917, of Field-Marshal Conrad von Hötzendorf as Chief of the General Staff of the Austro-Hungarian Army, will certainly not cause him to fall in the estimation of his countrymen, or the military world. They contain a plain soldierly statement of his experiences as a fighting general during the first two and a half years of the war, and a more general account of the remainder of the war, after he had been called upon by the Emperor Karl to be his Chief of the Staff.

Born in 1856, Arz entered the Army not by the fashionable way of the Wiener-Neustadt Academy, but through the reserve; intended for the law, he had conceived a taste for the Army whilst a one-year-volunteer. After passing through the Staff College, he held a succession of staff appointments. Promoted Major-General in 1908, he was appointed in May, 1913, after commanding a brigade and a division, to take charge of the Department of the Ministry of War concerned with organization, equipment, preparation for war and mobilization. This important work completed, on the 29th of August, 1914, he was given command of his old division, the 15th, in the VI Corps of Auffenberg's Fourth Army; and, on the 4th of September, of the VI Corps, its commander, Boroëvic, going to the Third Army. This Corps he commanded for two and a half years with considerable success, both in retreat and advance, aided, as he says himself, by constant good luck.

When an Austrian corps had to be sent in May, 1915, to Mackensen's Eleventh Army (Plettenberg's and François's German Corps) for the great break-through of Gorlice-Tarnow, Arz's was selected. His command, therefore, formed part of the spear-head in all the great attacks May-August, 1915, which drove the Russians out of Poland and Galicia, and he received a most flattering General Order from Mackensen on leaving him.

According to General Arz, the Russians, like other inferior races, could not stand heavy artillery fire and surrendered freely to avoid it, though they fought well with rifle and bayonet.

After nearly a year in the line near Lemberg, in August, 1916, when the attitude of Rumania became doubtful, Arz was sent to organize the defence of Transylvania, and eventually, with two divisions and three infantry brigades, met and delayed the advance of three Rumanian Armies, and gave time for the reinforcements to come up. In September he was promoted to command the Austrian First Army operating under the orders of the Archduke Karl, then heir to the throne, on the left of the forces engaged against Rumania.

On Karl becoming Emperor, he made it part of his policy—so he told Arz—to replace the officers who had been at G.H.Q. for a long period, by others who had had experience at the front, and in February, 1917, he sent Conrad, the Chief of the General Staff, to command in the Tyrol and shortly afterwards gave General Metz, his chief assistant, a corps, and replaced the two by Arz and Waldstätten. His choice, in view of the fact that the former had commanded every echelon up to and including an Army, does not seem unnatural.

General Arz throughout bears witness to the zeal, interest in the operations, and love for his people exhibited by the Emperor. His attitude is very loyal. He tells us little about his relations with his master, except that he accompanied Karl everywhere, saw him daily, and submitted all important decisions to him. He specifically states, however, that the Empress never interfered in military matters.

His relations with Hindenburg-Ludendorff and with General von Cramon, the German plenipotentiary at Austrian G.H.Q., were always of the best. He gives the text of the convention as regards unity of command, but states that it was never necessary to make use of the clause which gave Karl the right of final appeal to the German Emperor in case of a serious difference of opinion.

The plan for Caporetto was devised by Arz and Waldstätten. When submitted to Ludendorff with a request for the loan of six German divisions, the First Quartermaster-General was rather in favour of an offensive in the East, between the Pruth and Sereth, to annihilate the Russians in that quarter where their communications were very indifferent, and finally to settle with the Rumanians. He eventually decided to provide the German contingent when divisions were freed by the conclusion of the Riga offensive. The pursuit after Caporetto stopped at the Piave, we are told, on account of the state of the roads and bridges being such that it was impossible to bring up heavy artillery to deal with the Italian resistance

and force passages. The Emperor Karl ordered the continuation of the offensive, but it was found that the preparations would take a long time, and as the Germans gradually withdrew their divisions, the idea had to be abandoned. The Brest-Litovsk peace, the internal condition of Austria, the serious lack of food, the conquest of Ukraine and the endeavours to secure its food supplies takes up considerable space in the narrative ; neither ally got very much in return for the troops they sent into Russia, but Germany as usual broke her word, and poor Austria did not even get the proportion promised.

During the German offensives in 1918, Austria's share was to lend heavy batteries, and to hold the Italians and the French and British reinforcements to their ground and prevent them from sending assistance to the west. Arz conceived that the best way to carry out his task was to attack, and he proposed to do so on the centre sector of the Piave front and simultaneously make an advance for the mountain sector between the Piave and the Brenta, which, if successful, would come down on the flank of the Piave line. Conrad desired to do something more far-reaching, and strike farther to the rear ; and eventually—we read between the lines that he had Karl's approval—was allowed to make an attack west of the Brenta, in the region of the Asiago plateau. This struck against the sector where stood the British XIV Corps and it was a failure. The Piave offensive, as is well known, gained a few points on the western bank, but the positions won were so insecure and the losses so heavy that the Austrians were forced to withdraw. The repetition of Caporetto fondly expected by the Austro-Hungarian nation had not been achieved, and as in Germany after the failure of the March, 1918, offensive, the depression was all the deeper. Conrad was deprived of his command.

The Germans chose this very moment to ask for the assistance of six Austrian divisions. It was the beginning of the end. Soon Bulgaria was asking for help, and two Austrian divisions were actually on the way to the Balkans when she collapsed.

By October the condition of the Austro-Hungarian Army was pitiable ; of the fifteen divisions of the Isonzo army seven had less than a third of their establishment, and only five had more than two-thirds ; they were short of food, clothing and munitions. In the homeland there were strikes in all the large towns, and the men of the Navy had notified that they would leave their ships on the 1st of November. Hungary took the opportunity to demand half the staff appointments of the Army, and that the Hungarian divisions

should be pulled out and grouped together as a separate Army. After Karl's manifesto to his peoples the Hungarian Minister of War, in spite of the fact that the final Italian offensive had begun, ordered the Hungarian divisions to leave for home.

The account of the last days at Schönbrunn, and the events immediately preceding the Armistice, are given at considerable length, and reveal the miserable weakness of the Emperor. When confronted with the Armistice terms on the 2nd of November, 1918, he hesitated and could not make up his mind to accept them as Arz advised; he called together the Austrian Council of State, who declined to take the responsibility of deciding. Then, after a telegram to the Austrian plenipotentiary had been drafted and dispatched, Karl said that the Armistice could not be settled without parliamentary sanction, and countermanded the telegram, and, at 3 a.m. in the morning, came to Arz's room with a paper appointing him Commander-in-Chief. Meanwhile, the Hungarian Minister of War had ordered his nationals to lay down their arms, and the message directing the troops to cease hostilities had reached the Isonzo Army. Finally, came the crowning blow of the Italian declaration that the Armistice would not begin until twenty-four hours after the acceptance of the terms. General Arz holds the view that, in spite of all, an orderly retreat could have been made, had not the Hungarians broken the front by independent retirement.

The reminiscences of Graf Burian, *Drei Jahre aus der Zeit meiner Amtsführung im Kriege* (Berlin : Ullstein), who from January, 1915, to December, 1916, and again from April, 1918, onwards was Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, are a mine of condensed information. The book is divided into twenty-two chapters. Some, like those on Italy, Serbia, Turkey, Bulgaria, Rumania, America and Poland, are summaries of the diplomatic negotiations and relations; others, like "Stürgkh and Tisza," "Ruler and Heir-Apparent," contain the personal views and reminiscences of the author, whilst others again, like "U Boat War" and the "Alliance with Germany," include both.

The author takes a thoroughly South German view of the outbreak of the war; he holds that fate, not any person or group of persons, was responsible for it, and that man was impotent to avert it. Defeat is not a verdict of guilty, but merely a decree of fate. The victors are now the accusers and the judges, but all that the public should demand to know is whether those in office used the power given them well or ill.

Italy is represented as gradually increasing her price for remaining neutral, and both Italy and Rumania as endeavouring to follow Prussia's policy (*vide* Clausewitz) of fishing in troubled waters and obtaining accession of territory by backing the winner in the war. Germany was quite ready to give them what they wanted, as in either case it was at Austria's expense. Count Burian tells us that he obtained the consent of both the Austrian and Hungarian Governments to the cession of part of the Tyrol to Italy, but only to take effect at the end of the war. Hungary flatly refused to hand over any territory to Rumania except part of the Bukovina. The old Emperor Franz-Joseph was prepared to give anything in reason to ensure Italy's and Rumania's neutrality, but before negotiation with them he had to negotiate with his own divided Government.

The fate of Russian Poland was a life or death matter for the Austro-Hungarian Empire. It contained twelve million Poles, whilst Galicia contained nearly as many, eight million, who had been allowed, unlike the unfortunate inhabitants of Prussian Poland, to keep their own language and customs. Once Russian Poland was freed it was bound to join up with the Galician Poles. If it were made an independent Kingdom, Austria would sooner or later lose Galicia; if Poland were added to Galicia, there would be a third considerable nation in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and the Hungarians did not mean to permit this. The Austrian solution was a personal union with her Empire, through the Emperor as King, but at any hint of handing Poland over to Austria or making it independent, Germany put forward demands for part of it to improve her strategic frontier. A buffer-state with an hereditary sovereign dependent on Germany was her solution, and to this, after the Brusilov offensive had been brought to a stop by German help, Austria had to agree. It is obvious that had Germany won the war, she would, as after 1864 in Schleswig-Holstein, have fought her allies for the spoil.

Throughout the war Germany was plotting to get Austria deeper into her power, particularly to continue the treaty of alliance for a long period of years, to form a customs union, or, at any rate, to give mutual preferential treatment; and to train the Austro-Hungarian troops on the German model.

Graf Burian never managed to see eye to eye with the German Government. He strongly opposed unrestricted submarine warfare—which he describes as jumping into the water to avoid getting wet by rain—as certain to bring the United States into the war;

Kühlmann failing to convince him, Wilhelm II. came to Vienna in December, 1916, and procured his dismissal from the Emperor Karl. On his return to office in April, 1918, just after Ludendorff's Amiens offensive, in succession to Czernin, who had come to grief over the Prince Sixtus de Bourbon letters, he says he found—

“all ‘peace tones’ were silent . . . nothing but battle and victory were spoken of. . . . Germany in moments of great success was not to be had for a peace of renunciation, and a peace of this sort only was possible.”

And internal political troubles made peace indispensable for Austria.

Karl's journey to Spa shortly after Burian's return has been represented by the Germans as a “pilgrimage to Canossa,” to apologize for the Sixtus letters. Burian, however, says that it was made at the invitation of Wilhelm II., conveyed through the Military Plenipotentiary, in order that there might be a full discussion of the association of the two Empires.

The author gives interesting sketches of Franz-Joseph and Karl. With the former it was a pleasure to work ; in spite of his immense practical experience of the conduct of foreign affairs, he was always open to argument ; but his advisers had to make their ideas very clear. He would not listen to talk that was not to the point. He was convinced that he could hold together the various peoples composing his Empire. “It was the politicians not the people who filled him with anxiety.” Karl was treated like a child, and instead of being trained as a ruler and instructed in politics, was mostly with the Army, was never called to a Crown Council till March, 1915, and then only because it was a question of ceding territory to Italy. It was not until three days before his death that Franz-Joseph permitted him to be recalled at Burian's earnest entreaty. Tisza is described as a leader by nature, with the gift for ruling ; the key-note to his character was that he was a thorough conservative, who regarded all change and concession as risky.

RUSSIAN THEATRE

Die deutsche Kavallerie 1915 in Litauen und Kurland (Berlin : Mittler), by Lieutenant-General M. von Poseck, an account of the operations of the German cavalry in Lithuania and Courland in 1915, is very instructive—the author is now Inspector of Cavalry in Germany—although it has not the particular interest of his first

book, "The German Cavalry in Belgium and France, 1914,"* which describes operations against the British. The open country near the Baltic coast would seem well adapted for movement of cavalry, and the then non-continuous nature of the front offered numerous ready-made gaps; but the German cavalry, we discover, was not enterprising; in fact, the only dashing exploits recorded are two Russian cavalry raids. The first, by the Ussuri Cossack Brigade in May, penetrated "deep into the rear of the German lines." The German telephone lines were destroyed over a wide area and supply interrupted, and the raiders escaped untouched. General von Poseck himself characterizes it as "a cavalry exploit carried out with dash and skill." The other raid, also by Cossacks, occurred at the end of September, got twelve miles behind the German line, and for three days played havoc with the rearward communications, and drew troops in pursuit from the very weak front. The raiders again escaped scot-free. On the other hand, all a few German raiders did was to blow up short lengths of railway, and, witting not that this method had been found worthless sixty years before—General Sherman taught us how to interrupt railways—were surprised to see trains running again very soon after their visit. In large bodies the German cavalry was unable to move much faster than the infantry; it had no special cavalry bridging equipment like our own, could not get the ordinary pontoon wagons over the bad Russian roads, and was therefore compelled to wait and build extemporized bridges, and the streams were many. Attempts were made to put the machine guns and demolition equipment on pack animals, but "as the pack saddles proved unsuitable, the equipment had to be carried on little carts obtained locally." We learn further that as a novelty, "the Engineer detachment was made a mounted one (*beritten gemacht*)," for here again the enemy, as in so many practical military matters and staff work, was behind us, and had no engineer field squadrons. The whole of the baggage transport had to be abandoned, and country carts and horses substituted for it. All this is far from creditable to the provision of the late Great General Staff.

The book deals with two main operations, the diversion made on the coast a few days before the break-through at Gorlice-Tarnow in Galicia was begun, and the subsequent general advance to Riga and the line of the Duna river. Ludendorff, it will be recalled, advocated the turning of the Russian line from the north; when Falkenhayn and Conrad decided on a break-through elsewhere, he

* Reviewed in the *Army Quarterly*, October, 1921.

" would not entirely abandon his scheme, and in order to hold the Russian forces and divert attention from the break-through point in Galicia, he determined on an operation on a large scale at the end of April, with three divisions and three cavalry divisions under Lieut.-General von Lauenstein, from East Prussia to Lithuania and Courland."

General von der Marwitz commanded the Cavalry Corps, which contained our old friends the 3rd, 6th and Bavarian Cavalry Divisions, with the author as chief of the staff.

General von Poseck tells the main story with great clearness, and provides excellent sketch maps by which the routes of the troops can be followed ; episodes and details obtained from lower formations and units he gives in small print. To narrate shortly what happened, on the 26th of April, 1915, an attempt was made up the coast to turn the Russian flank ; the Russians seem to have had news of the operation and fell back without getting caught ; the villages were found empty and everything of value removed or burnt. The German cavalry led the advance, but the larger bodies were held up and had to wait for the infantry to come along and help them. A general advance from the Prussian frontier to the neighbourhood of Schaulen (on the Libau railway), some seventy-five miles, was made. Some cavalry, with infantry in wagons, was then pushed on ahead to get to Mitau. At that moment came information of a Russian concentration against the exposed right flank and rear of Lauenstein's force, and, on the 3rd of May, the cavalry was at short notice brought back to cover that flank. There were protests from the cavalry leaders against this sudden change, as there was not time to collect all the partols, relay posts, etc., that were out. Hindenburg-Ludendorff then gave orders for Lauenstein's force to take up a defensive position along the Dubissa (roughly north and south) covering the area gained near the coast, and here the whole force remained entrenched for two months, from the 12th of May to the 13th of July, the cavalry being employed as a mobile reserve to reinforce threatened points. It was during this period that the Russian cavalry made its first raid.

On the 26th of May, Lauenstein's force came under General Otto von Below and was renamed the Niemen Army, and from the end of June onward was gradually reinforced, whilst preparations were made for an offensive, as further south, owing to the break-through at Gorlice-Tarnow, 2nd of May and subsequent operations, the Russians were everywhere falling back.

Below's Army was organized into three corps under Richthofen (3 divisions), Morgen (2 divisions) and Lauenstein (3 divisions),

the 3rd and Bavarian Cavalry division being attached to the first, and the 2nd, 6th and 8th Divisions, and a composite cavalry division, all under General von Schmettow, to the last, nearest to the coast. During the advance and in the small fights which took place with the Russian rear guards, the German cavalry acted purely as mounted infantry. It was particularly useful to a large force advancing in many columns for covering and searching the gaps between the columns, and for pushing up reinforcements quickly where they seemed to be required. It is alleged that one charge was made, but it turns out that the only foundation for the claim is that a German squadron in open order galloped 4,000 yards after some retreating Russian horsemen, and killed eight and captured five. A Russian Guard Cavalry Brigade (*Garde à cheval*, ten squadrons) did make a genuine charge on the 6th of October, in lines supported by closed squadrons, on some dismounted German cavalry and *Landwehr*, who were retiring driven back by artillery fire. It was stopped by enfilade fire and machine-gun fire of the reserves. "It is regretted that there was no reserve mounted at hand to pursue." It is estimated that the Russians lost 150 men and 200 horses killed. General von Poseck comments that

"it was a further proof that even a well timed, properly echeloned and boldly ridden charge must eventually fail in face of enemy machine, rifle and gun fire."

There are some excellent photographs of the German commanders and their staffs. The author might have helped the reader of his text by giving some indication, with regard to well-known reference points, where the many small villages mentioned are to be found on the maps. He has a long list of abbreviations, the only one we found it necessary to look up, "K.T.D.," was not explained. He makes the curious mistake of calling the Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaievich (that is Nicholas son of Nicholas) throughout "Nikolaievich" only, and indexes him in this way also.

The latest of the monographs on the war published by the *Reichsarchiv* (the *Ersatz* for the Historical Section of the Great German General Staff), entitled *Karpathen- und Dniester-Schlacht 1915* (Oldenburg : Stallong), is not up to the standard of its predecessors in the series, either in interest or execution. It is indeed exceeding dull. Except for the purpose of trumpeting how much inferior Austro-Hungarian were to German troops, it is somewhat difficult to imagine why it was written at all, particularly when

monographs on much of the fighting in 1914, *e.g.*, on the battle of Le Cateau, the battle of the Marne, the battle of the Aisne and the Race to the Sea, are still lacking.

The present publication deals with the operations, starting from Munkacz in the period January–June, 1915, of Bothmer's Corps (3rd Prussian Guard Division, 1st Prussian Division and the Hungarian 38th Honved Division), which, with the 48th Reserve Division and the Reinforced 6th Guard Infantry Brigade, under Gerok, formed Linsingen's Southern Army and co-operated with Hoffman's Austrian force. At the opening of 1915, the Russians were across the crest of the Carpathians, and Linsingen was sent to assist the Austrians in pushing them back again and in endeavouring to relieve Przmysl. The Carpathians are not mountains except as regards their absolute height above the sea-level (3,000–4,000 feet in the section concerned), but a high-lying hilly region, difficult to traverse from the military point of view on account of the lack of roads and abundance of woods. In winter they are snow covered, but in January, 1915, the snow was not deep, and was easily trodden down, at least on the roads. The Germans, however, were not equipped for warfare on such ground, and seem to have made no special preparation except by providing a few men with ski for inter-communication, and borrowing some mountain batteries from their Allies, which, we learn, were of no use.

The first step of Linsingen was to secure the Usok and Lysa passes. This with German troops leading—as the Austrians, we are told, thought them “untakeable”—he proceeded to do, his opponents offering very little resistance. But once his men were a little way down the northern slopes, with all the difficulties of getting supplies over the crest, the Russians held them up. Trench warfare ensued from the 11th of February to the beginning of May, although on the 9th of April Bothman's Corps took the Zwinin, a high hill in the Russian position, by surprise, an operation, we are told “that throws the storming of the Spicheren heights in 1870 far into the shade.” Except that the Germans in each case had great numerical superiority and did capture a line of heights, there seems no similarity of any kind between the two actions. The Russians replied on the 11th of April with a counter-attack which sent the left wing of the 38th Honved Division flying, but the situation was, of course, restored by the Germans.

It was not until Mackensen's success at Gorlice-Tarnow had upset the equilibrium of the Russian front, and Linsingen's opponents withdrew, that he was able, on the 15th of May, to advance. “The

Southern Army had overcome the Carpathians. What it was expected to do in fourteen days had taken four long months."

Bothmer was then ordered to capture Stryi, twenty-five miles ahead. Thanks to the Austrians, a frontal attack failed, and enveloping attacks miscarried. The Germans were preparing a third attempt by the 3rd Guard Division, when on the 31st of May the Russians counter-attacked the 1st Division, and Hoffmann's Austrians :

"The 12th Austrian Landsturm Brigade was dispersed. Where the rest of them were and what was happening further on the right could not be ascertained . . . the resistance of our Austrian neighbours appeared to slacken more and more."

Instead of going to their help Bothmer attacked with the 3rd Guard Division and caught the Russians napping.

The monograph ends with an account of the forcing of the Dniester line on the 26th of June, after the Germans had secured a footing on the northern side on the 8th of June, and, owing to Austrian failure, had been compelled to relinquish it.

It is most difficult to follow the movements of the troops, as their lines of advance are not clearly marked on the maps, nor does the text give any assistance in finding the places mentioned. The losses are not given. There is no order of battle of the Austrian troops mentioned, and no index.

BULGARIA

A German, Lieut.-Colonel R. von Mach, who served with the Bulgarians, has been moved to translate for the benefit of his countrymen the long speech of Lieut.-Colonel A. Tanev, in defence of three members of the Radoslavov Cabinet at their trial for high treason 1919-1923. His reason for so doing is that this speech is largely an attempt to whitewash Germany's high-handed procedure in Bulgaria. He calls the pamphlet, indeed, "A Defender of Germany before the Bulgarian High Court, 1923." (*Ein Verteidiger Deutschland vor dem bulgarischen Staatsgericht* 1923. Berlin : Mittler.)

The charges against the Ministers were shortly that they declared war on Serbia, and afterwards on Rumania, without consulting the Sobranje ; failed to conduct the war properly ; did not consult Bulgaria's interests ; let the Germans get control of the Army and of the railways ; permitted them to rob Bulgaria of

her supplies and resources without getting anything in return, or insisting on Germany fulfilling the conditions of the Military Convention of the 6th of September, 1915, made between Germany, Austria and Bulgaria in regard to military assistance and material.

The defence is full of praise of Germany and her generosity to her allies. As regards the war, General Tanev admits it was a gamble, and the Ministers were bound either to have statues erected to them or to be put in the dock. He claims that they were right in backing Germany, and that she would have won if America had not brought over two million men. He disclaims that the Ministers had any responsibility for the conduct of the war after they had selected a commander-in-chief, and recalls that the French after 1870 did not try M. Ollivier, but only Marshal Bazaine. As regards declaration of war, he asserts that the Serbians violated Bulgarian territory by digging a trench on a knoll within it, and therefore began hostilities. But he ignores the fact that the Military Convention was signed thirty days before the alleged act of hostility. Similarly, he claims that Rumania attacked Bulgaria by firing at Rustchuk, where Austrian monitors were moored on the Danube. He states they failed to hit the ships, but wounded Bulgar citizens in the town.

The charge that the Germans drew rations in Bulgaria in June, 1917, for 173,383 men when they had only 16,000 to 18,000, and smuggled the balance of food thus secured out of the country, he attempts to get over by pleading that officers drew double and treble rations, and Mackensen twelve rations (he does not claim the Field Marshal ate them), and that they had 101,740 men and 18,000 prisoners (who undoubtedly did not get full rations). Further, he pleads that the Germans could not have smuggled anything out of the country without the connivance of the railway authorities. Another charge, however, is that the Minister of Communications handed over the railways to the Germans, and General Tanev gives the latter high praise for improving the lines and increasing their carrying capacity. There is also a further charge of allowing Germany to instal her own field post, by which thousands of packets of food, amounting to 1,800 truck loads a year, were sent out of the country. This the defender ridicules, and says it amounted only to one truck daily, and in any case such indulgence was due to men who were shedding their blood for Bulgaria! The Ministers, needless to say, were found guilty.

AIR RAIDS

The fourth volume of the German official history of the war on sea, *Der Krieg in der Nord See* (Berlin : Mittler), compiled by Captain O. Groos, deals with the period February to the end of December, 1915. In this no naval actions of note took place—two chapters indeed are headed “Waiting for the British Attack,” and two, “Differences of Opinion as to the employment of the Fleet”—but the submarine war was further developed—though its results are described as “little satisfying” and the hopes based on it as “shattered.”

The book is of military interest as it ridicules the fear, as expressed by Admiral Bacon, of German landings on the Flanders coast, and it describes from the logs the first six Zeppelin raids over England : 9th–10th of August, 12th–13th of August, 17th–18th of August, 8th–9th of September, 13th of September and 13th–14th of October, 1915.

There was never even a plan for a landing on the coast, as there were “not even approximately sufficient forces to cover such an operation and keep off the Dover Patrol.” As regards supposed schemes for blocking the harbours of Dunkirk, Calais and Boulogne “it seemed to the German Command more important to keep their own ports open for U-boats than to bar the hostile ones.”

There was, it appears, a considerable difference of opinion between the political, military and naval chiefs as to the advisability of bombing cities. The admirals, powerless at sea, were in favour of it ; the General Staff was doubtful whether anything could be effected against London ; and Falkenhayn gave it as his opinion that “such a blow must be effective or it will bring disadvantages.” Bethmann-Hollweg was opposed to it, or would only permit it under restrictions—*e.g.* at the week-end when most English people he thought were out of town, and the Kaiser seems to have been of his opinion. Eventually, the French raid on Karlsruhe gave the admirals a lever, and the Kaiser released London including the City for attack, with the sole restriction that “monuments, particularly St. Paul’s Cathedral, should be spared.”

It may be said at once that a great deal more damage is claimed by the airship commanders than was actually accomplished ; but we may charitably put this down to optimism rather than to deliberate mis-statement, and the logs generally cover themselves by adding “as far as could be observed.” The commanders had

a free hand to select other targets if they could not reach their objectives, and this accounts for the neighbourhood of towns near the coast coming in for bombardments intended for London ; Hull docks and the Middlesbrough furnaces and benzol factory were, however, original objectives. It appears very definitely in the narrative that the airships usually threw overboard their explosives directly searchlights and guns were turned on them. The commanders seemed to think our air defences were immediately on top of the establishments they were to secure, as the following extract will indicate :—

“ About 1 a.m. (10th of August, 1915), although a thick layer of clouds rendered observation difficult, it was supposed that the airship (L.10) must be over the eastern suburbs of London, and it moved to attack at the height of 3,200 metres. Scarcely had it done so than many searchlights were after it. They could not hold it, however, through the clouds although they caught it from time to time. Nevertheless L.10 received a lively fire of shell and shrapnel. Simultaneously the whole supply of bombs : two 100 kg., twenty 50 kg., and 60 incendiary, were dropped, but it could only be established with great uncertainty that some fell in the immediate vicinity of ships in the Thames and the search-light emplacements. From the large amount of air defence it might be assumed that we had struck on important factories or docks that the batteries and lights were intended to protect.”

In the raid of the 8th–9th of September, 1915, the commander of L.13 states that the glow of London could be seen from the north of Cambridge, and adds : “ for the direction of the attack the Inner Circle of Regent’s Park, lighted up as if in peace, offered a welcome starting point,” and he then proceeded down Holborn. The damage done by this attack was estimated by the *Times* at half a million.

In the attack on the 13th–14th of October, even light-bombs dropped failed to give the airships a clue to where they were. “ At 9.10 p.m., the reflection on the clouds of a large sea of light betrayed the neighbourhood of London,” and at 9.30 when one airship reached Kentish Town “ London was still brightly lighted.” Though each raid gave the navigators experience and made it easier for them to reach London, the narrative shows that the defence methods steadily improved, and in the sixth raid aeroplanes for the first time appear and try to set L.15 on fire ; she had to throw overboard all ballast to get clear.

GENERAL

International Law and the World War, by J. W. Garner, Professor of Political Science in the University of Illinois (*London and New York : Longmans, two volumes, 40s.*), is a book worth reading as it deals with a side of war somewhat neglected in England in spite of the excellent chapter on the laws and usages of war in the "Manual of Military Law." It is not a dull legal treatise; it contains a story full of incident and is a storehouse of information. It begins with an introductory chapter on the status of international law at the outbreak of war—in which it is said that—

"the rules laid down in the British manual are irreproachable; they are humane and liberal and represent the most enlightened views regarding the conduct of land warfare,"

whereas the German manual, it is said,

"warns military commanders against humanitarian tendencies of the time and refers to the humane principles of the Hague Conventions as sentimentalism and flabby emotion."

The other chapters—excluding those referring to naval, maritime and commercial matters—are concerned with the treatment of enemy diplomatic and consular representatives after the outbreak of war, in which connection the Germans are said to be outside the pale of civilized nations; treatment of enemy aliens; forbidden weapons and instrumentalities, including gas; treatment of hostages and employment of civilians as shields against attack; devastation of enemy territory; bombardment; destruction of monuments, buildings and institutions especially protected by the law of nations; aerial warfare; violations of the Geneva Convention; treatment of prisoners; military Government in Belgium; contributions, requisitions, and forced labour; collective fines and community responsibility; deportation of civilian population; German invasion of Belgium and Luxembourg; occupation of Greece by England and France; exportation of arms and munitions to belligerents; the effect of war on international law, and the outlook for the future. The author, though an American, comments on the way in which Neutral States, like the U.S.A., signatories of the Hague Conventions, looked on without protest at flagrant violations by Germany of the rules they had assisted to draw up, and thinks "that the time has arrived when the body of States should adopt a different attitude toward violations of international law by particular States."

The numerical inadequacy of the great German Army in proportion to her population has frequently been put forward as one of the excuses for the defeat of the Central Powers. The case has been exceedingly well summarized from this standpoint in *Die deutsche Rüstungspolitik vor dem Kriege* (Bonn : Schroeder), by Dr. Herzfeld, a tutor of Halle University. It is an almost perfect example of how history can be perverted to serve political ends. The newly united Empire was exposed, soon after 1871 we are told, to the dangers of a two-front war. It was only after hard-fought discussions with the Reichstag that Bismarck and his successor Caprivi were able to secure such increases of the Army as gave it a "modest superiority over France alone." In 1899 there was an important addition of three corps, but the Reichstag reduced the numbers asked for by 7,000. In 1904, the Morocco crisis produced the first serious war scare of the new century ; but, in view of the unfavourable political situation, as the Centre and Socialists were in the majority, the Government did not dare to make demands for an increase of the Army corresponding to the increase of population. The Bosnian annexation crisis, 1908-1909, showed the fearful latent danger of war : Russia was building up a great army at feverish speed ; France was spurred on to even larger armaments ; "the envious England was in the act of completing the formation of the Haldane Expeditionary Force." The attempt of the German War Minister in 1910 to introduce a large Army programme broke down on the opposition of the Imperial Treasurer, who was supported by the Chancellor. Then came the second Morocco crisis, but the elections of 1912 brought a fatal increase of the Social-Democratic vote, and the Minister of War had again to be content with a wholly insufficient Budget.

The German General Staff was certain of the intentions of France and Russia, and the attitudes of England and Italy. "On top of this came the great Belgian Army Bill." This led to Ludendorff's 1912 memorandum and his removal from the Staff.

The author avoids figures ; one would hardly gather that the 15 German (including Bavarian) corps of 1870 had by August, 1914, grown to the 25 Active corps, 14 Reserve corps, 7 *Ersatz* divisions and 32 *Landwehr* brigades, say 40½ corps, which took the field then, without counting the numerous Reserve, *Ersatz*, *Landwehr* and *Depôt* formations left in Germany. The total of trained men had risen from 900,000 in 1870, to 5½ millions in 1914.

TRANSLATION

The description of the horrors of the attack on Verdun, written under the form of a romance by Fritz von Unruh, the German novelist, has been translated into French under the title of *Verdun* (*Paris : Kra, 10 francs*). The book is concerned with the adventures of a single infantry company, and mainly the experiences, thoughts, and sayings of the captain, the lieutenant, a temporary officer, the sergeant-major, a drummer, a cook, and a pioneer. There is none of the "exhilarating forward on the enemy" about it. One man goes mad, one is blinded, two are killed. Occasionally we are shown the Army Corps and division commanders, each driving the man behind him to make efforts to push forward, callously regardless of the loss of life, and seeing nothing but the objective.

REVIEWS AND NOTICES OF RECENT BOOKS AND ARTICLES ON MILITARY SUBJECTS

Reminiscences, 1848-1890. By Major-General Sir FRANCIS HOWARD, K.C.B., K.C.M.G. London : John Murray, Albemarle Street, W. 15s.

For thousands, perhaps for tens of thousands of years, men were apparently obliged to hunt in order to exist ; and, unless acquired aptitudes can be transmitted to descendants, it must be due to the promptings of some still powerful preying instinct that many of us turn for amusement and recreation to the killing of game, and like Sir Francis Howard devote a great part of our lives to shooting. But it may safely be said that few could tell the tale of their experiences in the domain of sport in so interesting a way.

The "Reminiscences" of Sir Francis Howard are full of good stories, and the book, therefore, is one of those which, if it finds its way into a Mess library, will serve to cheer and revive minds overtired with grave contemplation of the intricate problems of present-day warfare. At the same time, however, useful information will be obtained of the history of the period between the middle and closing years of the nineteenth century ; and, what is more important, as to how officers can best win the confidence and affection of their men.

Sir Francis gives many hints on field and other craft, but whether chicken farmers will follow this receipt for the production of eggs is perhaps doubtful :

"A couple of the mess hens having stopped laying, they administered to each a Cockles' pill, with such excellent results that it became difficult to pick up the eggs as fast as they laid them."

Stories of exciting struggles between Bavarian keepers and poachers will also enlighten many as to the hard school in which some of the most stubborn of our late opponents learnt to sharp-shoot ; and other tales will unfold certain of the "strange kinks in the German character."

Much of the book deals with Indian sport, and incidentally with

the turf in India, and these chapters may contain information that may be useful even in the conditions that at present prevail in this great peninsula. A typical story of Indian mentality is that of a troublesome riding-camel and her camel-man. Having completed the shoot Sir Francis had ordered the man to ride the animal back to Gwalior, but was met by a refusal, the camel-man saying that—

“ he was a poor man and smelt, which was true. I sent him with her [the camel] to a neighbouring village with orders to return to Gwalior when she had had a day's rest. Shortly afterwards Hillyard, who commanded at the fort, was surprised by seeing a procession, consisting of my camel-man and sixty coolies carrying a platform on which lay a putrid camel, winding its way up the hill to the officers' quarters. It turned out that, Rebecca having got a chill and died in the village she was resting at, my old man, fearing he might be accused of having sold her, had hired coolies to carry her eighty miles into the Fort.”

Sir Francis was not only a keen shot, but was also an ugly customer with his fists ; and on one occasion, in order that he might show how he could hit, he—

“ walked up to a varnished deal door, let out at it, leaving the dents of my knuckles in the panel, and then showed him my hand none the worse for it.”

The author makes some slips in the spelling of proper names which might easily have been avoided. For instance, the Battyses of the Guides do not spell their name Battie, and the late General Penn Symons spelt his second name with one not with two *m*'s. There was also in the Indian Army in 1879, no such regiment as the 21st Pathan Infantry, but there was the 21st (Punjab) Regiment of Bengal N.I.

Egypt and the Army. By Lieut.-Colonel P. G. ELGOOD, C.M.G.
Oxford University Press. 16s.

The author's long experience of civil and military administration in Egypt enables him to write with authority upon that country and its Army. He has succeeded in giving us a book which is full of interest and of sound judgment.

The intricate problems connected with the Government of Egypt during the war have not, so far as we know, been brought prominently to the notice of the public and have, perhaps, been rather lost sight of in the march of more recent events in that country. Colonel Elgood gives an instructive account of them and enables the English reader to understand the successive stages through

which Egyptian public opinion passed—how what was at first a spirit of sullen acquiescence in British control was developed into one of angry discontent, and revolt.

Englishmen have been too much inclined to regard the state of feeling in Egypt before the war as one of gratitude for the prosperity conferred on the country by Lord Cromer and his successors. This appears to have been an incorrect view. The Egyptians acknowledged indeed the work of Lord Cromer, but were deeply distrustful of the promise of the British Government that its control was to be only of a temporary nature, especially as in the years immediately preceding the war the number of British officials was greatly increased and the share of Egyptians in their own government appeared to be becoming smaller rather than greater.

The events leading up to the war were watched in Egypt with interest, yet with aloofness. There was a comfortable conviction in the Egyptian mind, first that Egypt could not possibly become involved in a European war, and secondly, that Great Britain would certainly be defeated and her control, without any effort on their part, removed. It is apparent, therefore, that it was only through a very sagacious handling of the situation that the successive proclamations declaring Egypt to be at war with the King's enemies (5th of August, 1914), declaring martial law (2nd of November, 1914) and establishing the Protectorate (18th of December, 1914) were received without any active outburst of popular feeling. The author gives full praise to the wise administration of General Maxwell and his skilful cooperation with the Egyptian Government during this period.

The war at first made little difference to Egypt. The Turkish attack on the Suez Canal in December, 1914, made the Egyptians realize the fact that active opposition to England during the war would, even if successful, only result in a change of masters. The country was prospering, and the orders made under martial law were wise and reasonable. One rash undertaking was, however, given, which proved impossible of fulfilment, namely that no demands would be made on Egypt for assistance in the prosecution of the war. This was remembered at a later date and increased the ever present distrust of British promises.

As the war went on, British control tightened, as was inevitable, and the life of all classes in Egypt became affected to an increasing degree. By the beginning of 1917 the last Turkish soldier had been driven out of the Sinai Peninsula and the Army was no longer a garrison for the defence of Egypt. Egypt then became the base

for a large expeditionary force destined for the conquest of Palestine, and this was a rôle in which she was reluctant to offer any assistance. Yet the demands made upon her increased. A strict food control was established; the fellahin were compulsorily enlisted in the labour and camel corps; camels and other private property were requisitioned; all arms were required to be surrendered; free dealing in the 1918 cotton crop was stopped, and to the Egyptian, although in reality he was never unjustly treated, it seemed as if his interests and those of his country, were being entirely sacrificed to those of the occupying Power. At this point, in the opinion of the author, a declaration by the British Government as to the future relations with Egypt would have been timely and might have saved the troubles that were to come. But no such declaration was made, and Egypt was left to speculate with impatience as to what degree of liberty the conclusion of hostilities would bring to her.

On the morrow of the Armistice, an unofficial deputation headed by Saad Pasha Zaghlul, waited upon the High Commissioner with a request to be allowed to proceed to London to lay before the British Cabinet a claim for autonomy. Colonel Elgood considers that the refusal to grant this request was largely responsible for the events that ensued. What was at that time, in reality, discontent at the prevailing war conditions and, treated as such could have been satisfied, rapidly developed into a wide-spread political agitation for complete independence, and the deportation of Zaghlul and three of the leaders of the movement was the signal for the outbreak.

The author does not deal with the political developments subsequent to the quelling of the riots, but, for an understanding of them, it is necessary that the wartime history of Egypt should be studied, and in this book that story is well told.

Horse-sense and Horsemanship of To-day. By Lieut.-Colonel GEOFFREY BROOKE, D.S.O., M.C., 16th/5th Lancers, Chief Instructor, Cavalry Wing Equitation School, Weedon; with introductions by General The EARL OF CAVAN, K.P., G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O., K.C.B., and Lord WODEHOUSE, M.C. Constable & Company, Ltd. 15s.

Colonel Brooke's book, as might be expected, is an extremely valuable addition to the existing literature on the subject of horsemanship and the training of hunters and polo ponies, and its value

lies in the fact that it is based upon the results of practical experience and not upon theory. It is also, although it contains much that is purely technical, very pleasant to read and it is illustrated with excellent and well-chosen photographs, which, with the author's comments beneath them, are of great interest. Colonel Brooke emphasizes the importance of the rider altering his seat according to the type of riding in which he is going to engage, and his advice on the training of polo ponies should lead to fewer ponies being spoilt, which is one of the only ways by which the present shortage can be remedied. It is essentially a book for the young officer, and although horsemanship cannot be acquired only from books, it is one which will put him on the right lines and save him from many a costly mistake.

The West Yorkshire Regiment in the War, 1914-18. Vol. I. By EVERARD WYRALL. The Bodley Head.

From the point of view of any old, distinguished, line regiment the period 1914-1918 possesses a significance and interest out of all proportion to its length. It provides a complete contrast to the last European conflict in which British forces were engaged: there are new weapons and new tactics, new equipment and new devices, new conditions and new usages. It is a warfare transformed. And, as it never was before, the Army is the nation and the county is the regiment which numbers, perhaps, a dozen fighting battalions—perhaps many more—serving on different fronts across Europe and the East. There is no experience, and no triumph or tragedy, of the past which is not equalled and excelled during these years.

Many regiments have already published their histories, or records of service, which cover the period of the Great War. The appearance of the chronicle of the West Yorkshire, the author of which is announced as having several works for other regiments in preparation, leads one to ask if justice is being done—or will be done—to a succession of great opportunities.

In this case it is evident that a close and conscientious study has been made of the official documents. But something more is required than the impression that an industrious apprentice is conning a battalion diary for the benefit of the reader, and is throwing him a quotation, judicious or injudicious, from time to time. Indeed, such documents should be quoted with rare discretion: they have done their duty if they have provided a structure of facts. That gift of language which would clothe these facts worthily, and disdain

the bald platitude and the eccentric use of quotation and exclamation marks, appears to be lacking.

Then a writer imbued with the regimental spirit would not have omitted to relate with proper pride how the Territorial units gallantly shook off their domestic air, and how the Service battalions came into being. These matters are of the very stuff of history.

Again, technicalities exist to be explained or recast in lucid language: they can neither be ignored nor left to speak for themselves. Thus the mystic letters and numbers which in combination were used to denote points upon the map often present difficulties to the narrator. It is possible to translate them into simple descriptive terms or the proper map may be reproduced and the system explained. Where there is no explanation and no map, ill service is done to the regiment and to the reader alike.

Opinions may differ as to the amount of detail into which it is advisable to enter in describing the policy and plans of the Allied and enemy High Commands. But such descriptions demand a sound appreciation which, in our opinion, is lacking in Mr. Wyrall's work. The author also indulges in some hasty criticism that could well be spared.

The regiment which itself produces a competent historian is to be congratulated. Or it should be possible—but subject always to the question of expense—to discover a writer of some parts, preferably with regimental experience on active service. The other alternative is to wait, for the official records will keep: but no time should be lost in collecting from private sources such letters, diaries, portraits, sketches and personal recollections as are obtainable. This is generally an arduous business which, of its very nature, admits of no delay.

Rosemary. Collected and compiled by F. de BURGH and WALTER STONEMAN. Sampson Low, Marston & Co. 7s. 6d.

“There’s rosemary, that’s for remembrance.” This book is published in aid of the funds of the “Not Forgotten” Association, which is doing such splendid work in making life better worth the living for our wounded of the Great War who—yet to be cured or incurable—are still in hospital. Twenty-one eminent men of letters are represented, each by a short story, essay or poem, and the result is vastly more entertaining than the great majority of modern novels can claim to be. The full-page camera portraits of contributors add considerably to the attractions of the volume:

and Sir Sidney Low's admirably worded preface should assuredly induce many of the purchasers to, as he phrases it, "do a little more."

Experiments in State Control at the War Office and the Ministry of Food. By E. M. H. LLOYD. Humphrey Milford, The Clarendon Press.

Nearly every one is prepared to believe in the inefficiency of Government control of industry during the war years. To those who would gain some idea of the enormous difficulties and embarrassments with which the Government was confronted, and the large measure of success which attended its efforts to organize all available resources for the prosecution of the struggle, this book may be commended.

It belongs to the British Series of the Economic and Social History of the World War, and the author had experience of war administration both in the Raw Materials Section of the War Office and in the Ministry of Food. He has had access to the official documents of both Departments and has achieved an able and dispassionate survey of the course of State control in Great Britain during the war, so far as military necessities and foodstuffs are concerned.

After summarizing the history of Army supply in peace and war, Mr. Lloyd explains how the supply problems of the War Office increased and multiplied after the outbreak of war in 1914, the difficulties which arose in the organization of the industries affected, and the methods by which these difficulties were met. The legal basis of control is the subject of a special chapter.

A similar plan is followed in dealing with Food Control, and one section of the book is devoted to comparative studies of the chief questions involved in State control. The texts of many important Government Orders are given as appendices.

The History of the Norfolk Regiment, 1685-1918. By F. LORAIN PETRE, O.B.E. Vol. I.—1685-1914. Norwich: Jarrold & Sons, Ltd.

In these days the history of any old British Corps previous to the Great War has, more than ever, a picturesque, almost romantic, quality. A notable instance is provided by the career of the Norfolk Regiment.

It is true that during the first hundred and twenty years of its

existence fortune was not kind. In the course of the War of the Spanish Succession it met disaster at Castello de Vide and again at Almanza ; and it did not escape Saratoga in the American War of Independence. But there is nothing here of which the Regiment cannot be proud, and perhaps no other corps can furnish such shining examples of courage and fortitude in hardship, undeserved misfortune, and the depression of defeat. And later came victory at both Roliça and Vimeiro, whilst—after the Corunna campaign and the disastrous Walcheren expedition—the Regiment gained its full share of laurels under Wellington in the Peninsula. The nineteenth century saw the 1st Battalion serving in the First Afghan War, and present at the fierce actions of the first struggle with the Sikhs. Later came the Crimea. It was the turn of the 2nd Battalion to represent the Regiment in the Second Afghan War, and again in the South African War of 1899–1902.

An adequate presentation of a story so vivid in contrasts as that of the Norfolk Regiment depends, in the first place, upon the documents which are available. Mr. Petre is unfortunate inasmuch as all the Regiment's records were lost in the wreck of the *Ariadne* transport in 1805, but he is a diligent student of the authorities which have been preserved.

Sir W. Gomm's letters and journals and Sergeant Hale's diary have proved invaluable for the Peninsular War ; Sir Arthur Borton's papers have rendered excellent aid on the First Afghan War, First Sikh War and the Crimea. The quotations from such sources as these provide quite the best and most interesting parts of the narrative ; for it must be confessed that Mr. Petre too obviously lacks the regimental spirit. And he has not much gift for the description of the course of an action, whilst the sketch maps are not clear enough to assist the narrative as they should.

The portraits and other illustrations are well selected and admirably reproduced. Some of them are associated with the history of the Militia and Volunteer Battalions, to which a special chapter is devoted. The whole volume is exceedingly well printed and got up—it can, of course, always be re-bound when necessary—but Mr. Petre would have done well to see that it was quite self-contained. Short accounts of the most distinguished Colonels of the Regiment ; details of its establishment at various periods ; a full account of uniforms, badges and colours ; how the figure of Britannia became the Regimental badge—all these matters are of sufficient interest and importance to warrant inclusion in the pages of the text. They are not only relegated to " Appendices," but the

latter are not to be discovered. Presumably they will eventually be found at the tail of the next volume.

On the other hand the Bibliography might be confined to those books, documents and manuscripts used in the writing of this pre-War period.

ARTICLES IN REVIEWS

The Fortnightly Review, July, 1924. "The Military Problems raised by the World-War," by the President of Mexico.

General Obregon, in an interesting article, considers that the military errors committed by both sides were due to the idea that war is a science, whereas, he considers, it is neither more nor less than an art. He lays stress on the psychological factor, and on conditions produced by the enemy's mistakes which no science can foresee. He has special blame for the German command in adopting trench warfare.

The Quarterly Review, July, 1924. "The Study of War," by Major-General Sir George Aston, K.C.B.

In this article, which reviews the work of Clausewitz, Sir Charles Oman's *Art of War in the Middle Ages*, and other writings, the author deplores the wide gulf between the civilian and the military mind in this country, pointing out the necessity for the civilian and the military man having greater knowledge of each other's work. "War," he says, in discussing whether it is an art or a science or both, "comes more into the province of social life, as a conflict of human interests and activities."

The Nineteenth Century and After, August, 1924. "Bonnie Prince Charlie," by Lieut.-Colonel C. A. Court Repington, C.M.G.

This article contains some interesting details about the conduct of the campaign of 1745.

Blackwood's Magazine, August, 1924. "Marechal de Saxe—Military Prophet," by CAPTAIN B. H. LIDDELL HART.

Marshal Saxe left some valuable "Reveries on the Art of War," which were published posthumously. From these a large number of quotations are given in this article, and are examined in the light of modern experience.

LIST OF BOOKS RECEIVED

- "Experiments in State Control at the War Office and the Ministry of Food." By E. M. H. Lloyd. Published by Oxford University Press. 10s. 6d. net.
- "Horse-sense and Horsemanship of To-day." By Lieut.-Colonel Geoffrey Brooke, D.S.O., M.C. Published by Constable. 15s. net.
- "Rosemary." Collected and Compiled by F. de Burgh and Walter Stoneman. Published by Sampson Low, Marston & Co., Ltd. 7s. 6d. net.
- "Jane's All the World's Aircraft, 1924." Compiled and Edited by C. G. Grey. Published by Sampson Low. 2 *gns.* net.
- "A Record of the Battles and Engagements of the British Armies in France and Flanders, 1914-1918." By Captain E. A. James. Published by Gale & Polden, Ltd. 4s. net.
- "The History of the Norfolk Regiment, 1685-1918." Vol. I. By F. Loraine Petre, O.B.E. Published by Jarrold & Sons, Ltd.
- "Official History of New Zealand's Effort in the Great War." Vol. IV. the War Effort of New Zealand. Edited by Lieut. H. T. B. Drew, N.Z.E.F. Published by Whitcombe & Tombs, Ltd. 8s.
- "Simplified Organization and Administration." By Captain R. H. D. Bolton. Published by Gale & Polden, Ltd. 4s. 6d. net.

PARLIAMENTARY NOTES

HOUSE OF COMMONS

ALLIED ARMIES IN BULGARIA.—On the 2nd of June, *the Prime Minister*, in reply to a question by *Mr. Morel*, informed the House that it had been agreed that the cost of the Allied Armies in the occupied territories of Bulgaria, as defined in Article 133 of the Treaty of Neuilly, should be discharged by the payment by Bulgaria of the sum of 25,000,000 gold francs, this sum to bear interest at 5 per cent. and to be paid in instalments spread over ten years.

MARESFIELD CAMP.—On the 4th of June *the Secretary of State for War* stated that Maresfield Park was the property of the Public Trustee, as successor of a German subject who owned it before the war, and that the areas at Maresfield and Crowborough at present occupied by the War Office would be vacated early in 1925.

BRITISH ARMY OF THE RHINE.—On the 4th of June, *the Secretary of State for War* stated that the estimated monthly cost of the British Army of the Rhine during 1924-1925 was £140,000, exclusive of cost of accommodation and miscellaneous services provided free by Germany. He also stated that the law administered by the summary courts in the occupied territory was British military law, supplemented when necessary by ordinances of the Rhineland Commis-

sion ; it was, however, open to the summary courts to hand persons over to the German civil courts where the ordinary German civil law prevailed.

MOTOR VEHICLES.—On the 4th of June, *the Secretary of State for War* gave the following figures with regard to the number of light cars, ambulances and motor vehicles other than commercial cars and lorries under the control of the War Office, both at home and abroad :—

				Armistice, 1918.	31st of May, 1924.
Lorries, etc.	50,259	1,222
Cars and vans	26,133	615
Ambulances	7,045	157
Motor cycles	34,865	849
Total				121,302	2,843

AIRSHIP CONSTRUCTION.—On the 4th of June, in the course of a debate on the Air Supplementary Estimate, *the Under-Secretary of State for Air* gave some details of the new airship which is under contract. It will be more than twice as large as any yet built in this country, and it must, under the contract, be capable of travelling at the rate of 70 miles per hour.

FLYING ACCIDENTS IN INDIA.—On the 16th of June, in reply to a question by Captain Terrell, *the Under-Secretary of State for Air* stated that the number of flying accidents involving death or personal injury in the R.A.F. in India during the last three years were as follows :—

1921-22	7
1922-23	4
1923-24	14

The number of flying hours in 1923-1924 was considerably greater than in the other two years.

GENERAL LAWRENCE'S COMMITTEE.—On the 17th of June, *the Secretary of State for War* stated that the Army Council had decided, with the concurrence of the Treasury, to adopt the two principal recommendations on which General Lawrence's Committee was unanimous, namely, the amalgamation of the Royal Army Pay Corps and the Corps of Military Accountants, and the continuance of the new scheme of cost accounting, subject to an investigation as to the possibility of greater economy in its working.

ARMY STRENGTH.—On the 24th of June *the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for War* gave the following figures as the total effective strengths of the undermentioned countries, excluding reserves and colonial troops, and, in the case of Great Britain, the

Territorial Army, the authorized peace strength of which was 185,554 :—

Great Britain	155,935
France	732,248
Germany	100,000
Czecko Slovakia	149,877
Russia	1,003,000

FULL DRESS.—On the 1st of July, *the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for War*, in reply to a question by *Lord Apsley*, stated that while full dress was an undoubted incentive to recruits to join the Guards Brigade in preference to other units, the cost of extending it to other units had hitherto been found prohibitive.

IRAQ (BOMBING OPERATIONS).—On the 3rd of July, *the Under-Secretary of State for Air* stated that during the past five months bombs had been dropped on five occasions in Iraq, and that in all cases, except one, not less than two days' warning was given to enable the inhabitants to withdraw.

CHANNEL TUNNEL.—On the 7th of July, *the Prime Minister* made a statement on the Channel Tunnel question, which had been referred to the Committee of Imperial Defence. The Committee unanimously found that the advantages of a Channel Tunnel were not commensurate with the disadvantages which would arise from a defence point of view, and that it should not be proceeded with at the present time.

ROYAL AIR FORCE (ECONOMICS).—On the 8th of July, in reply to a question by *Sir F. Sykes*, *the Under-Secretary of State for Air* stated that, as a result of a close scrutiny of Air Ministry establishments, it was contemplated that the estimate of the number of additional services *personnel* required to complete the home defence expansion could be reduced by nearly 1,750.

DISCHARGES.—On the 8th of July, *the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for War* stated, in reply to a question by *Mr. Somerville*, that during the year ended the 31st of May last the number of soldiers who purchased their discharge was 1,097, of whom 341 were recruits. The number discharged on compassionate grounds was 755.

ROYAL AIR FORCE (STATISTICS).—On the 8th of July, *the Under-Secretary of State for Air*, in reply to a question by *Lieut.-Colonel Sir F. Hall*, stated that the total number of officers and other ranks on the active list of the Air Service was 3,156 officers, 102 cadets and 28,524 airmen. The number serving in Great Britain was 2,125 officers, 102 cadets and 20,501 airmen.

TEMPORARY COMMISSIONS.—On the 29th of July, *the Secretary of State for War*, in reply to a question by *Lieut.-Colonel Meyler*, stated that the number of temporary officers at present serving was 294.

SANDHURST.—On the 29th of July, *the Secretary of State for War* stated that, as from January next, the five existing companies at Sandhurst would be reduced to four.

LULWORTH COVE.—On the 29th of July, *the Secretary of State for War* informed the House that the War Office had decided to exercise their powers of purchase under the Acquisition of Land Acts with regard to Lulworth Cove, but that this did not preclude the resumption of negotiations for a lease if suitable terms could be arranged.

DISCHARGES.—On the 29th of July, in reply to a question by *Mr. C. Wilson*, *the Secretary of State for War* gave the following figures relating to the numbers of men discharged as not likely to become efficient soldiers :—

Year ending 31st October.	Total number discharged.	Number per 1,000 of strength.
1911	903	3'72
1912	926	3'83
1913	870	3'69
1921	2,946	1'43
1922	3,249	15'78
1923	3,105	15'98

He stated that the increase in the last two years was attributable partly to the effect of war conditions on the physique of growing lads, and partly to reductions.

CEMETERIES (IRAQ).—On the 31st of July, *the Secretary of State for War* gave an account of the progress of the work of the Imperial War Graves Commission in Iraq, which is not so far advanced as in other theatres of war.

EX-RANKER OFFICERS.—On the 6th of August, on the motion for the second reading of the Appropriation Bill, a further discussion took place on the question of the pensions of ex-ranker officers.

APPENDIX

[*Supplied from official sources with the permission of the Controller of His Majesty's Stationery Office.*]

I. THE ARMY

1. ARMY COUNCIL

The Rt. Hon. Stephen Walsh, M.P., *Secretary of State for War (President of the Army Council).*

Major C. R. Attlee, ret., M.P., *Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for War (Vice-President of the Army Council).*

General the Earl of Cavan, K.P., G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O., K.C.B., *Chief of the Imperial General Staff (First Military Member).*

Lieutenant-General Sir R. D. Whigham, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*, *Adjutant-General to the Forces (Second Military Member).*

Lieutenant-General Sir W. Campbell, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*, *Quarter-Master General to the Forces (Third Military Member).*

Lieutenant-General Sir J. F. Noel Birch, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., Col. Comdt. R.A., *Master-General of the Ordnance (Fourth Military Member).*

J. J. Lawson, Esq., M.P., *Financial Secretary of the War Office (Finance Member).*

Sir H. J. Creedy, K.C.B., K.C.V.O., *Permanent Under-Secretary of State for War (Secretary of the Army Council).*

2. DEPARTMENTS OF THE WAR OFFICE

Secretary of State for War

The Rt. Hon. Stephen Walsh, M.P.

Military Secretary to the Secretary of State for War. Lieutenant-General Sir W. E. Peyton, K.C.B., K.C.V.O., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*

Judge Advocate-General. Sir F. Cassel, Bt., K.C.

Chief of the Imperial General Staff

General the Earl of Cavan, K.P., G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O., K.C.B.

Director of Military Operations and Intelligence. Major-General Sir J. T. Burnett-Stuart, K.B.E., C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*

Director of Staff Duties. Major-General C. F. Romer, C.B., C.M.G., *p.s.c.*

Director of Military Training Major-General Hon. J. F. Gathorne-Hardy, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*

Adjutant General to the Forces

Lieutenant-General Sir R. D. Whigham, K.C.B., K.C.M.G.,
D.S.O., *p.s.c.*

Director of Recruiting and Organisation. Colonel Sir R. S. May, K.B.E., C.B., C.M.G.,
D.S.O., *p.s.c.*

Director of Personal Services. Major-General F. F. Ready, C.B., C.S.I.,
C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*

Director-General, Army Medical Service. Major-General Sir W. B. Leishman, Knt.,
K.C.B., K.C.M.G.

Quarter-Master General to the Forces

Lieutenant-General Sir Walter Campbell, K.C.B., K.C.M.G.,
D.S.O., *p.s.c.*

Director of Movements and Quartering. Major-General A. A. McHardy, C.B.,
C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*

Director of Remounts. Colonel (temp. Col. on the Staff) C. E. G.
Norton, C.B., C.S.I., A.D.C.

Director of Supplies and Transport. Major-General P. O. Hazelton, C.B., C.M.G.

Director of Equipment and Ordnance Stores. Col. (Hon. Col. on the Staff) R. K. Scott,
C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.

Director-General, Army Veterinary Services. Major-General W. D. Smith, G.B., C.M.G.,
D.S.O.

Master General of the Ordnance

Lieutenant-General Sir J. F. Noel Birch, K.C.B., K.C.M.G.,
Col. Comdt. R.A.

Director of Artillery. Colonel (temp. Col. on the Staff) J. T.
Dreyer, C.B., D.S.O.

Director of Fortifications and Works. Major-General H. F. Thuillier, C.B.,
C.M.G.

Director General of Factories. Sir H. Mensforth, K.C.B., C.B.E.

Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for War

Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for War. Major C. R. Attlee, ret., M.P.

Director-General of the Territorial Army. Lieutenant-General Sir H. S. Jeudwine,
K.C.B., K.B.E., Col. Comdt. R.A.

Comptroller of Lands. E. H. Coles, Esq., C.B.

Financial Secretary of the War Office

Financial Secretary J. J. Lawson, Esq., M.P.
Director of Army Contracts. Sir J. A. Corcoran, K.B.E., C.B.

Permanent Under-Secretary of State for War

Permanent Under-Secretary of State for War and Accounting Officer. Sir H. J. Creedy, K.G.B., K.C.V.O.
Deputy Under-Secretary of State. J. B. Crosland, Esq., C.B.
Principal Assistant Under-Secretary of State. Sir B. B. Cubitt, K.C.B.
Chaplain-General. Rt. Rev. Bishop J. Taylor-Smith, C.B., C.V.O., D.D.

3. COMMANDS OF THE ARMY AT HOME**A.—ALDERSHOT COMMAND**

General Officer Commanding-in-Chief. Lieut.-General Sir P. W. Chetwode, Bt., K.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O.
Colonel on the Staff, General Staff. Colonel (temp. Col. on the Staff) C. P. Heywood, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
Major-General in charge of Administration. Major-General B. F. Burnett-Hitchcock, C.B., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
1st Cavalry Brigade. Colonel Commandant F. W. L. S. H. Cavendish, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
1st Air Defence Brigade. Colonel C. W. Collingwood, C.M.G., D.S.O.
1st Division. Major-General Sir A. A. Montgomery, K.C.M.G., C.B., *p.s.c.*
1st Infantry Brigade. Colonel Commandant J. McC. Steele, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.
2nd Infantry Brigade. Colonel Commandant J. G. Dill, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
3rd Infantry Brigade. Colonel Commandant H. H. S. Knox, C.B., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
C.R.A. 1st Division. Colonel Commandant A. G. Arbuthnot, C.M.G., D.S.O.
2nd Division. Major-General Sir E. P. Strickland, K.C.B., K.B.E., C.M.G., D.S.O.
5th Infantry Brigade. Colonel Commandant G. W. St. G. Grogan, V.C., C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., A.D.C.
6th Infantry Brigade. Colonel Commandant W. H. Bartholomew, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
C.R.A. 2nd Division. Colonel Commandant H. R. Peck, C.M.G., D.S.O.

B.—EASTERN COMMAND

<i>General Officer Commanding-in-Chief.</i>	General Sir G. F. Milne, G.C.M.G., K.C.B., D.S.O., Col. Comdt., R.A., <i>p.s.c.</i> , A.D.C.
<i>Colonel on the Staff, General Staff.</i>	Colonel (temp. Col. on the Staff) C. Bonham-Carter, C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>
<i>Major-General in charge of Administration.</i>	Major-General J. W. O'Dowda, C.B., C.S.I., C.M.G., <i>p.s.c.</i>
<i>4th Division.</i>	Major-General Sir R. B. Stephens, K.C.B., C.M.G., <i>p.s.c.</i>
<i>10th Infantry Brigade.</i>	Colonel Commandant A. B. E. Cator, C.B., D.S.O.
<i>11th Infantry Brigade.</i>	Colonel Commandant F. J. Marshall, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>
<i>12th Infantry Brigade.</i>	Colonel Commandant N. J. G. Cameron, C.B., C.M.G., <i>p.s.c.</i> , A.D.C.
<i>C.R.A. 4th Division.</i>	Colonel Commandant A. B. Forman, C.M.G., D.S.O.
<i>54th (East Anglian) Division.</i>	Major-General J. Duncan, C.B., C.M.G., C.V.O., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>
<i>161st Essex Infantry Brigade.</i>	Colonel T. N. S. M. Howard, D.S.O.
<i>162nd East Midland Infantry Brigade.</i>	Colonel J. Brown, C.B.E., D.S.O., T.D.
<i>163rd Norfolk and Suffolk Infantry Brigade.</i>	Colonel W. K. Legge, C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>
<i>C.R.A. 54th Division.</i>	Colonel A. R. Wainewright, C.M.G., D.S.O.
<i>44th (Home Counties) Division.</i>	Major-General Sir H. W. Hodgson, K.C.M.G., C.B., C.V.O.
<i>131st (Surrey) Infantry Brigade.</i>	Colonel B. C. Dent, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.
<i>132nd (Middlesex and Sussex) Infantry Brigade.</i>	Colonel R. E. Solly-Flood, C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>
<i>133rd (Kent and Sussex) Infantry Brigade.</i>	Colonel P. M. Robinson, C.B., C.M.G.
<i>C.R.A. 44th Division.</i>	Colonel F. A. Wilson, C.M.G., D.S.O.

C.—LONDON DISTRICT

<i>General Officer Commanding.</i>	Major-General the Lord Ruthven, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>
<i>General Staff Officer, 2nd Grade.</i>	Major E. W. S. Balfour, D.S.O., O.B.E., M.C., <i>p.s.c.</i>
<i>26th (London) Air Defence Brigade.</i>	Colonel D. H. Gill, C.M.G., D.S.O.
<i>56th (1st London) Division.</i>	Major-General Sir G. P. T. Feilding, K.C.B., K.C.V.O., C.M.G., D.S.O.
<i>167th (1st London) Infantry Brigade.</i>	Colonel G. C. B. Paynter, C.M.G., D.S.O.
<i>168th (2nd London) Infantry Brigade.</i>	Colonel A. E. Glasgow, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.
<i>169th (3rd London) Infantry Brigade.</i>	Colonel J. V. Campbell, V.C., C.M.G., D.S.O., A.D.C.

C.—LONDON DISTRICT—*continued*

<i>C.R.A. 56th (The London Division.</i>	Colonel F. W. H. Walshe, C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i> , A.D.C.
<i>27th (London) Air Defence Brigade.</i>	Colonel C. R. Kelly, C.M.G., D.S.O.
<i>47th (2nd London) Division.</i>	Major-General Sir W. Thwaites, K.C.M.G., C.B., <i>p.s.c.</i>
<i>140th (4th London) Infantry Brigade.</i>	Colonel W. H. V. Darell, C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>
<i>141st (5th London) Infantry Brigade.</i>	Colonel C. H. Pank, C.M.G., D.S.O., T.D.
<i>142nd (6th London) Infantry Brigade.</i>	Colonel Hon. A. G. A. Hore-Ruthven, V.C., C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>
<i>C.R.A. 47th (2nd London) Division.</i>	Colonel E. H. Eley, C.M.G., C.B.E., D.S.O., T.D.

D.—NORTHERN COMMAND

<i>General Officer Commanding-in-Chief.</i>	Lieut.-General Sir C. H. Harington, G.B.E. K.C.B., D.S.O., Col. The King's R., <i>p.s.c.</i>
<i>General Staff Officer 1st Grade.</i>	Colonel W. W. Seymour, <i>p.s.c.</i>
<i>Colonel on the Staff in charge of Administration.</i>	Colonel (temp. Col. on the Staff) A. E. W. Harman, C.B., D.S.O., A.D.C.
<i>5th Cavalry Brigade.</i>	Colonel H. F. Wickham, C.I.E.
<i>6th Cavalry Brigade.</i>	Colonel H. S. Sewell, C.M.G., D.S.O.
<i>50th (The Northumbrian) Division.</i>	Major-General F. A. Dudgeon, C.B., <i>p.s.c.</i>
<i>149th (Northumberland) Infantry Brigade.</i>	Colonel H. H. S. Morant, D.S.O.
<i>150th (York and Durham) Infantry Brigade.</i>	Colonel H. L. Alexander, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>
<i>151st (Durham) Light Infantry Brigade.</i>	Colonel G. O. Spence, C.B., D.S.O., T.D.
<i>C.R.A. 50th (Northumbrian) Division.</i>	Colonel C. E. Palmer, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.
<i>49th (The West Riding) Division.</i>	Major-General A. A. Kennedy, C.B., C.M.G., <i>p.s.c.</i>
<i>146th (1st West Riding) Infantry Brigade.</i>	Colonel W. H. L. Allgood, C.M.G., D.S.O.
<i>147th (2nd West Riding) Infantry Brigade.</i>	Colonel R. E. Sugden, C.M.G., D.S.O., T.D.
<i>148th (3rd West Riding) Infantry Brigade.</i>	Colonel L. F. Renny, C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>
<i>C.R.A. 49th (The West Riding) Division.</i>	Colonel J. G. B. Allardyce, C.M.G., D.S.O.
<i>46th (The North Midland) Division.</i>	Major-General C. C. Van Straubenzee, C.B., C.M.G.
<i>137th (Staffordshire) Infantry Brigade.</i>	Colonel T. W. Stansfeld, C.M.G., D.S.O.

D.—NORTHERN COMMAND—*continued*

- 138th (*Lincolnshire and Leicestershire*) Infantry Brigade. Colonel L. H. P. Hart, D.S.O., T.D.
- 139th (*Sherwood Foresters*) Infantry Brigade. Colonel B. A. Smith, D.S.O., M.C., T.D.
- C.R.A. 46th (*The North Midland*) Division. Colonel R. E. Myddelton, T.D.

E.—NORTHERN IRELAND DISTRICT

- General Officer Commanding. Major-General A. R. Cameron, C.B., C.M.G., *p.s.c.*
- General Staff Officers 2nd Grade. { Bt. Major F. W. L. Bissett, D.S.O., M.C. (temp.),
Major G. H. Donnelly, M.C. (temp.).

F.—SCOTTISH COMMAND

- General Officer Commanding-in-Chief. Lieutenant-General Sir W. P. Braithwaite, K.C.B., *p.s.c.*
- General Staff Officer 1st Grade. Colonel E. G. L. Thurlow, D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
- Colonel on the Staff in charge of Administration. } Colonel (temp. Col. on Staff) C. R. Newman, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
- 51st (*The Highland*) Division. Major-General A. B. Ritchie, C.B., C.M.G.
- 152nd (*Seaforth and Cameron*) Infantry Brigade. Colonel L. Holland, D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
- 153rd (*Black Watch and Gordon*) Infantry Brigade. Colonel A. J. Reddie, C.M.G., D.S.O.
- 154th (*Argyll and Sutherland*) Infantry Brigade. Colonel G. Thorpe, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
- C.R.A. 51st (*The Highland*) Division. Colonel E. F. Shewell, C.M.G., D.S.O.
- 52nd (*The Lowland*) Division. Major-General H. L. Reed, V.C., C.B., C.M.G., *p.s.c.*
- 155th (*East Scottish*) Infantry Brigade. Colonel W. B. Lesslie, C.B., C.M.G.
- 156th (*West Scottish*) Infantry Brigade. Colonel R. S. Murray-White, D.S.O.
- 157th (*Highland Light Infantry*) Infantry Brigade. Colonel A. J. McCulloch, D.S.O., D.C.M., *p.s.c.*
- C.R.A. 52nd (*The Lowland*) Division. Colonel F. Rainsford-Hannay, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*

G.—SOUTHERN COMMAND

- General Officer Commanding-in-Chief. General Sir A. J. Godley, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., *p.s.c.*, Col. R. U. Rif.

G.—SOUTHERN COMMAND—*continued*

<i>Colonel on the Staff, General Staff.</i>	Colonel (temp. Col. on the Staff) C. P. Deedes, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>
<i>Major-General in charge of Administration.</i>	Major-General G. H. B. Freeth, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>
<i>and Cavalry Brigade.</i>	Colonel Commandant B. D. Fisher, C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>
<i>3rd Division.</i>	Major-General Sir W. C. G. Heneker, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O.
<i>7th Infantry Brigade.</i>	Colonel Commandant G. H. N. Jackson, C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>
<i>8th Infantry Brigade.</i>	Colonel Commandant S. E. Hollond, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>
<i>9th Infantry Brigade.</i>	Colonel Commandant Sir H. J. Elles, K.C.M.G., C.B., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i> , A.D.C.
<i>C.R.A. 3rd Division.</i>	Colonel Commandant H. C. Stanley-Clarke, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.
<i>48th (The South Midland) Division.</i>	Major-General Sir P. P. de B. Radcliffe, K.C.M.G., C.B., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>
<i>143rd (Warwickshire) Infantry Brigade.</i>	Colonel A. Mudge, C.M.G.
<i>144th (Gloucestershire and Worcs.) Infantry Brigade.</i>	Colonel R. J. T. Hildyard, C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>
<i>145th (South Midland) Infantry Brigade.</i>	Colonel L. A. E. Price-Davies, V.C., C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i> , A.D.C.
<i>C.R.A. 48th (The South Midland) Division.</i>	Colonel W. E. Clarke, C.M.G., D.S.O.
<i>43rd (The Wessex) Division.</i>	Major-General Sir L. J. Bols, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O. (Col. Devon R.), <i>p.s.c.</i>
<i>128th (Hampshire) Infantry Bgde.</i>	Colonel H. C. R. Green, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.
<i>129th (South Wessex) Infantry Brigade.</i>	Colonel M. H. E. Welch, C.B., C.M.G., <i>p.s.c.</i>
<i>130th (Devon and Cornwall) Infantry Brigade.</i>	Colonel C. G. Fuller, C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>
<i>C.R.A., 43rd (The Wessex) Division.</i>	Colonel A. C. R. Nutt, D.S.O.

H.—WESTERN COMMAND

<i>General Officer Commanding-in-Chief.</i>	Lieutenant-General Sir R. H. K. Butler, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., <i>p.s.c.</i>
<i>General Staff Officer, 1st Grade.</i>	Colonel Sir H. Wake, Bt., C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>
<i>Colonel on the Staff i/c Administration.</i>	Colonel (temp. Col. on the Staff) E. Evans, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., A.D.C.
<i>53rd (The Welsh) Division.</i>	Major-General Sir T. O. Marden, K.B.E., C.B., C.M.G., <i>p.s.c.</i> , Col. Welch R.
<i>158th (Royal Welch) Infantry Brigade.</i>	Colonel A. C. Girdwood, C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>

H.—WESTERN COMMAND—*continued*

159th (Welsh Border) Infantry Brigade.	Colonel Hon. A. F. Stanley, D.S.O.
160th (South Wales) Infantry Brigade.	Colonel R. McDouall, C.B., C.M.G., C.B.E., D.S.O.
C.R.A. 53rd (The Welsh) Division.	Colonel L. A. Abel-Smith, D.S.O.
55th (The West Lancashire) Division.	Major-General Sir C. L. Nicholson, K.C.B., C.M.G., <i>p.s.c.</i> , Col. E. Lan. R.
164th (North Lancashire) Infantry Brigade.	Colonel L. J. Wyatt, D.S.O.
165th (Liverpool) Infantry Brigade.	Colonel J. G. Chaplin, C.B.E., D.S.O.
166th (South Lancashire and Cheshire) Infantry Brigade.	Colonel C. N. Perreau, C.M.G.
C.R.A. 55th (The West Lancashire) Division.	Colonel H. E. Carey, C.M.G., D.S.O.
42nd (The East Lancashire) Division.	Major-General A. Solly-Flood, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i> , Col. P.W. Vols.
125th (Lancashire Fusiliers) Brigade.	Colonel J. A. Strick, C.B., D.S.O.
126th (East Lancashire and Border) Infantry Bgde.	Colonel R. E. S. Prentice, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.
127th (Manchester) Infantry Brigade.	Colonel E. L. Challenor, C.B., C.M.G., C.B.E., D.S.O.
C.R.A. 42nd (The East Lancashire) Division.	Colonel E. M. Birch, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>

J.—CHANNEL ISLANDS

*Guernsey and Alderney Dis-
trict :*

<i>Lt.-Governor and Com- manding the Troops.</i>	Major-General Sir J. E. Capper, K.C.B., K.C.V.O., Col. Comdt. R. Tank Corps.
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Jersey District :

<i>Lt.-Governor and Com- manding the Troops.</i>	Major-General Hon. Sir F. R. Bingham, K.C.B., K.C.M.G.
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4. DISTRIBUTION OF REGULAR UNITS OF THE ARMY

A.—Cavalry Regiments

Regiment.	Station.	Commanding Officer.	Remarks.
The Life Guards (1st and 2nd)	Windsor	Lt.-Col. H. C. S. Ashton.	
Royal Horse Guards (The Blues)	Regent's Park	R. G. H. Howard-Vyse, C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
1st King's Dragoon Guards	Rhine	Lt.-Col. A. C. Little, D.S.O.	
The Queen's Bays (2nd Dragoon Gds.)	Sialkot	Lt.-Col. C. S. Rome, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
3rd-6th Dragoon Guards	Colchester	Lt.-Col. G. A. Sanford, D.S.O.	
4th-7th Dragoon Guards	Secunderabad	Lt.-Col. A. S. Pilcher	
1st The Royal Dragoons	Aldershot	Lt.-Col. W. T. Hodgson, D.S.O., M.C.	
The Royal Scots Greys (2nd Dragoons)	Risalpur	Lt.-Col. S. J. Hardy, D.S.O.	
3rd The King's Own Hussars	Egypt	Lt.-Col. P. J. V. Kelly, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
4th Queen's Own Hussars	Lucknow	Lt.-Col. T. W. Pragnell, D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
5th-6th Dragoons	Bangalore	Lt.-Col. C. R. Terrot, D.S.O.	
7th Queen's Own Hussars	Edinburgh	Lt.-Col. Hon. D. P. Tollemache, D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
8th King's Royal Irish Hussars	York	Lt.-Col. A. Curell.	
9th Queen's Royal Lancers	Palestine	Lt.-Col. J. Greene, D.S.O.	
10th Royal Hussars (Prince of Wales's Own)	Aldershot	Lt.-Col. M. Graham, D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
11th Hussars (Prince Albert's Own)	Meerut	Lt.-Col. W. J. Lockett, D.S.O.	
12th Royal Lancers (Prince of Wales's)	Tidworth	Lt.-Col. J. Blakiston-Houston, D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
13th-18th Hussars	Aldershot	Lt.-Col. E. F. Twist.	
14th-20th Hussars	Tidworth	Lt.-Col. J. G. Browne, C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
15th-19th Hussars	Egypt	Lt.-Col. Hon. J. D. Y. Bingham, D.S.O.	
16th-5th Lancers	Egypt	Lt.-Col. H. C. L. Howard, C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
17th-21st Lancers	Tidworth	Lt.-Col. T. P. Melville, D.S.O.	

B.—Royal Regiment of Artillery

Stations of Units.

Brigades, Royal Horse Artillery.

Brig.	Battery.	—	Brig.	Battery.	—
1	H.-Q. B M A	Exeter (for Aldershot) Trowbridge (for Aldershot)	3 (etd.)	J F	Egypt } Abbassia Egypt }
2	H.-Q., K C L	Meerut Sialkot Secunderabad (for Risalpur)	5	H.-Q., G N E	Aldershot (for Newport) Aldershot (for Trowbridge)
3	H.-Q. D	Egypt } Abbassia Egypt }	Unbrig.	I O	Risalpur (for Secunderabad) St. John's Wood

Field Brigades, Royal Artillery.

1 (Army)	H.-Q. 11 52, 80 (H), 98	Bulford	18 (Army)	H.-Q. 93, 94, 95 (H)	Edinburgh
2	H.-Q. 35 (H) 53, 87	Meerut	19	H.-Q. 29 (H) 59	Dunbar Brighton
3	H.-Q. 18, 62, 75, 65 (H)	Agra Deepcut	20	39, 96, 97 H.-Q. 41, 45 (H) 67, 99	Bangalore (for Aldershot)
4	H.-Q. 4 (H), 7	Longmoor	21	H.-Q. P. Z. (H) Y	Lahore Jullundur
5	H.-Q. 63, 64, 73, 81 (H)	Bordon (for Bulford)	22	Q (H) H.-Q. 32	Ferozepore Jhansi (for Rawalpindi)
6	H.-Q. 69, 74, 77, 79 (H)	Bordon (for Larkhill)		55 (H)	Jhansi (for Campbellpore)
7	H.-Q. 16, 43 (H)	Lucknow		33	Nowgong (for Rawalpindi)
	9 17	Fyzabad Bareilly		36	Nasirabad (for Kawalpindi)
8	H.-Q. H (H) V. W. X.	Rhine	23	H.Q. 60, 89, 90	Mhow (for Nowshera)
9	H.-Q. 19, 20, 28, 76 (H)	Deepcut		100 (H)	Mhow (for Peshawar)
10 (Army)	H.-Q. 51, 54, 30 (H), 46	Newcastle-on- Tyne	24	H.Q. 22	Rawalpindi (for Jhansi)
11	H.-Q. 78 (H), 83, 84, 85	Sheffield Colchester		50	Rawalpindi (for Nowgong)
12	H.-Q. 6, 23, 49, 91 (H)	Aldershot (for Bangalore)		56 (H)	Campbellpore (for Jhansi)
13	H.-Q. 2, 8, 44, 82 (H)	Woolwich		70 (H)	Rawalpindi (for Nasirabad).
14	H.-Q. 38, 61 (H), 68, 88	Quetta Hyderabad (Sind)	25	H.-Q. 12, 25, 31 (H) 58	Larkhill (for Bordon)
15	H.-Q. R. T. U. S (H)	Bulford (for Exeter) Bulford (for Bristol)	26	H.-Q. 15 40 (H) 48	Jubbulpore
				71	Allahabad
16	H.-Q. 27 (H), 72, 86 (H)	Kirkee	27	H.-Q. 21, 24, 47 (H) 37 (H)	Nowshera (for Mhow) Peshawar (for Mhow)
		Secunderabad	28	H.-Q. 1, 3, 5, 57 (H)	Shorncliffe
17 (Army)	H.-Q. 10 13, 26, 92 (H)	Hounslow			

Allotment of Batteries to Field Brigades.

Batt.	Brig.	Batt.	Brig.	Batt.	Brig.	Batt.	Brig.	Batt.	Brig.	Batt.	Brig.	Batt.	Brig.
H	8th	1	28th	18	3rd	35	2nd	52	1st	69	6th	86	16th
P	21st	2	13th	19	9th	36	22nd	53	2nd	70	24th	87	2nd
Q		3	28th	20	"	37	27th	54	10th	71	26th	88	14th
R	15th	4	4th	21	27th	38	14th	55	22nd	72	16th	89	23rd
S		5	28th	22	24th	39	19th	56	24th	73	5th	90	"
T		6	12th	23	12th	40	26th	57	28th	74	6th	91	12th
U		7	4th	24	27th	41	20th	58	25th	75	3rd	92	17th
V	8th	8	13th	25	25th	42	2nd	59	18th	76	9th	93	18th
W		9	7th	26	17th	43	7th	60	23rd	77	6th	94	"
X	21st	10	17th	27	16th	44	13th	61	14th	78	11th	95	"
Y		11	1st	28	9th	45	20th	62	3rd	79	6th	96	19th
Z		12	25th	29	19th	46	10th	63	5th	80	1st	97	"
		13	17th	30	10th	47	27th	64	"	81	5th	98	1st
		14	4th	31	25th	48	26th	65	3rd	82	13th	99	20th
		15	26th	32	22nd	49	12th	66	4th	83	11th	100	23rd
		16	7th	33	"	50	24th	67	20th	84	"		
		17	"	34	16th	51	10th	68	14th	85	"		

C.—Pack Brigades, Royal Artillery

Brigades.	British Pack Batteries.	—
I.	H.Q. 2, 3, 4	Bulford (for Ewshott)
II.	H.Q. 5, 7, 9	Ewshott (for Bulford)
III.	H.Q. 16, 18, 19	Aldershot
IV.	H.Q. 15, 20	Norwich
V.	H.Q. 14	Helmieh (Egypt)
	13	Aden (for Egypt)
	I	Helmieh (Egypt), for Aden
20th (Indian)	H.Q. 10 (H)	Razmak
21st (Indian)	H.Q. 12 (H)	Jutogh
22nd (Indian)	H.Q.	Peshawar (for Kohat)
	8 (H)	Kalabagh
23rd (Indian)	H.Q. 17 (H)	Quetta
24th (Indian)	H.Q.	Kohat (for Peshawar)
	11 (H)	Khyra Gali
25th (Indian)	H.Q.	Abbottabad
	6 (H)	Bara Gali

Medium Brigades, Royal Artillery.

Brig.	H.A. and Batteries.	—	Brig.	H.A. and Batteries.	—
1	H.-Q. 3 (H) (T.D.) 5 (H), 22 (H) (T.D.) 1	Shoeburyness Woolwich (for Ipswich)	4	H.-Q. 15 (H) (T.D.) 14 (H) (T.D.) 13 (H) 16 (H)	Roorkee Cawnpore Delhi
2	H.-Q. 9 (H) (T.D.) 4 (H) (T.D.) 7 (H) (T.D.) 12		5	H.Q. 18 (H) 19 (H) (T.D.), 20 (H) (T.D.) 17	
3	H.-Q. 2 10 (H) 6 (H) (T.D.) 11 (H) (T.D.)	Malta Gibraltar	(unbrigaded)	8 (H) 21	Larkhill Larkhill (for Rhine) Karachi Rhine (for Larkhill)

Heavy Batteries, Royal Artillery.

Bat- tery.	—	Bat- tery.	—	Bat- tery.	—
1	Clarence Barracks, Portsmouth (for Sierra Leone)	15	Lough Swilly	30	Shoeburyness
2	Plymouth	16	Bere Island	31	Gibraltar
3	Queenstown	17	Portsmouth	32	Leith Fort
4	Aden	18	Queenstown	33	Bere Island
5	Gibraltar	19	Ceylon	34	Queenstown
6	Portsmouth	20	Fort Brockhurst	35	Aden
7	Bombay	21	Plymouth	36	Broughty Ferry
8	Gibraltar	22	Fort Brockhurst	37	Queenstown
9	Bombay	23	Malta	38	Hong Kong
10	Jamaica	24	Clarence Barracks, Portsmouth	39	Fort Brockhurst
11	Bermuda	25	Hong Kong	40	Leith Fort
12	Malta	26	Pembroke Dock	41	Clarence Barracks, Portsmouth
13	Hong Kong	27	Singapore	42	Sierra Leone (for Portsmouth)
14	Fort William, Calcutta	28	Portsmouth		
		29	Mauritius		

Anti-Aircraft Brigade, Royal Artillery.

1st	1 2 3	Blackdown.	
Survey Co., Royal Artillery Larkhill.			

D.—Royal Engineers

Stations of the Head Quarters of Units.

School of Military Engineering, Chatham	27th Co. (Fortress), Bermuda
Electric Light School, Gosport	30th Co. (Fortress), Plymouth
Training Battalion R.E., Chatham	31st Co. (Fortress), Ceylon
Depot Battalion R.E., Chatham	33rd Co. (Fortress), Queenstown Har- bour
R.E. Mounted Depot, Aldershot	34th Co. (Fortress), Guernsey
Railway Training Centre, Longmoor	35th Co. (Fortress), Pembroke
1st Field Squadron, Aldershot	36th Co. (Fortress), Sierra Leone
and Co. (Field), Egypt	38th Co. (Field), Aldershot
3rd Co. (Fortress), Dover	39th Co. (Fortress), Sheerness
4th Co. (Fortress), Gosport	40th Co. (Fortress), Hong Kong
5th Co. (Field), Aldershot	41st Co. (Fortress), Singapore
7th Co. (Field), Rhine	42nd Co. (Field), Egypt
8th Co. (Railway), Longmoor	43rd Co. (Fortress), Mauritius
9th Co. (Field), Shorncliffe	44th Co. (Fortress), Jamaica
11th Co. (Field), Aldershot	45th Co. (Fortress), Gibraltar
12th Co. (Field), Aldershot	49th Co. (Fortress), North Queensferry
13th Co. (Survey), York	54th Co. (Field), Bulford
14th Co. (Survey), Edinburgh	55th Co. (Field), Catterick
15th Co. (Fortress), Gibraltar	56th Co. (Field), Bulford
16th Co. (Fortress), Paull-on-Humber	58th (Porton) Co., Porton
17th Co. (Field), Bulford	59th Co. (Field), Catterick
19th Co. (Survey), Southampton	Experimental Bridging Co., Christ- church
22nd Co. (Fortress), Gosport	1st A. A. Bn. R.E., Blackdown.
23rd Co. (Field), Aldershot	
24th Co. (Fortress), Malta	
26th Co. (Field), Bordon	

E.—Infantry Regiments

Regiment.	Location.	Commanding Officer.	Remarks.
1st Grenadier Guards	Aldershot (for Wellington Barracks)	Lt.-Col. E. G. H. Powell	
2nd ditto	Wellington Barracks (for Tower of London)	Lt.-Col. L. M. Gregson, O.B.E.	
3rd ditto	Chelsea Barracks (for Aldershot)	Lt.-Col. M. E. Makgill-Crichton - Maitland, D.S.O.	
1st Coldstream Guards	Windsor (for Aldershot)	Lt.-Col. J. E. Gibbs, M.C.	
2nd ditto	Hyde Park & Wellington Barracks	Lt.-Col. G. J. Edwards, D.S.O., M.C.	
3rd ditto	Chelsea Barracks	Lt.-Col. W. St. A. Warde-Aldam, D.S.O.	
1st Scots Guards	Tower of London	Lt.-Col. F. G. Alston, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Wellington Barracks	Lt.-Col. Sir V. A. F. Mackenzie, Bart., D.S.O., M.V.O.	
1st Irish Guards	Hyde Park Barracks	Lt.-Col. Hon. H. R. L. G. Alexander, D.S.O., M.C.	
1st Welsh Guards	Aldershot (for Windsor)	Lt.-Col. T. R. C. Price, C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
1st Royal Scots	The Secunderabad and Belgaum Colchester	Lt.-Col. J. H. Mackenzie, C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
and ditto		Lt.-Col. L. K. Smith, C.B.E., D.S.O.	
1st Bn. The Queen's Royal Regiment (West Surrey)	Aldershot	Lt.-Col. R. G. Clarke, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
and ditto	Allahabad	Lt.-Col. J. Rainsford-Hannay, D.S.O.	
1st Bn. The Buffs (East Kent Regiment)	Gibraltar	Lt.-Col. R. E. Power, D.S.O.	
and ditto	Portland	Bt.-Col. J. Kennedy, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
1st Bn. The King's Own Royal Regiment (Lancaster)	Shorncliffe	Bt.-Col. O. H. L. Nicholson, C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
and ditto	Rangoon	Lt.-Col. J. A. Nixon, D.S.O.	
1st Northumberland Fusiliers	Rhine	Lt.-Col. A. C. L. H. Jones	
and ditto	Fyzabad	Lt.-Col. H. R. Sandilands, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
1st Royal Warwickshire Regiment	Chatham	Lt.-Col. C. R. MacDonald, C.M.G., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
and ditto	Nazirabad and Ahmedabad	Bt.-Col. C. F. Watson, C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
1st Royal Fusiliers (City of London Regiment)	Jullundur and Amritsar	Lt.-Col. M. O. Clarke, D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
and ditto	Aldershot	Lt.-Col. G. A. Stevens, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
1st Bn. The King's Regiment (Liverpool)	Jersey (for Aldershot)	Lt.-Col. G. L. Oliver	

Infantry Regiments—*continued*

Regiment.	Location.	Commanding Officer.	Remarks.
2nd Bn. The King's Regt. (Liverpool)	Chakrata	Bt.-Col. W. A. Blake, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
1st Norfolk Regiment	Jamaica and Bermuda	Lt.-Col. F. R. Day, D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Colchester	Lt.-Col. A. L. Hadow, C.M.G.	
1st Lincolnshire Regiment	Hollywood	Lt.-Col. F. G. Spring, C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
2nd ditto	Dinapore	Lt.-Col. F. W. Greatwood, D.S.O.	
1st Devonshire Regiment	Blackdown	Lt.-Col. G. N. T. Smyth-Osbourne, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
2nd ditto	Delhi	Lt.-Col. J. D. Ingles, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
1st Suffolk Regiment	Gibraltar	Lt.-Col. F. T. D. Wilson, O.B.E.	
2nd ditto	Colchester	Lt.-Col. F. S. Cooper, D.S.O.	
1st Bn. The Somerset Light Infantry (Prince Albert's)	Devonport	Lt.-Col. J. S. N. Harrison, D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Agra	Lt.-Col. A. W. S. Pater-son, D.S.O.	
1st Bn. The West Yorkshire Regiment (The Prince of Wales's Own)	Rhine	Lt.-Col. P. L. Ingpen, D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Bambay and Deolali	Lt.-Col. A. A. W. Spencer	
1st East Yorkshire Regiment	Egypt	Lt.-Col. J. McD. Haskard, C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
2nd ditto	Litchfield	Lt.-Col. F. H. Harvey, C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
1st Bedfordshire and Hertfordshire Regiment	Aldershot	Lt.-Col. W. Allason, D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Kamptee	Lt.-Col. H. W. Wel- don, D.S.O.	
1st Leicestershire Regiment	Aldershot	Lt.-Col. F. H. Ed- wards, D.S.O., M.C.	
2nd ditto	Khartoum	Lt.-Col. C. H. Haig, D.S.O.	
1st Bn. The Green Howards (Alexandra Princess of Wales's Own Yorkshire Regiment)	Madras and Bel- lary	Lt.-Col. M. D. Carey	
2nd ditto	Dover	Lt.-Col. N. E. Swan, <i>p.s.c.</i>	
1st Lancashire Fusiliers	Tidworth	Lt.-Col. C. de Putron	
2nd ditto	Landi Kotal	Lt.-Col. H. M. Far- mar, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
1st Royal Scots Fusiliers	Glasgow	Lt.-Col. C. H. I. Jack- son, D.S.O.	

Infantry Regiments—continued

Regiment.	Location.	Commanding Officer.	Remarks.
2nd Royal Scots Fusiliers	Sialkot	Bt.-Col. H. E. R. R. Braine, C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
1st Cheshire Regiment	Lucknow	Lt.-Col. H. S. Adair, D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Strensall	Lt.-Col. E. G. Hamilton, C.M.G., D.S.O., M.C.	
1st Royal Welch Fusiliers	Multan	Lt.-Col. C. S. Owen, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Pembroke Dock	Bt.-Col. C. J. Stockwell, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
1st South Wales Borderers	Devonport	Lt.-Col. L. H. Tudor, O.B.E.	
2nd ditto	Barrackpore and Dum Dum	Lt.-Col. H. P. Yates, D.S.O.	
1st King's Own Scottish Borderers	Edinburgh	Bt.-Col. P. A. V. Stewart, C.B.E., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
2nd ditto	Egypt	Lt.-Col. J. C. W. Connell, D.S.O.	
1st Bn. Cameronians (Scottish Rifles)	Aldershot	Lt.-Col. E. B. Ferrers, D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Quetta	Lt.-Col. H. H. Lee, D.S.O.	
1st Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers	Iraq	Lt.-Col. C. Ridings, D.S.O., O.B.E.	
1st Gloucestershire Regiment	Aldershot	Lt.-Col. J. R. Wethered, C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
2nd ditto	Jhansi	Lt.-Col. R. Wilkinson, D.S.O.	
1st Worcestershire Regiment	Meerut	Lt.-Col. L. M. Stevens, D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Dover	Lt.-Col. G. M. C. Davidge, D.S.O.	
1st East Lancashire Regiment	Malta	Lt.-Col. P. Hudson, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Bordon	Lt.-Col. G. E. M. Hill, D.S.O.	
1st East Surrey Regiment	Hong-Kong	Lt.-Col. F. S. Montague - Bates, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Aldershot (for Jersey)	Lt.-Col. R. A. H. Orpen-Palmer, D.S.O.	
1st Duke of Cornwall's Lgt. Infantry	Lucknow	Lt.-Col. H. D. Goldsmith, D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
2nd ditto	Rhine (for Guernsey)	Lt.-Col. A. P. Williams-Freeman, D.S.O., O.B.E.	
1st Bn. The Duke of Wellington's Regiment (West Riding)	Gosport	Lt.-Col. N. G. Burmand, D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Egypt	Bt.-Col. C. L. Smith, V.C., M.C.	
1st Border Regiment	Aden	Lt.-Col. G. H. Harrison, D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Aldershot (for Malta)	Lt.-Col. H. W. Grubb, C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
1st Royal Sussex Regiment	Londonderry	Lt.-Col. R. Bellamy, D.S.O.	

Infantry Regiments—*continued*

Regiment.	Location.	Commanding Officer.	Remarks.
2nd Royal Sussex Regiment	Singapore	Lt.-Col. S. de V. A. Julius, <i>p.s.c.</i>	
1st Hampshire Regiment	Egypt	Lt.-Col. R. S. Allen, D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
2nd ditto	Bordon	Lt.-Col. L. C. Morley, C.B.E.	
1st South Staffordshire Regiment	Maymyo	Bt.-Col. R. W. Morgan, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Plymouth	Lt.-Col. M. B. Savage, C.B.E., D.S.O.	
1st Dorsetshire Regt.	Egypt	Lt.-Col. G. M. Herbert, D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Aldershot	Lt.-Col. C. Saunders, D.S.O.	
1st Bn. The Prince of Wales's Volunteers (South Lancashire)	Portsmouth	Lt. - Col. B. H. W. Taylor, C.B.E.	
2nd ditto	Mhow	Lt.-Col. W. B. Ritchie, D.S.O.	
1st Welch Regiment	Bareilly	Lt.-Col. C. R. Berkeley, C.M.G., D.S.O., O.B.E.	
2nd ditto	Colchester (for Tidworth)	Lt.-Col. A. Derry, D.S.O., O.B.E.	
1st Bn. The Black Watch (Royal Highlanders)	Quetta	Lt.-Col. S. H. Eden, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Bordon	Lt.-Col. S. A. Innes, D.S.O.	
1st Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry	Shorncliffe	Bt.-Col. A. G. Bayley, C.B.E., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
2nd ditto	Rawalpindi	Lt.-Col. C. G. Higgins, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
1st Essex Regiment	Bordon	Lt.-Col. A. B. Incedon-Webber, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Ambala	Lt.-Col. C. R. Roberts-West.	
1st Bn. The Sherwood Foresters (Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire Regiment)	Blackdown	Lt.-Col. K. C. Weldon, D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Gharial	Lt.-Col. R. S. Popham, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
1st Bn. The Loyal Regiment (North Lancashire)	Tientsin	Lt.-Col. F. W. Greenhill, O.B.E.	
2nd ditto	Tidworth	Lt.-Col. R. E. Berkeley, D.S.O.	
1st Northamptonshire Regiment	Shorncliffe	Lt.-Col. H. C. W. H. Wortham, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Lahore	Lt. - Col. C. R. J. Mowatt, D.S.O.	
1st The Royal Berkshire Regiment (Princess Charlotte)	Raymak	Lt.-Col. A. E. F. Harris, D.S.O.	
2nd ditto (of Wales's)	Plymouth	Lt.-Col. F. H. Moore, C.B.E., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	

Infantry Regiments—continued

Regiment.	Location.	Commanding Officer.	Remarks.
1st Queen's Own Royal West Kent and ditto [Regiment	Poona	Lt.-Col. H. D. Buchanan- Dunlop, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
	Ballykinlar (for Woking)	Lt.-Col. J. T. Twisleton- Wykeham-Fiennes	
1st King's Own York- shire Light Infantry and ditto	Rhine (for Graves- end)	Lt.-Col. H. W. B. Thorp, D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
	Ferozepore	Lt.-Col. H. Mallison, D.S.O.	
1st The King's Shrop- shire Light Infantry and ditto	Poona and Kirkee	Lt.-Col. P. L. Hanbury, C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
	Tidworth (for Rhine)	Lt.-Col. P. F. Fitz- gerald, D.S.O.	
1st Middlesex Regi- ment (Duke of Cambridge's Own) and ditto	Aldershot	Lt.-Col. R. M. Heath, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
1st King's Royal Rifles Corps and ditto	Ahmcdnagar	F. E. Swainson	
	Kuldana	Lt.-Col. F. G. Willan, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
	Rhine	Lt.-Col. C. A. Howard, D.S.O.	
1st Wiltshire Regi- ment (Duke of Edinburgh's) and ditto	Tidworth	Lt.-Col. F. H. Dansey, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
	Bangalore	Lt.-Col. A. W. Timmis, M.C.	
1st Manchester Regiment	Guernsey and Alderney (for Rhine)	Lt.-Col. F. H. Dorling, D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
and ditto	Jubbulpore	Lt.-Col. W. B. Ed- dowes	
1st Bn. The North Staffordshire Regi- ment (The Prince of Wales's) and ditto	Secunderabad	Lt.-Col. H. C. Tweedie D.S.O., O.B.E.	
	Lichfield	Bt.-Col. F. C. T. Ewald, D.S.O.	
1st York & Lancaster Regiment and ditto	Rhine	Lt.-Col. G. H. Wedg- wood, D.S.O.	
	Karachi	Lt.-Col. H. M. Hutchin- son, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
1st Durham Light Infantry and ditto	York (for Bally- kinlar)	Lt.-Col. A. E. Irvine, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.	
	Cawnpore and Benares	Lt.-Col. J. W. Jeffreys, D.S.O.	
1st Highland Light Infantry (City of Glasgow Regt.) and ditto	Ballykinlar	Lt.-Col. T. A. Pollok- Morris, O.B.E., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
	Egypt	Lt.-Col. H. T. C. Single- ton, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
1st Seaforth High- landers (Ross-shire), Buffs (The Duke of Albany's) and ditto	Belfast	Lt.-Col. H. F. Baillie, D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
	Nowahera, Cherat and Peshawar	Lt.-Col. K. G. Buchanan, C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
1st Gordon Highldrs.	Malta	Lt.-Col. H. P. Burn, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
and ditto	Fort George	Bt.-Col. J. L. G. Burnett, C.M.G., D.S.O.	

Infantry Regiments—*continued*

Regiment.	Location.	Commanding Officer.	Remarks.
1st The Queen's Own Cameron High- landers	Calcutta	Lt.-Col. E. Craig- Brown, D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
2nd ditto	Rhine	Lt.-Col. G. I. Fraser, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
1st Bn. The Royal Ulster Rifles	Rhine	Lt.-Col. E. G. Dunn, D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
2nd ditto	Wellington, Calicut and Malappuram	Lt.-Col. W. J. N. Cooke-Collis, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.	
Royal Irish Fusi- liers (Princess Vic- toria's)	Dover	Lt.-Col. R. G. Shuter, D.S.O.	
1st Argyll and Suther- land Highlanders (Princess Louise's)	Port Sudan	Lt.-Col. G. W. Muir	
2nd ditto	Parkhurst	Lt.-Col. C. P. James, D.S.O.	
1st Rifle Brigade (Prince Consort's Own)	Peshawar	Lt.-Col. E. B. Powell, D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
2nd ditto	Aldershot	Lt.-Col. J. L. Buxton, C.M.G., D.S.O.	

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Headquarters Royal Tank Corps Centre	..	Wool.
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2nd Battalion	Farnborough.
Lt.-Col. C. D. V. Cary-Barnard, C.M.G., D.S.O.		
3rd Battalion (less 1 Co.)	Lydd.
Lieut.-Col. W. J. Shannon, C.M.G., D.S.O.		
4th Battalion	Wareham.
Lieut.-Col. H. G. R. Burges-Short, D.S.O.		
5th Battalion	Perham Down, Salis- bury Plain.
Lieut.-Col. K. M. Laird, D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>		
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Workshop Training Battalion	Wool.
Lieut.-Col. N. H. Stone.		
Central Schools	Wool.
Lieut.-Col. G. M. Lindsay, C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>		
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3rd	" "	Cairo.
5th	" "	Scarborough.
6th	" "	Barcilly (for Peshawar)
7th	" "	Peshawar (for Barcilly).
8th	" "	Lahore.
9th	" "	Gardai and Manzai.
10th	" "	Delhi and Agra.
11th	" "	Kirkee and Bombay.
12th	" "	Ireland.

II. THE ARMY IN INDIA

[Corrected up to the 1st of August, 1924.]

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Area Commander. Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) W. H. Beach, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., B.S.

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Commander. Major-General C. W. G. Richardson, C.B., C.S.I., I.A., *p.s.c.*

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Brigade Commander. Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) A. W. H. M. Moens, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., I.A., *p.s.c.*

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*Headquarters, Burma Independent District**(Maymyo)*

Commander. Major-General H. C. Tytler, C.B., C.M.G., C.I.E., D.S.O., I.A.

RANGOON BRIGADE AREA*(Rangoon)*

Area Commander. Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) H. Ross, C.B., C.I.E., D.S.O., I.A.

Aden

Commander. Major-General T. E. Scott, C.B., C.I.E., D.S.O., I.A.

III. THE ROYAL AIR FORCE

1.—Air Council

<i>President of the Air Council.</i>	Brig.-Gen. the Rt. Hon. Lord Thomson, P.C., C.B.E., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i> , Secretary of State for Air.
<i>Vice-President of the Air Council.</i>	William Leach, Esq., M.P., Under Secretary of State for Air.
<i>Members.</i>	Air Chief-Marshal Sir H. M. Trenchard, Bt., G.C.B., D.S.O., A.D.C., Chief of the Air Staff; Air Vice-Marshal Sir P. W. Game, K.C.B., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i> , Air Member for Personnel; Air Vice-Marshal Sir W. G. H. Salmond, K.C.M.G., C.B., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i> , Air Member for Supply and Research; Air Commodore J. M. Steel, C.B., C.M.G., C.B.E., Deputy Chief of the Air Staff (Additional Member); Sir W. F. Nicholson, K.C.B., Secretary of the Air Ministry.

2.—Air Ministry

<i>Secretary of State for Air.</i>	Brig.-Gen. the Rt. Hon. Lord Thomson, P.C., C.B.E., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>
<i>Under Secretary of State for Air.</i>	William Leach, Esq., M.P.
<i>Secretary of the Air Ministry.</i>	Sir W. F. Nicholson, K.C.B.
<i>Deputy Secretary of the Air Ministry.</i>	Sir S. Dannreuther, Kt., C.B.
<i>Department of the Under Secretary of State for Air :—</i>	
<i>Director of Civil Aviation.</i>	Air Vice-Marshal Sir W. S. Brancker, K.C.B., A.F.C.
<i>Deputy Director of Air Transport.</i>	Lieut.-Colonel I. A. E. Edwards, C.M.G.
<i>Aerodromes and Licensing.</i>	Lieut.-Colonel F. C. Shelmerdine, O.B.E.
<i>Department of the Secretary of the Air Ministry :—</i>	
<i>Secretary.</i>	Sir W. F. Nicholson, K.C.B.
<i>Deputy Secretary.</i>	Sir S. Dannreuther, Kt., C.B.
<i>Principal Assistant Secretaries.</i>	H. W. W. McAnally, Esq., C.B.; B. E. Holloway, Esq., C.B.; J. A. Webster, Esq., C.B., D.S.O.
<i>Director of Accounts.</i>	J. S. Ross, Esq., C.B.E.
<i>Deputy Directors.</i>	{ H. W. Clothier, Esq. F. W. N. Sibley, Esq.

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Chief Valuer and Compensation Officer.

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*Director of Organisation and Staff Duties.*Air Vice-Marshal Sir I. L. B. Vesey, K.B.E.,
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*Deputy Director of
Staff Duties.*Colonel Hon : M. C. A. Drummond, C.M.G.,
D.S.O., *p.s.c.**Signals.*

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*Deputy Director.*Colonel T. D. Mackie, C.M.G., O.B.E.,
M.I.Mech.E.Department of the Air
Member for Per-
sonnel :—*Air Member for Per-
sonnel.*Air Vice-Marshal Sir P. W. Game, K.C.B.,
D.S.O., *p.s.c.**Director of Personal
Services.*Air Commodore C. A. H. Longcroft, C.B.,
C.M.G., D.S.O., A.F.C.*Deputy Director of
Manning.*Group-Captain P. B. Joubert de la Ferté,
C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.a.**Director of Training.*

Air Commodore T. C. R. Higgins, C.M.G.

*Deputy Director.*Group-Captain P. L. W. Herbert, C.M.G.,
C.B.E.*Educational Adviser.*

Colonel I. Curtis, M.A., A.M.I.M.E.

*Director of Medical
Services.*Air Commodore D. Munro, C.B., C.I.E.,
M.B., M.A., F.R.C.S.(E.).*Chaplain-in-Chief.*

Rev. H. D. L. Viener, C.B.E., M.A., K.H.C.

Air Ministry—continued**Department of the Air****Member for Supply
and Research :—**

Air Member for Supply and Research.	Air Vice-Marshal Sir W. G. H. Salmond, K.C.M.G., C.B., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>
Director of Technical Development.	Air Commodore F. C. Halahan, C.M.G., C.B.E., D.S.O., M.V.O.
Director of Scientific Research.	(Vacant).
Deputy Director of Design.	Wing-Commander H. M. Cave-Browne- Cave, D.S.O., D.F.C.
Deputy Director of Armament.	Wing-Commander E. D. M. Robertson, D.F.C.
Deputy Director of Instruments.	Wing-Commander J. B. Bowen, O.B.E.
Director of Airship Development.	Group Captain P. F. M. Fellowes, D.S.O.
Deputy Director of Aero- nautical Inspection.	Lieut.-Colonel H. W. S. Outram, C.B.E.
Director of Equipment.	Air Commodore D. Le G. Pitcher, C.M.G., C.B.E., D.S.O.
Deputy Director.	Wing Commander G. Laing, O.B.E.

3.—Air Commands**A.—HOME****(a) Inland Area**

The Inland Area comprises all units in Great Britain, with the exception of those units included in the Coastal Area, and the Cranwell and Halton Commands.

Headquarters : Hillingdon House, Uxbridge.

Telegraphic Address : Airgenarch, Uxbridge.

Telephone No. : Uxbridge 231/2/3/4/5/6.

Air Commodore	T. I. Webb-Bowen, C.B., C.M.G., Air Officer Commanding.
Air Commodore	B. C. H. Drew, C.M.G., C.B.E., <i>p.s.c.</i> , Chief Staff Officer.

Units as follow :—

Headquarters, No. 1 Group	Kidbrooke.
No 1 Stores Depot	"
" 3 " "	Milton, Berks.
" 4 " "	Ickenham.
The Packing Depot	Ascot.
Medical Stores Depot	Kidbrooke.
Record Office	Ruislip.
Armament and Gunnery School	Eastchurch.
No. 207 (Bombing) Squadron	"
School of Technical Training (Men)	Manston.
No. 2 (Army Cooperation) Squadron	"

(a) Inland Area—continued

No. 1 Group—continued

No. 9 (Bombing) Squadron (H.Q. and 1 Flight)	Manston
<i>Headquarters, No. 3 Group</i>	Spittlegate, Grantham.
No. 39 (Bombing) Squadron	Spittlegate.
„ 100 (Bombing) Squadron	„
„ 2 Flying Training School	Digby.
„ 7 (Bombing) Squadron	Bircham Newton.
„ 99 (Bombing) Squadron (H.Q. & 1 Flight)	„
„ 5 Flying Training School	Sealand.
„ 2 Stores (Ammunition) Depot	Altrincham.
Aeroplane and Armament Experimental Establishment, including—	Martlesham.
No. 15 (Bombing) Squadron	„
„ 22 (Bombing) Squadron	„
<i>Headquarters, No. 6 Group</i>	Kenley.
No. 24 (Communication) Squadron	„
„ 32 (Fighter) Squadron	„
„ 56 (Fighter) Squadron	Biggin Hill.
Night Flying Flight	„
No. 41 (Fighter) Squadron (H.Q. & 2 Flights)	Northolt.
Inland Area Communication Flight	„
Superintendent of R.A.F. Reserve	„
No. 25 (Fighter) Squadron	Hawkinge.
„ 17 (Fighter) Squadron (H.Q. & 2 Flights)	„
Station Headquarters	Duxford.
No. 19 (Fighter) Squadron (H.Q. & 2 Flights)	„
„ 29 (Fighter) Squadron (H.Q. & 2 Flights)	„
„ 111 (Fighter) Squadron (H.Q. & 2 Flights)	„
<i>Headquarters, No. 7 Group</i>	Andover.
No. 4 (Army Cooperation) Squadron	South Farnborough.
School of Photography	„
Experimental Section (R.A.E.)	„
School of Army Cooperation, including—No. 16 (Army Cooperation) Squadron	Old Sarum.
Central Flying School	Upavon.
No. 3 (Fighter) Squadron (H.Q. & 2 Flights)	„
No. 1 Flying Training School	Netheravon.
„ 11 (Bombing) Squadron (H.Q. & 2 Flights)	„
Electrical and Wireless School	Flower Down.
No. 58 (Bombing) Squadron (H.Q. & 1 Flight)	Worthy Down.

THE ARMY QUARTERLY

(a) Inland Area—continued

No. 7 Group—continued

School of Balloon Training	Larkhill.
No. 12 (Bombing) Squadron (H.Q. & 2 Flights)	Andover.
„ 13 (Army Cooperation) Squadron	„
<i>Units Directly under Area Headquarters :—</i>	
R.A.F. Depot	Uxbridge.
(a) School of Physical Training and Drill	„
(b) Reception Depot	West Drayton.
R.A.F. Central Band	Uxbridge.
M.T. Repair Depot	Shrewsbury.
Inland Area Aircraft Depot	Henlow, Beds.

(b) Coastal Area

The Coastal Area comprises Stations, etc., as follows: Calshot, Lee-on-Solent, Gosport, Isle of Grain, Cattewater, Donibristle, Leuchars, and Felixstowe. Also all Aircraft-Carriers and Units afloat in Fighting Ships in Home Waters, and all Recruiting Depots.

Headquarters : 33-34 Tavistock Place, W.C.1.

Telegraphic Address : Airgenarch, Kincross, London.

Telephone No. : Museum 7840.

Air Vice-Marshal. F. R. Scarlett, C.B., D.S.O., Air Officer Commanding.

Group Captain. C. F. Kilner, D.S.O., Chief Staff Officer.

Units as follow :—

<i>Headquarters, No. 10 Group</i>	Lee-on-Solent.
R.A.F. Base	Gosport.
(a) Headquarters	„
(b) No. 420 (Fleet Spotter) Flight ..	„
(c) „ 421 (Fleet Spotter) Flight ..	„
(d) „ 423 (Fleet Spotter) Flight ..	„
(e) „ 461 (Fleet Torpedo) Flight ..	„
(f) „ 462 (Fleet Torpedo) Flight ..	„
(g) Development Flight	„
Care and Maintenance Party	Cattewater.
R.A.F. Base	Calshot.
(a) Headquarters	„
(b) No. 480 (Flying Boat) Flight ..	„
(c) H.Q., Training Squadron	„
(d) Air Pilotage Flight	„
(e) Seaplane Training Flight	„
(f) Marine Training Section	„
School of Naval Cooperation	Lee-on-Solent.
No. 444 (Fleet Reconnaissance) Flight ..	„
<i>Units Administered Direct by Area Headquarters.</i>	
Care and Maintenance Party	Donibristle.
R.A.F. Base	Leuchars.
(a) Headquarters	„

(b) Coastal Area—continued

Units Administered Direct by Area Headquarters—continued

(b) No. 401 (Fleet Fighter) Flight	Leuchars.
(c) „ 404 (Fleet Fighter) Flight	„
(d) „ 405 (Fleet Fighter) Flight	„
(e) „ 406 (Fleet Fighter) Flight	„
(f) „ 442 (Fleet Reconnaissance) Flight	„
R.A.F. complement in H.M.S. <i>Argus</i> .	
Marine Aircraft Experimental Establishment	Felixstowe.
Care and Maintenance Party	Grain.
Inspector of Recruiting, R.A.F. ..	Henrietta Street, W.C.2.
(a) R.A.F. Recruiting Depot ..	„
(b) „ „ „ ..	Newcastle-on-Tyne.
(c) „ „ „ ..	Birmingham.
Air Ministry Wireless Section ..	Kingsway, W.C.2.
R.A.F. Central Hospital	Finchley (for Uxbridge)
Research Laboratory and Medical Officers' School of Instruction ..	Holly Hill, N.W.3.
Central Medical Board	„

(c) Cranwell

The Air Officer Commanding, Royal Air Force, Cranwell, is Commandant of the R.A.F. (Cadet) College and commands all units at Cranwell.

Headquarters : Cranwell, Sleaford, Lincs.

Telegraphic Address : Aircoll, Sleaford.

Telephone No. : Sleaford 64/5/6/7.

<i>Air Commodore.</i>	A. E. Borton, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., A.F.C., Air Officer Commanding.
<i>Wing-Commander.</i>	L. A. Pattinson, D.S.O., M.C., D.F.C., Administrative Duties.

Units as follow :—

R.A.F. (Cadet) College.	Band.
Boys' Wing.	R.A.F. Hospital.

(d) Halton

The Air Officer Commanding, Royal Air Force, Halton, is Commandant of No. 1 School of Technical Training (Boys) and commands all units at Halton.

Headquarters : Halton House, Halton, Wendover, Bucks.

Telegraphic Address : Aeronautics, Halton Camp.

Telephone No. : Aylesbury 161/2 ; Wendover 72/4.

<i>Air Commodore.</i>	C. L. Lambe, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., Air Officer Commanding.
<i>Wing Commander.</i>	W. R. Read, M.C., D.F.C., A.F.C., Staff Duties.

Units as follow :—

No. 1 School of Technical Training (Boys)	Halton.
--	---------

(d) *Halton—continued*

School of Cookery	Halton.
R.A.F. Hospital	„

(e) *R.A.F. Staff College*

Headquarters : Andover, Hants.

Telegraphic Address : Foresight, Andover.

Telephone No. : Andover 84-87 and Salisbury 190.

<i>Air Vice-Marshal.</i>	Henry R. M. Brooke-Popham, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., A.F.C., <i>p.s.c.</i> , Commandant.
<i>Group Captain.</i>	Wilfred R. Freeman, D.S.O., M.C., <i>p.s.a.</i>

B.—OVERSEAS(a) *R.A.F., Middle East*

Headquarters : Villa Victoria, Cairo.

<i>Air Vice-Marshal.</i>	Sir Oliver Swann, K.C.B., C.B.E., Air Officer Commanding.
<i>Wing-Commander</i>	J. E. A. Baldwin, D.S.O., O.B.E., <i>p.s.a.</i> , Staff Duties.

Units as follow :—

Administered direct by Command Headquarters.

Egypt Stores Depot	Aboukir.
„ Engine Repair Depot	Abbassia, Cairo.
„ Aircraft Depot	Aboukir.
Aden Flight	Aden and Somaliland.
<i>Headquarters, Egyptian Group</i>	Heliopolis.
No. 216 (Bombing Squadron	„
„ 47 (Bombing) Squadron	Helwan.
„ 208 (Army Cooperation) Squadron	Moascar, Ismailia.
„ 4 Flying Training School	Abu Sueir.

(b) *Iraq Command*

Headquarters : Baghdad City.

<i>Air Vice-Marshal.</i>	J. F. A. Higgins, C.B., D.S.O., A.F.C., Air Officer Commanding.
<i>Air Commodore.</i>	A. M. Longmore, D.S.O., Chief Staff Officer.

R.A.F. Units as follow :—

Administered Direct by Command Headquarters.

Station Commandant	Hinaidi.
H.Q. Accountant Office	Baghdad.
Brigade Accountant Office	„
Aircraft Depot	Hinaidi.
Combined Hospital	„
Central Supply Depot	„
Supply Depot	Mosul.
Inland Water Transport (Detachment)	Baghdad.
No. 1 (Fighter) Squadron	Hinaidi.
„ 6 (Army Co-operation) Squadron	Mosul.
„ 8 (Bombing) Squadron	Hinaidi.

(b) Iraq—continued

Administered Direct by Command Headquarters—continued.

No. 30 (Bombing) Squadron	Hianidi.
„ 45 (Bombing) Squadron	„
„ 55 (Bombing) Squadron	„
„ 70 (Bombing) Squadron	„
<i>Headquarters, Armoured Car Wing</i>	Baghdad.
No. 3 Armoured Car Company	Basrah.
„ 4 „ „ „	Hinaidi.
„ 5 „ „ „	Mosul.
„ 6 „ „ „	Hinaidi.
<i>Headquarters, Basrah Group</i>	Basrah.
Rest Camp	„
R.A.F. Prison	„
Stores Depot	„
Base Supply Depot	„
Combined Hospital	„
Inland Water Transport	„
No. 84 (Bombing) Squadron	Shaibah.

Military Forces in Iraq.

1st Battalion Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers	63rd Co. Q.V.O. Madras Sappers and Miners.
1/15th Punjab Regt.	Iraq Signal Section
1/2nd Bombay Pioneers.	No. 2 Wireless Coy., R.C.S. (No. 2 Section).
6/13th Frontier Force Rifles.	
113th Indian Pack Battery.	

(c) R.A.F. India

Headquarters : Delhi.

<i>Air Vice-Marshal.</i>	Sir E. L. Ellington, K.C.B., C.M.G., C.B.E., p.s.c., Air Officer Commanding.
<i>Group Captain.</i>	J. A. Chamier, C.M.G., D.S.O., O.B.E., Chief Staff Officer.

Units as follow :—

<i>Headquarters, No. 1 Indian Wing</i>	Peshawar.
No. 5 (Army Cooperation) Squadron	Dardoni.
„ 28 (Army Cooperation) Squadron	Peshawar.
<i>Headquarters, No. 2 Indian Wing</i>	Risalpur, Nowshera.
No. 27 (Bombing) Squadron	„ „
„ 60 (Bombing) Squadron	„ „
<i>Headquarters, No. 3 Indian Wing</i>	Quetta.
No. 20 (Army Cooperation) Squadron	„

Units administered direct by Command Headquarters :—

Aircraft Depot	Karachi.
„ Park	Lahore.
No. 31 (Army Cooperation) Squadron	Ambala.
Central Accounts Office	Poona.

(d) R.A.F. Mediterranean

Headquarters : Valletta, Malta.

This Command comprises all units cooperating with the Navy in the Mediterranean Sea area.

Group Captain. A. W. Bigsworth, C.M.G., D.S.O., A.F.C.,
Officer Commanding.

Squadron Leader. H. E. M. Watkins, A.F.C., Air Staff Duties.

Units as follow :—

R.A.F. Base Calafra, Malta.

(a) No. 481 (Float Plane) Flight

R.A.F. Units in—

H.M.S. *Eagle*.

(a) Headquarters.

(b) No. 402 (Fleet Fighter) Flight.

(c) „ 422 (Fleet Spotter) Flight.

(d) „ 440 (Fleet Reconnaissance) Flight.

(e) „ 460 (Fleet Torpedo) Flight.

H.M.S. *Hermes*.

(a) Headquarters.

(b) No. 403 (Fleet Fighter) Flight.

(c) „ 441 (Fleet Reconnaissance) Flight.

(e) Palestine Command

Headquarters : Bir Salem, Palestine.

Air Commodore. E. L. Gerrard, C.M.G., D.S.O., Air Officer
Commanding.

Wing-Commander. T. O'B. Hubbard, M.C., A.F.C., Staff Duties.

R.A.F. Units as follow :—

Command Accounts Office Bir Salem.

No. 14 (Army Cooperation Squadron) Ramleh, Palestine.

No. 2 Armoured Car Company Sarafand and Jerusalem.

Supply Depot Sarafand.

Palestine General Hospital Ludd.

Combined Hospital Jenin.

Headquarters, R.A.F., Trans-Jordania Amman.

Flying Section

1 Section of No. 2 Armoured Car Coy.

Military Units in the Palestine Command :—

9th Q.R. Lancers Sarafand.

No. 2 Wireless Coy., R.C.S. (H.Q. and

No. 1 Section)

(f) Independent Units, &c.

Aeronautical Committee of Guarantee *via* A.P.O., S 40, British
(British Section) Army of the Rhine.

R.A.F. Unit in H.M.S. *Pegasus* c/o G.P.O., London.

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The Army Quarterly

CONTENTS

	PAGE
I. Editorial	225
II. Intelligence at an Army Headquarters on the Western Front during the Last Phase of the Great War. By Colonel F. S. G. Piggott, D.S.O.	234
III. "The Other Side of the Hill." No. IV. Mametz Wood and Contalmaison: 9th-10th of July, 1916 (with Map)	245
IV. The Command and Administration of the Military Forces of the Empire in War. By Brevet Lieut.-Colonel H. D. Wynter, C.M.G., D.S.O., Australian Staff Corps.	260
V. The German Strategic Reserve in 1917. By Brigadier-General J. E. Edmonds, C.B., C.M.G. (R.E., retired)	270
VI. Frederick, the Soldiers' Friend. By F. J. Hadleston, C.B.E., Librarian, War Office	273
VII. Smuts v. Lottow. A Critical Phase in East Africa; August to September, 1916 (with Map). By Colonel G. M. Orr, C.B.E., D.S.O., Indian Army (retired)	287
VIII. The Study of Military History. By Lieut.-Colonel E. C. Ansley, D.S.O., R.F.A.	300
IX. Some Further Reflections on the Recent Olympic Games. By Brigadier-General R. J. Kentish, C.M.G., D.S.O. (Member of the International Olympic Council and Honorary Secretary, British Olympic Association)	316
X. The Evolution of Air-Power. By "Avion"	328
XI. "Surprise" in Fortification in the Future (with Maps and Diagrams). By Captain J. A. C. Pennycuik, D.S.O., R.E.	342
XII. The Art of Command according to Xenophon. By J. M. Scammell, Major, Infantry, O.R.C., United States Army	352
XIII. The Infantry Man-Power Problem. By Brevet Major G. S. Brunskill, M.C., K.S.L.I.	366
XIV. An Operation of War (with Map). By Brevet Lieut.-Colonel R. H. Beadon, C.B.E., R.A.S.C.	375
XV. Battalion Organization in Time of Peace. A Reply to Criticism. By Captain M. Beekwith-Smith, D.S.O., M.C., Coldstream Guards	383
XVI. Tales of Intelligence. No. 7. Cross-Channel Traffic. By "Jabb" (late of the Intelligence Corps)	387
XVII. A Matter of Izzat. By "Talib"	402
XVIII. Notes on Foreign War Books	408
XIX. Reviews and Notices of Recent Books and Articles on Military Subjects	432

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THE ARMY QUARTERLY

VOL. IX. No. 2.

JANUARY, 1925

EDITORIAL

THE third General Election in the course of two years has taken place since the *Army Quarterly* last appeared, and a strong Conservative Government with a formidable majority has now been placed in power. It is to be hoped that for some years to come the country will be spared another General Election, and that its interests, both civil and military, will be in safe hands. There is nothing so demoralizing for all classes of the community as constant changes of Government, with the reversals of policy which such changes usually entail.

Sir Laming Worthington-Evans once again returns to the War Office and Sir Samuel Hoare to the Air Ministry. It is certain that both these statesmen realize that, so long as the situation abroad remains as it is to-day, no further reductions are possible in our military or air strength. Our available forces are admittedly all too small for the defence of the Empire.

* * * * *

The series of outrages upon British officers and officials, which have been perpetrated in Egypt since that country was granted its independence, have culminated in the brutal murder in Cairo of Major-General Sir Lee Stack, Governor-General of the Sudan and Sirdar of the Egyptian Army. Owing to the wise precaution of not weakening our garrison in Egypt while the policy of its Government was frankly anti-British, and to the firm conduct of affairs since the murder of the Sirdar, the military situation in Egypt would appear, for the present at any rate, to give no serious cause for anxiety. But the time has undoubtedly arrived for our position in Egypt to be more accurately defined, and for our intentions with regard to

the Sudan to be made absolutely plain not only to King Fuad and to his advisers, but also to the rest of the world.

Certain of the comments on the British note to the Egyptian Government which have appeared in the foreign Press—more especially in some sections of the French Press—show that our friends and Allies as well as our late enemies are somewhat too ready to misinterpret our motives and only too eager to attribute to British Imperialism a series of demands which were not only perfectly legitimate in the circumstances of the case, but were necessary also to carry out a course of policy consistent with our position of responsibility in Egypt.

* * * * *

Our policy, both as regards Egypt and the Sudan, has been perfectly clear and straightforward. The former country was given a form of Home Rule, and it was hoped that her national Government would preserve law and order and safeguard the interests of foreigners. Hitherto, although it signally failed to carry out these obligations, it has been treated with great forbearance by this country. But the time has now arrived when Great Britain, as the Power ultimately responsible for the welfare of the Egyptian people, and the safety of the foreign population in Egypt, can no longer tolerate the state of political unrest that exists in that country. Such measures must be taken as may be deemed necessary by His Majesty's High Commissioner for the adequate protection of life and property. This does not mean that there is any intention on the part of the British Government of altering the measure of independence already conceded to the Egyptian State; but it does mean that from now onwards the successive Governments of King Fuad will be compelled to keep the anti-British agitation within bounds and to protect the lives of foreigners resident within their country.

With regard to the Sudan the British attitude is equally plain. There is no question of our leaving that country or giving way to the Egyptian claim to a suzerainty over its people. This was made perfectly clear to Zaghlul Pasha by Mr. Ramsay Macdonald last October. Our first and paramount duty is to preserve the civilization which we have brought into existence in the Sudan, and we are convinced that the worst thing we could do for the happiness and prosperity of the Sudanese would be to hand them over to an Egyptian administration. The wonderful work of development which we have already done in the Sudan is known to our better-informed friends in France and all over the world. What we have

done in the Sudan, the French have done in Morocco. They have always had our support. It has not been our practice to urge that any misunderstanding between them and the native population under their control was a matter of concern to other nations or should be referred at once for settlement to the League of Nations. We have looked upon Morocco as a French sphere of influence, and have taken it for granted that French statesmen and administrators in Northern Africa were influenced in their policy not by selfish motives, but by a sincere wish to promote the welfare of the peoples entrusted to their government. We feel, therefore, that we have a right in our colonial difficulties to count upon our Allies for a similar attitude of sympathetic self-restraint.

* * * * *

By the assassination of the Sirdar in Cairo, Great Britain has lost a public-spirited and single-minded servant ; Egypt, a sincere friend ; and the Sudan, a capable ruler who had devoted his life to the service of that country and who had guided it wisely through the last three difficult years of the war and the even more difficult years which succeeded the war.

Though a soldier by profession, Major-General Sir Lee Oliver Fitzmaurice Stack never had the fortune of proving his military capacity in any important military operations, and he will be remembered for his work of civil administration in the Sudan, rather than for his military services. He joined the Egyptian Army in July, 1899, and his connection with the civil administration of the Sudan dated back to the year 1904, when Sir Reginald Wingate, who was then Governor-General, selected him as his Private Secretary. From this date until his death Stack held either purely civil appointments or appointments which combined civil and military duties. In 1908 he was given the office of Director of Military Intelligence and Sudan Agent in Cairo. He returned to Khartoum in 1913 as Civil Secretary to the Sudan Government ; and in 1917, when Sir Reginald Wingate was called to Cairo to take up the position of High Commissioner, Stack was chosen to succeed him as Sirdar of the Egyptian Army and Governor-General of the Sudan. As Sirdar and Governor-General Stack fully justified the expectations of those who knew him. Under his prudent and sympathetic rule during the last three years of the war, the Sudan remained tranquil and gave no serious cause for anxiety. The loyalty of the inhabitants throughout the war was indeed most gratifying. Stack would have been the first to acknowledge that this satisfactory condition of affairs was in the first place due to the

just and sympathetic lines on which Government policy had been laid by his predecessor, and to the support which he received from a particularly capable and experienced body of officers and civil servants ; but a large measure of credit was due to Stack himself, for the wise vigilance and tact which he exercised and for the confidence which his personal qualities inspired in the country.

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Amongst the first duties which fell to the new Governor-General was the pacification of the extensive Darfur Province, which had recently been occupied as the result of a short but brilliant little campaign, and the establishment in it of a simple but adequate machinery of Government. The measures taken were successful and the blessings of order and justice were extended to that Province.

But if the war time had its difficulties, the years succeeding the war brought with them even greater difficulties. Amongst other problems, which claimed the Governor-General's attention, were the excessive rise in the cost of the necessities of life which in the Sudan as elsewhere pressed severely on the people, and the completion of the great scheme for the irrigation of the Gezira, which had been suspended by the war, and which, owing to the great increase in the cost of materials and labour and for other reasons, necessitated the making of entirely new financial arrangements to meet a greatly increased expenditure and a series of harassing negotiations.

In the meantime violent nationalist agitation broke out in Egypt and led to the grant by the British Government of a measure of independence to Egypt, the status of the Sudan and the position of the Sirdar being left over for future settlement with the new Nationalist Ministry. Upon the formation of that Ministry under Zaghlul Pasha, the Ministers, so far from respecting the *status quo ante*, encouraged by their action disloyalty on the part of Egyptian officers towards the Sirdar, claimed the Sudan as the exclusive property of Egypt and characterized the British occupation of that country as a usurpation. This placed Sir Lee Stack in an intolerable position. As Sirdar of the Egyptian Army he was under an Egyptian Minister, who overrode his authority not on any personal grounds, but because he represented Great Britain. As Governor-General of the Sudan he was responsible for the safety of that country, but could no longer rely upon the loyalty of the Egyptian Army or of many of his Egyptian officials. It was due only to his tact and good temper and to his personal popularity that a crisis was for a time averted.

Stack came home on leave and to discuss the situation with the

British Government. Disaffection had been spread by Egyptian agitators amongst certain limited sections of the population in the Sudan, and last August, during his absence from the Sudan, mutiny broke out amongst the Egyptian railway battalion at Atbara and the military cadets at Khartoum.

When Stack returned to Cairo after the failure of the conversations between Mr. Ramsay Macdonald and Zaghlul Pasha, he knew that he would be running risks of attempts on his life. At a last interview before he left London, an old friend begged him to take the precaution whilst in Cairo of being accompanied by an armed escort. Stack promised to consider the suggestion. But it would seem from the account of his assassination that he chose to risk his life unguarded rather than to take precautions which might have been misinterpreted and cause alarm.

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Lee Stack was worthy of his place amongst the distinguished band of soldier administrators, who as rulers in tropical Africa have upheld the honour of England and have devoted themselves whole-heartedly to the interests of the native races under their charge. With great powers of industry, he possessed the capacity of getting at the essentials of a problem and the tact to make his decisions acceptable to those affected by them. His accessibility, modesty, courtesy and fairness won him wide popularity, and the affection and respect of those who were privileged to know him. But his chief strength lay in his single-minded devotion to duty and his whole-hearted desire to serve the interests of those for whom he was responsible. He loved the Sudan and its people.

The roll of the British Governor-Generals of the Sudan is a notable one, Gordon, Kitchener, Wingate, Stack. Of these, three have given their lives in the service of their country, each in circumstance of the highest dramatic order. It would be hyperbole to suggest, and Stack would have been the first to disclaim, that he possessed the genius or strength of Gordon or Kitchener. But in his devotion to duty, in his single-minded patriotism and in his love of the Sudan he was a worthy successor to those two great national heroes.

* * * * *

The Geneva Protocol of Arbitration and Security, recently adopted by the Fifth Assembly of the League of Nations, has now been published and presented to Parliament. It is possible, therefore, to study these latest proposals for the maintenance of peace and, in view of their far-reaching character, it is to be hoped that

they will be studied carefully by the citizens of the British Empire—for, unless the nations of the world keep in touch with the proceedings of their representatives at Geneva, there is always a danger of their being committed to a line of policy which, although admirable in theory, may be quite unworkable in practice.

The new Conservative Government has acted wisely in refusing to come to any decision with regard to the ratification of the Protocol before it has had an opportunity of consulting the statesmen of the Dominions. It is, indeed, fairly clear that some of the proposals contained in the Protocol cannot be accepted by this country as they stand. No one disputes that those who drew them up were not animated “by the firm desire to ensure the maintenance of the general peace and the security of nations whose existence, independence or territories may be threatened,” but it would appear somewhat doubtful whether the suggested extensions of the jurisdiction of the League of Nations as laid down in its original Covenant would be acceptable to the Great Powers in certain classes of disputes.

* * * * *

Take, for instance, Article 3 of the Protocol by which the signatory States are asked “to recognize as compulsory, *ipso facto* and without special agreement, the jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of International Justice.” Hitherto the submission of matters in dispute to this Court, which was set up by the Assembly of the League in 1921, has been voluntary except in such cases where agreements existed binding the signatory States to accept its decisions. But if Article 3 of the Protocol were ratified by this country, it would appear that we should be bound henceforward to recognize as compulsory the jurisdiction of the Court “in respect of all or any of the classes of legal disputes affecting (a) the interpretation of a Treaty; (b) any question of international law; (c) the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international obligation; (d) the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international obligation.” It is not difficult to contemplate many such disputes arising which it would be practically impossible for any British Government to induce Parliament to submit to the decision of an international tribunal, however impartial it might be supposed to be.

The new method laid down in the Protocol—the so-called “sanctions” for compelling obedience to the provisions of the Covenant of the League of Nations—also requires very careful consideration. These sanctions to be enforced against what is termed an “aggressor” State—*i.e.* any State which resorts to war in

the same definite and clear expression, with every now and again a touch of humour, that had marked him in bygone days at Woolwich and Chatham ; in a word, he inspired everyone with confidence. Those who had the opportunity of hearing his appreciation of the situation at this period of the war, as given at one of the Commander-in-Chief's regular conferences of Army Commanders, will remember Cox's terse sentences : " The enemy will attack ; he will attack soon ; he will attack on the Western Front."

Before March had well begun, there was no longer any doubt that the Fifth Army would be involved. Amongst many warnings issued by the G.S. " I " at Army headquarters the following may be quoted :—

March 9th.—" The indications this week confirm the theory that the enemy is preparing for an attack in the near future against the Fifth Army front. . . ."

March 16th.—" There is no reason to modify deductions already drawn as to the imminence of an enemy offensive."

March 19th.—" Indications of a more than usually definite nature point to the fact that the enemy's preparations are practically complete."

It may not be out of place to record here that one high authority, despite the repeated and definite statements from Fifth and Third Armies and G.H.Q., did not hold this view.

Very early on the 19th of March, the last pieces of evidence from the Fifth Army front regarding the approaching storm were gathered. A German artillery non-commissioned officer captured west of Bony, an aeroplane pilot brought down near Ly-Fontaine, infantry prisoners captured south-west of Villers-Guislain, and Alsatian deserters from a trench-mortar battery south of St. Quentin, all told the same story, each in his own way—in some cases, it is true, unwittingly. The sources of information were not only independent, but the prisoners were of a widely differing type ; and the news they gave, corroborating many other indications, completed the last link in the chain of evidence gradually forged during the preceding weeks. All these matters were reported by " urgent Operations priority " telegrams to G.H.Q. and after several long telephone conversations between the writer and Cox, it was agreed that the final details as regards the date and hour of the enemy's attack, the nature of the preliminary gas bombardment, the German reserves available, etc., were now in our possession.

Parenthetically it may be remarked that prisoners' statements—carefully sifted and checked—about such a prosaic subject as the



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The Army Quarterly

CONTENTS

	PAGE
I. Editorial	225
II. Intelligence at an Army Headquarters on the Western Front during the Last Phase of the Great War. By Colonel F. S. G. Piggott, D.S.O.	234
III. "The Other Side of the Hill." No. IV. Mametz Wood and Contalmaison: 9th-10th of July, 1916 (with Map)	245
IV. The Command and Administration of the Military Forces of the Empire in War. By Brevet Lieut.-Colonel H. D. Wynter, C.M.G., D.S.O., Australian Staff Corps.	260
V. The German Strategic Reserve in 1917. By Brigadier-General J. E. Edmonds, C.B., C.M.G. (R.E., retired)	270
VI. Frederick, the Soldiers' Friend. By F. J. Hudleston, C.B.E., Librarian, War Office	273
VII. Smuts v. Lettow. A Critical Phase in East Africa; August to September, 1916 (with Map). By Colonel G. M. Orr, C.B.E., D.S.O., Indian Army (retired)	287
VIII. The Study of Military History. By Lieut.-Colonel E. C. Anstey, D.S.O., R.F.A.	300
IX. Some Further Reflections on the Recent Olympic Games. By Brigadier-General R. J. Kentish, C.M.G., D.S.O. (Member of the International Olympic Council and Honorary Secretary, British Olympic Association)	316
X. The Evolution of Air-Power. By "Avion"	328
XI. "Surprise" in Fortification in the Future (with Maps and Diagrams). By Captain J. A. C. Pennycook, D.S.O., R.E.	342
XII. The Art of Command according to Xenophon. By J. M. Scammell, Major, Infantry, O.R.C., United States Army	352
XIII. The Infantry Man-Power Problem. By Brevet Major G. S. Brunskill, M.C., K.S.L.I.	366
XIV. An Operation of War (with Map). By Brevet Lieut.-Colonel R. H. Beadon, C.B.E., R.A.S.C.	375
XV. Battalion Organization in Time of Peace. A Reply to Criticism. By Captain M. Beckwith-Smith, D.S.O., M.C., Coldstream Guards	383
XVI. Tales of Intelligence. No. 7. Cross-Channel Traffic. By "Jabb" (late of the Intelligence Corps)	387
XVII. A Matter of Izzat. By "Talib"	402
XVIII. Notes on Foreign War Books	408
XIX. Reviews and Notices of Recent Books and Articles on Military Subjects	432

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The new Conservative Government has acted wisely in refusing to come to any decision with regard to the ratification of the Protocol before it has had an opportunity of consulting the statesmen of the Dominions. It is, indeed, fairly clear that some of the proposals contained in the Protocol cannot be accepted by this country as they stand. No one disputes that those who drew them up were not animated “by the firm desire to ensure the maintenance of the general peace and the security of nations whose existence, independence or territories may be threatened,” but it would appear somewhat doubtful whether the suggested extensions of the jurisdiction of the League of Nations as laid down in its original Covenant would be acceptable to the Great Powers in certain classes of disputes.

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Take, for instance, Article 3 of the Protocol by which the signatory States are asked “to recognize as compulsory, *ipso facto* and without special agreement, the jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of International Justice.” Hitherto the submission of matters in dispute to this Court, which was set up by the Assembly of the League in 1921, has been voluntary except in such cases where agreements existed binding the signatory States to accept its decisions. But if Article 3 of the Protocol were ratified by this country, it would appear that we should be bound henceforward to recognize as compulsory the jurisdiction of the Court “in respect of all or any of the classes of legal disputes affecting (a) the interpretation of a Treaty; (b) any question of international law; (c) the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international obligation; (d) the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international obligation.” It is not difficult to contemplate many such disputes arising which it would be practically impossible for any British Government to induce Parliament to submit to the decision of an international tribunal, however impartial it might be supposed to be.

The new method laid down in the Protocol—the so-called “sanctions” for compelling obedience to the provisions of the Covenant of the League of Nations—also requires very careful consideration. These sanctions to be enforced against what is termed an “aggressor” State—*i.e.* any State which resorts to war in

the same definite and clear expression, with every now and again a touch of humour, that had marked him in bygone days at Woolwich and Chatham ; in a word, he inspired everyone with confidence. Those who had the opportunity of hearing his appreciation of the situation at this period of the war, as given at one of the Commander-in-Chief's regular conferences of Army Commanders, will remember Cox's terse sentences : " The enemy will attack ; he will attack soon ; he will attack on the Western Front."

Before March had well begun, there was no longer any doubt that the Fifth Army would be involved. Amongst many warnings issued by the G.S. " I " at Army headquarters the following may be quoted :—

March 9th.—" The indications this week confirm the theory that the enemy is preparing for an attack in the near future against the Fifth Army front. . . ."

March 16th.—" There is no reason to modify deductions already drawn as to the imminence of an enemy offensive."

March 19th.—" Indications of a more than usually definite nature point to the fact that the enemy's preparations are practically complete."

It may not be out of place to record here that one high authority, despite the repeated and definite statements from Fifth and Third Armies and G.H.Q., did not hold this view.

Very early on the 19th of March, the last pieces of evidence from the Fifth Army front regarding the approaching storm were gathered. A German artillery non-commissioned officer captured west of Bony, an aeroplane pilot brought down near Ly-Fontaine, infantry prisoners captured south-west of Villers-Guislain, and Alsatian deserters from a trench-mortar battery south of St. Quentin, all told the same story, each in his own way—in some cases, it is true, unwittingly. The sources of information were not only independent, but the prisoners were of a widely differing type ; and the news they gave, corroborating many other indications, completed the last link in the chain of evidence gradually forged during the preceding weeks. All these matters were reported by " urgent Operations priority " telegrams to G.H.Q. and after several long telephone conversations between the writer and Cox, it was agreed that the final details as regards the date and hour of the enemy's attack, the nature of the preliminary gas bombardment, the German reserves available, etc., were now in our possession.

Parenthetically it may be remarked that prisoners' statements—carefully sifted and checked—about such a prosaic subject as the

issue of new gas-masks, were of real value ; whereas sensational "information" from the same source, that a Bulgarian Army of manœuvre was concentrated in Luxembourg, was obviously false ; the British Intelligence service was well enough acquainted with the location of the divisions of the Bulgarian Army to know that none of them was in the Grand Duchy.

The great battle which opened at dawn on the 21st of March, and lasted until the early days of April, has already been fully and frequently described ; the world knows how the Fifth Army, holding a front of forty miles, from the river Oise near La Fere to a point between Gouzeaucourt and Flesquières, with fourteen divisions and three cavalry divisions, was assailed by nearly fifty German divisions, and forced to fall back almost to the gates of Amiens.

Before the battle it had been impressed on all subordinate formations that identifications of German divisions must be reported as rapidly as possible, so that the Higher Command might know, from the depletion of the enemy's general reserve, whether the attack was the main attack or a feint. Owing to the admirable signal arrangements, and whole-hearted cooperation of the Intelligence *personnel* in the lower formations of the Fifth Army, all the enemy's divisions identified up to midnight on the 21st-22nd of March were reported with such celerity that the writer was instructed to send the following message to the G.S.O.'s 2 (Intelligence), III, VII, XVIII and XIX Corps, and to the Deputy-Director of Signals at Army headquarters :

"The B.G. 'I' has expressed his warm thanks for the very rapid way in which identifications have reached him yesterday and to-day. The accurate knowledge of the enemy's Order of Battle, obtained so quickly, has been of the greatest assistance to the General Staff at G.H.Q.

"As this satisfactory result is largely due to the efforts of yourself and your staff, and the Intelligence officers of divisions, brigades and battalions, I should be very glad if you would let all concerned know how valuable their work has been." *

When it is realized that against the Fifth Army alone thirty-eight German divisions were identified in line (thirty-four by contact), on the 21st-22nd of March, the importance of the work done by the Intelligence *personnel* can be readily appreciated. It was already clear within twenty-four hours of the opening of the battle that it was no feint that had been launched on the Somme.

It may be interesting to quote here from an Annexe to the

* Addressed to Majors J. M. Hamilton, R. H. Thornton, C. G. Ling, and R. H. German ; and to Colonel E. G. Godfrey-Faussett.

G.H.Q. Summary of Information, dated the fourth of May, 1918, giving the German Order of Battle, at the moment of assault on the 21st of March, 1918, and showing the divisions in line, in close reserve, and in army reserve. The grand total was seventy-five divisions, against the British Third and Fifth Armies—of which twenty-seven were concentrated against the former and forty-eight against the latter. Of these forty-eight (and the details published on the 4th of May were the result of information subsequently received, and carefully sifted), forty-five had already been reported on the 23rd of March, in the following telegram from Fifth Army "I" to G.H.Q. "I":

"Indications to 12 noon show 45 German divisions opposite this Army front of which not less than 30 are in line, and 15 in immediate reserve AAA this information has been given verbally to Commander-in-Chief here AAA details as regards figure 45 by special despatch rider later but figure is considered conservative AAA addressed G.H.Q. 'I,' repeated Third Army 'I,' and 3rd and 6th French Armies. Fifth Army 'I,' 1.45 p.m."

No account of the ten days and nights of stress during the first fury of the German onslaught would be complete without reference to the Intelligence *personnel* at Army headquarters itself, namely:—Captain Hugh Smith (the G.S.O. 3), Captain Francis Thelwall (in charge of Enemy Order of Battle), and other officers—and Sergeant-Major H. T. Langstone and his non-commissioned officers and men. Throughout the battle, during which Army headquarters retreated first from Nesle to Villers-Brettonneux, and then to Dury, their loyal and efficient labours prevented the slightest interruption in the vital Intelligence service of General Gough's hard-pressed Army.

* * * * *

The B.G. "I" spoke of the battle which was just over as the "battle for position," and of the battle of the Lys (which opened on the 9th of April) as the "battle for the reserves"; and he said that the Germans had a third battle in view, the "knock-out blow." The writer did not arrive at General Plumer's headquarters until forty-eight hours after the Flanders battle had been joined, and already the Germans had bitten deeply into the British line. The rest of April was spent in slowly fighting the enemy to a standstill; heavy attacks were delivered by him on the 17th, 25th and 29th of April, and though Mont Kemmel was lost on the 25th, his defeat on a front of nine miles between St. Jans Cappel and Zillebeke Lake on the 29th marked the end of the battle of the Lys.

During the next six weeks the Intelligence service of the Second

Army owed much to the R.A.F. In March, at the headquarters of the Fifth Army, it was the enemy's Order of Battle which was of supreme importance ; in May with the Second Army it was the enemy's rear organizations (dumps, light railways, aerodromes, roads, hospitals, etc.) which demanded the closest attention and observation. The air photographic branch, directed by Captain W. J. Pugh, collated the results of air reconnaissances with such skill and discernment, that as early as the 17th of May, in the Army weekly Intelligence Summary, it was possible to make the following definite statement :—

“ There is evidence to the effect that the enemy's attitude, although quiescent at the moment, is not of a permanently defensive nature. . . . That an attack is in preparation must be considered certain.”

This was supplemented on the 24th of May by : “ It is possible that the date of his attack may be in the near, but not immediate, future ” ; and on the 27th of June by : “ Indications continue to accumulate that the enemy's preparations for an attack on this front are well advanced.”

The B.G. “ I,” always anxious to be in the closest personal touch with the situation, visited Blendecques (whither Second Army headquarters had retired from Cassel in April), several times in May and June to satisfy himself that the warning was not unfounded. On the 17th of June, he wrote in his Appreciation :

“ There is no doubt that an attack is being prepared from the Lys salient, but more definite evidence is required before the flanks of the attack can be defined, and before the imminence of the attack can be estimated. The enemy's rear organizations are complete, but indications of the final preparations are still lacking.”

At the end of the month of June, in the Second Army Intelligence Summary, it was stated that the obstruction of the enemy's communications caused by our artillery fire and bombing, and the sickness (Spanish influenza) in the Lys salient were probably contributing to delay the attack ; in short, that there were “ many indications that an attack is impending, but none that it is imminent.”

Early in July, however, it became evident that we should not have long to wait, and on the 15th of July, G.H.Q. “ I ” stated that indications “ all point to offensive intentions in Flanders in the near future.”

Although stress has been laid on the great value of air photographs at this period, the examination of prisoners conducted under the direction of Captain A. F. Bosworth ; the determination of the

enemy's Order of Battle, under Captain T. G. Robinson ; and observation of his wireless activity, under Captains C. Tizard and C. J. Casey ; all furnished corroborative evidence. Yet another source—agents' reports—on one occasion gave confirmation as to the large number of hospitals which had been steadily accumulating in the enemy's back areas ; these reports stated categorically that nurses and doctors in Brussels and elsewhere had all been mobilized and were being sent forward to the Lys salient, to man the new field hospitals there. Incidentally, it may be mentioned that indications of a technical nature, like the appearance of hospitals, were invariably discussed with the departmental officers concerned, in this case, with the Deputy-Director of Medical Services. Similarly, the positions of the enemy's dumps and light railways, were closely examined in consultation with the A.Q.M.G. and the Assistant Director of Transportation, both as an index to his intentions, and as a target for our airmen.

Another branch of Army Intelligence—study of enemy documents—brought off what may be described as a coup, towards the end of May. A patrol captured a German non-commissioned officer with a bag containing his company's mail ; no time was lost in forwarding the bag to Army headquarters—the days of souvenir hunting had long past—and Captain Reid Brown (in charge of that section of "I" at A.H.Q.) began his usual monotonous search through German letters and postcards. On this occasion he found a nugget : a German pioneer sergeant, from his handwriting evidently a man of education and intelligence, writing from near Laon to a friend in his former unit in Flanders, mentioned the heavy and important work in which he had been engaged, and informed his correspondent that the results would soon be seen. In point of fact this was the first indication of the sudden blow which fell upon the French front on the Chemin des Dames on the 27th of May ; the incident of the "Laon postcard" was a topic of conversation in Intelligence and other circles for long afterwards.

Reverting to the expected Flanders attack, it is possible that for future historians the 18th of July, 1918, will appear as one of the most crucial days of the war. The German offensive mounted in Flanders was ready to be launched at any moment, and every nerve of the British Intelligence service was strained to obtain the final warning ; it was at this precise moment that the French counter-attack in Champagne introduced a new factor. Almost immediately the issue before the German Higher Command stood out crystal clear ;

could they attack in the north, allowing Prince Rupprecht to keep his reserves in Flanders intact, before it was known whether the Crown Prince on the Marne could hold his own? If the Crown Prince gave ground and wanted help, the transference of these reserves southward would weaken Rupprecht's potential driving-power and jeopardize the success of his venture. It can easily be imagined with what eagerness the German divisions in Flanders were watched as the battle raged in Champagne. Early in August the first rumours came that the tampering with Rupprecht's general reserve had begun, quickly confirmed by the appearance of Flanders divisions in Champagne; he still had enough troops, however, for a modified attack on the Belgians, or the Second and First British Armies. The Order of Battle section was again of primary importance at Second Army "I."

Even before the Fourth Army's great stroke on the 8th of August ushered in the third battle of the Somme, the die had been cast, and it could be stated definitely that the attack intended to be launched by the Germans in Flanders was certainly postponed, and probably abandoned. On the contrary, a new possibility had to be considered well before the end of August; would the enemy even stand his ground? It was now that a hitherto unobtrusive section of the Intelligence branch, enemy movement and activity, took a prominent place in our work. Systematic and informed collation and study of all forms of enemy movement and activity, as reported by ground and air observers throughout the area of the Second Army, led to a standard of normality being obtained, leading to definite conclusions whenever a variation took place.

These deductions, based on an exact knowledge of the enemy's daily movements by train, by light railway, by canal and by road; of the number of fires and explosions in back areas; and of his aerial activity, proved of very great value in supplementing other indications of the enemy's plans obtained from other sources.

For the development of this branch of Intelligence work, the principal credit must be given to Captain G. E. R. Gedye.

In view of the enemy's abandoned offensive in Flanders, the following extract from the G.H.Q. Summary of Information, Part II., of the 29th of October, has an especial interest:

"A secret order issued by the Fourth German Army on 22/7/18 (Ia/VIII. No. 1955/989) . . . affords definite proof of the enemy's intention to launch an attack in Flanders during July of this year and of its abandonment about the 22nd July."

On the 6th of November additional extracts from captured

German orders were published in the G.H.Q. Summary, which gave "further evidence as to the intended offensive in Flanders this summer":

"In view of the elaborate nature of the preparations referred to, it is interesting to note that a German officer recently captured by the French stated that the offensive for which the best and most detailed preparations had been made was the one which was immediately to have followed the offensive of the 15th July, but which never came off."

It is satisfactory to know that the German plans, though never carried into action, were not hidden from those whose business it was to keep the Commander-in-Chief informed of the enemy's intentions.

At the end of August, the Intelligence service suffered the grievous loss of its Chief, accidentally drowned near Montreuil. At that time the future, though hopeful, had not assumed that aspect of certain triumph that so soon afterwards transformed the situation on the Western Front; and Cox could not have known that within three months the Armistice would be signed. For rather more than half a year he had directed the Intelligence section of the General Staff at G.H.Q.; during that time he had inspired confidence and affection throughout the Intelligence service in France and Flanders, and in many other quarters. He left to Brigadier-General G. S. Clive, his successor, a most efficient instrument for the final stages of the great struggle.

* * * * *

The enemy's retirement from the Lys salient began at the end of August, and on the 28th of September an Anglo-Belgian offensive in Flanders began the final driving of the Germans to the Rhine. As the British troops advanced, the significance of large and numerous dumps of heavy ammunition immediately behind the old German front line was appreciated by all, and noted with singular satisfaction by the Intelligence section of the General Staff, Second Army.

Army Intelligence had been developing a new section during the late summer, termed security and counter-Intelligence; under Major F. G. Poole its activities had been carefully and successfully fostered. It was distinct from I(b), (counter-espionage), but worked in close touch with that branch.

The two extracts from General Routine Orders 5040 and 5396, dated the 17th of September and the 27th of October, 1918, respectively, reproduced below, give some idea of the progress made as regards training our own men to avoid giving information to the

enemy ; the extracts are translations of captured German orders, and refer to units at that time in the Second Army :

“ Div. H.Q. 24/8/18.

“ G.R.O. 5040.

“ English prisoners brought in this morning at Point V in map sq. 7353, belong to 2/23rd London Regiment, 21st Brigade, 30th Division ; prisoners brought in between Points O and F in map sq. 7454 belong to 7th and 8th Royal Innis. Fusiliers, 90th Brigade, 30th Division. 2/23rd London Regiment came from 60th British Division from Palestine ; 7th and 8th Royal Innis. Fusiliers came from the disbanded 16th Division.

“ *Examination is exceedingly difficult, as prisoners, especially those of 2/23rd Londons, appear to have been very well trained in case of capture, and are very clever at giving evasive answers. The Sergeant prisoner absolutely refuses all information.*”

“ G.R.O. 5396.

“ (i) *Method of Capture.*

“ The prisoners belong to a big patrol ordered to make good the occupation of a farm (apparently Hof Osternelle, near Ploegsteert) and to put out of action the machine guns conjectured to be there.

“ The 21 prisoners, among whom were 4 N.C.O.'s, *had all taken off their badges, and could not or would not give a satisfactory reason for having done so.*

“ (ii) *Personal.*

“ The great majority of the prisoners belong to the workman class ; *they make a good military impression, but in their statements they are so extraordinarily reticent that one must assume that their superior officers have instructed them clearly and warned them how to behave when taken prisoner.*”

(NOTE.—This refers to British prisoners, captured by the enemy near Ploegsteert on the 11th of September, 1918, from the 12th Norfolk Regiment.)

Signal traffic discipline also advanced more and more towards perfection as the months passed ; a captured German order (dated LI Corps, August 1st) refers to “ the striking improvement which has lately taken place in the telephone and wireless discipline of our enemies.”

The work of the air photographic section in defence has already been referred to ; its value was now shown in attack. Maps of the enemy's newly-made roads and light railways were prepared, and the closest touch kept with the Chief Engineer, against the time now at hand, when the British Army would be advancing over the ground which so long had been far behind the German lines. The fourth battle of Ypres, on the 28th of September and following

days, was the beginning of the end ; Second Army headquarters had returned to Cassel on the 1st of September, and moved forward to Roubaix on the 23rd of October.

The sands were rapidly running out when the Second Army, early in November, began to prepare for the passage of the Scheldt. Considerable difficulty had been experienced for some days in keeping touch with the retreating enemy, and the Order of Battle, and prisoners' examination sections, were unable to obtain definite information. On the other hand, the documents, air photographic and enemy movement sections were usefully occupied. It was left to yet another section to supply the final Intelligence stroke : while the British troops lay west of the Scheldt and all preparations for battle had been completed, the enemy's wireless section of Second Army " I " produced evidence to the effect that the passage of the river would be unopposed. Although lacking corroboration from other sources, deductions from the observed movements and procedure of the enemy's wireless stations were definite, and at dawn on the 9th of November, the day fixed for the forcing of the river, British patrols found the eastern bank unoccupied.

The Army Intelligence Summaries on the 8th, 9th and 10th of November had contained the following Appreciations :

" The enemy has begun to withdraw opposite the Army on our right, and there are indications that the withdrawal may extend northwards to our own front."

" The enemy's retreat from the river Scheldt is now general opposite the whole Army front."

" There are no indications of the enemy making a stand at present."

Captain R. B. FitzGerald, the G.S.O. 3, who maintained the smooth and efficient work of an office numbering in all some twenty officers and an equal number of non-commissioned officers and men, discussed the last Summary with the writer. It seemed simple enough, being a fact, not a forecast—

" Hostilities ceased at 11.00 hours to-day."

* * * * *

The above is no more than a sketch of the Intelligence service at the headquarters of an army during the final stages of the war in France and Flanders. In 1918 it worked during retreat, defence, trench warfare, attack, open warfare and pursuit ; the experiences gained, therefore, cover a wide field, and their brief description may possibly have some historical value. The writing of them has recalled many memories and induced certain reflexions, of which

two may be set down here. First, liaison is as vital for Intelligence as for any other part of staff work ; and, second, it is no less important to have an *esprit de corps* running through all the ramifications of a complex organization, than in a battalion or a division. A few examples of liaison have been given, with the signal, medical, engineer, supply and transportation branches ; cooperation with the artillery was, of course, unceasing, and specific examples would be misleading. As regards *esprit de corps* : in 1918, from the B.G. " I " to the scout officer of a battalion or to the last-joined member of the Intelligence Corps, it may safely be said that all ranks were proud of " I " and of its supremely important work.

We have it on no less authority than that of Napoleon himself that a commander who does not know his enemy's dispositions and intentions does not know his job. Methods of warfare have developed and changed since the days of the Great Emperor, but it is just as necessary for an army to have a good Intelligence service now as it always has been since the dawn of history.

“THE OTHER SIDE OF THE HILL”

No. IV *

MAMETZ WOOD AND CONTALMAISON: 9TH-10TH OF
JULY, 1916 †

(With Map)

I

IN a previous article, No. II of this series, the stubborn defence put up on the 1st of July, 1916, by the 26th Reserve Division astride the Ancre on a front Serre—Beaumont—Thiepval—Ovillers was described. For a few hours on that day, as a result of the capture of the Schwaben Redoubt by the 36th (Ulster) Division, the Germans had believed imminent the isolation and capture of Thiepval and, with that, the loss of the Thiepval plateau. Time was given, however, for the German counter-attack against the Schwaben Redoubt to develop, and, by the evening of the 2nd of July, the 26th Reserve Division was again established along practically the whole of its original front line trench.

Southward, however, the 28th Reserve Division, the other division of the XIV Reserve Corps, holding the front Ovillers—Fricourt—Montauban, had completely broken, the British capturing the entire Montauban plateau. The 28th Reserve Division was saved from utter annihilation by the timely arrival of units of the 10th Bavarian Division, the only reserve of the XIV Reserve Corps. During the subsequent days the British continued to make gradual progress. On the night of the 2nd/3rd Fricourt village was captured, and on the following day the line was advanced on to the rising ground facing the south-western side of Contalmaison. At the same time, on the right, a position was consolidated along the bed of the Mametz valley, including Caterpillar Wood and Bernafay Wood.

* Previous articles in this series appeared in the *Army Quarterly*, January, 1924; April, 1924; and July, 1924.

† *Das Infanterie-Regiment Nr. 183*: Hase, Dresden, 1922; *Das Infanterie-Regiment Nr. 184*: Soldan, Berlin, 1920; *Das Württemberg Res. Inf. Reg. Nr. 122 im Weltkrieg*: Mugge, Stuttgart, 1922; *Die Schwaben an der Ancre*: Gerster, Heilbronn, 1920.

It was the gradual yielding on this part of the front, together with the firm stand of the 26th Reserve Division astride the Ancre and about Thiepval, that now led to the complete alteration of the British plan for the Somme offensive. Sir Douglas Haig decided to abandon his original intention of making his main attack across the Thiepval plateau eastward towards the Bapaume—Péronne road, and instead to attack the Pozières—Ginchy ridge from the south from the line of the Mametz valley, thereby taking advantage of the success already gained there.

This alteration of plan necessitated a considerable amount of administrative work, as it involved the supply of food and ammunition to a far greater force of men and artillery to this sector than had been at first arranged for. By the 8th of July, however, the preparatory orders were issued for the venture, and the 14th of July was given as the date for the beginning of the second phase of the Somme battle, the attack of the Pozières—Ginchy ridge from the south. To give every chance of success the ridge was to be attacked on a comparatively narrow frontage of two miles between Longueval and Bazentin-le-Petit, the German second line which lay in front of those two places being given as the objective. As a preliminary to the main attack, however, the Fourth Army was instructed to concentrate at once on the capture of Trones Wood, on the right flank, and of Mametz Wood and Contalmaison on the left. Unless these localities were in British possession it was felt that the flanks of the main attack on the 14th of July would be insecure.

In accordance with these instructions orders were issued by the Fourth Army on the 8th of July for an attack on Mametz Wood and Contalmaison by the 38th, 17th and 23rd Divisions, to begin the following day, the 9th.

2

In the meantime the German 3rd Guard Division had been hurried forward from Valenciennes, and it relieved the remnants of the 28th Reserve Division and the 10th Bavarian Division, its right on the Bapaume—Albert road, south of Ovillers,* and its left east of Flat Iron Copse, including the whole of Mametz Wood.

The German original second line position lay along the southern side of the Pozières—Ginchy ridge, but after the capture of the front line on the 1st of July the Germans continued to hold various intermediary positions across the southern spurs of the ridge that reach out into the Mametz—Montauban valley. The keystone of

* See Sketch Map.

the position taken up by the 3rd Guard Division was the Kaisergraben that lay across the Contalmaison spur protecting Contalmaison village. This trench had been constructed some months previously and was fairly complete, well wired in front and with good dug-outs some twenty feet deep into the hard chalk soil. On the right the Kaisergraben was connected with Owillers by Fourth Street (Quergraben III) and its left joined on to Mametz Wood by Wood Trench.*

On the night of the 4th/5th July the British (52nd Brigade, 17th Division) captured the sector of the Kaisergraben between the Contalmaison—Fricourt road and Wood Trench, and named it Quadrangle Trench, also a part of Wood Trench, though about fifty yards of the latter, nearest the Wood, was still held by the Germans. On the night of the 6th/7th a party of the 10th Lancashire Fusiliers (52nd Brigade), pushing on again from Quadrangle Trench, had entered the southern end of Contalmaison village, but they were not supported, and at daylight the Germans counter-attacked and forced them back to Quadrangle Trench. That part of the Kaisergraben in front of the western edge of Contalmaison, north of the Contalmaison—Fricourt road, was still in German hands.

On the 7th July the 3rd Guard Division was in its turn relieved by the 183rd Infantry Division from about Cambrai, consisting of the 122nd Reserve, the 183rd and 184th Infantry Regiments. On the march up the greater part of the 184th Regiment was diverted from Le Sars to assist the neighbouring division which was heavily engaged and hard pressed in Trones Wood. Only two regiments were thus left to relieve the 3rd Guard Division. These reached the German second line about Pozières and Bazentin-le-Petit during the night 6th/7th. The trenches here had been badly battered by the British artillery during the preceding days and a large number of the dug-outs had been blocked. In the circumstances little protection could be obtained, and as it was already garrisoned by the supports of the 3rd Guard Division, a large number of the new arrivals had to lie out in the open. During the morning the trench was continually shelled and the casualties were consequently heavy, the 3rd Battalion, 122nd Reserve Infantry Regiment in particular, losing 5 officers and 220 other ranks. The ground about Pozières, Contalmaison and Mametz Wood was also continually under British shell fire, Contalmaison village itself, says the German account, being frequently hidden in a cloud of black smoke, great fountains

* See Sketch Map.

of débris rising up above it at times as the heaviest shells fell among the ruins.

The relief was carried out during the night of the 7th/8th. The 183rd Infantry Regiment took over from the 9th Grenadiers between Owillers and Contalmaison (exclusive), and the 122nd Reserve Infantry Regiment from the 163rd Infantry Regiment between Contalmaison (inclusive) and the south-western corner of Mametz Wood. The other regiment of the 3rd Guard Division, the Lehr Regiment,* holding the southern edge of Mametz Wood and about Flat Iron Copse, was not relieved.

The German dispositions on the evening of the 9th between Owillers and Mametz Wood were therefore as follows: The 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 183rd Infantry Regiment were in the Kabel and Roedergraben with the 1st Battalion in reserve in Pozières. Of the 122nd Reserve Infantry Regiment the 1st Battalion (Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4 Companies) held Contalmaison village and the Kaisergraben to west of it, with battalion headquarters at the Château. The 3rd Battalion held Quadrangle Support (Nos. 10, 11 and 12 Companies) and Wood Support (No 9 Company), with battalion headquarters in the Wood. The 2nd Battalion of the regiment was in reserve in the German second line behind Contalmaison Villa, but during the 9th the 9th Company in Wood Support and part of Wood Trench lost 50 per cent. of its strength in casualties during a British bombardment of Mametz Wood, and the 5th Company was sent from the 2nd Battalion to reinforce it. The 8th Company was also sent forward into Mametz Wood as a closer support for the 3rd Battalion, but half of this company was subsequently sent across to Contalmaison to reinforce the 1st Battalion there. This left only the 6th and 7th Companies in reserve in the second line position.

The Lehr Regiment held the southern edge of Mametz Wood with its 2nd Battalion, while the 1st Battalion occupied the trenches about Flat Iron Copse, and the 3rd Battalion was in reserve about Bazentin-le-Petit.

3

There were delays in the preparation of the British 38th, 17th and 23rd Divisions for the offensive against Mametz Wood and Contalmaison that had been ordered to begin on the 9th of July,

* The Lehr infantry battalion of the Guard Corps was in peace time, as its name implies, an instructional unit which was attached to the 1st Guard Infantry Brigade. On mobilization the battalion was expanded into a normal regiment of three battalions and formed part of the 3rd Guard Division.

and an attack by the 17th Division, in the centre, against Contalmaison was all that materialized on that day. This was delivered by the 50th and 51st Brigades from Quadrangle Trench northward, against Quadrangle Support at 11.20 p.m. under cover of the darkness. On the right the 50th Brigade was checked almost at once by machine-gun and rifle fire and had to return to its trenches, but on the left the 51st Brigade was temporarily successful. The 8th South Staffords and the 7th Lincolns carried the western end of Quadrangle Support and advanced between it and Contalmaison village. The 11th Company, 122nd Reserve Infantry Regiment, was almost entirely obliterated, but Lieutenant Irion, the senior German officer in Quadrangle Support, was able to form a stop at the western end of the trench with sandbags and a machine gun and thus prevent the capture of the trench itself. Parties of the Lincolns and South Staffords, however, pressed on astride Pearl Alley to about Acid Drop Copse. Here they halted, finding both their flanks unsupported. Meanwhile the attack of the 50th Brigade had been definitely held up by the German 10th and 12th Companies, and the Lincolns and South Staffords were ordered to withdraw to Quadrangle Trench before daylight to avoid being cut off. A machine gun and its crew near Acid Drop Copse appear not to have received this order and remained in position. They were to do useful work later on.

By daylight (the 10th) the situation had not materially changed except for the arrival of the 6th Company, 122nd Reserve Infantry Regiment sent forward from the second line position (2nd Battalion) to reinforce Quadrangle Support. The march of this company during the night up to the front line is of interest if only to show that the Germans also had their troubles. The company commander, Lieutenant Köstlin, a civil engineer in times of peace, gives full details in his report. The order to reinforce the 3rd Battalion about Mametz Wood reached him during the afternoon of the 9th. At dusk he marched his company from the second line position about Bazentin back to the ammunition dépôt at Martinpuich, to fill up with ammunition and hand-grenades and to have a square meal from the battalion field-kitchen cart. Their dinner was interrupted by a shell which so much frightened the horse that it bolted at a gallop, food, kitchen and all into the darkness. It was after midnight before the ammunition had been issued and the company left Martinpuich with its two machine guns. The night was very dark, and although two guides had been sent from the 3rd Battalion to lead the way, Lieutenant Köstlin preferred to march across the

open by compass. At first the companies marched in file, but the crossing of the many trenches and shell holes between Martinpuich and Bazentin in the dark soon made the column very extended, and much time was lost in halts for closing up. After crossing the second line position at Bazentin, therefore, he formed the company into column of sections in file, and this method of advance proved much simpler and quicker. But from now onward the ground they had to cross was constantly shelled. Every few minutes shrapnel burst somewhere among the column and many casualties were suffered. Since Mametz Wood had been a special target of the British artillery for some days, and was a very easy place to get lost in at night, he decided to move across the open between the wood and Contalmaison village, following roughly the line of the Grossherzogsgaben (Pearl Alley), formerly a communication trench leading from the second line up to Quadrangle Trench, and then reach the wood from Quadrangle Support. Soon after crossing the Bazentin—Contalmaison road the two guides said they thought the front line was close at hand, so he halted the company and told the guides to go on and see, and to ask where his company was wanted. It was about 2.30 a.m. and there was a faint glimmer of the dawn.

"After some twenty minutes," he writes, "the guides returned saying the trench was straight ahead with the 10th, 11th and 12th Companies, and that reinforcements were badly needed there. The company therefore moved on at once, but after a few yards a machine gun suddenly opened fire close by from the rising ground on the right. Fortunately it was not yet light enough for the gun to take accurate aim and the bullets passed over our heads. For a moment, however, there was a great confusion, some lay down, some ran back and some forward. I shouted 'Double march, into the trench in front,' and hurried on, believing the company to be with me. But the trench was further than I thought, some 300 yards, and on reaching it I found that only thirty had arrived out of the whole company."

Later, he heard that in the confusion his order had not been heard and the men believing themselves up against an enemy's position had gone back to the second line about Bazentin or remained in shell holes on the way. Lieutenant Irion, who met him on his arrival at the trench, said that the British had broken through the western end of the trench during the night, and this undoubtedly accounted for the machine gun.* Lieutenant Irion also said that since midnight no communication had been possible to battalion

* This was probably that of the South Staffords left near Acid Drop Copse a few hours before. According to the German account it received a direct hit from a British shell during a bombardment of the village later in the day, and all its crew were killed outright.

headquarters, Major von Zeppelin, in Mametz Wood, whose last instructions were that companies were to act independently and not to await orders from him. The three companies in the trench, Nos. 10, 11 and 12, had lost very heavily during the past twenty-four hours, and the total now holding it, including the new arrivals, was 6 officers and 160 other ranks. Lieutenant Köstlin, being the senior officer present, took over command of the trench.

4

The attack of the 38th (Welsh) Division on the right against Mametz Wood had been postponed till 4.15 a.m. (the 10th). The bombardment of the southern part of the wood began at 3.30 a.m. The Germans had found the wood difficult to put in a state of defence. It consisted chiefly of fair-sized oak, beech and alder trees averaging 30 to 40 feet high, and beneath was a thick and in places almost impenetrable tangle of undergrowth, briar, bramble and saplings. The bombardment which had destroyed many of the trees, uprooting them or slashing them to pieces, had made the wood still more impassable. Except for a few machine guns in shelter pits here and there along the ridges and in small clearings, the Germans had, therefore, left the wood itself alone, confining their attention to a line of trench along the southern edge, with support lines in the open ground on both sides half-way up it, Wood Trench (Tote Stellung) and Wood Support (Weissgraben) on the west and a line of trench about Flat Iron Copse on the east.

The operation by the 38th Division on the morning of the 10th took the form of a direct assault against the southern edge of the wood, held by the 2nd Battalion Lehr Infantry Regiment. At both corners of the southern end a narrow strip of wood reaches out some 200 yards towards the bed of the Mametz valley in which the Welsh infantry had assembled overnight for the assault. The final bombardment was very heavy and accurate, and the right and left of the assaulting brigades, 114th and 113th respectively, advancing behind a smoke screen, were able to secure the trenches at the end of the two strips of wood on the flanks before the Germans could get out of their dug-outs. The centre of the attack, the inner flanks of the two brigades, was held up, as the companies had a great distance of open ground to cover, giving the Germans time to get into a firing position to meet them. The assault here lost heavily and wavered, the lines lying out in the open for about an hour, taking cover in folds of the ground as best they could. Gradually,

however, the troops worked along the strips of wood on both flanks into the wood itself, and the remnants of the 2nd Battalion Lehr Regiment either retired or were surrounded. By 6 a.m. the whole of the southern edge of the wood was occupied and the advance continued northwards through it, units moving generally by companies in single file with patrols in front. Here and there machine-gun posts were encountered, but their field of fire in the dense undergrowth was very limited and they were soon put out of action with bombs. Beyond that no serious opposition was met in the wood itself. Nevertheless, progress was slow, and it was late in the morning before the ride across the centre of the wood was reached. The fifty yards of Wood Trench still held by the 5th and 9th Companies (122nd Reserve Infantry Regiment) was outflanked from the wood and evacuated, the Germans running back under a heavy fire to Wood Support, where they held on obstinately. On the eastern side of the wood the 3rd Lehr Battalion about Flat Iron Copse gave incessant trouble. As soon as the Welshmen had advanced up the wood beyond the level of their trench a number of men would run into the wood and fire into them from behind, causing a temporary panic and loss, and then would withdraw to their trench again. With both flanks held the advance through the wood now lost its drive. Units were considerably intermingled and the line was reorganized along the line of the central ride, where it remained till about 4.30 p.m.

5

It is clear that had the night attack of the 50th Brigade (17th Division) succeeded in capturing Quadrangle Support, the position of the two German companies (5th and 9th) holding out in Wood Support would have been untenable, and the 38th and 17th Divisions could now have swept on without opposition to the Contalmaison—Bazentin road. Already at 8.30 a.m., with a view to cooperation in this manner between the two divisions, the 50th Brigade had been ordered to take every step to secure Quadrangle Support and to be prepared to advance northward as soon as the 38th Division came up on its right. Since the Brigade had failed to cross the 200 yards of open ground between the opposing trenches under cover of darkness, it was not, however, considered practicable in daylight, and instead, an attempt was made to take it by bombing. A communication trench, Quadrangle Alley, led up from Quadrangle Trench to the eastern end of Quadrangle Support, and it was hoped that a detachment of bombers would be able to get along

the Alley into Quadrangle Support trench and bomb their way up it, thereby preparing the way for an infantry assault. To this end the battalion bombers of the 7th East Yorks moved along Quadrangle Alley. Within 20 yards of the German trench, however, the Alley had been blocked and filled in by the Germans, and, according to the battalion (7th East Yorks) diarist, the first three men who attempted to rush across were immediately shot down. Although a great effort was made, the bombers found it impossible to get across to Quadrangle Support.

The report of Lieutenant Köstlin gives the German version of this effort, and explains how Quadrangle Support held out. His trench lay aslant the slope of Shrapnel Valley, and was sheltered from artillery observation by a shoulder of the Contalmaison spur along which lay Quadrangle Trench and the British line.

“During the morning,” writes Lieutenant Köstlin, “the British made further efforts to reach our trench by the sap (Quadrangle Alley) that came within 20 yards of our own left. My sentries, however, noticed steel helmets moving about above ground-level at the sap-head and kept it under careful watch. Each time the men began to climb up out of the sap-head and run forward at us with bombs, the sentries gave the alarm, and we were able to greet them with a heavy fire at point-blank range. Then others crowded at the sap-head and repeated the effort, but with equal failure, and by midday a heap of British dead and wounded lay about the sap-head. Each time they had been checked one of my men in particular ran forward across the open and threw bombs into the sap-head and returned unhurt. The last time, however, about midday, he was shot before he could get back.”

From Lieutenant Köstlin's position in Quadrangle Support he was also able to watch the progress of the fighting in Mametz Wood on the opposite slope of Shrapnel Valley. He saw to his astonishment the sudden retirement of the remnants of the 5th and 9th Companies from Wood Trench to Wood Support for no apparent reason, the actual advance of the 38th (Welsh) Division through the wood itself not being visible to him. An hour later, about midday, a sentry drew his attention to the edge of Mametz Wood, about 400 yards to his left rear, where he thought he saw a man in khaki.

“I looked through my glasses. I looked again, it was incredible. But there he was, an Englishman in khaki and steel helmet, standing bolt upright, regardless of cover as usual, near a long, bare tree trunk. Looking more carefully, I saw others among the trees near by. They must have broken through and come past our left flank under cover of the trees in the bed of the valley, and that explained the sudden withdrawal of the 5th and 9th Companies. I ordered fire to be opened on the patrol

at the wood edge, and the men moved away into the cover.* It did not alter the fact, however, that Mametz Wood was now probably in British possession, threatening our line of retreat to Bazentin."

"But the surprises of the day," the report goes on, "were not at an end. Whilst still searching with my glasses, there suddenly appeared in the big open clearing in Mametz Wood, across which was Wood Support Trench (Weissgraben), lines of skirmishers who advanced across the open directly against Wood Support. From that trench came no sound, it seemed that both the 5th and 9th Companies had vanished into space. Nevertheless, from our trench the advancing lines offered an excellent target, as we were in a position to enfilade them at a range of 600 yards. I scarcely needed to give the order. My men had already seen the target, and a rapid fire opened almost at once. Every rifle was at work, the officers picking up rifles and joining in, until soon all the rifle barrels were red hot. Not a single Englishman seemed to reach Wood Support trench, and a large number lay dead and wounded about the open clearing.† From the firing in the wood it was evident that we had only held up the left flank guard of the main force advancing through the wood itself.

"Our ammunition was getting short, and we scraped together all we could find in the trench and the dug-outs and from the dead and wounded. Shortly afterwards a line of skirmishers suddenly appeared from a fold in the ground near the line of tall trees in the valley and advanced against the left of our trench. We were only just in time to stop them, the first extended line being shot down within a few yards of us. Already the second line was moving forward, and this was dealt with in the same way.‡ Fortunately, our old enemy in the sap-head had remained quiet after the lesson we had given him in the morning. An attack from there at this moment might well have been fatal for us."

* This was probably a patrol of the 6th Dorsets. The battalion diary states: "2nd Lieut. C—— led a patrol up the belt of trees running from the west end of Wood Trench to Wood Support. The patrol was fired on, 2nd Lieut. C—— and one man were wounded."

† At 10 a.m. the 6th Dorsets were ordered to "push two or three platoons from Wood Trench to Wood Support and occupy it if possible, if not already occupied by the Welsh Division." The 50th Infantry Brigade diary states that "the attack on Wood Support came under a heavy machine-gun fire in the open and failed because the troops of the 38th Division had moved away into the Wood and failed to cooperate."

‡ This probably refers to an attack by the 7th E. Yorks. The battalion diary states: "At midday orders were received from the brigade to do all that was possible to cooperate with the advance in Mametz Wood. I, therefore, reorganized companies in Quadrangle Alley, preparing 'C' and 'D' Companies to attack across the open up the valley. I waited until I considered conditions favourable, and this moment arrived when I saw British troops on the right and in the Wood, and some actually on the fringe of the Wood in rear of Wood Support. . . . Lieut. C—— and his men were almost immediately subjected to machine-gun fire, and this officer was killed in the attempt. 'D' Company, under Capt. H——, advancing across the open in extended order in two lines also came under heavy fire, Capt. H—— being killed. Upon launching this attack I sent down orderlies to bring up the other two companies, 'A' and 'B', in support, but did not consider myself justified in committing them to the same attempt. The attack was attempted with great determination, and if it could have been accomplished at that time I am confident we should have done it."

In the meantime the Welsh Division had continued its advance from the central ride northward through Mametz Wood to within 50 yards or so of the northern edge, where they established themselves for the night, having lost 2,390 all ranks during the fighting. The remnants of the 5th and 9th Companies in Wood Support trench had been either killed or taken prisoner. The battalion (3rd) commander, Major von Zeppelin, whose headquarters had been in the wood, was mortally wounded by shrapnel on leaving it.

6

Since the 17th Division had failed to take Contalmaison from the south on the night of the 9th/10th, the 23rd Division was now ordered to take it from the west, from the direction of La Boisselle. For this purpose the 69th Brigade, on the morning of the 10th, was ordered to pass through the front brigades of the division and attack Contalmaison village at 4.20 p.m., keeping south of the La Boisselle—Contalmaison road. The assaulting battalions of the brigade, the 8th Yorks on the right and the 9th Yorks on the left, had 1,500 yards, nearly a mile, of open rolling down to cross in daylight before reaching their objective.

The Germans were still holding the village with the 1st Battalion (Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4 Companies) of the 122nd Reserve Infantry Regiment, with battalion headquarters at the château, but the losses had already reduced the battalion strength to less than 600 all ranks. Odd detachments had been sent forward to reinforce the garrison, but were far from adequate to fill the gaps. Moreover, the casualties were ever increasing for the British III Corps artillery was doing its work well, and Contalmaison, shelled for two days and nights, was now a heap of rubble. The beginning of the renewed bombardment at 3.20 p.m. seems to have been the final factor that broke the staying power of the defenders. A number, estimated by British observers at 200, ran back towards Bazentin and Pozières, anywhere out of the village, the others taking refuge in any of the deep dug-outs still open either in the Kaisergraben (that part of Quadrangle Trench west of Contalmaison village) or in the village itself. Two restless days and sleepless nights, constant alarms, constant shelling and fighting and repairing trenches and dug-outs, had completely exhausted them, so that when the alarm was given at 4.50 p.m., at the conclusion of the bombardment, it had little effect. According to the regimental diary only 1 officer and 15 men of the two right companies (Nos. 3 and 4) appeared above ground, and these occupied some ruins at the western end of the village,

but the air was so full of smoke and the dust of crumbling ruins that the advance of the British could scarcely be seen.

At first the 8th and 9th Yorks were consequently able to carry out their long advance with little loss, the right, the inner flank, of the 9th Yorks directing and marching on the church, almost unrecognizable and invisible in the centre of the village. Crossing a depression within 500 yards of the village, the extended lines came under an accurate fire from the German batteries and suffered considerably, nevertheless, by 5.20 p.m., they were approaching the Kaisergraben. Masses of wire entanglement and wreckage that formed an obstacle in front of it was soon crossed and the trench entered without opposition. The 9th Yorks went straight ahead into the village, odd Germans here and there among the ruins being killed or taken prisoner. On reaching the main street the 9th Yorks wheeled left handed, northward, and halted along the northern end of the village, their objective.

The 8th Yorks had to pay more dearly in the last part of their advance, as they crossed the 50 yards between the Kaisergraben and a garden hedge bordering the houses of the village. This was probably due to the action of the 1 officer and 15 men mentioned above who had taken up a position among the ruins at the western edge of the village and now opened a sudden burst of fire that swept the lines of the 8th Yorks, just when victory seemed in their grasp. The 8th Yorks lost 4 officers and over 100 other ranks in a few moments, but this did not suffice to check the assault and, pressing on without delay, the village was entered. They now joined hands with the 9th Yorks and a general line was taken up round the northern and eastern edges of the village, including the château at the north-eastern corner. At this latter place the battalion commander (1st Battalion 122nd Reserve Infantry Regiment) in charge of the Contalmaison garrison was taken prisoner. In all, the 69th Brigade claims to have captured 8 German officers and 160 unwounded men, in addition to some 100 wounded lying in the dug-outs, also 6 machine guns and a quantity of ammunition. The total casualties of the 69th Brigade itself during the day and the following night were 39 officers and 816 other ranks.

No. 2 Company holding the south-eastern edge of the village was now taken in rear, and a counter-attack made by it against the road-junction, south of the church, was driven off by the 8th Yorks. The company fell back by Pearl Alley, a small party holding on to the Cutting until nightfall.

The situation of the remnants of Nos. 6, 10, 11 and 12 Companies still holding out in Quadrangle Support soon became very precarious, and their commander, Lieutenant Köstlin, seems to have been well aware of the fact. “His men,” he writes, “were quite exhausted and so thirsty that they drank the yellow muddy water out of the trench for want of better.” He saw that his only chance of escape was to hold on till dark, although, surrounded on three sides, he thought they would all inevitably be taken prisoners. The evening hours dragged on interminably and still no attack was made :

“It seemed, indeed,” he writes, “that the enemy did not consider an attack worth while, as finally we should have to fall like ripe fruit into his hands. At one moment there was a ray of hope, when we heard a heavy machine-gun and rifle fire open from our second line position on the northern edge of Mametz Wood. It might, we thought, be a counter-attack which would drive the British back through the wood. Immediately afterwards, however, a heavy bombardment by the British artillery opened on the second line position and the ground between it and the wood, great black and green clouds rising up from the northern side of Mametz Wood amid tremendous explosions. The infantry fire from our supposed counter-attack suddenly died away and with it our last hope of escape. At dusk, however, the British still made no attack on us from the front nor, as far as we could see, made any attempt to move behind us, either from Contalmaison or from Mametz Wood. In consultation with the other officers we decided to make a dash for safety as soon as it was dark. To do this, a number of selected men were told off to run forward to the enemy’s trench, throw hand-grenades into it as if an attack was about to take place, and under cover of this feint withdraw the whole of our force to the second line position, making our way the best we could, keeping Mametz Wood well on our right. After dark the ground behind our trench was being continually shelled, but about midnight this fire ceased and we decided to rush for it. The plan worked successfully, and although a number of men were wounded by shells and stray bullets we succeeded, a total of 5 officers and 120 men, in reaching the barbed wire entanglement in front of the second line position at 1.30 a.m. Here we were greeted by a machine gun which suddenly opened from the trench, but throwing ourselves on the ground and shouting we soon convinced the gunner of his error, and luckily with no cost to ourselves.”

7

The 183rd Regiment, in the Roedergraben, north of Contalmaison, had made two attempts to get forward to Fourth Street (Quergraben III). The first was made the night after its arrival, the 8th–9th, and timed for midnight,* but owing to the heavy rain of the previous days the communication trenches were so filled with mud and water that there were great delays in forming up in the

* All times given are Greenwich times.

assaulting position, so that it was 3 a.m., and daylight, before units were in their places. The deployment was seen by the British observers (34th Division) south of Owillers, and the development of the attack was prevented by artillery and machine-gun fire. The second attempt was made on the 9th, when, at 11.45 a.m., Divisional (183rd) Headquarters again ordered Quergraben III to be captured, the attack to begin at 1.30 p.m. after half an hour's artillery preparation. Before the orders could be written out the regimental commander, Colonel Schultze, was severely wounded, and it was some time before the next senior officer to take his place could be found. As a result the infantry attack was not delivered until 3.30 p.m., long after the conclusion of the bombardment, and it only succeeded in reaching some scraps of trenches half-way between the Roedergraben and Fourth Street. On the afternoon of the 10th, the regiment was ordered to make a renewed attack on Fourth Street, beginning at 5 p.m. This met a simultaneous attack of the British 111th and 112th Brigades (34th Division) which had been ordered to cooperate with the attack of the 69th Brigade on their right against Contalmaison. The 34th Divisional diary states that :

"the 111th Brigade was driven back to Fourth Street after an encounter with the enemy in which the brigade had heavy casualties, estimated at 8 officers and 350 other ranks, but took 100 prisoners. The 112th Brigade was also forced to retire, the enemy following up to within 50 yards of our trench. The 11th Royal Warwicks then advanced upon them and got in with the bayonet. It appears that these forward movements of our brigades forestalled the enemy, and that he was himself contemplating an attack."


The diary of the 183rd Regiment attributes the failure of its attack to the situation on its left in Contalmaison village, which had been entered by the British at 6 p.m., and who thereupon began to open fire against the left flank and rear of the regiment about the Roedergraben. At 8 p.m. an order arrived : "Contalmaison is still held by us with a weak force, but may have to be abandoned at any moment. This will expose the left flank of the 183rd Infantry Regiment." The regiment, therefore, was ordered to withdraw to the Kabel and Latorff trenches and hold Pozières at all costs.

8

By dawn, on the 11th, the Germans had taken up their fresh positions.

On the right the 183rd Regiment had withdrawn to the line of the Kabel and Latorff trenches around Pozières. The losses of the regiment had been heavy, nearly 1,000 all ranks.

TALMAISON JULY 1916



[To face page 258.

In the centre the remnants of the 122nd Reserve Infantry Regiment had withdrawn into and behind the German second line between Pozières and Bazentin-le-Petit, leaving machine-gun posts in front, along the northern edge of Mametz Wood and towards Contalmaison. On the 9th its three battalions had lost 13 officers and 217 other ranks, and, on the 10th, 17 officers and 964 other ranks.

On the left the Lehr Regiment continued to hold the line about Flat Iron Copse and eastward.

9

Summing up the battle the German historians praise the defence of Contalmaison as a very creditable performance by the German units concerned. The historian of the 183rd Infantry Regiment writes that the regiment was at that time at the zenith of its efficiency, having many of its pre-war regular officers and non-commissioned officers and a majority of young, able-bodied men who had undergone a whole winter of strenuous training. But the odds, he says, were too heavy against them—three British divisions (roughly thirty-six battalions) attacking concentrically against nine German battalions (183rd, 122nd Reserve and Lehr Infantry Regiments). The same writer describes the British infantry as determined and full of go, but as lacking in intelligent tactical work and showing no skill in making use of the successes they gained. Still more, however, he attributes the German difficulties to the great preponderance of strength of the British artillery, even greater than that of the infantry. The comparatively few German batteries available were quite incapable of dealing with the mass of British guns and howitzers arrayed against them and were consequently unable to give much assistance to their infantry in the defence. Further, he adds, the British artillery shot very accurately and picked up their targets quickly and well, their observation being undoubtedly much assisted by having command of the air, the loss of which, after the 1st of July, being a great disadvantage to the German batteries. The historian of the 122nd Reserve Infantry Regiment sums up the battle from a similar point of view. He maintains that his regiment had done all that could be expected of it, and that it was owing to the stubbornness with which it had held its ground that the British had had to deploy such a mass of infantry, expend such a great number of lives, and waste such a vast quantity of ammunition and so much valuable time in order to capture an intermediary position held by a comparatively small force.

THE COMMAND AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE MILITARY FORCES OF THE EMPIRE IN WAR

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The political organization of the Empire.—The efficient conduct by a nation of the operations of war depends ultimately upon the authority and stability of its national Government. Theoretically, the best results are likely to be achieved by the nation whose Government has complete authority over the whole of the national domain and is thereby able to utilize, at will, the whole resources of the nation and direct them towards the attainment of the object in view.

The salient factor affecting the conduct of a war by the British Empire arises from the nature of its political organization or constitution and consists in the fact that it has no central Government possessing complete authority over the whole of the national domain. It is composed of a number of States or Dominions each of which is said to be equal in status and to be free politically from the compulsion of any authority but its own free will.

At the same time these States or Dominions form what is called an Empire, owe allegiance to the same King and are associated together by bonds which, however indefinite or intangible in nature, have been proved to be of real strength. Their strength may indeed be due, for psychological reasons, to the very indefiniteness of their nature.

If, however, the truth of the opening postulate be accepted, the absence of a central governmental authority, in theory at any rate, must be admitted to be a great hindrance to the attainment of a common Imperial object so far as our defence preparations, organization of effort and direction in war are concerned.

The methods adopted to overcome this real (or perhaps only apparent) hindrance to our military efficiency may be said broadly to consist of voluntary cooperation on lines decided upon at conferences by statesmen from each of the States which together form

the Empire. But these Imperial Conferences cannot be regarded as forming a real central executive authority. The representatives of the various States cannot bind definitely their own countries to any particular line of action because the agreements made by them are subject to variation or repudiation by the Parliaments concerned.

There does not appear to be a possibility of any alteration in this state of things. The idea of some limited form of Imperial Federation for the defence of the Empire has been rejected by the Empire's statesmen for reasons which, it must be assumed, are good and sound. It is important to realize this when considering the ways and means whereby the best results may be obtained in the cooperation of the Empire in war. A clear understanding of the nature of the Imperial political organization is a condition precedent to a sound solution of the problem of the command and administration of the military forces of the Empire in war.

The soldier must realize that the political organization of the Empire does not exist, in the sense that he understands the word ; that its component States are tending to become more and more in the nature of allies ; that unity of action has to be achieved by means other than complete central control ; and that to ensure such unity of action methods of procedure affecting the relationships, between one another, of the forces of the various States of the Empire must be thought out on lines which are consonant with the independent character of each component State.

Strategical Direction.—In the past the first stage towards the cooperation of the military forces of the Empire has consisted in the placing by the Dominion Governments of their respective contributions of troops at the disposal of the Government of the United Kingdom.

The responsibility for the strategical direction of operations has consequently devolved upon the British Government.

Since there is no central Imperial authority to undertake this responsibility, it appears reasonable to suppose that, normally, the methods of the past will prevail in the future at all events for so long as the mother country remains the strongest and most populous partner, and the one, by reason of her internal and external organization, best fitted to exercise the strategical control of an Empire war.

This act of strategical subordination by the outer Dominions, being voluntary, should not presumably be regarded as derogatory to their status as quasi-allies.

It may happen, however, that the territory of one of the outer

Dominions is threatened and that Imperial cooperation will take the form of the provision of military assistance to that Dominion by the sister States. In such circumstances the responsibility for the strategical direction of military operations within, or in the vicinity of, that Dominion would, conceivably, rest with the Dominion concerned. This involves the commitment by the mother country and the other Dominions of the destinies of their forces into the hands of the threatened Dominion.

It also may be convenient that an operation, carried out by forces from the various parts of the Empire, should be based upon and maintained in material resources by a Dominion adjacent to the theatre of operations. In this case, as well as in the contingency that in a particular theatre of war the number of troops provided by a Dominion may exceed those of the mother country, the question arises whether the Dominion which is the predominant partner will or will not assume control of the direction of operations. There is little to be gained in speculating whether, in those circumstances, the Dominion which is the predominant partner will insist upon assuming control or, on the other hand, whether it may be disinclined to accept the responsibility. The answer can be determined only by the event.

It is apparent, however, that unified strategical control of the forces of the various States can be ensured only by a system of delegation of authority to one of the States. The delegate State may, normally, be the mother country, but this may not be the case invariably.

Command.—The exercise by the delegate State of the functions of strategical direction connotes the assumption by that State of the functions of executive command.

The State concerned will naturally wish to employ in chief command an officer who is responsible to it alone. Anything in the nature of divided allegiance would at once weaken its authority and consequently its power effectively to exercise its delegation.

This circumstance appears to exclude the possibility of the original appointment or succession to the office of commander-in-chief being open to any one who is not an officer of the forces of the delegate State. This is a disability, imposed by the nature of our political organization, which it does not seem practicable to overcome.

This disability does not apply with equal force to appointments to subordinate commands, since the political factors which affect command do not extend downward beyond the commander-in-chief.

As a general rule, purely military authority affects the appointment of subordinate commanders, but, nevertheless, certain factors which may involve exceptions to this general rule require to be examined.

It has been proved in practice that subordinate commands of formations composed of elements from the various component States can be exercised satisfactorily by generals who are not officers of the forces of the delegate State.

The authority of an officer to exercise command over subordinate formations composed of elements from the various States must be derived, however, from an appointment conferred either immediately or mediately by the delegate State.

In the case of the appointment of an officer who does not belong to the forces of the delegate State, this may involve a technical condition of divided allegiance which becomes, however, less pronounced if the appointment be conferred by the commander-in-chief and not directly by the Government of the delegate State.

In this way the subordinate commander would become responsible primarily to the military authority, and there would be no visible responsibility to the political authority of the delegate State.

It seems desirable, therefore, in view of the political factors involved, that in every case where the various States of the Empire are cooperating in war, the right to confer appointments to subordinate mixed commands should be vested in the commander-in-chief and should not be exercised directly by the Government of the delegate State.

This question of command is affected very closely by the existence (or non-existence) of rules defining the seniority of the officers commanding the forces of the component States. During the late war instructions on this point were issued by the Army Council and were published with each issue of the monthly Army List. In addition, this question of seniority was more or less regularized by the issue of temporary Commissions in the British Army to officers of the Dominion forces. Under the present condition of equality of political status, it seems to be open to question whether any one of the component States of the Empire is entitled, on its own authority, to issue rules on a subject of this kind which could be made applicable to the forces of the other States. It appears desirable that an agreement should be arrived at on this point and that identical regulations on the subject should be issued by each of the various States.

The exercise by the commander-in-chief of the functions of

supreme command under the authority derived from the delegate State, and the exercise of similar functions, within their own sphere, by subordinate commanders under authority conferred by the commander-in-chief or by virtue of seniority determined by regulations previously agreed upon by the various States, appear on the surface to extend to and to embrace all the accepted privileges of command. It is desirable to examine whether in practice this ideal is attainable and, if so, whether it is expedient.

The right of reference by a Commander to his own Government.—

The question arises whether the commander of the troops of any one State should, in any conceivable circumstances, be entitled to refer to his own Government and take its specific directions upon any orders issued by the commander-in-chief. The orders in question may relate to operations or to major and minor matters of administration.

This question must first be dealt with in relation to orders for operations. The ultimate responsibility of the Government of any one State to its own people and Parliament for the safety of its own troops cannot be removed from the shoulders of that Government. This fact appears to involve an inherent right of reference. On the other hand, it must be assumed that, when a State places its forces at the disposal of one of the other States, it does so unreservedly as regards their employment in operations: it has taken the plunge by its initial act of delegation. Any doctrine, however strongly based on theoretical grounds, which admitted this right of reference in regard to operations, would destroy the system of delegation upon which the efficient cooperation of the forces of the Empire depends. Any act of reference taken during operations would amount to a denunciation of the delegation. So long, therefore, as the cooperation of the forces of the Empire continues, as in the past, to be founded on the system of delegation, that delegation must be regarded as conferring upon the delegate State and through it upon the commander-in-chief the absolute right to employ at will all the forces at his disposal.

Only by this means is it possible to achieve in its main essential the ideal of a unified command and to overcome the inherent difficulties which, in regard to this problem, are imposed by the nature of our political organization.

This vital matter is dependent upon the strict adherence, by all States, to the logical consequences of the system of delegation. It is likely also to be affected by the personal characteristics of commanders.

It is essential, therefore, that the soldiers of all parts of the Empire should realize the full significance of these factors.

The maintenance of the system of delegation, with the advantages which it offers in regard to unified command, appears to be the only alternative to a state of affairs containing all the disadvantages of the relationship which exists between the several partners of an association of allies.

Administration.—The exercise of a unified command in a fully effective manner depends to a large extent upon administrative factors which must now be examined.

Unless it be possible to adopt the essentials of a common system of general administration applicable to all the Empire forces, it will not be practicable to achieve that flexibility upon which mobility and unfettered tactical control depend.

It has been mutually agreed that the forces of the various States of the Empire shall be organized, armed and equipped upon identical lines, and, so long as this policy is adhered to, it will be possible to maintain the forces of the Empire by the utilization of common stocks of supplies and material moved by a common line of communication and distributed by a common system. By this means only will it be possible with a minimum of friction to transfer at will subordinate formations from one of the higher formations to any other in accordance with the requirements of the strategical or tactical situation.

This wise agreement with regard to organization and armament will enable the functions of command exercisable by the delegate State to include the control of the essentials of a common system of general administration.

There are, however, certain matters, not coming within the scope of "general administration" properly so called, which are not so easily amenable to regulation by a common system.

Personnel Maintenance.—Though the forces of the various States when mobilized will, no doubt, be organized on identical lines they will inevitably be raised by varying methods which must be suited to local conditions in the States concerned. This will involve different methods in the detail, though not necessarily in the principle, of *personnel* maintenance.

For example, a State which raises and desires to maintain its units on a strictly territorial basis will require to apply the details of reinforcement administration in its own particular way. To do this properly, a knowledge of the home conditions and home organization of the State concerned will be necessary.

This factor indicates that to ensure the proper coordination of the home organization and special methods of *personnel* maintenance adopted by any State with the system to be put into effect in the field, a considerable discretion must be given to representatives of the various States in the field and a measure of overhead control must be allowed to the home authorities of those States, amounting to a virtual independence in this matter.

Maintenance by each State of the identity of its own forces.—In the past, when the need arose, certain formations and units have been disbanded and their *personnel* utilized as reinforcements for other formations. In a homogeneous army the right to take action of this nature would be inherent in the controlling authority. It is not expedient, however, that the authority of the delegate State should be exercised in such a way as to presume a right to disrupt the forces provided by any one of the other States and to utilize them, for example, to build up the units of another State. Such a contingency would not be likely to arise, but, nevertheless, it appears to be necessary that the maintenance of the identity of the forces of each of the States must be insisted upon as one of the conditions of the delegation system.

It follows that the right to control the transfer of any individual from its own forces must be retained by each State and be exercisable only by its own authorized officers.

Administration of Law.—The forces of each State, except when serving with the British Army in the United Kingdom, will be subject to their own military law. Each State has, up to the present, applied the provisions of the Army Act to its forces, but in one case, at least, with very important modifications. It is quite possible in the future that other States may cease to apply the provisions of the Army Act to their forces and this will involve the adoption by the States concerned of their own military codes.

Should the military forces of any one of the States cease, at any time, to be subject to the Army Act, but be governed solely by their own military code, it is probable that the functions of command exercised by the delegate State could not properly include the administration of a domestic law of another State. There is room for argument whether, in such an event, the divorcement of discipline from command would be a vital disability. It is certainly desirable in principle that the functions of command should include automatically the administration of discipline, but, nevertheless, the cold facts of the case may preclude the attainment of this ideal in regard

to the command of the Empire's forces and may demand the retention by each State of its independence in this matter.

Appointments and Promotions.—Each State will inevitably have its own system expressing its own policy as to appointments and promotion.

The States concerned must retain final control not only to ensure that their policy is carried out, but also because, for reasons of audit, the issue of pay to the appointees must be covered by the formal approval of the State which is responsible for payment.

Each State could, if it so desired, delegate to the commander-in-chief the power, subject to confirmation, to make appointments and promotions, but it is questionable whether it would be feasible to centralize in one authority the work of administering on behalf of the different States their several varying policies and methods. In such circumstances the responsibility of the commander-in-chief and his military secretary would be an unenviable one. Errors and differences of opinion concerning these matters are inevitable even under the simplest conditions. The resultant complaints and possible refusals of confirmation by the several States would be likely more than anything else, to disturb the confidence and amicable relations which should exist between the various States and the High Command.

Pay and Finance.—Each State, being responsible for the nature and the extent of its own financial commitments, will fix its own rates of pay and prescribe its own financial system and methods. The financial adjustments between the delegate State and the other States for the cost of the maintenance of the troops in supplies and material provided from common stocks in the theatre of war and other charges incurred in connection with a common system of general administration will no doubt be capable of settlement, as in the late war, by a charge *per capita* fixed according to the average cost of maintenance over a period, or by some other method mutually agreed upon. But each State must, for obvious reasons, retain direct control over its own pay administration and the direct expenditure of money on matters of domestic concern which are not covered by the general financial agreement.

The citation of the above factors is sufficient, without discussing the whole range of the internal administration of the various forces, to show that the several States must inevitably retain control over some matters of administration. Such matters, in their application to each State, are principally questions of domestic concern. The exclusion from the privileges of the commander-in-chief of the

authority to control them would not detract materially from his power to exercise the essentials of a unified command.

In fact the abstention of the delegate State and its commander-in-chief from interference in the comparatively minor matters of domestic concern is likely to assist, rather than to hinder, the exercise of a unified command in its main essentials, because, in view of the independent character of the various States, it is upon these minor domestic questions that friction and misunderstanding are most likely to arise unless they are left in the control of the various States.

The considerations discussed above lead to the conclusion that the full cooperation of the military forces of the various States of the Empire, when acting together in a theatre of war, can best be secured if the command and administration of those forces are governed by the following main principles : (a) the continuance of the system of delegation whereby the functions of strategical direction and tactical control are vested in one of the States to be exercised on behalf of all ; (b) under the delegation, the commander-in-chief to have absolute discretion as to the disposal of all his forces for operations ; the clear recognition by each State that the theoretical right of reference to its own Government can only be exercised, in regard to operations, at the peril of undermining the whole structure on which is built the power of the Empire to act efficiently as a unified whole ; (c) the maintenance throughout the Empire of uniformity in organization, armament and equipment ; adherence in a theatre of war to a common system of general administration under unified control ; and (d) the recognition of the right of each of the States to control the administration of its forces in matters of purely domestic concern.

There is ample evidence that at the beginning of the late war no very clear ideas existed, either amongst officers of the British Army or those of the Dominions, on the question of the precise relationship with one another of the forces of the various States of the Empire. The experience of the war gradually brought about a procedure conforming more or less, in its essentials, to the principles outlined above. After the war ended there arose a more or less definite conception of the political status, within the Empire, of the self-governing Dominions.

As a result of this more definite conception concerning status it becomes possible to arrive at a fairly clear idea of the relationship existing between the forces of the various States when acting together in a theatre of war. It appears to be desirable that a doctrine should

be formulated which should guide, if not the political attitude, then, at all events, the military attitude towards this subject. Such a doctrine should, when formulated, be well known by all officers.

This article has been written with the object of directing military thought to this important question.

THE GERMAN STRATEGIC RESERVE IN 1917*

BY BRIGADIER-GENERAL J. E. EDMONDS, C.B., C.M.G. (R.E.;
retired)

THE German Supreme Command achieved several of its successes by the use of a quite small strategic reserve. A few divisions, suddenly sent up to reinforce a selected part of the front, brought about important results, temporary perhaps, but out of all proportion to the numbers employed. Nothing of the kind seems to have been attempted by the Allies—except at Gallipoli—and there unfortunately surprise was totally lacking. The difference of language, tactics and munitions of the various nations of the Entente rendered the application of force in this way far more difficult than in the case of Austro-Germany. Command of the seas failed to give the advantages that interior lines, with highly organized railways, conferred on our enemies.

The information now available with regard to 1917 shows that the Germans had only a margin of six divisions free for employment anywhere, and that with this equivalent of the original British Expeditionary Force, they obtained three very considerable victories.

In June, 1917, the imminence of the so-called “Kerenski” offensive was evident to the German Supreme Command, and as soon as it began on 1st July they were free to act.

Ludendorff at once telephoned to General Hoffmann to ask whether he considered it practicable to make a break-through, which had been previously discussed, in the direction of Tarnopol, and in this way counter the Russian offensive. The Chief of the Staff, Eastern Front, replied “cheerfully” in the affirmative :

“for a German offensive along the Lemberg—Tarnopol railway must very soon stop the Russian attack just beginning [to the south of the proposed counter-stroke] in Galicia. The more troops the Russians put in against the front of the Austrians and German South Army, the greater must be the German success.”

* Authorities : Ludendorff's *Meine Kriegserinnerungen*. Hoffmann's *Der Krieg der versäumten Gelegenheiten* (General Max Hoffmann in September, 1916, succeeded Ludendorff as Chief of the General Staff, Eastern Front). Arz's *Zur geschichte des grossen Krieges* (General-colonel Arz was, from the 27th of February, 1917, to the close of the war, Chief of the General Staff of the Austro-Hungarian Armies).

Ludendorff provided six divisions, and the results foreseen were obtained. On the very first day of attack, the 19th of July, a break twelve miles wide and nine deep was made in the Russian front. By the 25th, Tarnopol was captured, and by early August Galicia and Bukovina were practically cleared. Lack of railways then made farther progress slow and difficult.

It became a question of what further use could be made of the six divisions in order to accelerate the break-up of the Russian Armies. Ludendorff now asked Hoffmann whether they would be sufficient to carry out Hindenburg's old pet scheme (*Lieblingsidee*) of the forcing of the Dwina and the capture of Riga. The First Quartermaster-General added that, in view of the development of the situation in the West, he would probably not be able to spare the divisions for very long. It was the end of August before they arrived in the neighbourhood of Riga, and at the very time that the third battle of Ypres, begun on the 31st of July, had brought about a crisis, or rather a series of crises—

“Twice General Ludendorff telephoned that he wanted the troops; twice that he could manage without them.”

Finally, it became certain that the six divisions could be employed at Riga. The success achieved at that place by the throwing in of the strategic reserve under General von Hutier is well known and has been described in detail in these pages.*

We now turn to the Italian theatre: On the 25th of August, 1917, the Austrian Chief of the General Staff requested the approval of the Kaiser Karl for an offensive against Italy from the upper Isonzo, as a counter to the attack (the eleventh battle of the Isonzo) then in progress. He required fifteen divisions for the purpose, but could only put his hand on nine. He “knew that the German Supreme Command had about eight divisions available.” He therefore begged Karl to induce the Kaiser to lend six of them for the offensive in the common interest of the Central Powers. Letters were immediately exchanged between the two sovereigns—Arz gives them in full—Wilhelm replying on the 1st of September that the six divisions that had taken part in the Galicia offensive and were now at Riga were his sole strategic reserve (*meine operative Reserve*). After discussing whether after the Riga attack they had better be employed on the Moldau between the Pruth and Sereth, to complete the overthrow of the Russians, or on the Isonzo to settle with the

* See *Army Quarterly*, January, 1924, “Hutier's Rehearsal.”

Italians, Wilhelm agreed that if and when Riga fell, should the season still be favourable, his reserve should be lent and sent to Italy for a joint attack.*

On the 4th of September the Germans entered Riga, and, on the 24th, the first of their troop trains began to arrive on the Austro-Italian frontier. On the 23rd of October all was ready. The six divisions were put in together, and the result was Caporetto.

The six divisions remained in Italy until the beginning of December, 1917, and were not therefore available as a reserve at the time of the battle of Cambrai. That the German strategic reserve was so small is a revelation.

* Actually six divisions different to those employed in Galicia and at Riga were despatched—3 of them having special training in mountain warfare—the Alpine Corps (really only a division) and the 117th and 200th, which had been in the Carpathians.

FREDERICK, THE SOLDIERS' FRIEND

BY F. J. HUDLESTON, C.B.E., Librarian, War Office

WITH the exception of that engaging child, poor little Octavius, who died aged four in 1783, Frederick Augustus Duke of York and Albany was George III.'s favourite son. He was born on the 16th of August, 1763, at the "Queen's House" * in St. James's Park, somewhat publicly in the presence of the Princess Dowager of Wales, several Lords of the Privy Council and Ladies of the Bedchamber. This little boy, quite apart from the occasion of his christening, soon made a noise in the world. A few months after his birth his father, in his capacity of Elector of Hanover, caused his son to be declared Bishop of Osnaburg which led to an acrimonious discussion between the Chapter, the Elector of Cologne and the Regency of Hanover as to the management of the bishopric during the little prince's minority. Four thousand medals, the work of "the ingenious Thomas Pingo" ("Phœbus! What a name!"), were struck on this occasion, and another equally ingenious gentleman, James Burgh, dedicated shortly afterwards a volume of essays "To the Right Reverend Father in God, of three years old, His Royal Highness Prince Frederick, Bishop of Osnaburg." Meanwhile, the little Prince played with his elder brother George at Kew and Richmond Lodge, had the whooping-cough, was inoculated for the smallpox, invested with the insignia of the Bath (aged four), given his Garter (aged six), and on Sunday evenings with his older brother (poor little children!) would have the privilege of listening to His Majesty's readings from "some of our best divines." The names of his tutors are now all forgotten, but one whose name was recommended, but by some fortunate chance rejected, is still remembered, the notorious Dr. William Dodd, who, in spite of Dr. Johnson's petition, ended on the gallows for forgery. The little Princes were tied to their books for eight hours a day, but it is pleasant to relate, found time enough to acquire singular proficiency at "single-wicket cricket on Kew Green," and also had their own little farm at Kew, which they ploughed, weeded, sowed with wheat, threshed the wheat, milled it, made it into bread and, quite

* Where Buckingham Palace now stands.

like Masters Sandford and Merton, "invited their parents to partake of the philosophical repast." In short, he seems to have had a very happy childhood in spite of the cares of his bishopric.

In 1780, he was gazetted Colonel, and his royal parents decided to send him for a long stay in Germany, then the home of military science, to be educated for the Army. Here, at Brunswick, he made his first acquaintance with the Prussian Exercise, which later Sir David Dundas was to introduce into the British Army, and at Berlin paid his respects to the Great Frederick, and attended the manœuvres in Silesia. On this occasion there was some plain speaking on the part of the royal umpire. His officers manœuvred so badly that several of them were put under arrest, and Frederick roundly declared "were I to make generals of shoemakers and tailors the regiments could not be worse." The men in von Erlach's regiment, so the angry monarch asseverated, "looked like smugglers and marched like cabbages and turnips." A very pleasant field day altogether. While at Potsdam the Duke met H.R.H. Frederica Charlotte Ulrica Catherine, the Princess Royal of Prussia, "of a *petite stature* but," like all princesses that ever were, "elegantly formed"; she in later life became Duchess of York.* The Duke of York had several narrow escapes in his life, but none so narrow as that connected with his marriage. For the Duke of Brunswick had hoped that his nephew Frederick would marry his daughter Caroline who, later became the unlucky consort of the equally unlucky George IV.

The Duke of York returned from Germany in 1787, and when he arrived at Windsor, it was, Miss Fanny Burney tells us, "an affecting sight to view the general content. But that of the King went to my very heart. So delighted he looked; so proud of his son; so benevolently pleased that everyone should witness his satisfaction." The Prince of Wales came post-haste from Brighton to Windsor, exceeding the limit all the way, as was his royal habit in every thing throughout life, and "there never," remarked Princess Augusta, "had been so happy a dinner since the world was created."

* The Princess Royal of Prussia was the daughter of Frederick William and Elizabeth of Brunswick, whom he divorced. This Princess of Brunswick appears to have been of a cynical disposition. When she heard, in exile, that her daughter was betrothed to the second son of the King of Great Britain she remarked (so Lord Holland tells us) that "it was a good match enough for the daughter of Müller the musician." But Frederick William himself was just as bad: *Maitressenwirtschaft* was his hobby. Indeed, the head of the House of Brandenburg, as he heard of his nephew's escapades, might often have observed bitterly in the words of the Cockney lyricist:

"Ours is a nice House, ours is."

But there were those about the Court who anticipated the worst. Some few months after his return it was whispered that "his amours were numerous," and it was feared that he would "entangle himself with a habitude." She duly came along, so the Mrs. Clackits of the day tell us, in the person of the Countess of Tyrconnel, whom another habitude, the southern Lass of Richmond Hill,* Mrs. Fitzherbert denounced as "a lady of contaminate character." General Grenville, who had been the Duke's bear leader in Germany, was much upset. He writes to Lord Cornwallis: "I am sorry to say that we go on at a most furious rate; and I cannot but lament most sincerely certain points of our conduct, which I hope we shall correct before it is too late." Listen also to Lord Bulkeley: "The Duke of York never misses a night at Brooks's, where the hawks pluck his feathers unmercifully and have reduced him to the vowels I.O.U." But the young Prince was shortly to show that whatever excesses natural high spirits and the contagious example of a volatile elder brother may have led him into, "we" had the courage of "our" race. This he proved in his duel with Colonel Lennox, afterwards Duke of Richmond, and famous for his Brussels ball. This duel, according to the Gruncher,† had its origin, like a more famous encounter, that between the medical officer of the 97th Regiment and a member of a certain celebrated London club, in a ballroom, where three masks spoke insultingly of the Prince of Wales. The Duke suspecting one of them to be Colonel Lennox of his own regiment, spoke to him to such effect that later the Colonel demanded an explanation. To which the Duke with commendable spirit replied that "off parade he wore a grey ‡ coat, and as a private gentleman was ready to give him satisfaction if he pleased." The meeting took place on Wimbledon Common, the Duke being seconded by Lord Rawdon and Colonel Lennox by Lord Winchelsea. "The signal being given Lieut.-Colonel Lennox fired and the ball grazed his royal highness's curl. The Duke of York did not fire." The whole party returned to town, the Duke going immediately to Carlton House and hailed the Prince of Wales, "Brother, it is all over and all is quite well; but I have no time to tell you particulars, for I must go to the tennis-court." A curious sequel, typical of this Romantic Age, was that Colonel Lennox's sister begged, and was granted, the royal curl that her brother had shot away.

* The real lass of Richmond Hill was a Miss I'Anson of Richmond, Yorks. The sentiment "I'd crowns resign, to call her mine" in the charming old song was the reason for the popular opinion that Mrs. Fitzherbert had inspired it.

† See "Greville Journal," i. p. 62.

‡ It is a minute point, but some authorities say brown.

The next important event in the Duke's life (if one omits the measles which he had at this time) was his marriage to the Princess Royal of Prussia in 1791. On this interesting occasion "the Duchess was dressed in white satin with tassels and fringe of gold, the Duke was in his regimentals and the Prince of Wales in a chocolate-coloured suit." The Duke, in spite of some philanderings, one of which, as we shall see, made some stir, was, for his period and position, a kind and considerate husband, and the two lived, on the whole, on excellent terms notwithstanding, or perhaps thanks to, the fact that he dwelt in London while she lived at Oatlands in Surrey "entirely surrounded" as the geography books say, by pets, chiefly little dogs, of which she had forty. She appears to have had the kindest of hearts. "She is delighted," says Greville, "when anybody gives her a dog, or a monkey, or a parrot, of all of which she has a vast number. If she were to see anybody beat or kick any of her dogs she would never forgive it."

The Duke was not destined to be a success in the field. But in considering his first campaign in Holland we must remember that he had not a free hand, and that the Army was in a shocking state. The real commander was the Prince of Coburg, and the Cabinet at home had, not a finger, but a fist, in the pie. Regarding the state of the Army Sir Henry Bunbury writes "our army was lax in its discipline, entirely without system, and very weak in numbers. Each Colonel of a regiment managed it according to his own notions, or neglected it altogether. There was no uniformity of drill or movement; professional pride was rare; professional knowledge still more so."

The real cause of failure was that the Cabinet insisted that the Duke of York and his troops should undertake the siege of Dunkirk; this was on the recommendation not of Coburg, not of Mack his Chief of Staff, not of the Duke, but—of Lord Chancellor Rosslyn. Just as, in later years—but that is another story.

But it was during this unfortunate campaign that the Duke of York laid the foundations of that popularity with the rank and file upon which was finally raised the column which is familiar to every Londoner. In a very simple, unaffected "Impartial Journal" by Corporal Robert Brown of the Coldstream Guards, there are constant references to his care and thoughtfulness for his men. "H.R.H. frequently visits the trenches in person, and seems much pleased with the alertness of the men at work." "H.R.H. has ordered an additional quantity of wood to be issued out to the men; and also a quantity of liquor, which not a little contributes to

preserve the health and spirits of the troops." "The C.-in-C. desires that the officers commanding brigades will have distributed to their men a full allowance of rum * for this day [2nd May, 1794], which his R.H. will pay for." "H.R.H. always attentive to the good of the soldiers, issued an order directing the commanding officers of regiments to pay very particular attention to the provision of necessaries for the sick sent to the general hospitals." On this the Duke was particularly insistent. He issued, in January, 1795, a most practical general order that an inspecting officer "should visit frequently the hospital at unstated hours, to superintend the cleanliness and discipline of it in every particular, to examine the diet of the patients and observe whether they receive that unremitting care and attention their situation demands."

When Sergeant-Major Darley of the Coldstream Guards was wounded and taken prisoner after performing prodigies of valour, the Duke sent a trumpeter to the French camp to say that the surgeon who attended him should be liberally rewarded, and also had a letter sent to Darley's wife commiserating with her on her husband's misfortune, congratulating her on his gallantry. Did the Duke of Wellington ever do anything like this? One fears that Mrs. Darley would have had to have been the Countess of Darley before she would have received any such letter from him.

He was careful also of the amenities of war. At the siege of Valenciennes he readily gave leave for a lady in the beleaguered city "near the time of her delivery" to leave the town under a safe-conduct. And when the National Convention issued their infamous decree that no quarter should be given to British and Hanoverian troops, whom they pleasantly termed "the slaves of George the most atrocious of tyrants," the Duke responded with a general order addressed in sentiment almost as much to the French

* Rum came into its own again in the European War. The Navy had always remained faithful to it, as is evident from the lyric which the "Follies" used to sing with such enthusiasm:

When Beresford
Arrives on board
The first thing he wants is—Rum.
And Percy Scott
He likes it hot
And he drinks quite a lot of—RUM.
And Fisher too
He tells his crew
That rum will make them lither:
When with the Fleet
He drinks it neat
—And not a bad judge either!

troops * as his own, of a very dignified nature, forming an admirable pronouncement, in spite of the somewhat stilted language of the period, on the decencies of warfare. No wonder that when he returned to England in December, 1794, the men felt "they had lost a father and a friend who had endeared himself to them by his humanity, justice and benevolence."

The Duke who had been gazetted General in April, 1793, was in February, 1795, made Field-Marshal and Commander-in-Chief, and set about the gigantic task of reforming the British Army. One of his first reforms must have caused screams of angry rage in many a nursery and consternation in many a schoolroom.† This was his innovation with regard to purchase. He laid down a rule that no person should take rank, or obtain a Commission as a field officer, who had not actually served six years. He then set about military education. Hitherto ambitious lads had been sent, like the Duke himself, for their military education to Germany. But in May, 1802, thanks to the Commander-in-Chief, the Junior Department of the Royal Military College was instituted at Great Marlow,‡ being subsequently, in 1812, installed at Sandhurst. The Duke "attended the examinations in person, took notice of the most deserving and recommended them to his Majesty for Commissions in the line." He also instituted confidential reports, a general monthly return of the troops, and formed "a deposit of military knowledge" which was the puny infant which gradually grew up into the present lusty and well-developed Directorate of Military Operations and Intelligence. He even tackled the Commissariat. This which "from time immemorial had been an infinite source of fraud underwent a purgation." And so did the military hospitals, for the proper conduct of which the Commander-in-Chief issued most detailed instructions. By his directions also those men of the 85th Regiment, who had never had small-pox, were inoculated by Dr. Jenner. Nor did he forget the women and children. He founded a lying-in hospital for the wives of men belonging to the Foot Guards and an "Asylum for Educating One Thousand Children, the Legal Offspring of British Soldiers" which is familiar to all of us as the Duke of York's School.

* The French soldiers paid no attention whatever to this ukase of the National Convention.

† Sir Walter Scott wrote that not only were infants and schoolboys given Commissions, but "in some instances they were bestowed upon young ladies, when pensions could not be had. We knew ourselves one fair dame who drew the pay of Captain in the — Dragoons, and was probably not much less fit for the service than some who, at that period, actually did duty, for no knowledge of any kind was demanded from the young officers."

‡ It is a curious coincidence that West Point was founded in the same year.

In 1799 the Duke's reforms at home had been interrupted by an excursion abroad which was not a success. This was the Helder Expedition which, though it was mysteriously spoken of in England while in preparation as "the Secret Expedition," was no secret to the French and Dutch Governments, who were perfectly cognizant of, and prepared for it. One should remember that although it was a failure and we had to evacuate the country, one of the objects aimed at, and an important object, the capture of the Dutch Fleet, was attained. The Russian troops who acted with us did not precisely cover themselves with glory. Indeed, the Emperor Paul, disgusted with their behaviour, disbanded certain regiments. And here the Duke gave a signal instance of his love of justice and fair play. He wrote a long letter to the Russian ambassador, Count Woronzow, in which he said, "I think it my duty, and it gives me pleasure to do justice to several [Russian] regiments who in different actions with the enemy have evinced as much order as bravery." It is rather curious that just about this time he himself was called upon to disband a British regiment which had succumbed to seditious propaganda in a country where it seems to be a natural growth of the soil.

It is probably not generally known that in 1803 it was proposed, by the Duke of Sussex of all people, that a Military Council should be appointed: it is a coincidence that almost exactly one hundred years afterwards an Army Council (with, however, of course, very different functions) should have come into existence. The Duke of Sussex's proposal was thrown down on the ground that "such a council, instead of assisting, would embarrass the Commander-in-Chief in the discharge of his professional duties." But something even more embarrassing befell the Duke in this year. The Prince of Wales wrote to his father pointing out that he was anxious "to shed the last drop of my blood in support of your majesty's person, crown and dignity," and suggested that in order to do this in a befitting manner he should be promoted to the rank of general. The King replied, somewhat coldly, "should the implacable enemy so far succeed as to land you will have an opportunity of showing your zeal at the head of your regiment."* Poor Prinney (as Mr. Mischievous Creevey calls him) regarded this suggestion as "a degrading mockery," and applied to his brother. A long correspondence followed, and the Duke's letters, refusing the request, are a model of firmness, tact and brotherly kindness.

But this was a trifle compared with the sea of trouble which

* 10th Light Dragoons.

overwhelmed the Commander-in-Chief in 1809. About 1803 the Duke had, in the language of the period, "formed a connexion" with a Mrs. Mary Anne Clarke. Mary Anne was no doubt a baggage, but, from her portrait, a most attractive little baggage, and (unlike a contemporary and equally beautiful and baggaggy baggage, Emma) a very clever and entertaining baggage. In 1807 the Duke and she parted, and she passed to the protection of a Colonel Wardle, M.P. (of the Militia), upon which the allowance paid her by the Duke terminated. Mary Anne was annoyed, and the upshot was that Colonel Wardle * brought a charge in the House of Commons against the Duke of corruption in his administration, and of having shared with the lady the profits on the sale of military Commissions and promotions. This led to an inquiry before a Committee of the whole House which lasted for nearly two months. "The idlers at White's and the frequenters of the opera—whom at other times it had been found difficult to drag from the claret bottle or the Ballet to vote even upon the most important questions—were now unfailing in their Parliamentary attendance." "Sad work," wrote in his diary Wilberforce, who was terribly shocked, probably as much so as on the historic occasion when Mr. Richard Brinsley Sheridan, found adhesive to a Westminster pavement, having partaken of one, or possibly, two, and questioned by the watch as to his name, thickly hiccupped "Wwwwilberforce!" But alas and alas! as the inquiry proceeded, it pains one to read "even the rigid Wilberforce seems fascinated by her attractions." † One cannot but admire the way in which Mary Anne stood up to, and scored off, her cross-examiners. "Under whose protection, Madame," thundered a pompous Parliamentary Personage, "are you now?" "I had thought, Sir," cooed Mary Anne turning to the chairman, "that I was under *yours*." The quidnuncs and the populace were, of course, delighted with the whole proceedings. Idlers in the gin-shops engaged in the Arcadian pastime of pitch and toss, would cry to one another not "Heads or Tails," but "Duke or Darling." ‡ Brother George was, or pretended to be, vastly disgusted by Gad! but for the oddest of reasons—"he thought his own taste in regard to women was better than the Duke's." The upshot was that by a large majority the Duke was acquitted of the abuses with which he had been

* Who, gossip said, hoped, should the Duke be succeeded as Commander-in-Chief by Some One Else, to be made Secretary at War.

† If you study his portrait in the National Portrait Gallery, you will note in his eye the suggestion of the faintest flicker of a twinkle which quite explains this change in his attitude.

‡ Dr. Williamson, author of "Curious Survivals" (1923), states that this is still to be heard in London.

charged and, in the words of Mr. Fortescue, "no one can read the evidence without concluding that this was a just verdict." The same day the Duke resigned his appointment as Commander-in-Chief.

It is most gratifying to be able to add that Colonel Wardle quarrelled with Mary Anne over a little matter of a furniture bill, brought an action against her and the tradesman who had supplied it for conspiracy, and lost it. In Mary Anne's book, "The Rival Princes," in the compilation of which, from its style, she might have had the help of the gentleman who later became editor of the *Eatonswill Gazette*, there is some delightfully plain speaking about the Colonel. He is a PUBLIC IMPOSTOR, a black sheep, a jesuit and a Mushroom Patriot. She herself is "an indiscreet mother," the Duke of York is "a gentleman and a prince adorned by many excellent qualities." Croker—Ally Croker she calls him—whose cross-examination she had resented, is "a ludicrous Irishman with a brogue which makes him scarcely intelligible to his countrymen." Colonel Wardle, after threatening actions against various papers "for loss of his popularity," sank into obscurity,* but his name will live for ever in the genial old gentleman for whom Dickens annexed it.

Mary Anne's fate was happier than Emma's. Following nine months' retirement from the world for libelling the Right Hon. W. Fitzgerald, she devoted herself to the education of her daughters, "who all married well." After Waterloo she settled in Paris and had a kind of salon, frequented, according to Gronow, by the Marquess of Londonderry, and also, I like to think, by Mrs. Rawdon Crawley, for Becky and she had much in common; perhaps also she and Mme. Grassini may have swapped quaint and diverting anecdotes about the Duke of York and "*ce cher Villainton*," as Mme. Grassini calls an English admirer of hers. Mary Anne died at Boulogne in 1852, aged seventy-six.

The Duke of York retired to Oatlands (where we may be sure his most amiable Duchess gave him the kindest of welcomes) and the diversions of the countryside which included pretty frequent visits to Newmarket. Mr. Greville, the diarist, managed his racing stable for him, but he had, like his brother George, no great success on the turf. He was succeeded as Commander-in-Chief by Sir David Dundas, but directly the Prince of Wales became Prince Regent he reinstated his brother in the office in which he had done

* You can occasionally see his portrait in the second-hand print shops: he has—I am sure the Duke must have said so—"a demmed raffish and unpleasant countenance."

such sterling work for the Army. There was a debate in the House on the event, and several members who had opposed the Duke a few years before now voted in his favour, expressing their regrets at having been previously carried away by popular prejudice. One of the first things the Duke did on being re-appointed Commander-in-Chief was, when the news of the battle of Barrosa reached England, to write to Major-General Dilkes congratulating him "on the distinguished conduct of my gallant old friends the Guards under your command"; he describes himself as "a brother Guardsman, a title of which I shall ever be most proud." The Duke continued with unceasing zeal his office work and provided Wellington with the troops which were to bring peace at long last to Europe. That keen observer General Foy said of the Duke of York, "*il a préparé aux soldats les moyens de vaincre.*" Historians who, with one canting eye fixed upon the dear old Nonconformist Conscience (the curse of England),* cast the other Pecksniffian optic, as the old slang has it, towards heaven with oily indignation over the Clarke case, should in decency quote the unanimous vote of the House of Commons after Waterloo, "that the thanks of this House be given to his Royal Highness the Duke of York, Commander-in-Chief of the British forces, for his continual, effectual and unremitting attention to the duties of his office for a period of more than twenty years, during which time the army has improved in discipline and in science to an extent unknown before, and, under Providence, risen to the height of military glory."

The remaining years of the Duke's life do not call for much comment. On the death of Queen Charlotte the guardianship of the King's person devolved upon him and, in the words of Sir Walter Scott, "no pleasure, no business was ever known to interrupt his regular visits to Windsor, where his unhappy parent could neither be grateful for, nor even sensible of, his unremitted attention." In June, 1819, on a Most Auspicious Occasion, in response to the mild command "Name this child" (or should one say, princess, or royal infant?) the Duke replied, after a slight altercation between the Regent and the Duke of Kent as to the respective claims of Georgina and Elizabeth, "Alexandrina Victoria." In 1820 the Duchess of York died and, in accordance with her wishes, was buried in the parish church of Weybridge, rather a humble resting-place for a Princess Royal of the Prussia of Frederick the Great. She had continued to the end kind, sensible, charitable both in deed and

* How much pleasanter is the curse of Scotland, the Nine of Diamonds, though surely the Joker would be more appropriate!

thought, and amiable. Her dogs, and her birds also, must have missed her sadly, for Oatlands was what is now called a Bird Sanctuary. Which fact inspired Lord Erskine to some occasional verse beginning :

“ At Oatlands where the buoyant air
Vast crowds of rooks can scarcely bear,”

a mark that even Mr. Winkle could not have missed. But the Duchess strictly forbade at Oatlands what the poet in question called “ the fowler’s dreaded sound.” Let us hope that the descendants of the Oatlands rooks still caw gratefully over the quiet country church where this most kind-hearted woman lies buried.

It is interesting to note that in this year the Duke of York and the Duke of Wellington toured the east coast “ on a shooting expedition.” Rather strange companions, for York was not overfond of Wellington. Greville, noting in his diary the opinion of the former of the latter writes, “ he does not deny his military talents, but he thinks that he is false and ungrateful, that he never gave sufficient credit to his officers, and that he was unwilling to put forward men of talent who might be in a situation to claim some share of credit, the whole of which he was desirous of engrossing himself.”

The Duke of York was all for the Church of England as by Law Established, and in 1825, with the courage which was natural to him, spoke so vehemently and with such genuine feeling against the Roman Catholic Relief Bill which had passed the third reading in the House of Commons, that the Lords threw it out. He may have been right ; he was probably wrong ; but he maintained what he thought was right in face of torrents of abuse from the opposition.

He had suffered some years from dropsy, and in 1826 was taken seriously ill and died in January, 1827, in the house of his old friend the Duke of Rutland in Arlington Street. The last act of his official life was a measure for the relief of old lieutenants prevented by *res angusta* from obtaining promotion by purchase. Mr. Peel, speaking in the House of Commons, said : “ I can never forget the last words which I heard from the royal prince only nine days before his death. When he received the news of a part of our troops having landed at Lisbon,* he exclaimed in a faint but triumphant voice, ‘ I wish that the country could compare the state of the brigade which has landed at Lisbon in 1827 with the state of the brigade which landed at Ostend in 1794 ? ’ ”

* A *casus fœderis* having arisen, British troops had been sent to Portugal to support Isabel, the Princess Regent, against Dom Miguel.

"In the failings of the Duke of York," says a writer in the *Annual Register* for 1827, "there was nothing that was unEnglish, nothing that was unprincely." He was, in fact, a Royal John Bull, with all John Bull's little weaknesses for wine, women, song, whimsical and indelicate anecdote, cards, and racing. But on the other hand, he had all John Bull's joviality, kindness and good nature. He compares very favourably with his royal brothers. When the "Greville Journals" were first published, "We were not amused," indeed we were distinctly annoyed.* One of the passages which probably much annoyed us is the Gruncher's statement: "He [the Duke of York] is the only one of the Princes who has the feelings of an English gentleman." Greville goes on, "He delights in the society of men of the world and in a life of gaiety and pleasure. He is very easily amused and particularly with jokes full of coarseness and indelicacy; the men with whom he lives most are *très-polissons* and *la polissonnerie* is the *ton* of his society." This is rather in the manner of a "damned good-natured friend," but is it not an exact description of John Bull as he always was, and as, one hopes, he always will be? Thackeray, who has no good word to say of George IV., says of the Duke that he was "big, burly, loud, jolly, cursing, courageous," all of which apply equally well to John Bull. In appearance he was, according to Sir Walter, "large"—Gronow says over six feet—"stout and manly." It will be remembered that Miss Lucretia Tox detected in him a resemblance to Mr. Dombey: this was the partiality of a loving heart, for the only resemblance between the genial Duke and the proud and pompous merchant was that both were "fine figures of men." A pleasant light is thrown on his character in a letter of the 6th of June, 1815, from his niece, Princess Charlotte, whose death, due to the blundering incompetence of a Dr. Parker Peps, led, as so admirably described in Mr. Lytton Strachey's lively pages, to several hasty royal marriages. "Dearest Frederick," she writes, "you are always so very kind to me that I do not feel the least scruple in asking you a favour," the said favour being the loan of his box at Covent Garden for two friends. She ends, "You have all my best wishes for Ascot; do not fail to let me know if you win, dearest Frederick."

He had the memory for faces characteristic of his house. Sir James McGrigor was presented to him at Bergen-op-Zoom, and had some conversation with him which the Duke recalled at one of his levées at the Horse Guards twenty years later to the celebrated

* Prince Leopold, Queen Victoria's youngest son, was so angry with Mr. Greville's book that he threw it into his bath. (Earl of Warwick's "Memories.")

army doctor. He could not tolerate injustice, or what he thought was injustice. When Seringapatam was taken, Lord Harris, then General Harris, superseded Baird ("öor David") in command of the place by Colonel Wellesley (as he then was), brother of the Governor-General. Elers tells us in his *Memories*, "some two years afterwards, upon General Harris's return home and on attending the Duke of York at one of his levées, Harris, who was not very quick in a difficulty, was asked quickly and suddenly by the Duke, 'Pray, General Harris, what reason had you for superseding General Baird in command of Seringapatam and giving it to a junior officer' ?" * Poor Harris stammered and was at a loss for a reply, and the Duke turned his back upon him."

It is curious that the best contemporary appreciation of him should have been written by a foreigner, General Foy. In the first volume of his "*Histoire de la Guerre de la Péninsule*," written about 1818, he says that his appointment as Commander-in-Chief opened a new era for the army. He sees the advantages attaching to a royal Commander-in-Chief: "*il a pu attaquer quelques abus invétérés. Les ministres auraient-ils rejeté une proposition utile, quand elle était présentée par le fils chéri du roi d'Angleterre, par le prince qui, après la reine, était le premier dans le cabinet derrière le trône? Le duc d'York est né avec un esprit plus juste qu'étendu. Le goût de ses fonctions et le sentiment de son devoir ont vaincu son penchant naturel à la dissipation. Voyant beaucoup par lui-même, quoiqu'il ait l'assistance de collaborateurs habiles, et connaissant personnellement tous les chefs et un grand nombre d'officiers, il a conduit et administré l'armée comme un bon colonel mène la famille de guerriers dont il attend sa réputation.*" This is praise from Sir Hubert Stanley.

After Foy let us quote a sergeant, the anonymous author of "*The Eventful Life of a Soldier*" (1827). He recalls how when he enlisted the soldier was "one of the veriest slaves existing, his hair soaped, floured and frizzed, with his musquet to burnish, his white breeches to pipe-clay, so that it took three or four hours' hard work to get ready for parade, where if a single hair stood out of its place extra drill would be given him by his superiors who seemed to look upon him as a brute with neither soul nor feeling. Thanks to H.R.H. the Commander-in-Chief little is now left the soldier to complain of. Every individual in the Service is attached to the Duke of York and looks up to him in the light of a father and a

* The real reason was Baird's want of tact and bad temper: three years in a dungeon at Seringapatam had soured him—and no wonder.

friend. The Duke of Wellington will not be to the army what the Duke of York has been."

His pleasant courtesy and affability at his levées (held every Tuesday) must have made officers of the period feel that the Army was just a large family with a benevolent head whom any one could approach. It will be remembered that on one of these occasions the Duke was pleased to remark of a mere major in a marching regiment, known to his brother officers as "the Flower of Ours," that "there is no adulation about Joey," and Joey was never tired of quoting him. There were probably many Joeys in the army who had a very real affection for the Commander-in-Chief. For example, General Dyott, whose Diary is full of references to the gracious manner and tact of the Duke. He writes on the occasion of his death, "his loss was greatly lamented and most sincerely regretted by the army. I believe a more kind-hearted or more benevolent man did not exist." He echoes the words of the sergeant quoted above, "the Duke of Wellington, although so great a captain and having so frequently led the British troops to victory, is not a general favourite, and he must make great exertions to obtain the popularity possessed by his royal predecessor." He would have been still less a favourite with the Army had officers and men known that when Sir H. Torrens submitted to him on his appointment as Commander-in-Chief a general order in praise of the Duke of York, Wellington turned it down with the remark, "I dislike to come before the Army and the world with this parade." * Which seems churlish.

The Duke of York with his industry at office work, his zeal for reform, his jollity, his genial graciousness, his fatherly interest in the welfare of the rank and file and their families, is indeed an admirable example (the best in history) of the influence for the Army's good, of a royal Commander-in-Chief. Geniality is not, indeed cannot, be characteristic of a Board. But, of course, on the other hand, a Board cannot, at all events in its corporate capacity, get itself involved in entanglements with baggages.

* What a contrast is furnished by Lord Wolseley who, when he succeeded the Duke of Cambridge as Commander-in-Chief, wrote: "In this his first Army Order, Lord Wolseley wishes, in the name of the Army, to assure H.R.H. of the affectionate regard of all who have served under him during his long period of office."

SMUTS *v.* LETTOW

A CRITICAL PHASE IN EAST AFRICA; AUGUST TO
SEPTEMBER, 1916

(*With Map*)

BY COLONEL G. M. ORR, C.B.E., D.S.O.,* Indian Army (retired)

THROUGHOUT 1915 the small British and Belgian forces had kept their dreary watch along the frontiers of British East Africa, Uganda, the Belgian Congo and Northern Rhodesia, which were contiguous with German East Africa. By January, 1916, the advent of strong reinforcements from South Africa and India allowed plans for a general offensive to be put into operation. The general plan was for a concentric advance into the centre of German East Africa from all the Allied frontiers, the main force being that under the command of General Smuts which was to advance southward from the slopes of Kilimanjaro. The first step taken was to clear the enemy from the slopes of Kilimanjaro before the rainy season of April set in. This was successfully accomplished. Meanwhile, General Smuts perfected his arrangements for the forward move of his own columns and for the cooperation of the Belgians from the Congo, and of General Northey from Rhodesia. The latter was not under the orders, at that time, of General Smuts. By the end of May, 1916, the British detachment in Uganda were ready to move against Muanza at the southern end of Lake Victoria and to cooperate with the Belgian columns, which had made good most of the German territory between the north end of Lake Tanganyika and Lake Victoria. They were then to advance on Tabora. General Northey had commenced his advance towards Iringa. Lettow's dispositions conformed generally to those of the Allies. His main force faced General Smuts. The detachments facing the British Lake detachment and the Belgians were grouped under the command of Wahle with headquarters at Tabora. Aumann commanded a small group facing Northey. There were small garrisons in the coast towns.

General Smuts' main invasion of German East Africa, starting from the southern slopes of Kilimanjaro, had been by two lines of advance towards the Central railway. The western line ran from

* The writer was A.A. and Q.M.G. of the 1st E.A. Division (General Hoskins).

Aruscha across the Massai steppe through Kondoa Irangi on Dodoma. The eastern line was down the Pangani river, and then through Handeni in the general direction of Morogoro.

Before the advance started, Lettow's main force, under his personal command, was behind the Ruwu river, a tributary of the Pangani. Smuts' first move had been to send a force at the beginning of April under Van Deventer to Kondoa Irangi. This obvious threat to the centre of German East Africa had forced Lettow to transfer the bulk of his force to oppose Van Deventer, and to take command on that front himself. Smuts at once, on the 18th of May, began the movement of his main column down the Pangani and did not halt until he reached the block of the Nguru mountains at the end of June. Lettow about this time transferred himself with his main body back to oppose Smuts, whereon Van Deventer advanced to the Central railway, which the heads of his columns reached at Kilimatinde on the 31st of July, at Dodoma on the 29th of July, and Kikombo station on the 30th of July. The enemy's main force in the Morogoro-Dodoma area were now separated from the forces in the Tabora area which were opposed to the Belgian and British columns operating from the north-west and from Lake Victoria, respectively.

Smuts' next object was to bring Van Deventer eastward along the railway so as to get into closer cooperation with his own column * which would move simultaneously southward. It was now the beginning of August. Lettow was credited with having concentrated 20 companies on the Nguru front, and Smuts had hopes of cornering them in the mountains. Smuts, splitting his force into four columns, began his southern movement through the Nguru mountains on the 5th of August. Van Deventer, who had concentrated his force at Njangalo, began his eastward move on the 9th of August.

By the 13th, when Smuts' columns had come together near Turiani, it had become clear that they were dealing with only part of Lettow's force, and that the balance had retired farther south towards the Central railway, either in the direction of Morogoro or Kilossa.† On the 13th, Van Deventer had reached Mpapua. When the advance through the Nguru mountains began, Smuts had entertained some hope that even if he failed to corner the enemy in those mountains, he might still be brought to bay at Kilossa, on the Central railway. Information tended strongly to show that,

* See General Smuts' despatch of the 17th of October, 1916, para. 30.

† *Ibid.*, para. 36.

if the enemy retired from the railway, Mahenge would be his next objective; and as the most convenient point of departure for Mahenge appeared to be Kilossa, there was some justification for the hope that the rapid advance from the north and west might cut the enemy off in the direction of Kilossa.*

The references in General Smuts' despatch to the possible continued retreat of Lettow south of the Central railway, imply that this possibility was in Smuts' mind before he began his move on the 5th of August. We know that at the time of Smuts' advance in May the idea was held, both then and for a long time afterwards, that Lettow would look on the defence of Dar-es-salaam, Tabora, and the Central railway as his main object, for which he would fight to the last, and that their loss would mean the end of the campaign.† And we know that all administrative arrangements by G.H.Q. were to get the forces forward only as far as the Central railway. If, therefore, in August, General Smuts realized the possibility of Lettow continuing south of the Central railway, it was very necessary to try and bring him to book before he crossed.

This question of retreat south of the Central railway had also exercised the mind of Lettow. It is interesting to turn to his "Reminiscences" and gauge to what extent he was forced into the positions in which he was shortly to find himself and whether he did not, in fact, miss an opportunity of carrying out his declared intention successfully. It would appear that the question of the general direction of retreat south of the Central railway was forced on Lettow some time in June—probably about mid-June—when he was still facing Van Deventer at Kondoa Irangi. He tells us why he decided on the Mahenge country. "By moving there," he says, "we should avoid being surrounded, it was fertile, and suitable for guerilla warfare. From there also it would be possible to withdraw further to the south and to continue the war for a long time to come."‡ It will be seen that he never carried out his intention, but his "Reminiscences" do not give the reason. On the top of this decision, or perhaps at the very same time, he had to come to another decision, and that was as to what action he should take in view of Smuts' southward advance. He says:

"There were a quantity of stores deposited along the Central railway, particularly in the vicinity of Morogoro. These were endangered by

* See General Smuts' despatch of the 17th of October, 1916, para. 40.

† See "The East African Force, 1915-1919," by Brig.-Gen. C. P. Fendall, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., p. 67.

‡ See "My Reminiscences of East Africa," by General von Lettow-Vorbeck, p. 141.

the rapid advance of General Smuts who had penetrated far to the south beyond Handeni . . . I therefore decided . . . to march my main body to Dodoma, proceed thence by rail to Morogoro, and move up in support of Major Kraut." *

Lettow's reference to Smuts having penetrated to the south, "beyond Handeni," is curious. This was not a fact when Lettow must have come to his decision to move away from Kondoa. Lettow and his main body were not in front of Kondoa on the 24th of June when Van Deventer attacked and easily captured the position held by the enemy. It is probable that the 15 or 16 companies constituting the main body had left several days before, possibly about the 20th, by which time Lettow might have heard of Smuts' arrival on the 17th of June in the vicinity of Handeni—certainly not "far to the south beyond Handeni."

Kondoa to Dodoma is seven marches, Dodoma to Morogoro by rail was about 150 miles, so Morogoro must have been reached about the 29th of June, by which time Lettow would no doubt have heard of the arrival of Smuts at the Nguru mountains, 50 miles south of Handeni.

Lettow joined Kraut, as he says, "early in July," and fixed his headquarters at Turiani (on the south-east flank of the Nguru mountains, 26 miles from our entrenched camp at Msiha). Turiani was four marches from Morogoro. Smuts made no move throughout July, but Van Deventer began his southward move on the 16th of July. Meanwhile, there is no indication, either in his "Reminiscences" or from any other source, that Lettow was making any preparation for his intended retreat on Mahenge. There were two routes by which Mahenge could be reached from the stretch of the railway Morogoro-Kilossa, but they converged at Kidode. By far the better of the two was the track from Kilossa. By this route Kidode was about 60 miles (four marches). The other was from Morogoro through Mlali and Mahalaka. By this route Kidode was at least 80 miles through difficult country entailing certainly eight marches. It is interesting to note, in view of Lettow's future retirement to Kissaki, south of Morogoro, that there was no route shown on the map, or known, by which the Mahenge road, south of Kidode, could be reached from Kissaki.

Now, one must infer from his "Reminiscences" that Lettow intended to retreat on Mahenge, but that meanwhile he had pushed his main body north to Turiani in order to cover Morogoro, an

* See "My Reminiscences of East Africa," p. 142.

important depôt. Bearing this in mind, we will continue the account of what took place. We left Smuts at Turiani on the 13th, faced with the fact that whatever had been opposing his advance in the Nguru mountains, the bulk of the force had retired, but whether in the direction of Kilossa or Morogoro was still uncertain. We must turn again to Lettow's "Reminiscences" to try and discover when he withdrew his main body and why. His main body was certainly not engaged in the fighting north of Turiani on the 9th and 10th of August. He refers to his own presence in Morogoro at this time and to the consent he gave to Schulz, commanding the Turiani detachment, to retire on Morogoro via Dakawa.* Prior to this he says :

"When Otto's detachment approached Kilossa, it became necessary to move the main body at Turiani also. Headquarters and a part of the force moved to Morogoro, Kraut with several companies and a 4-inch gun to Kilossa. At Turiani, Schulz took command."†

This rearward move must have taken place before the 9th of August. It was not until the 9th of August that Van Deventer had concentrated his force at Njangalo, so that the only information which Lettow could have had regarding the movements of Van Deventer's columns was that they had reached the railway at the end of July and possibly that they were moving eastward towards Njangalo. Njangalo was at least 90 miles west of Kilossa. Consequently, Lettow's reference to Otto's detachment approaching Kilossa as being the signal for his move southward from Turiani is difficult to understand.

Otto was in close touch with Van Deventer at Njangalo from the 1st to the 9th of August. The question, therefore, arises that if Lettow withdrew his main body from Turiani because of Van Deventer's presence at Njangalo which in itself pointed to a probable move towards Kilossa, why did he send Kraut with only "several" companies to Kilossa and take his own headquarters and the remainder to Morogoro? He says that the force retreating before Van Deventer consisted of 5 companies. Kraut was believed to have had 5 companies facing Smuts in the Nguru mountains. The main body which Lettow transferred from Kondoa to Morogoro and thence to Turiani was believed to be 15 companies. When he withdrew from Turiani he left certainly 5 companies with Schulz and sent 6 companies (it is believed) with Kraut to Kilossa. This would have left Lettow with 9 companies at Morogoro.

Lettow, in his book, particularly says that he had no intention

* See "My Reminiscences of East Africa," pp. 146, 147. † *Ibid.*, p. 145.

of fighting a decisive engagement on the northern slopes of the Uluguru mountains ; that it would have been madness to await the junction of hostile columns, each individually superior to him in numbers, and fight with his back to steep and rocky mountains ; that it was sounder to deal with only a part of the enemy.* In view of Lettow's expressed intention of retiring on Mahenge, and his disavowal of any intention to fight at Morogoro, the reason for his dispositions in early August are mystifying.

Speculation on what might have happened in war is always open to criticism, but, nevertheless, in this case the temptation to speculate is very strong. If, leaving Turiani to Schulz's detachment, he had got away his main body of 15 companies even as late as by the 8th of August, Lettow could have been at Kilossa by the 13th of August. On this date Schulz would have been, as he was, in the vicinity of Kwedihombo, opposing Smuts' advance which was being appreciably slowed down by reason of the difficult road. On the 13th Otto was retiring slowly in front of Van Deventer who had reached Mpapua, after a fight, on the night of the 12th of August. Otto's next fight with Van Deventer was at Kidete Station on the 15th and 16th of August. Now, Kidete is only two easy marches from Kilossa, so that Lettow could have thrown his 15 companies into the fight on the evening of the 15th or morning of the 16th. Whatever the result of the fight, Lettow could have been back at Kilossa by the 19th. By this date there is no reason to suppose that Schulz would have been pressed farther towards Kilossa than Kimambe. We know Van Deventer found it difficult to make progress in face of Otto's opposition between Kidete and Kilossa, and did not reach the latter place till the 22nd of August. There would seem, therefore, to have been a reasonable opportunity for Lettow to have dealt a blow " at a part " of his enemy's divided forces on the 16th and to have kept the Kilossa-Mahenge road open for retirement on the 20th, if his intention was to move back that way. And if he had no intention of defending Morogoro, there should have been time between mid-June (when he decided on Mahenge as his objective and thought there was an immediate threat to Morogoro) and mid-August, to have cleared Morogoro and organized the Kilossa-Mahenge line of retreat.

To return to actual events. By the 15th, it had become certain to Smuts that the enemy in his front was retiring on Morogoro via Dakawa (on the Wami river). The crossing was not occupied till the 18th and the advance not resumed till the 23rd. Meanwhile

* See " My Reminiscences of East Africa," p. 149.

Smuts made his arrangements to try and bring Lettow to bay at Morogoro. To this end Enslin's mounted brigade had left on the 21st for Mkata, *en route* for Mlali, which he occupied on the 24th. The main force from Dakawa moved to the east of Morogoro, so as to block the road leading from Morogoro round the eastern slopes of the Uluguru mountains.* On the 24th of August it was 18 miles north-east of Morogoro. On the 26th, one brigade occupied Mikesse and the rest of the force moved on Morogoro, which was found unoccupied. It was entered the same day. Information regarding the enemy pointed to his division and retirement in three detachments, one via Mlali where Enslin was engaged on the 24th, one round the eastern slopes, and the third by a hitherto unknown track through the mountains south of Morogoro.

If we are to depend on Lettow's "Reminiscences," what had happened was this. Relying on Smuts' predilection for wide turning movements, Lettow felt sure that an attempt would be made to reach his rear by working round the west side of the Uluguru mountains. When information pointed to a "strong column" (it was Enslin's mounted brigade) being on its way to do this, he decided to wait until it was near Mlali and then to attack it with his whole force. His force had by now been increased by part of Otto's detachment, whose place in front of Van Deventer had been taken by Kraut. It may be said here that after the fight near Kilossa on the 21st, Kraut had retired by the Mahenge road and communication with him was interrupted for some time. On the 23rd, Lettow sent Otto with 3 companies as an advanced guard to Mlali following with, apparently, the main body, on the 24th, but he arrived too late to affect the fight which gave Enslin possession of Mlali. Lettow, so as to ensure getting to Kissaki before a movement round the west of the Uluguru mountains could reach it, took his main body into the mountains east from Mlali. He tells us Kissaki had in it 600 tons of food, and the military stores removed from Morogoro. A detachment (probably 3 companies) under Stemmermann had been sent as escort to the 4-inch Königsberg gun and the howitzer battery, which could only hope to get to Kissaki by the reasonably good road along the eastern slopes of the mountains.† It is probable, from the remark that the military stores in Morogoro had been sent to Kissaki, that the removal of these stores by any route to the Mahenge road had proved too difficult and that this difficulty was the main factor in Lettow's

* See General Smuts' despatch of the 17th of October, 1916, para. 40.

† See "My Reminiscences of East Africa," p. 150.

decision to give up the Mahenge route as his southern line of retreat. Consequently, he decided to keep his main body in touch with the main dépôt of supplies and food. It would appear, taking time and distance into consideration, that it was not the converging advance of Van Deventer and Smuts that forced him to this decision, but rather the necessity of following the bulk of his stores and supplies by the only road by which he could get them away. Further, he must have been aware that there was no system of supply dépôts to carry him across the Rufiji valley.

On the 26th of August Smuts decided to continue the pursuit in spite of the fact that his forces and animals were worn out with the exertions of the last three weeks and his transport had reached its extreme radius of action.* This was a decision which had to be made in the face of very great difficulties which are worth considering if General Smuts' leadership is to be put under review.

It has already been pointed out that the administrative arrangements of G.H.Q. were made only to carry the forces to the Central railway. If the troops had arrived on that railway in a normal state of physical ability; if, even allowing for the occasional mishaps to transport such as must follow in the train of a large force advancing a long way over such a country, the men's stomachs could have been kept moderately full and their other wants supplied in a like measure—then a further call on them would have been a small matter. An advance over a comparatively short period, during which any elasticity which the transport possessed could have been stretched so that the troops could have had only half their needs supplied, would have been a call to which the troops could have physically responded. As it was, their hearts responded but their bodies failed. This was not due merely "to the exertions of the last three weeks and to the transport reaching its extreme radius of action." The transport had broken down by the end of May. Throughout the June advance and the August advance and even during the July halt, except for a few days, the transport had not been able to deliver more than half the needs of the troops. This was literally true of the main body advancing with Smuts, and there is reason to believe that the force under Van Deventer had fared as badly if not worse. The transport had lost any elasticity it may have had long before the troops reached the Central railway. Van Deventer's halt in June and Smuts' halt in July had given neither man nor beast opportunity to build up their strength and they easily succumbed to climatic diseases. General Smuts, in a

* See General Smuts' despatch of the 17th of October, 1916, para. 40 (end).

preface to Brig.-General Crowe's book, "General Smuts' Campaign in East Africa," seems to foresee criticism of the decision of the 26th of August. He says :

"It may be said that I expected too much of my men, and that I imposed too hard a task on them under the awful conditions of this tropical campaign. I do not think so. . . . It is true that efforts like these cannot be made without inflicting the greatest hardships on all, but it is equally true that the Commander who shrinks from such efforts should stay at home."

Referring to the farther advance through the Uluguru mountains, he speaks of "the strong hope that this supreme effort might end the campaign." The physical effort made by the troops is to their immortal honour. The untoward result of the fighting on the north-west outskirts of Kissaki, to be related later, may possibly be attributed to the glaring failures of the commanders on the spot, rather than to the undoubted physical exhaustion of the troops themselves. Nothing would have succeeded like success, but Smuts' hope was not fulfilled; it is doubtful whether it was justified.

To return to the narrative of events. On the 26th of August the forces were ordered to continue the pursuit on both flanks of the Uluguru mountains. On the west Enslin's mounted brigade had been joined by Nussey's mounted brigade (less one regiment) from Kilossa. On the 27th of August Smuts went himself to Mlali with General Brits whom he now put in command of the pursuit on the western flank. Brits' force consisted of Enslin's and Nussey's mounted brigades, Beves' two battalions of South African Infantry and some guns. Nussey's brigade followed the enemy by a footpath through the mountains while the remainder moved by a more circuitous route to the west which led them to Mahalaka and thence south-east on Kissaki. Brits found it impossible to take guns or vehicles even by this route, and sent them back. After overcoming great natural difficulties Brits' force reached the vicinity of Kissaki without opposition from the enemy on the 5th of September, but he had completely lost touch with Nussey through the breakdown of the latter's wireless set.

Meanwhile, on the eastern flank of the Uluguru mountains, Hoskins' division, consisting of Hannington's and Sheppard's brigades and some artillery, had been pursuing its way in the face of opposition both from the enemy and the terrain.* On the 5th of September Hannington's brigade was engaged about 8 miles

* See Gen. Smuts' despatch of the 17th of October, 1916, para. 41.

south-west of the Ruwu crossing, while the tail of the division was still working on the road in the river gorge. The head of the division was therefore between 40 and 45 miles from Kissaki.

It is not known what G.H.Q. considered to be the dispositions of Lettow's companies, but presumably they reckoned 19 companies to have retreated towards Kissaki and that of these 3 or 4 were opposing Hoskins; 15 or 16 were, therefore, in or near Kissaki. Brits was in communication with G.H.Q. and was doubtless aware of this. On the 6th of September Brits issued his orders for an attack on Kissaki. He had had no word from Nussey and could not get into communication with him; nevertheless, he ordered Beves with his two infantry battalions to advance by the footpath leading along the north bank of the Mgeta, and Enslin with his 3 mounted regiments to make a *détour* to the west and approach Kissaki from the south and south-west.

What happened on the 7th is what always will happen in thick bush country if wide turning movements are attempted. Effective cooperation is rendered impossible and the divided portions risk being beaten in detail. Beves was held up first by one, and then by another, apparently unexpected, line of entrenchments, and dug in. Enslin duly worked round to the south and found himself in an extensive rubber plantation and was then attacked on his right flank. Caught between two fires, cut off from Beves and unable to establish communication with him, Enslin retired with loss in the night. Lettow tells us his side of the story. He had been several days at Kissaki before large hostile camps were reported a day's march west of Kissaki. He had already decided to meet any attack from the west well away from the Boma (Fort), which was in the open and exposed to view from aircraft. In this forward bush position he placed Otto's detachment (presumably 5 companies). To the north of Kissaki he placed a detachment under Tafel, presumably also 5 companies, and held back the remainder to the south. He allowed Enslin's turning movement to continue until it was in rear of Otto's detachment and then let loose his reserves.*

On the 8th, Nussey's mounted brigade, in complete ignorance of the events of the 7th, walked up against Tafel's detachment. Nussey was not able to do more than hold his own till evening, when Brits' messengers found him and he obeyed the order to withdraw to Little Whigu Hill, at which place Brits had concentrated the rest of his force. General Smuts' guarded comments on

* See "My Reminiscences of East Africa," p. 154.

the actions of the 7th and 8th refer to "the two isolated efforts" which "led to a double retirement and a regrettable recovery of enemy morale." According to Brig.-General Crowe, who was C.R.A. at Smuts' headquarters, it had been the intention of General Smuts to be present and to direct operations, but he was unable to get through. General Crowe states that the enemy's strength was between 3000 and 4000, but this could hardly have been so. Even allowing an average strength of 150 for each of the 16 companies the strength would only reach 2400, and by no means were all 16 companies employed either on the 7th or the 8th. On the other hand, Brits' units must have been at a very low strength, probably the mounted regiments did not average 250 men each nor the infantry more than 400 each. Nussey's units must have been even weaker. It is very doubtful whether, even with Nussey's brigade in cooperation on the 7th, Brits would have mustered as many as 2300 men all told. Nor had he any artillery. It was surely a case in which time would have been well spent in reconnaissance, while Hoskins' division would have been approaching nearer day by day. The latter's line of advance would have been directly on to Lettow's only line of retreat. No doubt Lettow would not have allowed his retreat to be cut off, but Brits stood a much greater chance of inflicting real damage if he had contented himself with closing on Lettow until he moved back and then striking. Nevertheless, in spite of the distance away of Hoskins' column, General Smuts himself was apparently prepared to attack Lettow with only Brits' troops. When Smuts heard, on the 9th, of the double reverse he at once ordered Brits to push round by the south. Brits found this impossible and, instead, began to work Enslin's brigade by the north, but this movement seems to have made no headway until Lettow withdrew his force on the 13th. Meanwhile Lettow had gauged Brits' powers of offence sufficiently to risk moving his main body from Kissaki to Duthumi, leaving, he says, Otto with 5 companies at Kissaki. On the 9th, Stemmermann was approaching Duthumi closely followed by Hannington's brigade, and that evening Lettow left Kissaki with (presumably) 10 or 11 companies and reached Duthumi (some 12 miles distant), he says, that night.* Hannington attacked on the 10th, and obtained possession of the high ground on the enemy's left before Lettow was able to make use of its tactical advantages. The troops under Hannington's orders consisted of the 57th (Indian) Rifles, the 3rd King's African Rifles, the Gold Coast Regiment, a half


* Lettow has made an obvious mistake in dates in his account, p. 156.

battalion of Kashmir Imperial Service troops, the machine guns of the Royal North Lancs. and the 129th Baluchis, a battery of South African 13-pounders and the 27th Mountain (Indian) Battery. All at a very low strength and much exhausted. The fight continued throughout the 10th and 11th, during the night of which the 29th Punjabis reinforced Hannington after a forced march on practically empty stomachs. On the 12th, Lettow began to withdraw his companies, though the fight continued till nightfall without any appreciable advance on our part. On the 13th, the enemy was found to have withdrawn from the Duthumi river to the Mgeta. On the 14th, the enemy withdrew to the south of the Mgeta where Lettow concentrated his force in an entrenched camp covering his line of retreat on Kibambawe. The way was now open for Enslein to pass by the north of Kissaki. The attack on the enemy's new position was, however, not pressed—

“ as our men were exhausted and worn out with ceaseless fighting and marching for several weeks through most difficult country on half rations or less, and a thorough rest was imperatively necessary, not only on military but also on medical grounds.” *

Were the honours with Smuts, or with Lettow? Smuts had failed to prevent Lettow retreating south of the Central railway and had failed to bring him to book at Kissaki. If casualties include the numbers lost from sickness and exhaustion, then our casualties far exceeded those suffered by the enemy. Although Lettow's force was committed for the autumn and winter to the unhealthy Rufiji valley instead of being in the Mahenge uplands, our troops were similarly situated and suffered more in proportion owing to the increasing difficulties in the way of forwarding supplies. General Smuts claims that it was Van Deventer's move on Kilossa that thwarted Lettow from his intention to retreat on Mahenge. It would appear, rather, that Lettow voluntarily gave up that line of retreat because he could not get away his large accumulation of stores at Morogoro except by the road east of the Uluguru. It is thought that he missed an opportunity of dealing a blow at Van Deventer during the second week of August, but the opportunity would never have been his if Smuts had displayed less inactivity during the second half of July. Whatever the reason which forced Lettow to retreat on Kissaki rather than on Mahenge, it would seem that Smuts misread the situation on the 26th of August, and was not justified in hoping to bring the campaign to

* See General Smuts' despatch of the 17th of October, 1916, para. 43.



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an end by a further pursuit through the Uluguru mountains. He should have been contented that Lettow was in the Kissaki area and not in the Mahenge area ; that alone was a great advantage because the lines of supply in future operations would be far shorter and easier to maintain than if large forces had had to be directed towards Mahenge. In view of the state of the transport and of the troops, operations south of the Central railway could not be effective until the Central railway was available as a line of supply with Dar es Salaam as a base. Dar es Salaam was not occupied till the 4th of September and it was not till the 6th of October that the rail track was made available for even the temporary expedient of adapting motor tractors with trailers ; it was much later before it was possible to run trains.

THE STUDY OF MILITARY HISTORY

BY LIEUT.-COLONEL E. C. ANSTEY, D.S.O., R.F.A.

THE first piece of advice usually given to a would-be military student is "Read little and think much." It is liable to leave the recipient impressed with its value, but bewildered how to begin. If he reads a volume of military history and sits down to think, thoughts seem shy of coming and a feeling of helplessness creeps in. Many a student takes refuge in consequence with the crammer and is lost. This may appear sweeping in its condemnation of a class of men that includes within its ranks able, well-read and practical soldiers. Nevertheless, it is true because the crammer in preparing notes for his pupils is doing the very work the performance of which offers the only road to sound military knowledge. He may pass them through their examinations, but he is not making good soldiers of them. He is doing his pupils' thinking for them and serving up the results in a concentrated form. Not only is such concentrated food of necessity undigested, but the results are not always complete or sound. The notes produced recently by one of the most successful of the London crammers on the battle of Le Cateau consisted of a *résumé* of the dispositions and movements of both sides followed by half a page of comments. Of these comments only two were worth the trouble of writing; they were half truths and missed the essentials, while the most important lessons of all were omitted. Yet had these lessons been complete in all respects the value to the reader would have been small compared with the benefit he would have acquired from deductions born of his own investigations. The beginner is liable to feel the task beyond him. But the matter is not too difficult for him if it is tackled in the right way. This article is an attempt to show one way by which officers can approach the study of military history and tactics without any other assistance than that offered by the Regulations.

What exactly are the results that should be obtained? The student should acquire such a familiarity with the principles of the military art, coupled with an appreciation of the nature of the

conditions in which they have to be applied in war, that when the test comes, whether on service or in examination, he should be able to give due weight to all the factors concerned and to arrive at a sound conclusion.

Now the principles of strategy and tactics are concisely and admirably put in "Field Service Regulations." Whether one agrees with all the teaching those volumes contain or not, one accepts them as the doctrine of war laid down for the British Army. F.S.R. is the Bible of the British officer, and an intimate knowledge of its contents is his requisite. But in itself it is not sufficient. It forms the basis of the student's thinking. It is not so much the principles contained in it that require consideration as their application. Pegs are required on which the principles can be hung up and thoroughly examined. These pegs are supplied by military history. In short, the record of military operations must be read side by side with F.S.R. Comment is thus guided into the right channels; principles are impressed on the mind, not as separate lifeless texts, but in association with actual events; and the events themselves, absorbed as pale but useful substitutes for experience, link themselves to the principles which they respect or ignore.

It has already been pointed out that an intimate knowledge of F.S.R. is the military student's first requisite. Until that has been acquired the study of a campaign should not be attempted. The second volume of F.S.R. should be taken, and, for the purpose the writer now has in view, special attention should be paid to chapters VII, *et seq.* When each chapter has been read it should be worked through a second time, the most important words and passages being underlined. When the chapter is looked over a third time the markings catch the eye and the words are impressed on the mind. These markings also assist in subsequent references to important passages the student may wish to find.

The following example will show what is meant by important words and passages. Page 150 is part of the section on the "Advance to the Battlefield." The student might underline lines 3-5 "should take the form of independent squadrons or smaller bodies detached on special missions." Line 9 "unlikely" and line 11 "a definite plan." This draws attention to the fact that although a commander should have some plan in his head, it is improbable that he can receive any detailed information at this early stage in an operation.

In section 109, para. 2, "commanders of columns should be well forward, usually with their advanced guards," might be underlined

and have a cross-reference to para. 107 (1) where the necessity for personal supervision is mentioned and section 73 (p. 112) which deals with the personal reconnaissance of commanders of all forces of the size of a corps or less. Such cross-references will be found later to be of value.

Some may prefer to mark other passages than the above. The consideration of what to underline is of itself of value. It is part of the thought the student has been enjoined to practise. He may mark sentences because they are fresh to him in the thought they contain, or because he feels that he is liable to forget them, or in view of the inherent importance of the principles they express.

The subject of cross-references mentioned above points to a further desirability for acquiring familiarity with F.S.R. Without wearisome repetition every aspect of the military art cannot be exhaustively dealt with in one place. Thus the action of cavalry before a battle is concerned partly with reconnaissance, partly with protection and finally with the employment of mounted troops in battle. References will be found, therefore, under all these headings. The index cannot be so complete as to contain all references without being unwieldy. The task of noting such cross-references imposed upon the student by treating F.S.R. in the way the present writer suggests will repay its performance many times over.

Familiarity with F.S.R. having thus been acquired, a student is ready to begin the study of some campaign. What is the object he should have in view? It is not merely to trace out the course of events in a campaign in a strictly historical sense, or to become capable of enumerating a string of dates, important marches and battles, losses and captures. He is searching mainly for illustrations of the principles of war and for starting-points for particular trains of thought. This does not mean that the whole of the volume he picks up need not be read or that it will be sufficient to dip at random in its pages. Events must be traced attentively from the beginning. For they are interrelated in many ways and the light shed on them by that which has gone before provides the setting in which they should be viewed.

It is now necessary to decide how military history can best be studied in conjunction with F.S.R. Let the student take the first volume of the "Official History of the Great War" which is available in all military libraries and is also obtainable from lending libraries or from the United Service Institutions. The first 46 pages lead up to the British entry into France and in

studying them, particular attention should be paid to the French plan and to the situation as it stood on the 20th of August. If the student continues reading to page 61 (end of chapter II), *i.e.*, twelve pages dealing with the operations of the British Army, he has still read but little. How will F.S.R. help him to think much?

The section in F.S.R. entitled "The Advance to the Battlefield" may recur to his mind and he should turn to it. Para. 1 reads, "An army advances on its concentration area covered by the advanced guards of its several columns, and by an advanced protective force of mobile troops; or a general advanced guard in which all arms will be represented." From Operation Order No. V (App. 10) he will have seen that the British commander decided on the protective force of cavalry and not on a general advanced guard. What were the arguments influencing this decision? To discover these arguments, the student must examine the situation as it presented itself on the morning of the 20th of August, and this is a task he might set himself. His first step will be to draw up a diagram indicating the position of both the Allies and also of the Germans, not as they were, but as they were believed to be at that date.


It may be objected at this point that the volume of the Official History gives insufficient detail to allow of such a diagram being drawn accurately. It is true that from the scope of the work condensation was unavoidable. Let it be remembered, however, that great historical accuracy is not the student's first aim. He is seeking material for thought. Problems which will serve to make clear to him the particular doctrines of war adopted by the British Army and to illustrate its principles are his *desiderata*. He should not hesitate, therefore, to make justifiable assumptions as to what was or was not known. But, in consequence of this, he should not adopt a too critical attitude of the commander responsible for the action which he is considering. He is ignorant of a mass of detail that was before the commander at the time, and, without a full knowledge of the aspect of the situation as it was presented to the general who issued the orders, sound criticism is impossible. The student is dealing with a problem that is only based on actualities. But the value he will draw from his labour is none the less great, and the lessons to be deduced need not be unsound.

The assumption with which it seems fair to start is that British Headquarters on the morning of the 20th of August was tolerably well informed of the position of the troops composing the French Fifth Army. It appears probable also that the situation in Belgium

was known. Page 48 shows that, on the 19th, the British airmen reported Brussels, Tournai and Courtrai, and the country between those places and Maubeuge where their aerodrome was located, clear of the enemy. On pp. 34 and 35 it is stated that, by the 18th, it was certain that the German II, IV and IX Corps, covered by the 2nd and 4th Cavalry Divisions, were opposite the Belgian left between Diest and Tirlemont, whilst the Guard, X and VII Corps were marching against the Belgian right on a front from Jodoigne to Namur. The active corps were being followed by seven reserve corps. On the evening of the 18th, the Belgian divisions were withdrawn from the Gette. On the 19th, one of the above-mentioned reserve corps and the XI Corps appeared before Namur. On the 16th of August General Joffre had said (p. 38) that, "In the north 7 or 8 German army corps and four cavalry divisions are endeavouring to pass westward between Givet and Brussels and even beyond these points." The position of the French Fifth Army, on the morning of the 20th, is given on page 39.

From this data can be constructed the following diagram :

POSITIONS AS KNOWN TO THE BRITISH COMMANDER ON THE MORNING OF THE 20TH OF AUGUST, 1914.



The task of the British Army (bottom of p. 38) was to move up on the left of the French Fifth Army "so as to hold in check any German forces that might advance from the Meuse and so gain time to allow the attack of the Third and Fourth Armies to become effective." The student must refer to the instructions which Sir John French had received from the British Government. Enough data will then be before him to allow him to draft an appreciation on which march orders could be based and the decision reached as to the distribution of troops.

In studying this situation the difficult position in which the British found themselves must be borne in mind. They were taking part in a plan for which they were not responsible. The student must distinguish between General Joffre's plan for the destruction of the German right in which the British were to fit in finally between the French Fifth Army and the Belgians on the one hand, and the plan for the movement from the concentration area up into line with the French. This is the plan with which he is immediately concerned. But he cannot prevent his thoughts turning for a few moments to the major plan. For a glance at the diagram he has just drawn shows that General Joffre's plan had already, by the 20th, gone awry. Looking at map 1 of the Official History he sees that the Germans on the 17th of August had reached the positions in which the French appear to have pictured them when the British Army should have completed its advance and turned eastward. The British in fact could not have joined hands with the Belgians on the Gette before the 24th. Thus the French plan was seven days out in its conception of the situation with which it was designed to deal. This must have been apparent to the British when they advanced on the 21st, but there was no choice before them other than to move up into line with the Fifth Army and to cooperate as best they could. The obligation of maintaining touch with that Army and prolonging its line constricted their advance to a definite direction.


Now the system of marching concentrated behind a general advanced guard* is part of a theory of war of which the tactical counter-part is discussed in F.S.R. section 110, para. 2. A part of the troops engages in a preparatory action while the remainder are kept in hand to deliver the decisive blow when the enemy's dispositions have disclosed themselves. It is a theory that before 1914 was sometimes ascribed to the French school of war in

* The strategical advanced guard, admirably exemplified by the Jena Campaign, 1806.


distinction from that held by the Germans. Without discussing the respective theories further, it may be said that the conditions under which the British were acting forbade any attempt at strategical manœuvre. A general advanced guard offered, therefore, no advantages while the organization of the Expeditionary Force in two corps of two divisions was likewise unsuitable for such a distribution of troops.

The march orders to be issued on the 20th of August had to provide for the movement northward of the British Army in such a way as to bring it into line with the French Fifth Army and then to begin a wheel eastward. The two British corps having been concentrated in depth, one south of the other, there were two ways in which this could have been done. The leading corps might move into line with the French and the other corps be brought up on its left, or the leading corps might move direct to the outer flank and the rear corps be brought up on its right in touch with the French, when a simultaneous wheel would bring them into line facing east. A sketch may make this clearer.

METHOD A.




METHOD B.



It will be seen that method "A" would take longer to complete the movement as the rear corps had farther to march, but it provided for connection with the French being established at the earliest possible moment. Method "B" gave each corps the same distance to march and was thus quicker to complete the movement, but took longer to establish touch with the Fifth Army. Thus "A" was safer, but slower. "B" might produce an embarrassing situation

if the enemy attacked during its execution or if the French retired, two eventualities which, as is shown in chapter II of the History actually occurred. It was evidently considered at G.H.Q. that rapidity of advance into line was of first importance and method "B" was selected. Note, however, the situation which arose on the evening of the 21st when the position was as follows :



Enghien to Mons is less than twenty miles. If the moves as ordered were continued on the 22nd, the II Corps would reach Mons with the heads of German columns perhaps five miles away ; the I Corps would have its heads of columns on the line Maubeuge—Bavai ; and the 5th Cavalry Brigade would be in touch with the enemy in the fourteen miles' gap between General Sordet's cavalry and the II Corps. It was a difficult situation enhanced by the inherent weakness of independent Allied commands. The need for one commander for the Anglo-French left wing was a crying one.*

It is not the purpose of the writer to examine in detail the strategical problem thus presented. It is worth turning, however, to F.S.R., section 103—"The decision to offer battle"—to recall the words "If the situation be temporarily unfavourable for (offensive action) it is wiser to manœuvre for a more suitable opportunity." The situation could not have presented itself to an Allied left wing commander in any other light than a highly unfavourable one.

* It is interesting to observe that the necessity for united command should have become apparent in the first fortnight of the war, whereas it took three years and eight months to become an established fact.

Assuming that such a commander had had under his orders the French Fifth Army, General Sordet's cavalry, the B.E.F., and the French Territorial divisions in the neighbourhood, what manœuvre could he have adopted? It was patent that the Germans were attempting to outflank the Allies. In spite of French miscalculations, the object of the Allied left wing was still to hold the Germans opposing them until the attack of the French Third and Fourth Armies developed. To do that the Allies must ensure that they were not outflanked and the safest precaution to take, if it were possible, would be to outflank the enemy. As no fresh troops were immediately available, the line could be extended westward in three ways (a) by straightening it out where it was distorted, *i.e.*, in the Charleroi-Dinant-Givet salient; (b) by making use of defended localities, namely Maubeuge; and (c) by economizing troops by using ground difficult for the enemy to attack over, such as the defile between Maubeuge and the Forest of Mormal and the forest itself. It is an interesting speculation, therefore, to consider what might have happened had the French Fifth Army been withdrawn from the awkward salient in which it found itself to a straight line from Givet to Maubeuge (inclusive), about forty miles for thirteen divisions (including three reserve divisions), of which seven miles were within the Maubeuge defences; the Maubeuge—Forest of Mormal defile and the forest entrusted to Sordet's cavalry; and the B.E.F., aligned from the forest towards Cambrai (eighteen miles). The weak spot in this distribution would have been the Forest of Mormal. For the French cavalry was not trained in defensive action to the same pitch as the British cavalry. It might perhaps have been strengthened by the units of the 4th Division as they came up. The rôle of the Allies would have been a delaying one and experience soon showed what remarkable delaying power the British divisions possessed. What might not have happened had both British corps, fresh and unwearied, met and outflanked the German forces west of the Forest of Mormal which, as events turned out, were hit so hard by one corps at Le Cateau?

The temptation to interest oneself in the "might-have-been" is a constant one in studying past operations. It is one that must be resisted. The student must strive to keep his gaze turned to the future and not to the past. The question he must put to himself is whether the plan sketched out above would be a sound one in the present conditions of armament and organization. Does not the modern tank reduce the defensive power which skill with the rifle and in the selection of positions conferred on the

British in 1914? This is a problem connected with the defensive in warfare which will be better dealt with when a defensive action is being considered. The train of thought started by para. 1 of section 108 has led the writer far enough. With a resolution to return to a consideration of the possibilities of the above plan in connection with delaying tactics, he must now pass on to a further examination of the approach march.

The advanced protective force of mobile troops must now be considered. As the primary rôle of that force is a protective one, the student must turn for enlightenment to the Protection chapter in which section 80 deals with the protective screen. It will be noted that the combination of cavalry and aircraft referred to in para. 1 is a post-war development. In 1914 they acted independently. What proportion of the available aircraft should have been allotted to the cavalry division, and how should they have been used? Until the Air Force training manuals are available, there is little guidance to be found in F.S.R. on these points. Nevertheless, it is worth the student's while to devote some consideration to the subject, and some assistance will be found in F.S.R. section 80, para. 5.

Para. 2 of section 80 explains the orders which a cavalry commander should receive from his army commander. At a first glance the expression "will be given a free hand as regards the manner in which these orders are carried out" conveys the impression that the army commander should say to his cavalry leader, "Go in front and protect me while I march my army from there to there," and leaves it at that. The orders to be given to the cavalry often provide a stumbling block in tactical schemes. They are either insufficient or interfering. The happy mean is hard to hit.

Operation Order No. 5 (Official History) lays down the area the cavalry is to move to each day and the location of its headquarters; the roads to be used; the outpost line to be taken up; and when the division is to be withdrawn. Was that too much or too little? or was it correct?

Section 80 of F.S.R. does not say what the nature of the orders given to the cavalry commander should be. For further enlightenment reference must be made, therefore, to the manual of the arm concerned. "Cavalry Training," vol. ii, section 4, which deals with the protective rôle of cavalry is of no assistance in the matter. The student must turn to the Protection chapter (p. 51), and there he will find in section 22, para. 4, that "Protective troops should be given definite instructions as to the direction in which they are to move, the distance to which they are to go, the time

at which they are to return and the position they are to occupy when at rest." These are the very points dealt with in Operation Order No. 5 so far as the cavalry is concerned. The proximity of other troops, including French, made it very necessary also to limit the use of roads. These points apply moreover to a squadron covering a brigade as well as to a division covering an army. Should the student ever be asked to give orders to protective cavalry, will not the movement of the cavalry from the 20th to the 21st of August, 1914, spring to his mind and recall the points on which instructions should be given? Such is one of the advantages to be drawn from a systematic study of actual operations.

The student has been led through a considerable train of thought from the starting-point furnished by para. 1, of section 108, and must return to the remaining paras. of that section. Paras. 2, 3 and 4 refer to the struggle for information and to the cooperation of the air force and the cavalry in that struggle. But it has been noted that in 1914 that cooperation was not fully understood and, therefore, no examples can be found of the precepts now laid down in the F.S.R. The student, consequently, must try to make some comparison between the information actually gained and the methods employed to obtain it during the approach march on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the information which might be obtained to-day in similar circumstances if the cooperation and the methods were brought up to date.

The information actually obtained was remarkably good, very much better than that placed by their cavalry and aircraft before the German commanders. This was due to the Belgian contact with the Germans having produced identifications; to the assistance rendered by a friendly population; and to the superiority of the British over the German cavalry. Recourse must be made once more to the diagram as an aid to study and to the information gained on the 21st and again on the 22nd. Was there any further information of importance for the British commander to know and could any steps have been taken to obtain it?

It is obvious that the most important thing of all was to ascertain how far westward the German flank extended. Should cavalry and aircraft have been dispatched on a special mission to clear up this point? What was the reason for their not having been so dispatched?

There must always be some conflict between the requirements of protection and reconnaissance. The importance of early and accurate information being so great, it might be argued that the

protection of the Army could have been left with safety to the advanced guards of the divisions and the whole of the cavalry been released for reconnoitring duties. Turning for help to "Cavalry Training" a glance at the contents shows that section 2 deals with the subdivision of cavalry duties, and in para. 4 one answer is found to these questions. If the first consideration is to cover a concentration or to conceal movements from the enemy, the greater part of the cavalry will be employed on protective duties. To conceal the whereabouts of the British forces was of great importance and it is now known that the Germans were kept in the dark most successfully. It will be remembered (pages 60 and 61 of the Official History) that a whole corps moving on Mons was halted for two hours because a report from Tournai was thought to refer to the British, and that, on the evening of the 22nd, von Kluck thought it possible that he might have had only cavalry in front of him at Mons.

Nevertheless, some detachments could have been spared on special missions. Reading further into section 2 of "Cavalry Training" it will be found (para. 5) that the main factor governing the question is the time factor. Will the detachment collect its information and transmit it to headquarters in time for the dispositions of an army to be altered if required? A little consideration will show that it is very doubtful whether cavalry dispatched on a detour to the westward in 1914 would have located the German right in time to be of use. It is true that motor cyclists were available for transmitting reports, but to-day wireless or aeroplanes could be used instead. In 1914 the delaying power of a small force was so great (*vide* the Scots Greys at Binche and Péronne) that delays to the progress of a reconnoitring detachment were inevitable. Would the modern adjuncts of armoured cars, tanks and aircraft make such a reconnaissance as is being considered more feasible than it was under the conditions of August, 1914?

The student must see what "Cavalry Training" has to say on the subject of special missions. Section 3 points out that the strength of reconnoitring detachments must be as low as possible, but, if a large body of cavalry is employed, aircraft, armoured cars and tanks will be normally attached. The employment of these arms with cavalry is discussed in chapters XI, XII and XIII. The cars can be used as feelers in advance of the cavalry or as pivots of manœuvre. Tanks are of value to restore mobility to dismounted cavalry. Negative information provided by aeroplanes is of no value until confirmed by cavalry. Such are the principal points to be extracted from the above chapters. It must also be noted what F.S.R.

says about the use of aircraft on such occasions (section 71, para. 7), and the general comments on land reconnaissance in section 72.

After reading those passages the following conception of the execution of a special mission can be obtained. First, to obtain the required information, the hostile screening troops may either be burst through or be avoided by a detour round the flanks. In such a situation as that of August, 1914, all the available cavalry supported by infantry in motor lorries, cars, tanks, artillery and aircraft would have been required to break through the cavalry covering the German front opposite the British. If the German cavalry were disposed in depth (as it has since been learnt it was) protective cavalry should be employed, as the operation would entail hard fighting and a difficult withdrawal. But as the object of the mission was to find the location of the German flank, a detour round the opposing cavalry would seem more promising. In this case the student should picture a preliminary reconnaissance by aircraft while the detachment is moving to a convenient starting point on the flank. If possible a temporary landing ground is selected and marked near this starting point. The air report shows roads A, B, C and D full of enemy troops, but roads E and F apparently empty. The object of the cavalry is now to confirm, not the use by the enemy of the road D, but the emptiness of E and F. If that is so, then the flank has been located. The cavalry commander selects the routes he will move by and the length of his bound. The aircraft carry out a close reconnaissance of those routes and are followed by armoured cars supplied with wireless to receive the air reports; the cavalry pushes on as fast as possible with the tanks well up ready to brush aside any opposition; and so the process is repeated next day until, after a detour of say fifty miles, roads E and F are struck; the result communicated by air or by wireless and the return journey begun.

It will be seen what an important part in the operation is played by the air force.* It seems indisputable that in future land operations will be prefaced by a struggle for air supremacy. Should our air-power be seriously crippled in that struggle, it is doubtful whether a special mission of the scope now being discussed, in which rapidity of execution was of primary importance, could be undertaken at all. But assuming that the battle in the air has not gone unfavourably for us, would an attempt to locate the enemy's flank by means of a special mission be sound in similar conditions to those of the

* See the last sentence of F.S.R., section 108, para. 4.

20th of August, 1914? It will be remembered that, on the 20th, air reconnaissance had not proved any German movement southward from the Brussels area. It was believed at French Headquarters that if the enemy did wheel southward he would not extend much west of Mons. Our cavalry detachment might, therefore, have selected Condé or St. Amand as a suitable starting point to make for, well clear of the flank. The student might suppose this force to have consisted of a regiment of cavalry, a light armoured car detachment, a tank section (4 tanks) with some carrier tanks * and a flight of aeroplanes. It moved off from its concentration area at daylight on the 21st. The morning was foggy and air reconnaissance was not possible, until the afternoon. After the point selected (Condé or St. Amand) had been reached the air report was received (see p. 51 "Official History") locating three German cavalry divisions and the main German line from Grammont through Enghien, Nivelles, Genappes, Sombreffe to Charleroi.

Thus the question to be decided on the morrow was whether the roads running north and south through Leuze and Tournai were clear or not. As is now known our detachment would have found itself, on the 22nd, in the midst of one of von der Marwitz's divisions. But presuming that it succeeded in eluding or breaking through the enemy, it could not have been in possession of the required information before the afternoon. If its reports had been in the hands of the army commander within the hour, would it have been in time to permit of any modification in the plan? Was it so superior to that already in his hands as to be worth the risks of the detachment in obtaining it?

The answers to both these questions are in the negative. The consideration of the reasons for this conclusion is a good example of the type of thinking the student requires to engage in and a serious reader will doubtless pause here to ponder over the problem for himself before proceeding further.

As regards a modification of the plan, it will be remembered that the writer has already noticed how restricted the British Army commander was in the choice of manœuvre open to him. The location of the enemy's flank would in most cases influence the front on which to deploy. But the British were tied by their right and could not deploy farther to their left. Had they been operating in isolation against an opponent of similar strength, moreover, the evening of the 22nd would have been too late for substantial modification of deployment. For the rear corps was already

* See "Cavalry Training," section 85, para. 6.

committed to a movement into line on the right of the II Corps. The location of the flank of a large army advancing rapidly by day against a force which is itself advancing quickly is evidently not a feasible object for a special mission.

If it is true, however, that information obtained from the air must be supplemented by land reconnaissance, how does it come about that our imaginary detachment was unable to add materially to the information already available at British headquarters? The explanation evidently is that in 1914 European armies had not learnt to conceal themselves from the air in the way that future conditions will impose upon them. "The moves (of units and formations moving up for battle) should be made at night." * While, to ensure complete concealment and to obtain surprise, "It will be necessary to carry out the deployment under cover of darkness." † Under such conditions information obtained from the air will of necessity be more fragmentary than formerly and confirmation by land, therefore, becomes essential. Further, the postponement of the day's march to the night may give the cavalry a gain of twelve hours in which to render its report. If the moves of the 22nd had not been due to take place until the night of the 22nd-23rd, reports received from reconnoitring detachments during the afternoon would have been in time for a modification to have been made. For the II Corps would still have been abreast of Maubeuge and the I Corps in rear of it.

Finally, it must be noticed that the primary protective duties of the advanced mobile troops did not preclude them from dispatching small reconnoitring parties to gain touch with the enemy from which valuable information and identification were received. This in fact is laid down in section 80, para. 3, as being one of the duties of the protective screen.

The moment has now been reached when first contact with the enemy is established. Reference to the section on that subject (section 109) in F.S.R. will show that the line of investigation starts from its paragraphs dealing with the composition of columns and leads through a consideration of the correct location of tanks, gas and other army units to the general distribution of supply and other rearward services. If the student will prepare a rough diagram of the whole of the Expeditionary Force, reconstituted in accordance with present establishments, he will find it of great value. The writer will return to this in a moment.

Enough has been said to guide the reader in the further study

* See F.S.R., section 3, para. 3.

† *Ibid.*, para. 5.

of military history on the lines here sketched out. A future article may assist him in applying the method to the study of the principles of attack and defence. In the meanwhile a few words may be added on the limitations a beginner should impose upon himself and on the expansion of the method to which the more advanced student should progress.

It must be repeated that the present article is limited to a procedure designed to impress the principles of war contained in F.S.R., in a living form, on the mind of the student. The principles laid down in F.S.R. are compiled under restrictions imposed by the existing organization, armament and equipment of the British Army. In studying them the student is studying the tactics of to-day. It is rightly laid down that all instruction and training are to be kept strictly within the bounds of present-day tactics. But that does not exempt soldiers from thinking deeply and continuously about the tactics of to-morrow. If tactics based on our present armament are termed the tactics of to-day, the tactics of to-morrow must be based on an organization, armament and equipment advanced to the furthest points of progress now imaginable with any certainty. Conditions imposed by imaginary inventions as yet unborn will create the tactics of to-day after to-morrow.

Once the principles of F.S.R. have been mastered, the student will find a field of absorbing interest in travelling once more over the ground he has studied and in considering the modifications to be brought about by expanded and perfected organizations and armaments which now exist only in an embryonic or half-developed stage. A brief example must suffice.

Turn to the diagram of the British Expeditionary Force, on the 23rd of August, 1914, referred to above, with its twenty-five miles of front, its ten miles' depth of fighting forces, its hundred and a hundred and eighty miles of tails stretching back to Boulogne and Havre. Picture large fleets of tanks and aircraft in the field with radii of action and capabilities as extensive as those we now know are attainable.

What will be the modifications imposed upon that diagram? As has been said above, however, such problems are for the advanced student and not for the beginner. The student who decides to begin or to continue his study of war should be urged to confine himself to the mastery of the principles of war of to-day as elucidated in our manuals and F.S.R. before being tempted to venture into more ambitious fields.

SOME FURTHER REFLECTIONS ON THE RECENT OLYMPIC GAMES *

BY BRIGADIER-GENERAL R. J. KENTISH, C.M.G., D.S.O. (Member
of the International Olympic Council and Honorary Secretary,
British Olympic Association)

*His Majesty's message to the British team, read out to them by H.R.H. the
Prince of Wales, 5th of July, 1924.*

"As Patron of the British Olympic Association I wish all possible success to our members who are competing in the Olympic Games to be held in Paris. I am very glad that it is possible for the Prince of Wales and Prince Henry to be present on this occasion.

"Whatever may be the results of the contests, I know that the demands on your strength, skill and endurance will be met with that spirit of pluck and good sportsmanship so traditional of the British Race.

"5th of July, 1924.

"GEORGE, R.I."

IN the October issue of this Journal I told of the reasons that had prompted me to respond to the request of the Editors to write my impressions of the Olympic Games in Paris, one of those reasons being my desire to assist any Army institution such as the *Army Quarterly*, and the other being my desire to tell of the ideals and objects of the movement radiating round the Games, and in doing so to answer in the limited space available the adverse criticism of the Games by a certain section of the English Press. Judging from the many letters which I have received since the article appeared and from the many remarks expressed to me verbally, it would appear that it has fulfilled its purpose, and for this I am grateful. Those, who had time to read my article, will remember that, in scouting the very idea of the Olympic Games coming to an end or of Great Britain withdrawing because one or two incidents of a regrettable nature had occurred, I said that I had written to Sir Robert Baden-Powell, the Chief Scout, to ask him to give me his views on the subject and also permission to publish his answer. In writing to him, I briefly outlined what had happened in Paris, and the question I put to him was whether, if similar incidents had occurred in August last at the International Jamboree in Copenhagen, he would have counselled that the Boy Scout movement

* An article by the same author, dealing with the ideals and objects of the Olympic Games, appeared in the *Army Quarterly*, October, 1924.

should come to an end, or alternately that our Boy Scouts should take no further part in the international side of the movement? The following is his reply :—

“ I cordially agree to your suggestion of working in closer communication between the Olympic Games and the Scout movement, but I must consult my International Committee before doing anything officially in the matter.

“ I am very glad you have put forward the true idea of international feeling at the Olympic Games. In view of the unfortunate impression created by the *Times* criticism (which, as you see, also took me in), I only hope that you will put the right view before the public with the greatest publicity possible.

“ I think the sentiments you assign to me are just those which I feel.

“ I had, as a matter of fact, told our boys before they went to the International Competition at Copenhagen, that I hoped they would not win, as I wanted them rather to show to other nations how to *lose* in a sportsmanlike way. And I told them that they had to remember that the competitions were not devised to show that one nation was better than another, but to bring nations together in keenly contested games. For in this way they would gain mutual respect—and respect is the first and most important foundation of friendship.

“ Mutual International Friendship was the aim of our Jamboree. So I think you will see that we were working entirely on the lines that you would wish.

“ Forgive me for dealing so briefly with this great question, but so soon as I am fit I should like to go into it more fully with you.”

Colonel Ronald Campbell, known to thousands inside and outside the Army, and not only known to, but beloved by all regardless of rank, creed or class, has written :—

“ Many thanks for your letter and the article on the Olympic Games and the movement generally. It is excellent, and a long way the best I have ever read on the subject, every word is to the point and every sentence drives home a lesson or a truth and scores a point.

“ Every honest person with common sense or an inkling of imagination, who knows what we are driving at, must realize the magnitude and possibilities of such a movement, and as a world force it is as great, if not greater, than the Boy Scouts. Every impartial person, who counts for anything, must know or will realize in a very short time that the Boxing and Fencing incidents were nothing in comparison to the good done by the other sports. The incidents will do good, for it will show the world that the International Olympic Committee is a power with a punch and cannot be over-ridden or treated in a high-handed way. Play, next to fighting, is the greatest of the world's dynamics.”

And so it is, we find men of every walk of life, such as the Chief Scout, John Galsworthy, H. G. Wells, Ronald Campbell and others,

all bearing testimony to the international value of sport and strongly supporting any movement that encourages the young men of this country to leave their shores to mingle and to mix with those of other countries, making friendships which last for ever.

With this I leave this subject, and in the following lines I propose to touch briefly first on the organization of the movement, then the steps which the Directorate has already taken in the case of those who offend against the tenets of sportsmanship, and finally I propose to tell of the doings of the British team in Paris.

Organization.—First, as regards the organization of the Olympic movement: the supreme body is the International Olympic Committee, consisting of a President, the Baron Pierre de Coubertin, the distinguished Frenchman, who in 1894 founded the movement, and who is responsible for its marvellous growth throughout the world, and of some sixty odd members representing some fifty odd countries, and each one of whom is a man of power and influence in his own country. This Committee meets once yearly and deals with every question of a non-technical nature. Helping it and preparing the way for its discussions is an Executive Committee, which consists of the following: President, the Baron Pierre de Coubertin (France); Vice-President, the Baron Godefroy de Blonay (Switzerland); Members, the Count Henri de Baillet-Latour (Belgium); the Marquis Melchior de Polignac (France); M. Edstrom (Sweden); and myself. This Committee meets as often as is necessary, and is really responsible for the whole of the executive work of the International Committee. Then affiliated to the supreme body are (a) the National Olympic Associations of some fifty odd countries, and (b) the International Federations, which direct and control each great sport throughout the world, and which, it should here be stated, are entirely responsible for the efficient organization and conduct of their own particular sport at each recurring Olympiad. Here, then, is a brief outline of the organization of the movement.

The Educative Side.—With regard to any disciplinary action which can and ought to be taken if and when any incident of a regrettable nature occurs, I would point out as clearly as possible that on the principle that "prevention is better than the cure," full pressure is now, and for the first time, being brought to bear on the National Olympic Associations, to take a far more active part in what might be called the educative side of the Games as opposed to the technical side, on which up to date their activities have been centred. And this pressure is being brought to bear by the International Olympic

Committee, chiefly because the responsibility for the proper conduct of the Games rests on that body, whose duty it is to see that this important aspect of the Games is understood by every nation. Previously, no steps have been taken to deal with glaring cases of bad sportsmanship, with the result that regrettable incidents have occurred, and have been seized upon by the opponents of the movement, as an excuse for condemning or of urging the discontinuance of the Games. Fortunately, the seriousness of this aspect is now fully recognized, and steps have been taken and will continue to be taken against any offending country. Personally, I have no doubt that as the National Olympic Committees take up and devote time and attention to the educative side of the Games, and as the countries realize that the International Olympic Committee is also sitting up and, as we say, taking notice, these incidents will gradually grow fewer and finally disappear. It is well that this should be so, because games played in a bad spirit are really not worth while playing; but we must remember that unless a boy is taught what "playing the game" means, he cannot be blamed if he plays his games in the only way in which he has been brought up to play them. And it is on this account that pressure is being brought to bear on the National Olympic Committees and through them on the governing bodies, to devote themselves to the educative side as keenly as they devote themselves to-day to the technical side. And in being able in this respect to influence the education of the youth of every nation, lies the strength of the Olympic movement, because it is a hundred to one that those, who "play the game" on the field of sport, most certainly will "play the game" in the game of life. What further necessity, therefore, is there for me or any one else to discuss the desirability or the soundness or otherwise of the Olympic movement?

THE BRITISH TEAM IN PARIS

The British team sent to Paris was the strongest numerically and possibly the best of any of the teams which have ever left these shores to represent Great Britain at an Olympiad. The team was strong numerically, because the Council decided quite early on, that it would provide the necessary funds for the governing body of every sport in the country, which desired to enter a team for an Olympic championship. In deciding on this policy, it was animated by two reasons, namely, one to show our athletes that no matter what their sport, the British Olympic Association desired to

give them every possible encouragement, and the other to give proof to our Ally, France, of the desire of this country to support her in her efforts to make the VIII Olympiad the greatest possible success, and it was agreed that there could be no better way of showing this, than by sending a full and representative team to represent Great Britain in the Games. Over 400 athletes, drawn from every corner in the country, therefore took part in the many competitions which went to make up the programme of the VIII Olympiad, and it will be readily understood that the preparations for the assembling, the transportation to and from Paris, the accommodation, the feeding and the transport whilst in Paris of a team of this number entailed a vast amount of time and thought on the part of the Directorate. Everything, however, went splendidly, and if the difficulties, due to the fact that the team was distributed over five hotels in different parts of Paris, were far greater from the administrative point of view than they had been in Antwerp, where our team was under one roof, those difficulties were overcome, and in no respect from the administrative point of view can the British Olympic Association be held to have failed.

Turning to the actual performances of our men, I first of all desire to make it quite clear that the British Olympic Association's responsibilities in connection with the British team began and ended with supplying the governing bodies with funds to help them in the selection and training of their men, and then finding them all food, accommodation and transport in Paris.

The first point which calls for mention is the number and nature of the sports which figured on the programme. Enumerated they were as follows : athletics, swimming, boxing, wrestling, fencing, weight lifting, gymnastics, Rugby and Association football, shooting, equestrian sports, lawn tennis, yachting, rowing, polo, cycling, skating and other winter sports, and arts, and in all except Rugby and Association football, Great Britain was represented. Many have asked the reasons why we had no teams in the football competitions? The answer is that in both cases the matches were arranged to take place in what we regard as the close season for football in this country, and in the case of the Association code, the Football Association, in the absence of any assurance or guarantee to the effect that other countries' views on the amateur question were in accordance with those which obtain in this country, declined to have anything to do with the competition. Speaking personally, I am in entire sympathy with the views of the Football Association regarding this question, and I am equally and as strongly

opposed to the game of football, whether at the Olympic Games or elsewhere, being played in the close season.

With regard to those sports in which we did take part I propose to classify them in two categories, namely, (a) those which are popular and, irrespective of class, much practised in England and which have, for this reason, come to be regarded as the national sports of the people; and (b) those which are only practised by a limited section of the community. In the former category I place athletics, boxing, swimming, lawn tennis, cycling and rowing, and in the latter fencing, wrestling, yachting, riding and jumping and polo. Weight lifting, gymnastics, shooting and arts I put in neither category, because they are in my opinion not sports, and I do not think they really ought to find a place in the Olympic programme.

Taking those in the first category, we find that in athletics our men acquitted themselves on the track in a very creditable manner, Abrahams, Liddell and Lowe winning three of the great classic championships of the world, and others being placed in practically every other track event on the programme. This in itself was to our credit and created a most excellent impression amongst the other competing nations. In the field events, however, we were right out of the hunt, Nokes, the Oxford Blue and A.A.A. champion, being third in the hammer and gaining our only place in the eight field events. To find a reason for our continued excellence on the track and our failure in the field events would take up too much space in this article. I merely content myself by stating that in my opinion the system, by which we seek to produce field events men, is wrong, and that until that system is changed we can never hope to achieve any greater success. We shall continue to produce the same number of individual brilliant men of the Jackson, Albert Hill, Butler, Abrahams, Liddell and Lowe type on the track, but unless we put our house in order we shall go on finishing right down the course in the field events. There is in my opinion no reason for this, and I suggest that the time has now arrived, when the Amateur Athletic Association should seriously take the matter up.

Turning to boxing, our men acquitted themselves excellently, as indeed they did at Antwerp when Great Britain finished right at the head of the competing countries, America being a close second. In Paris 28 countries took part and England was just beaten for first place by America. Both Mallin, the policeman, and Mitchell won their respective weights, and Elliott and Mackenzie of Scotland were runners up. Right through the tournament the attitude and

conduct of the British boxers was perfectly correct and an example to all, and if incidents occurred which disgraced the very word sport, we can take credit to ourselves that in no single instance was any member of our team a party to those incidents.

In swimming our men, although doing better than they did in Antwerp, were really outclassed, and only in one event did they secure a place. In the water polo our team, which up to and including the Paris Games had for years been unbeaten in the world of international water polo, met and were defeated by Hungary in the first round ; the score at the end of time was equal, but our opponents were younger men and consequently, when it came to playing the extra time ordered, they lasted better and won. Our ladies did a little better than the men, Miss Morton winning the 200 metres breast stroke with Miss Carson third ; Miss Harding was second in the 100 metres back stroke, and we also obtained two fourth and two fifth places. In the men's diving Clarke of Great Britain secured the third place, and of the ladies Miss White secured sixth place. The reasons for the more or less unsatisfactory results attained by our swimmers are now the subject of earnest consideration on the part of the Amateur Swimming Association, and as I understand the Council proposes to effect several much needed reforms in its system, we can confidently look forward to a general raising of the standard throughout the country.

In lawn tennis, in the men's competitions we achieved no success of any kind, but our ladies acquitted themselves creditably. True it is that Miss McKane, who had just before beaten Miss Helen Wills at Wimbledon, failed to repeat her performance and was knocked out by her rival in the semi-finals, but our ladies, Miss McKane and Mrs. Shepherd Barron, secured second place to the American pair in the doubles.

In cycling our men were almost as much out of the picture as they were in swimming, and in the whole of the events we only secured two places, namely, a second and a third in the 50 kilometres track race. A reason for our lowly position in this sport lies principally in the lack of public interest towards it, for owing to this lack of interest, the few remaining cycle tracks in this country have in the past few years been gradually disappearing, the last to go being the Crystal Palace track. Without efficient and up-to-date tracks I very much doubt whether the sport of track cycling can ever become the popular sport it was some years ago.

Coming to the last of our popular and really national sports, namely, rowing, I think I am correct in stating that we did as well

as could be expected in the circumstances, for in those events in which we entered the best men we had at our disposal, namely, the Third Trinity four in the "fours" and Beresford in the "sculls," Great Britain came out on top, and in those in which we did not enter our best, namely, in the "eights," we were outclassed and beaten by three fine crews, namely, the Americans, who won easily, the Italians and the Canadians.

However, we must, I suppose, be satisfied in winning two first class events, and we must hope that in four years' time, with the Games taking place in August instead of July, no difficulty will be experienced in sending the best men to represent us in every event.

Of the sports in the other category, namely, fencing, yachting, riding and jumping and polo, in the first named our teams and individuals failed to secure a place, although Mr. Edgar Seligman, captain of the British team, worked his way into the final pool of the Foils, but owing to injuries was compelled to scratch. In the ladies' fencing our representatives, Miss Davis and Miss Freeman, did better than the men, two of them entering the final pool and being placed second and fourth respectively.

In wrestling, in spite of the substantial financial assistance afforded the Council of the National Amateur Wrestling Association by the British Olympic Association, and in spite of the enthusiastic efforts of the officials and of the wrestlers themselves during the preparatory period, our men failed to obtain a place in any of the weights. Wrestling in this country has fallen far from the position it once occupied, and it will require much hard work and enthusiasm to restore it to its former popularity.

In yachting, any chance Great Britain might have had of coming out on top in this particular sport disappeared when the Yacht Racing Association failed to enter a boat in the 6 metre class. This, in my opinion, was a most unfortunate decision, for the reason that entirely owing to the direct representation made by our Yacht Racing Association, the French changed the venue of the regatta from the Seine to the open sea at Le Havre, only to find that England did not enter a 6 metre boat, although there are over thirty boats of that class in this country. I think, if only as an act of courtesy to their French yachting friends, our yachting authorities might have raised one of their numerous 6 metre boats and sent it across to compete.

In the polo there is much the same story to tell as has been told of the experiences of England's polo team in America. Only at the eleventh hour was the decision made to send a team to defend

the cup won and held by us ever since 1908, and then the team was not by a very long way the best side that could have been sent. The players arrived two days before their first match, went on to the ground as a team for the first time on the day of the match to play the Americans, and were heavily defeated by them by 10 goals to 2. The American team had been in Paris for over a month and included in its side was Mr. Hitchcock who played for America against England later on in the year. Against the Argentine team England did better, only being beaten by 9 goals to 5, and in the matches against France and Spain our team won by 15 goals to 2 and by 10 goals to 3, respectively. What a splendid thing it would have been if our polo authorities had decided on a team early in the year, entered it in the Champion Cup as a team and then had sent it to Paris again as a team to have competed in the fine Olympic Tournament which was staged at St. Cloud, finally sending the same team to represent us in America! We missed that chance I am sorry to say, and I am equally sorry to have to record the fact that in failing to properly organize our Polo resources for these great international encounters, we have lost much prestige in the world of International Polo.

Turning to the jumping, the officers who represented this country did as well as could be expected in the circumstances, for here again certainly two of our best men, namely, Lieut.-Colonel Malise Graham, 10th Hussars, and Major C. T. Walwyn, Royal Artillery, could not, for military reasons, make the journey. Of the four who composed the team, namely, Lieut.-Colonel Geoffrey Brooke, Major P. Bowden Smith, Capt. B. de Fonblanque and Lieut. C. Brunker, the former was severely handicapped through having to compete with an arm strapped to his side. Major Bowden Smith took the seventh place out of about 40 competitors. In the long distance riding test, which was preceded by the jumping of the Steeple Chase Course at Auteuil, our team acquitted itself with credit. I think I am right in saying that although the officers of other nations come to our Horse Show at Olympia year after year, this is the first occasion on which British officers have gone abroad and taken part in the great Horse Shows of other nations, and it is to be hoped that it will not be the last. Without the foreign officers Olympia would in a sense be a dull affair. Fortunately they come every year, although it has always seemed to me a little wanting in courtesy that we have not before now returned the compliment. However, it was a good thing to see a British Riding and Jumping team in Paris, and I trust that now the ice has been broken, every

encouragement will be given in the future to our officers to compete abroad.

There only remains that small group of events, which appeared on the programme in Paris, but which I personally cannot bring myself to think ought to be included in the programme at all. I refer to shooting, weight lifting, gymnastics and arts. But they were included, and in accordance with its policy the Council supported the entry of our teams in each one of them. Only a small measure of success was obtained, and I doubt very much whether we are justified in supporting these events in the future.

There remains but one more event to tell of, and the performances of the British team in Paris are told. I refer to the Modern Pentathlon, and I have left it to the last purposely because the Army organized and made itself responsible for our representation. This competition is in my opinion essentially one for encouragement in the Army, for the simple reason that five events, which together go to make up the Modern Pentathlon competition, namely, revolver shooting, riding across country, *épée* fencing, swimming, and cross-country running, all have their military uses. In 1920 a combined team from the Army, Royal Navy and Marines and Royal Air Force entered. The members who composed it lacked many essentials during their training, but they acquitted themselves as well as could be expected in the circumstances. This time, however, the organization was much more thorough. A Modern Pentathlon Association, with Lieut.-General Sir Philip Chetwode, G.O.C.-in-Chief Aldershot Command, as President, was formed, and from that Association a strong and representative committee was selected and directed the movement from the headquarters of the Physical Training Branch of the Army at Aldershot. For the first time a Pentathlon Championship was held at which 15 officers and warrant officers competed, and a team was eventually selected. It consisted of the following: Capt. B. G. Horrocks (The Middlesex Regiment), Capt. F. B. Barton (17/21st Lancers), Gentleman Cadet D. T. Young (R.M.C.), and Regimental Sergeant-Major G. Vokins (10th Royal Hussars), and with the following as reserves: Lieut. D. F. O. Scott, Lieut. H. V. Kearon, Lieut. H. N. Charrington and Lieut. W. A. Goddard, proceeded to Paris. Their performance in the competition was a very great improvement on that in 1920, and there is no doubt that now a start has been made and an Association established on a sound footing, our standard will go on improving. I strongly appeal to the Army authorities to encourage this splendid event, especially at the Royal Military College and the

Royal Military Academy, and I do so because I know that if every cadet at those two Colleges is encouraged to make himself even moderately proficient at revolver shooting, riding, cross-country running, swimming and fencing, he will on joining be a very great asset to his unit.

I have told in very general terms of the doings of our men in Paris. They may not sound very thrilling, and, except for our three great wins on the track and our equally great wins in boxing and rowing, I do not think they were very thrilling, and I would go on to say that I do not think they ever will be very thrilling until radical reform takes place in the sports system in this country. I believe that the governing bodies of our sports are at last sitting up and taking notice; and, if they will make up their minds to scrap and to rebuild where necessary, then we may look forward with confidence to the future. If, on the other hand, they will not scrap or rebuild, then we shall continue to occupy the lowly position we occupy to-day in certain sports in comparison with the athletes of other nations. It is the effacing of the individual and the encouraging of the team spirit, which has worked such wonders in the Army, and it is just the same effacement of the individual and the same encouragement of the team, that is required in the world of sport outside the Army.

I trust that I have not laid too much stress on victory or made it appear as the only goal, which the British team went out to gain in Paris. There was another, namely, the promotion of a good feeling between the athletes of this country and those of the other countries assembled in Paris. There is no possible doubt that in this respect our team, with H.R.H. The Prince of Wales at its head and inspired by the message * sent by His Majesty the King and read out to them by the Prince, scored a great—perhaps the greatest—victory of all. No sign or suspicion of bad sportsmanship was shown by a British competitor from start to finish of the Games, and we came away from Paris conscious of the fact that we had done our duty and left behind us just the same impression, which British sportsmen always do and, I am quite sure, always will leave behind them when they leave the field at the close of play.

I cannot conclude without acknowledging through these columns the magnificent response which the Army made to the appeal which the British Olympic Association sent out to the three Services to support it in its efforts to raise the funds required to ensure that

* The message appears at the beginning of this article.

Great Britain should be properly and worthily represented at the Games. Practically every single unit of the Army sent a donation, the majority coming from all ranks, and the total contribution reaching the splendid sum of £1517 6s. 5d. For every contribution received I wrote a line of personal thanks. If, however, any of my letters have gone astray—and I sincerely trust that this is not the case—then I take this opportunity of publicly acknowledging the contribution of every unit which subscribed, and of saying “thank you” to all ranks for their generous support of a movement, which has no other aim or object than that of maintaining the prestige of Great Britain in the world of international sport, and at the same time of bringing the athletes and sportsmen of every country in the world together in friendly rivalry.

As to the future, the next Olympiad will take place in 1928 in Holland, and the X Olympiad will take place in 1932 in America. Before the IX Olympiad comes round, the programme will have undergone a very radical alteration, several sports being taken right out and of those retained the number of events and of the number of competitors in each event being considerably reduced. This will have the effect of bringing the Games to more reasonable and more wieldy proportions, and, as the period during which the competitions are to be held is also to be considerably reduced, the expense will be very greatly lessened, and this, of course, is what all the countries are demanding. The British Olympic Association is at the present moment preparing for 1928. It has good offices at 166, Piccadilly and a sufficient staff. It is backed by the same band of voluntary workers as before and, last but not least, has a good balance at the bank. The prospects were never brighter. This is the only answer I can give to those who have inquired of me if the Olympic Games are going on, and if they are, whether Great Britain will continue to take part. In concluding this article, therefore, I express the hope that when 1928 draws near the Army will in the same generous manner help the British Olympic Association to send to Holland the best team of British athletes this country can produce.

N.B.—I desire to state that the Official Record of the VIII Olympiad, containing many photographs of the games, will be published in the New Year. Any one desirous of obtaining a copy is requested to order it at once from Messrs. Gale & Polden of Aldershot, and at the same time to enclose with the order a postal order or cheque for 6s.

THE EVOLUTION OF AIR-POWER

By "AVION"

I

EVERY nation wishes to increase its air-power.

No country in Europe is at present able to support the necessary expenditure for the maintenance or equipment of a sufficient air force to meet its particular needs, or to satisfy its public as to national security.

What, then, is the best procedure to adopt with regard to the development of air-power on a slender financial basis? It is an answer to this question that the present writer is now endeavouring to suggest.

The comparative strengths of armies are easily arrived at by a mere comparison in numbers: since, apart from questions of national moral, the equipment of armies is so far standardized as to provide a common background to "bayonets."

In the case of navies, the number of ships, by types, is also a fairly reliable guide as to the relative strengths of two opposing fleets. Naval equipment or armament, however, even in ships of the same type, is liable to considerable variation. So that a comparison by numbers has to be modified by technical considerations—speed, weight of broadside, etc.—to a far greater degree than when comparing two armies.

The same considerations apply to air forces. It is in fact obvious that any new arm is necessarily subject to tremendous changes consequent on technical development.

So that if we desire to compare two existing and separate air forces we must not rely too much upon a mere comparison of the numbers of opposing squadrons or machines; and must be prepared to make considerable allowances for technical development, and equipment in the shape of armament.

There are other features, apart from any existing air force of whatever composition, which must also be considered. There is

the question of "reserves," and the all-important question of "production": in brief, the organization for, and the possibilities of, rapid expansion when the financial stringencies of peace conditions give way to the unconditional terms of modern war.

Of course, this question of "reserves" and of "production" is applicable to armies and to navies as well as to air forces. But no amount of organization, no conceivable policy, can, on the outbreak of war, suddenly increase a nation's man-power beyond a known and existing figure. It is not possible to influence the birth-rate in order to multiply the available number of "bayonets" on the outbreak of war. Similarly, the supply of naval units in the form of warships, cannot be suddenly augmented by the process of putting battleships "on a production basis." It takes months, and possibly years, to complete even comparatively small naval craft.

It is only when we come to aircraft that "production" is able to play a predominant rôle within the first phase or first few months of warfare. But this question of "production" in war time has a distinct bearing on expenditure in peace time. Aircraft very rapidly become obsolete, and the "production programme" must consequently be shaped to produce equipment which can be effectively employed before it has time to become obsolescent. A nation which desires to develop its air-force reserves and to make full use of its war-time "production," must be prepared to expend large sums in peace time upon the evolution, development, and experiment necessary to determine upon a satisfactory "production programme."

These factors and considerations are variously apprehended; but two main schools of thought are discernible in most countries. There are those in favour of maintaining (in peace time) "the largest possible air force," *i.e.* the maximum number of squadrons and machines in commission which finances will allow of. There are others, who disregard numbers, and desire to have from moment to moment, the best that technical development can furnish.

These are the extreme views; and the truth is that real efficiency is to be found in a middle course. What in fact is wanted under the restrictions of peace-time finance is, a compact, efficient and highly trained standing air force equipped with the best standard machines it is possible to afford; an adequate reserve of trained *personnel*; and an experimental programme of development which will allow the war-time "production" scheme to produce without delay aircraft which shall be substantially better than the best of the enemy's machines.

The only consideration (often favoured by air-power theorists

which might seriously challenge the soundness of this middle course policy, is the possibility of being confronted with a short war—attack *à outrance*. In 1914 both the French and German staffs aimed at and expected such a war ; but, in the light of experience then gained, it seems unlikely that hopes can ever again be based upon such a policy.

The counter to this remote possibility of a rapid *à outrance* conception of war, is to be prepared by training and intention to utilize the standing air force immediately on the outbreak of war to the limit of its powers, and so to continue until such time as the reserves become available. The essential factor is time ; time in which to mobilize and to equip the “ reserves.”

With a given air policy and the consequent strategy, the problem of deciding upon “ types,” the relative importance of each type, and hence their proportionate strengths, is largely a matter of common sense, and a question upon which individual nations could have no difficulty in deciding. In each case, however, the strength and composition of the (probable) enemy must naturally be taken into account.

There is, moreover, another and very important consideration to be reckoned with in maintaining the “ balance ” of air-power, or competing for air supremacy in time of peace. It is the danger of a potential enemy suddenly and without warning producing an entirely new type of aircraft, which at a stroke renders obsolescent the material of its own and its opponent's air force. Perhaps the best example of what is meant is furnished by the advent of the British “ Dreadnought ” battleship at a period when the British and German navies were endeavouring to outbuild each other in capital ships of the then stereotyped and standard design. Her appearance in 1908 revolutionized the naval shipbuilding programmes of the world, and six years later in the war of 1914 her predecessors of the “ pre-Dreadnought ” type, representing an enormous capital expenditure, had degenerated into sea-going “ cannon-fodder.”

It may be argued that the evolution of any revolutionary new type of aircraft is at present unlikely in view of the immense and forced development given to aircraft by the last and still recent war. No new or completely untried principle, it may be contended (the helicopter is almost as old as the aeroplane), is likely to present itself. But was there anything entirely novel about the “ Dreadnought ” ? Was any new principle involved ? In point of fact there was nothing in itself new about the “ Dreadnought,” or about her

successors the "battle-cruisers." Nor was there anything new about the Austrian howitzers which battered down the Belgian forts in 1914, or the long-range German guns which bombarded Paris in 1917. These great and momentarily startling developments are not due to scientific inspiration or the result of abstruse technical or mathematical considerations. They are the product of the experience of the seaman and the soldier.

Almost any nation therefore—provided it has sufficient capital—can produce a "Dreadnought" of the air. The remedy against surprises of this sort is of course to be in possession of the "Dreadnought" beforehand; and having produced the "Dreadnought," to be prepared to produce a "super-Dreadnought."

The genesis of the technical problem in relation to aeroplanes lies in the fact that an aeroplane cannot leave the ground or remain in the air without the expenditure of "power." Fundamentally every aircraft problem is a problem which centres on power, and is dependent upon engines: at present petrol engines. For reasons which need not be entered into here, the use of 200 horse-power in an aeroplane does not produce exactly twice the result or double the "performance" which is obtained from the use of 100 horse-power. This is a fact to which the theorists cling, and upon which an attitude of resistance to the augmentation of power in aeroplanes has centred itself. With the existing and past types of aeroplanes nothing is easier than for the expert to prove the (theoretical) inefficiency of a 200 h.p. aeroplane when compared with a similar machine of 100 h.p. But, to take the simple case of a weight-carrying aeroplane, the machine with a higher horse-power will in actual practice always carry more weight than the aeroplane of a lower horse-power. In other words, from a purely military point of view, and apart from any question of theoretical efficiency, the augmentation of horse-power in aeroplanes is of cardinal importance. The unanswerable truth of this statement is admirably borne out by a glance at Tables 1, 2 and 3 in Appendix I. to this article. These tables show the growth in aeroplane "record" performance for speed, maximum height and duration. Such performances, as is well known, increase progressively year by year. It will be seen that the horse-power of the various machines also increases with each increase in record performance.

It is clear, therefore, that a practical "Dreadnought" aeroplane must be furnished with a clear predominance of power over its predecessors. The engines which enable military aeroplanes to fly, generally speaking, must be the largest and most powerful engines

it is possible to obtain. This is the ruling factor in the struggle for, and the maintenance of, superiority in aeroplane *matériel*.

It is equally clear that air force expansion and growth must be accompanied by radical changes in *matériel*, and hence by changes in organization and policy.

II

In what ways, if at all, can the traditional organization of a standing air force be amended in order to increase its fighting efficiency, without evolving an increase in expenditure? Is it possible to reduce expenditure in certain directions in order to make available larger sums of money for the building of aircraft, for experiment and research, for the reserves, and for laying the foundations of a "production policy" in the event of war?

There are certain peculiarities in the composition and policy of existing air forces, which are not to be found in other fighting services, for example: (1) of the total *personnel* of all standing air forces, the vast proportion are non-combatants. Almost all the men (airmen) are non-combatants; and (2) the life of aircraft under war conditions is amazingly short. In the latter part of the late war 100 per cent. replacements in material were required at least every three months, and often more frequently.

These two facts are perhaps the outstanding features of every existing air force. They are responsible for creating unexpected anomalies and for exerting an indirect pressure on the employment and utility of military aeroplanes. Let us, in the light of what actually happens in practice, examine the effects.

Aeroplanes are essentially the most mobile of all forces. Terrestrial obstacles (mountains, rivers, etc.) do not hamper their movements. Lines of communication, in the military sense, between the point of concentration and the objective are not necessary. Rapidity of movement is a fundamental feature of aeroplanes. And yet it is an established and accepted maxim in existing air forces, that aeroplane units cannot operate, except for a very brief period, when detached from their bases.

Reduced to simple terms, the combatant components of an air force consist of (1) the aeroplanes; (2) the very small number of officers and men who man the aeroplanes; and (3) the necessary supply of fuel, ammunition and bombs.

Attention must now once more be drawn to the extremely short life of military aeroplanes. And then an examination must be made

of that which constitutes the base or aerodrome with its accompanying ground equipment, the recognized support provided for an aeroplane squadron. The war of 1914-1918 in Europe was, of course, at once the background and the basis of all such organization as has grown up. This is a truism, and no doubt the normal organization of the air forces concerned was well suited to the peculiarly static form of warfare which existed from 1915 to 1918. In short, an aerodrome or base for the operations of an aeroplane squadron has come to consist of : (1) the landing ground or aerodrome ; (2) permanent, semi-permanent, or " portable " aeroplane hangars ; (3) a considerable amount of mechanical transport ; (4) workshops and repair facilities (either portable in lorries, or semi-permanent) ; (5) accommodation for *personnel* ; and (6) a supply of bombs, ammunition, fuel, etc. The latter supplies being in most cases made available from army resources, and delivered as required by army agencies. Add to this that by 1918 there was a universally marked tendency to make aerodromes more and more permanent in character.

The effect of all this is to render aeroplanes (in themselves so mobile) mobile only in relation to their radius of action from an established base or aerodrome. The static character of the late war in Europe has been responsible for the growth—around the combatant components of an air force—of a vast litter of ground equipment, and a deadweight in non-combatant *personnel*. The causes for this tendency are quite clear, and, in fact, the peculiar circumstances of the war in Europe made this development inevitable.

An average establishment for an aeroplane squadron for any of the Great Powers may be taken to approximate to the following : (a) aeroplanes, 10 ; (b) total officers and men, 150 ; and (c) motor vehicles, 15. Out of the total *personnel* of 150 officers and men, not more than 25 can be included in what we have called the combatant components of a squadron. The remaining 125 are for squadron headquarters, maintenance and repair, communications, etc. ; but are additional to the (army) *personnel* employed in maintaining the necessary supply of rations, fuel for aircraft, ammunition, etc.

It is impossible to resist the conclusion that at least some part of this non-combatant *personnel*, some portions of the accumulations of ground equipment at aerodromes can be dispensed with.

Are aeroplane hangars necessary ? Can their provision be justified when the war-time life of the aeroplanes they shelter rarely exceeds a few weeks ? When we consider that aeroplanes are built

to fly at speeds of 100 miles an hour and more in all sorts of weather, it is absurd to contend that they cannot be secured on the ground, and their "vitals" adequately protected under all conditions, without the use of hangars. There is, in fact, overwhelming evidence to prove that they can be so secured, and that the deterioration to machines exposed in the open is not serious.

Is it not probable that the elaboration of ground equipment, and the use of (unnecessary ?) hangars, (unnecessary ?) transport, etc., creates the need for, and in turn absorbs the services of a large proportion of the non-combatants ?

Would not the mobility of squadrons be enormously increased if they could be freed from the incubus of elaborate ground equipment and non-combatant *personnel* ? If such a state of affairs could be brought about, would not the aeroplane squadron be more efficient than it now is ?

Suppose a unit in a naval fleet or squadron becomes damaged, and is, for example, unable to steam, in spite of every effort on the part of its own crew. The damaged unit immediately becomes a hindrance, and even a danger, to the fleet. She must be immediately detached from the fleet, or if this is impossible, abandoned ; rather than remain with, and so compromise the efficiency and even the safety of, the fleet.

Surely there is a parallel in this respect between a fleet of ships and a squadron of aeroplanes. And is not the naval procedure in such cases the right procedure to adopt with aeroplanes ?—aeroplanes which last for so short a time, for which replacements on a large scale must anyhow be provided.

Take the case of a squadron of aeroplanes cooperating with a flying column of troops advancing into a hostile country. To be of any real service to the troops the aeroplanes must be in constant touch with them. They must move with the troops. They cannot work from a base behind the lines. Besides, for all intents and purposes there may be no lines. In this sort of advance there is no possibility of preparing aerodromes in advance of the troops. The line of advance is probably undetermined, and is in any case dependent on the enemy's movements. Advancing troops have quite sufficient difficulty in dealing with their own essential transport and supply services ; they do not want to be further encumbered with the impedimenta of an aeroplane squadron's ground equipment.

In order to carry out their duties of cooperation, the aeroplanes must accompany the troops ; they cannot take with them their aerodrome or base. What is the result ? They must discard their

portable ground equipment, and their non-combatant *personnel*. The squadron has in fact become reduced to its combatant component. Would it not be better if it had never consisted of anything but a combatant component? What is clear, is that the squadron can accompany the troops in this form: whilst as a complete squadron on accepted lines, it cannot. Here we are faced with the difficulty that, according to accepted practice, aeroplanes cannot operate, except for very short periods, when detached from their base. The answer to this, is that the bare essentials required by the combatant component of the squadron must be made as mobile as the squadron itself has now become: where the troops are responsible for the supply of fuel, rations, ammunition and bombs; whatever else may be required must be supplied by air. Like the fleet which cannot wait for a damaged ship or unit, the troops cannot wait while the air force repairs its aeroplanes. Damaged machines must be detached or abandoned; replacements—delivered by air—must take their place.

The writer has taken only one instance to illustrate the complexities of the difficulties arising from the use of an aeroplane squadron as it is organized to-day. But the situation that he has considered is a commonplace in warfare.

Aeroplane squadrons, of all nations, carry a relatively large amount of spares and spare parts for their machines. It would be absurd to suggest that no spare parts were necessary. But it is reasonable to question the proportion of spare parts and stores usually carried (from 10 to 25 tons in the aggregate), having regard once more to the life of the aeroplane, and to the necessity for maintaining the mobility of the squadron.

Considered from a production standpoint, what do the spares and spare parts of an air force's squadrons represent? Undoubtedly they are the equivalent of a considerable number of complete aeroplanes. As spares in any form represent an unrealizable asset, might it not be advantageous to forego the greater portion of them, and to utilize the same resources for providing complete aeroplanes?

These are disturbing questions. They involve suggestions in conflict with established tradition and in opposition to the conservative influences which are always to be found in every military Service. In spite of this, if it is possible to secure increased efficiency without increased expenditure by the adoption of any policy however revolutionary, then these questions must be faced.

The conservative attitude will be less likely to quarrel with the

absence of hangars, and reduction of non-combatant *personnel* in time of war, than under peace conditions. "It might work very well in war time," they would say; "but what about peace conditions?" How are we to manage with no hangars, practically no men, and a minimum of spares? To this question the writer's answer is, that if a change in war-time policy is desirable, and is adopted, then the peace-time organization must conform to the same principles and be arranged upon the same basis.

But what about training, how are our flying schools to manage on this basis? As to this, how much of the training of a standing air force for war purposes does "flying training" represent? It is indeed difficult at first sight to accustom oneself to the idea of aeroplanes without hangars; but there is a chapter in the history of airships (so much more fragile than aeroplanes) which furnishes an instructive example. Every one will recollect the agitation some years ago in Great Britain, France and Germany for the provision of airship hangars without which airships were held to be quite useless. No one can be ignorant of the enormous cost of such hangars; and so before long the use of airships and the possibility of having airships at all began to be governed by this question of hangars. Airship enthusiasts saw their services dwindle into mere nuclei; and from having clamoured for hangars (without which they had so often stated no airship was of use) they are to-day asserting that the "mooring-mast" fulfils all the necessary functions of a hangar—and that the latter are now relatively unimportant. The originally indispensable airship hangar with its windows of tinted-glass, all this, and a formidable literature on the deterioration of airships and airship fabrics when exposed to weather, are now relegated to the past; and hangars have become unnecessary except as a repair base. This is a transformation indeed, compared with which the abandonment of hangars for aeroplanes is but a trifling change.

There is one other point of practical significance in favour of the abandonment of aeroplane hangars. It is the certainty that in the next war it will not be possible to provide them—to transport or to erect them. This was definitely proved in all the belligerent countries during 1918.

Lastly, let it be emphasized that neither efficiency nor economy can be secured by any ruthless or sudden changes in an existing organization. The nation which undertakes the development of its present standing air force along the lines which have been suggested, must not plunge from one extreme to another, but pro-

ceed cautiously, slowly, and with forethought by way of a gradual transformation leading to the ends desired—efficiency, mobility, economy.

To summarize, it would appear that, consonant with economy, increased air-power should be sought in :

1. An increased mobility of aeroplane squadrons, which should be brought about by (a) the abandonment of aeroplane hangars ; (b) the reduction of spares, spare parts, ground equipment, etc. ; and (c) the organization of supplies and replacements by air.

2. A reduction in the numbers of non-combatant *personnel*.

III

Earlier in this article the writer touched upon the relation of experimental and research work, and of production programmes, to a standing air force.

With limited financial resources it is obviously not possible to attack the whole field of aeronautical research work. What limits, then, should be put upon the research programme ? In what direction should the research and experimental resources of an air force be guided ? It has already been pointed out that, so far as engines for aeroplanes are concerned, the essential requirement is increased power. But what particular improvements are to be aimed at in the actual building of aeroplanes ? How are existing types to be improved upon ? If the main outlines of this matter could be settled, the research programme would follow.

The Armistice in 1918 left the successful Powers with standing air forces composed of units of the following general types of aeroplanes. (For convenience, an outline of the principal functions of the various types has been included) :

- | | | |
|--|-------|---|
| (a) <i>Single-seater "fighters"</i> | | Air fighting, and for the maintenance of air supremacy. These machines have an essentially "high performance." |
| (b) <i>Army cooperation machines</i> (for spotting artillery fire, contact patrols, tactical reconnaissance, etc.) | | General assistance to troops. |
| (c) <i>Strategical reconnaissance machines</i> | | Long-range machines for distant reconnaissance. |
| (d) <i>Day bombers</i> | | } Bombing of various objectives. Long- and short-range machines. |
| <i>Night bombers</i> | | |
| (e) <i>Various special types</i> | | Troop carriers, flame-throwing aeroplanes, armoured machines for attack of trenches, etc. (None of these very definitely established or adopted.) |

(a) *Single-seater "fighters"* are now represented exclusively by a series of very similar "high-performance" machines fitted with one or more (generally two) forward-firing machine guns. These machines correspond very closely with the record-breaking speed machines—their fuel supply is very limited, and in general everything is sacrificed to performance and ease of handling. In the popular conception they are surrounded by a glamour which is not accorded to other types of machines; their achievements are necessarily spectacular, and the type consequently enjoys a popularity probably in excess of its deserts.

Generally speaking, the "single-seater" fighter is the weapon which is used to obtain, and to maintain, local air supremacy. These machines are employed in formations, except when sometimes used to attack troops and machine-gun emplacements in conjunction with an advance of their own troops. There is a growing tendency to restrict their employment solely to work which can be performed in formation, and individual fighting is now discouraged.

(b) *Army cooperation machines* perform a variety of duties: "spotting" for artillery fire, locating hostile guns and batteries, "contact patrols" support of troops during advances, close reconnaissance, communication duties, etc. They are, in short, "general purposes" machines, and their essential feature is that they should render the maximum service to the various army units. These machines are, in consequence, a compromise, and need not possess (nor do they exhibit) any particular flying qualities or air performance. A pilot and observer only are carried. Their usual armament consists of one fixed (forward firing) and one swivelling machine gun.

(c) *Strategical reconnaissance machines* are generally of the single-engined tractor type, carrying a pilot and observer, an aerial camera, and (sometimes) wireless telegraphy installations. They have a good "performance," high "ceiling," long range and high speed. As their range is vastly in excess of that possessed by "single-seater" fighters, they cannot be supported or escorted by these machines, and must be able to defend themselves unaided. Their usual armament consists of one forward firing, and one or two swivelling machine guns.

(d) *Bombing machines* are of various types, and roughly divisible into "day" bombers and "night" bombers. The former are generally "high performance" machines (usually single-engined with pilot and one passenger) employed in formations; the latter are of various types (single, twin and multi-engined), but carrying

a very large load of bombs, with a correspondingly lower "performance." They are employed individually, as opposed to employment in formation.

(e) *Special types of machines* for such purposes as troop carriers, etc., are not yet anywhere thoroughly developed.

On the assumption that these types are based on sound principles, it must now be considered in what direction they are likely to be evolved—or, rather, in what way it is desirable that they should be evolved.

It is not the purpose of the present writer to consider any special developments or requirements, but to treat the subject as a whole—in outline rather than in detail. One of the main outstanding features which must be reckoned with is the steady progressive growth of the "military load" carried by all the different types of machines. There is no reason to suppose that the military load will not continue to increase. We must, therefore, expect more powerful, and in consequence, larger machines.

The inevitable introduction of larger calibre guns in place of the existing 0.303 machine guns will be responsible for the first big step in this direction.

No less important is the development of the faculty for the employment of aeroplanes under all conditions of weather. Existing aeroplanes cannot be satisfactorily and with certainty flown in fog. It is necessary that they should be able to do so. The first step in this direction is the introduction (or re-introduction) of automatic stability for all types of military aeroplanes.

The question of the increase in size and power of military aeroplanes involves—for equal numbers—an increase in cost over the cost of present-day machines. It is probable, moreover, that this increase in cost will be a very substantial one; so that, *prima facie*, the size of standing air forces, reckoned in numbers of machines, is likely to decrease.

Briefly, then, we must expect that, for the same financial outlay, an improved and more powerful air force will have a smaller number of machines, and fewer pilots, than at present. This, in conjunction with the normally very short life of an aeroplane is destined to have a very important effect on the future of air forces. It means that each individual aeroplane will have to be able to undertake the duties previously performed by two or more machines: that the value of each individual pilot will be enormously enhanced.

It means that the *personnel* of an air force will be relatively very much reduced, but that *per contra*, the value of air force *matériel*

will be very much increased : that every possible measure of economy will have to be studied.

The present "single-seater" fighter will inevitably become larger and heavier as its armament increases. It is even possible that developments in armament may gradually transform this type into a two-seater or multi-seater.

The army cooperation machines will probably change less than other types, but are certain to be evolved in the direction of increased size with the growth in military load (including signalling and wireless gear, etc.). At present some nations employ their army cooperation pilots as observers also, and use the passenger for defence purposes only ; in others, the passenger performs all the duties other than piloting. The latter course must inevitably survive in view of the ever-increasing responsibilities and the complications of new signalling equipment. These machines may reasonably become three- or even four-seaters of low performance, but capable of landing in very bad country—having in fact a very low minimum speed.

Bombers of all types must be expected to increase in size and power very rapidly. The measure of efficiency in the case of a bombing aeroplane is ultimately dependent on the number of pounds or tons of bombs which can be carried over a given distance, per pilot.

To summarize the immediate requirements demanded by air force development, and to outline the main programme of research work devoted to these ends, the following points must be noted : (a) automatic stability for all types of aeroplanes ; (b) developments necessary for flying, etc., in fog ; (c) demand for steadily increasing power of aero engines ; (d) improvements in materials employed in the construction of aeroplanes in order to give increased "weathering" properties, consequent on the abandonment of hangars ; (e) new and simplified methods of construction to meet the requirements of heavier armament, and the general increase in size and power of aeroplanes ; and (f) lower minimum landing speed—particularly for army cooperation machines.

As regards the introduction of "special types" of aeroplanes, there would seem to be no imperative need for the development of any particular type. At the same time provision must be made to render by air to squadrons in the field such services as are absolutely essential, and which are now provided by aerodromes or bases.

As regards the organization of a reserve of air force *personnel*, it seems probable that in point of numbers a reduction over present

requirements may be looked for. On the other hand, the reserve of pilots will have to be very much more highly trained than is now considered necessary.

APPENDIX I

TABLE I.—TABLE OF PRINCIPAL AEROPLANE SPEED RECORDS WITH DATES

	Place.	Aeroplane.	H.P. and Motor.	Km. Speed.
1909	Reims	Curtiss	35 h.p. Curtiss	75'49 G. Bennet Cup.
1910	Long Is.	Bleriot	100 „ Gnome	98'5 „
1911	Eastchurch	Nieuport	100 „ Gnome	125'6 „
1912	Chicago	Depudussin	140 „ Gnome	169'7 „
1913	Reims	Depudussin	160 „ Gnome	200'8 „
1920	Étampes	Nieuport-Delage	300 „ Hispano	271'5 „
1921	Étampes	N. Delage	300 „ Hispano	273'3 Coupe D. Meurthe.
1921	Deloit	Navy-Curtiss	400 „ Curtiss	283'0 Pulitzer Trophy.
1922	Étampes	N. Delage	300 „ Hispano	289'0 Doupe D. Meurthe.
1922	Detroit	Army-Curtiss	400 „ Curtiss	334'5 Pulitzer Trophy.
1923	Saint-Louis	Navy-Curtiss	500 „ Curtiss	392'2 „

TABLE OF SEAPLANE SPEED RECORDS WITH DATES

	Place.	Seaplane.	H.P. and Motor.	Km. Speed.
1913	Morocco	Depudussin	160 h.p. Gnome	72'0 " Float " seaplane.
1914	Morocco	Sopwith	100 „ Gnome	89'0 „
1915	Bournemouth	Savoia	260 „ I-Fraschini	201'0 " Boat " seaplane.
1916	Venice	Savoia	450 „ Ansaldo	165'0 „
1917	Naples	Macchi	300 „ Fiat	189'0 „
1918	Naples	Supermarine	450 „ Napier	235'0 „
1919	Cours	Curtiss	465 „ Curtiss	284'8 " Float " seaplane.

APPENDIX II

TABLE II.—TABLE OF PRINCIPAL AEROPLANE ALTITUDE RECORDS WITH DATES

Date.	Aeroplane.	H.P. and Motor.	Height Metres.
1910	Antoinette	50 h.p. Antoinette	1,000
1910	Morane	50 „ Gnome	2,582
1912	Morane	80 „ Gnome	5,450
1919	Spad	300 „ Hispano	8,155
1923	N. Delage	400 „ Hispano	11,155

APPENDIX III

TABLE III.—TABLE OF PRINCIPAL AEROPLANE DURATION RECORDS (NON-STOP WITHOUT REFUELLING)

Date.	Aeroplane.	H.P. and Motor.	Time in Hours.
1912	M. Farman	70 h.p. Renault	13 hrs. 17 mins.
1914	Albatross	75 „ Mercedes	24 „ 12 „
1923	Fokker	400 „ Liberty	36 „ 5 „

"SURPRISE" IN FORTIFICATION IN THE FUTURE

(*With Maps and Diagrams*)

BY CAPTAIN J. A. C. PENNYCUICK, D.S.O., R.E.

IN this article it is proposed to comment—briefly—on the causes of failure of fortresses built with all the skill of the expert engineer when really tested in modern war, and an attempt will be made to make out a case against the expenditure involved in the creation of such structures in time of peace.

It is proposed to deal only with land fortifications designed to meet a land attack and not coast defences, built against a naval attack. These latter have, at present, certain great advantages over the ships which attack them, *e.g.* stability of platform, smallness of target, greater accuracy of range-finding instruments, etc. The introduction of modern inventions in the way of aircraft and gas (particularly mustard gas) may modify these advantages of the land fort over the ship in future conflicts; but coast defences against ships provide a special and separate problem from land fortifications.

Fortification on a land frontier, although defensive in its local application, may be said to be one of the means employed in seeking to attain the principle of war of "economy of force." The expectation of the fulfilment of this rôle of economy in the event of war is, therefore, the justification of the expense involved in building a fortress in time of peace.

The history of the art of fortification is the history of a continuous contest in invention, namely, the progressive contest of weapons *v.* armour.

The broad underlying principles of fortification may be stated briefly as follows:—(1) Fortification must be such that it gives the defender the best use of his weapons, and (2) Fortification must restrict the attacker in the use of his weapons.*

An examination of these two broad principles at once brings out the fact that fortification, to be true to its principles, must be constantly changing. This is particularly the case in modern times

* See "Fortification," by Sir George Sydenham Clarke (Lord Sydenham), and "The Principles of Land Defence," by Capt. (now Maj.-General) Thuillier, R.E.

where science and invention advance at an almost bewildering pace. Fortresses have failed again and again because they have been out of date, designed for obsolete weapons, and often sited in the wrong place when tested in actual war. Once built a fortress cannot be moved and the design of its works can only be modified slightly to accommodate, or counter, new weapons, therefore, a fortress built in time of peace cannot be wholly true to the principles of fortification.

Yet some form of land defence seems a vital necessity to protect a threatened frontier, and so we are continually treated to the spectacle of the construction of costly forts in time of peace, embodying all the lessons of the last war, but very naturally not designed to meet the unknown weapons of the next war !

Thus, the defences of Paris constructed about 1835 were thirty years out of date by the time they were attacked in 1870. At Port Arthur in 1904 the Russian forts were actually so new that they were still in course of construction, and only a few were completed when the war began. Yet again they were thirty years out of date ; they would have resisted the weapons of 1870, but were shattered by the Japanese 28 cm. howitzers. At Liège in 1914 the forts were equally out of date and were destroyed by the German howitzers.

Trench systems, on the other hand, in contrast with the rigid fortresses, have frequently succeeded, as the trenches could be dug quickly and designed and sited to suit the weapons of the moment, not those of a previous war. Well-known examples being Torres Vedras in 1810, Sebastopol in 1856 and Plevna in 1877.

Again at Antwerp in 1914, the forts bombarded by the Germans only resisted for three days after the beginning of the bombardment ; from the 28th of September to the 1st of October. Yet the trench lines along the rivers Lethe and Rupel were held for six days, from the 1st to the 6th of October.

It is recognized that examples such as these are not conclusive, as one of the great difficulties in considering fortification is that its history teems with contradictory examples, the success of Verdun may be quoted, for instance, in justification of fortification.

Yet one great lesson seems apparent, and that is the value of surprise in fortification. Surprise appears as a principle of war in the new F.S.R. Vol. II., but its effect on fortification is seldom examined. Its influence in all successful modern defences against well-equipped attack can, however, be traced, and where fortresses have appeared to fail unaccountably, surprise has been neglected and *vice versa*.

Take for example the case of Plevna in 1877 (*see* Plate 1). At the beginning of the Russo-Turkish Campaign Plevna was an unfortified and unknown town. The Russians crossed the Danube at Zimnitza and went straight for the Balkan passes on the route to Constantinople. They did not wish to be cumbered with unnecessary siege equipment and so arranged their plan of advance so as to avoid the Turkish "Quadrilateral" fortresses, namely, Rustchuk, Silestria, Varna and Shumla. Osman Pasha then appeared on their flank and entrenched himself at Plevna. Here he held out in his hastily dug, but well-designed entrenchments for five months, from July to December, 1877, with about 40,000 men.

Plevna could not be ignored because of its position on the Russian flank, and its defence came as a complete surprise to the Russians after they were committed to their plan, and consequently upset their calculations, and vitally affected the campaign.

If Plevna had been fortified before the war started, the Russians could either have made arrangements to have the necessary weapons to attack it, or avoided it as they avoided the Quadrilateral. The unexpected fortifications at Plevna had a much more serious effect on the campaign than the known fortifications of the Quadrilateral—a clear illustration of the value of surprise.

Again consider the case of Liège. Here was the case of a fortress situated on the line of advance selected by Von Schlieffen for the main effort of the German right wing Armies in the campaign against France. The fortress was built in time of peace and well known to the Germans, and they were able, deliberately, to invent a weapon to overcome it, *i.e.* the heavy field howitzer. Consequently, they were not obliged to avoid this fortress. It was captured in eleven days, by advanced troops, so that the main German Armies were able to advance unhindered as soon as their concentration was complete.

It is to be noted that the German right wing in 1914 was actually ahead of its scheduled programme, made out by Von Schlieffen, up to the 1st of September, 1914. Therefore, Liège can hardly be said to have occasioned any real inconvenience. It only delayed advanced troops and this delay had been expected and allowed for in the German plan.

It may be well, here, to revert briefly to the French fortresses such as Verdun, as it is sometimes asserted that "fortresses" themselves exerted a profound influence on the German plan. This is undoubtedly true in so far as the enemy had to pause and invent a weapon to destroy the forts opposed to them. For instance Bismarck said to the German Emperor in 1880: "The French

frontier is practically hermetically sealed [by fortresses] ”; but the Germans invented a means of unsealing this frontier in 1914.

A study of the ground in France and Flanders shows that the line of advance chosen for the German right wing Armies in 1914, did not avoid fortresses, but avoided natural obstacles on the road to Paris. The direct route to Paris was certainly closed by fortresses, but it was also barred by a series of natural obstacles such as rivers and mountains, at right angles to the line of advance—the country of the Argonne and Woëvre and the Champagne country, etc. (*see* Plate 2).

An advance across these natural obstacles would give the French numerous opportunities to fight delaying actions. The Germans were anxious for a quick decision, therefore they chose the route which avoided the natural obstacles although two great fortresses—Liège and Namur—stood in their path. The heavy howitzer was the key invented to unlock this barrier.

It may be urged that the Verdun forts were more successful than Liège and Namur, but the French success at Verdun and Nancy may be largely attributed to the magnificent use made by them of difficult country suitable for defence, for, although the Verdun forts were not altogether destroyed—instances even occurred there of guns mounted in cupolas being useful—it must also be remembered that the Mort Homme positions by the Meuse caused the Germans just as much delay, and as many casualties in their attacks, as any of the concrete forts. Yet the Mort Homme works were entirely field works constructed after the beginning of hostilities. It seems possible that one of the causes of the German attacks at Verdun and Nancy which met with such signal failure may have been due, paradoxically, to the success of their howitzers at Liège and Namur. They had invented a weapon which could destroy or cripple a fort, and so thought that this was enough to give them victory wherever that fort might be situated.

This contempt for fortification after Namur led them to forget the difficulties of the ground at Verdun and Nancy, and, as Captain Becker (of the German Army) points out, the power of the 42 cm. howitzer was sometimes exaggerated.*

To return, however, to the question of surprise, one further example from 1914 will be taken, that is the successful defence of Ivangorod on the Russian front. This was an important place commanding a road and railway passage over the Vistula. It was defended by a ring of forts which were old and in bad repair and

* *See* “ 42 cm. Mortar Fact and Fancy,” *R.A. Journal*, January, 1923.

very close in to the crossing. The Russian commander, Schwarz, decided to evacuate the forts and to dig a system of trenches beyond them. Guns were removed from the forts and all heavy artillery available formed into two groups north and south of the town and on the east bank of the Vistula.

The facts of the attack by the Germans were briefly as follows : their infantry attack delivered from the west came up against the unexpected trenches, and their artillery bombarded the unoccupied forts, and, in doing so, revealed their own positions. The Russians made good use of counter-battery fire, and, their dispositions coming as a surprise to the Germans, were successful with the result that the German attack was abandoned for that year.

It will be seen from the above instances that fortresses built in time of peace seem generally to have been either in the wrong place and so have been avoided as the Quadrilateral was avoided in 1877, or, being known like Liège in 1914, have succumbed to weapons deliberately designed for their destruction.

The rapid progress of modern science is likely to put a fortress out of date more quickly than ever in future warfare.

If gas is used for example, particularly persistent gas, it will be a weapon both land and sea fortresses will find it hard to compete with. Fortresses can certainly be provided with gas-proof dug-outs, and advocates of rigid defences actually suggest that this gives an advantage to the defence.*

Known forts, however, such as the Brialmont type of fort, should make an excellent target for mustard gas. The attacker does not necessarily wish to occupy a fort ; all he wants is to make it untenable or unpleasant for the enemy.

Then again the defenders of a ring fortress could only gas their besiegers with effect on the leeward side of the fortress, and the sector gassed would probably be temporarily evacuated. The besiegers on the other hand could bring up gas cylinders by train or M.T. and move them round as the wind changed so as to gas the whole fortress continuously.

This is perhaps rather straying into the realms of fancy, but we know that the effects of gas in the great war were felt for very long distances in favourable winds, eighteen miles from the point of discharge for example, while the Liège forts were built on a circle the diameter of which was only about nine miles.

Common sense, therefore, points to the conclusion that out-of-

* See "*Essai sur la Fortification permanente moderne*," by Colonel Levêque, *Revue du Génie Militaire*. August to September, 1923.

date forts are all that can be expected from a vast expenditure of money on concrete and armour in time of peace.

Verdun alone is reported to have cost about seven million pounds between the years 1874 and 1914,* and a post-war fortress, allowing for the great increase in wages and taking the increase in the cost of warships as a guide, would certainly involve formidable expenditure. The statements which have appeared in the Press regarding the projected expenditure on Singapore provide another example of the increase in cost of heavy construction.

After 1870 the French went in for a big and expensive policy of fortification on their eastern frontier. Commenting on this in "The Nation in Arms" Von der Goltz says: "The sole attention of the French Army was riveted to this object, which also governed the system of military organization and training, every effort being devoted to the creation of a feeling of security within the frontiers of France."

Presumably, too, Liège, Namur and Antwerp produced a false feeling of security and it is this necessity for security which induces a nation to waste money on rigid and obsolete fortifications. Even a fortress of the Brialmont type, of concrete and armour, is an undoubted obstacle and will act as a deterrent and protection against an enemy who is either ill-armed or lacks determination. But for this reason the fall of such a place when attacked by a really determined and well-armed enemy is apt to be very sudden and have a disastrous effect on national moral. Such fortresses cannot be up to date particularly in these days of rapid scientific progress, and they are contrary to the principles of fortification. The weapons the enemy will use to attack them cannot be foretold, and, if rigid defences are built in time of peace, they will be no surprise in war, and consequently no real safeguard.

Ludendorff in referring to the fall of Novo Georgievsk in 1915 says: "The day of the ring fortress is past," and modern history confirms this view.

So far this article has provided merely destructive criticism against "permanent" fortification, the writer now proposes to consider briefly a few suggestions for future fortification, which will conform with the principles of change and surprise, with the least waste of money.

He suggests that modern defence for a land frontier should :
(1) provide for an obstacle on, or just behind, the frontier ; and

* See *R. E. Journal*, July, 1921.

(2) also provide behind this barrier, not actual works or forts, but an "organization for defence," *i.e.* there should be plans in readiness for the speedy erection of defences in those areas where a defensive attitude is intended, or made necessary, such defences to be constructed after the outbreak of war.

As regards (1) the obstacle, in our present age an army of any magnitude is dependent on good communications, railways and roads, and cannot advance far from them. This dependency may be modified in the future by improvements in aircraft, but for the present it holds good and many examples can be quoted, *e.g.* the difficulties of our Army in 1918, at the time of the Armistice, advancing along the roads and railways destroyed by the Germans. Or again, the case may be cited of the German retreat in Poland in 1915, when the enemy destroyed all the communications behind him, and the pursuing Russian Armies were gradually brought to a standstill, not by hostile opposition, but by the failure of the communications.

Therefore, if arrangements are made in time of peace for the mining of all roads and railways crossing a frontier, any desired sector of the frontier can be made defensive by destroying these roads and railways in that sector on the outbreak of war.

How far it would be possible to have the charges actually laid in time of peace it is hard to say, but the mine chambers could be prepared and the charges held ready and put in during any precautionary period of political tension.

Charges left in position for long periods would be too dangerous. We have the case of the destruction due to lightning in 1916, of the railway bridge carrying the Baghdad railway over the Euphrates at Jerablus as an example of the danger of leaving charges in position too long.

In addition, there would be considerable political difficulties to overcome before extensive demolitions could be arranged; but well-organized propaganda should help to smooth these out.

An efficient obstacle of this sort would have been of great effect in 1914. It has often been pointed out, for instance, that a more complete destruction of the railways and tunnels near Liège in 1914, would have delayed the main German Armies far more than the defence of the obsolete forts at Liège and Namur. A thorough destruction of the vital lines might, in fact, have stopped altogether the advance of the German right wing through Belgium, in August and September, 1914, and the cost of such preparations would have been very small.

Additional obstacles can be suggested requiring construction, examples being : (a) the planting of belts of trees along a frontier to act as a tank obstacle and to close a dangerous avenue of approach ; * (b) areas of country to be kept covered with mustard gas, if gas is used ; (c) inundations ; and (d) tank mine fields, inert in normal times and rendered potent by switching on an electric current in war.

But in the arrangements for such obstacles there is a tendency to come back to forms of immobile constructed obstacles which can be made a subject for deliberate study by the enemy in time of peace and, consequently, may prove a waste of money like the obsolete forts of 1914, and such projects, therefore, must be viewed with suspicion.

The object of these obstacles is to give time after the outbreak of war for the creation of defences which must be constructed to stop a really determined enemy.

Turning now to (2), the actual organization of such defences, if they are to be up to date and to give real surprise effect, they must be built after the outbreak of war. They can then be sited and designed for the weapons of the moment, and put in the right place.

History has shown that trench defences of this sort have been as effective (often more effective) than the heaviest armoured forts put up in peace time. “ The best fortification judged by results, has been that improvised by stress of circumstance, unspoiled by the debasing influence of the text-book, and not demoralized by technical possibilities opened out by large expenditure.” †

Although constructional work should not be undertaken in time of peace on actual fortifications, much preparation at all likely places can be done. A large proportion of the time taken on any engineering construction has to be given up to preparations ; survey, detailed plans, organization of labour, collection of stores, etc. All this can be done in time of peace and careful plans can be prepared for the construction of defences at all places of importance ; big railway centres, the land side of harbours, etc., yet the actual intentions for defence would not be revealed to the enemy. These plans would have to be kept up to date and constantly revised as new weapons were evolved.

It should, perhaps, be noted that to be really effective such proposed defences should not be arranged too near to the frontier. Otherwise, the enemy will be able to collect guns secretly in time

* Possibly gas might be emitted in these belts in case of war, to increase the effectiveness of the obstacle.

† See “ Fortification,” by Sir George Sydenham Clarke.

of peace on his side of the frontier to shell expected working parties and to stop their work the moment war breaks out, while he is clearing the frontier obstacles.

It may be objected that the distance to achieve this would be indefinite because the working parties would be bombed by aircraft or shelled by guns of extreme range, with aircraft direction. But, against this, one can hope that reasonable anti-air protection could be organized to protect the working parties constructing important defences, and, if these defences were sited some twenty miles or so from the frontier, the enemy would not be able to get direct observation on them or to find out definitely about them until their construction was well advanced.

Before concluding this article attention must be drawn to the case of the protection of some especially important place such as a capital city or an unavoidable defile. In such a case national sentiment may insist upon defensive preparation which will make complete surprise in fortification on the lines suggested impossible. In the defence, therefore, slightly more latitude will be essential, but the object of the defenders should be to cut down construction to a minimum, and to use the powerful influence of good propaganda to make the people realize that they are not being exposed to avoidable risks.

The defences of Lötzen in East Prussia, constructed by the Germans from 1916 to 1918, afford an example of this type of fortification. These were planned under "peace conditions" with the experience of the early part of the war as a guide. The old fort of Lötzen commands a defile of the Masurian Lakes. It was not surrounded by "modern" defences, but two belts of new works were planned to the east of it. The inner of these lines is distant about eleven and the outer line nineteen kilometres from Lötzen. The works are well sited on tactical features, and about 2,000 metres apart. The only "permanent" construction undertaken consists in the provision of powerful reinforced concrete dug-outs at the sites of the proposed works. In addition, there are a few well-concealed concrete "pill-boxes" for machine guns. The dug-outs are sunk into the ground to render them inconspicuous and their general dimensions are shown in Plates 3 and 4.

Works of this type are a great advance on pre-war forts. They do not cost a great deal of money, and might be worth while in exceptional places to inspire confidence. But even these will get out of date and have to be scrapped sooner or later, and they would also give away the defenders' intentions if built in time of peace.

THE CAMPAIGN IN BULGARIA, 1877-8.

SKETCH MAP


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Positions of Russian Forces shown are on realization
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
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
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
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GERMAN DEFENCE

It is suggested, therefore, that the only definite work that can be undertaken at the sites of potential fortresses without this last disadvantage is the improvement of communications and control of the “lay-out” of buildings.

The former will be useful in time of peace as in war, and the latter does not give away sites of defences, but is particularly important in these days of aircraft.

By a suitable plan, and the control of buildings which spring up round important centres likely to require defence, the targets for bombing by hostile aircraft could be considerably reduced.

Projected depôts, ammunition dumps, etc., and the whole lay-out of the proposed defences could also be planned so as to make bombing much more difficult and the important places in the defended area less vulnerable, if their construction became necessary.

In conclusion the writer would like to summarize briefly the conclusions at which he has arrived :

Permanent fortifications built of concrete and armour in peace have the following main disadvantages : (i) they provide no surprise to an enemy ; (ii) they are invariably out of date ; and (iii) they are often in the wrong place owing to a change in economic or political conditions.

Although formidable obstacles, therefore, permanent fortifications are no real safeguard and cannot be depended upon to hold up a determined enemy ; their construction, consequently, is a waste of public money.

On the other hand, the alternative of laying waste national territory by extensive demolitions in the face of a sudden threat of invasion, has great moral and political objections, and it seems improbable that defence on these lines alone, though desirable, can be a practical policy.

This means that in addition to demolitions and work on plans, some “constructive” work must also be done in time of peace.

This, however, must be kept to a minimum and beyond the preparation of plans, improvement of communications and collection of stores, money should only be spent on skeleton defences at a very few particularly important places.

“Build no more fortresses, build railways,” was a saying of the elder Moltke after 1870.

Modern developments suggest a slight amendment :

“Build no more fortresses ; destroy railways.”

THE ART OF COMMAND ACCORDING TO XENOPHON

By J. M. SCAMMELL, Major, Infantry, O.R.C., United States Army

ENGLAND in 1914, the United States in 1917, and Xenophon 2,300 years before, had a similar problem to solve—the problem of adapting military discipline to the needs of a democratic people. The solutions were similar. But whereas we of to-day understand only imperfectly the full significance of our adjustments, Xenophon erected his into a system. By reviewing this system devised by Xenophon we may perhaps be able to arrive at a clearer conception of the principles which should underlie our own efforts.

Xenophon, like Oliver Cromwell, was a country squire who approached a military problem free from the fetters of military tradition. But he was also a student, and it is fairly certain that he entered upon his career as a soldier with a hypothesis—a doctrine—of war derived from the teachings of the sage Socrates. Now Socrates was not only a man of thought; he was likewise a man capable of vigorous action, as the description given by Alcibiades of his soldierly conduct at Coronea amply proves, and his views upon military problems were the result of the same mature reflection as he brought to bear upon his other experiences. To the field, then, came Xenophon; and he tested, in the light of his own experiences, the doctrine which he had received from Socrates, and he saw that it was good.*

* Some of Xenophon's comrades in arms had been trained from childhood in the Peloponnesian War; yet Xenophon far surpassed them in the understanding of their own profession. Witness his appreciation of the principles of the offensive, objective, security, cooperation and economy of force in the following extracts:—

"For it is not those who sit down nearest to their friends that provide them with the greatest security; but it is those who drive the enemy farthest away that help their friends most effectually out of danger." (Cyrop. IV, v, 28.)

"But when I think of it, I cannot conceive of any safer procedure for us than to march directly upon Babylon, if that is where the main body of the enemy's force is." (Cyrop. V, ii, 31.)

"You must be particularly watchful on the side where you know yourselves to be weaker, and you must attack the enemy above all in that quarter in which you see that they are most vulnerable." (Cyrop. I, vi, 36.)

"... never ... detach from our main body a force weaker than the force of the enemy. I do not mean by that that we should never go off, if circumstances

He records his impressions in his "Anabasis," and he begins this famous work by commenting upon the method of command of Clearchus and Cyrus the Younger. In the method of the latter he saw exemplified many of the principles laid down by Socrates. Hence, when in his historical romance the "Cyropædia" he came to set forth his doctrine of command, the hero, Cyrus the Elder, was an idealized portrait of his gallant Prince who fell at Cunaxa.

The doctrine for the successful conduct of an army in the field which Xenophon derived from Socrates may be summarized as follows: (1) to train the soldier to desire to be brave; (2) to look to the soldier's welfare; and (3) to place the best men in front and in rear, and the less reliable between them.

His formula for the obtaining of victory may be summed up in this one sentence, ' Battles are decided more by men's souls than by the strength of their bodies '—and he emphasizes again and again that success depends upon the physical health, the strength and endurance and the well-steeled hearts of all ranks; and the careful study of the art of war by the officers.*

It was not that Xenophon considered this formula as comprising the entire duty of an officer; it was merely that he laid stress upon this aspect of an officer's duties because hitherto it had been neglected. The following quotations from his writings show a far broader conception of what he expected from his officers: (1) "to render those under their command obedient and submissive to them (Discipline); (2) to appoint fitting persons to fulfil the various duties (Administration); (3) to punish the bad and honour the good (Law); (4) to render those under them well-disposed toward them (Moral); (5) to gain for themselves allies and auxiliaries (Diplomacy);

require it, with a still smaller detachment than that with which the Cadusian prince went. But if an officer, when he starts on an expedition, communicates his intention to one that is able to bring help, he may possibly fall into a trap, but then it is equally possible for the one who remains behind to entrap the enemy, and turn them away from our detachment; or he may annoy the enemy in some other way and so secure safety for his friends; and thus even those who are at a distance will not be out of reach but will keep in touch with the main body. But the man who goes off without communicating his purpose is in the same situation, no matter where he is, as if he were carrying on a campaign alone." (Cyrop. V, iv, 19 and 20.)

* Repeatedly Xenophon in one form or another reverts to this formula. To quote one instance:

"And as soon as he began to advance, he led on at double-time and they followed in good order, for they understood marching in line and practised it; moreover, they followed courageously, because they were in eager rivalry with one another and because their bodies were in thorough training and because the front rank men were all officers; and they followed gladly because they were intelligent men; for they had been convinced by long instruction that the easiest and safest way was to meet the enemy hand to hand—especially if the enemy were made up of bowmen, spearmen and cavalry." (Cyrop. III, iii, 57.)

(6) to be careful of their resources (Logistics); and (7) to be attentive and industrious in their duties " (Character).*

Upon the last of these precepts, as well as the fourth, Xenophon placed the greatest emphasis. He considered with Socrates that kings and commanders were not those who held sceptres merely, or those elected by the multitude, or those who gained authority by lot, or those who attained it by deceit, but those who knew how to command.

Knowledge of how to command men he regarded as the first requisite of an officer. In his "Memorabilia" of Socrates, Xenophon relates the following account of a dialogue which took place when the kindly philosopher met a youth fresh from a course in military art and began to chaff him, finally asking him what his instructor had taught him: "'He began,' replied the youth, 'with the same thing with which he ended; for he taught me tactics and nothing more.' 'But,' said Socrates, 'how small a part of the qualifications of a general is this!'"

The philosopher then went on to discuss discipline and how to secure it:—

"'You are doubtless aware that in all circumstances men most willingly obey those whom they consider most able to direct, for in sickness patients obey him whom they think the best physician; on ship-board the passengers obey him whom they think the best pilot, and in agriculture they obey him whom they deem the best husbandman.' 'If therefore, Socrates, I should myself appear the best horseman among them, will that circumstance be sufficient to induce them to obey me?' 'If you convince them in addition,' said Socrates, 'that it is better and safer for them to obey you.'" (Mem. III, iii, 9 and 10.)†

Next, as it appears to be germane to the above, let us consider Xenophon's fourth precept: "To render those under them well-disposed toward them."

This was the idea of the Chinese general Wu, who lived even before Xenophon: "The good general cares for his soldiers, and lovingly treats them as his children; as a consequence they follow him through the valley of the shadow, and are beside him in death."

Xenophon himself conceived of an intelligent cooperation as a "new discipline":—

"In the case of all those whom one wishes to make efficient coadjutors in any enterprise of any sort whatever, it seems to me pleasanter to draw

* See "Memorabilia," III, iv, 8.

† This whole passage is practically repeated in the "Cyropædia." In this case it is Cyrus who has been to school to learn military art, and Cyaxares who plays the part of Socrates.

them on by kind words and kind services rather than by compulsion and force ; but in the case of those whom one wishes to make enthusiastic followers in his plans of war, one must by all means try to capture them with kind words and kind officers. For those men who are to be trusty comrades, who will not envy their commander in his successes nor betray him in his adversity, must be his friends and not his enemies." (Cyrop. II, iv, 10.)

The most effective way of procuring this cooperation Xenophon judged—and rightly—to be through the personal example of the leader ; he cites the opinions of Cyrus the Elder to explain his meaning :—

"For he thought that it was not possible for him to incite others to good and noble deeds, if he were not himself such as he ought to be." (Cyrop. VIII, i, 12.)*

Xenophon recognized the true value of rewards as a means of inspiring his troops, as is illustrated by the following question and answer in the "Cyropædia" :—

"For putting enthusiasm into soldiers nothing seems more effectual than the power of inspiring men with hopes ?"

"Yes, my son, but it is just as if anyone on a hunt should always call up his dogs with the call that he uses when he sees the quarry. For at first, to be sure, he will find them obeying him eagerly ; but, if he deceives them often, in the end they will not obey him when he calls, even though he really does see a wild beast." (Cyrop. I, vi, 19.)

The rewards which an officer to-day is able to give are promotion and furlough. Cyrus, according to Xenophon, promoted those captains who had the best companies, and the lieutenants who had the best platoons. Moreover, he offered rewards to the companies

* The following passages illustrate further Xenophon's point of view :—

"The ruler ought to surpass those under his rule not in self-indulgence, but in taking forethought and in willingly undergoing toil." (Cyrop. I, vi, 8.)

"We must claim the right to rule . . . only on the ground that we are their betters. Now the conditions of heat and cold, food and drink, toil and rest, we must share even with our slaves. But though we share with them, we must try to show ourselves their betters in such matters." (Cyrop. VII, v, 78.)

"I should not be doing right, then, if I should let them get the impression that I was neglecting them and pursuing my own pleasure. For when soldiers think they are being neglected the good ones become much more despondent and the bad ones much more presuming." (Cyrop. V, v, 41.)

"And in his campaigns, also, if they fall in the summer time, the general must show that he can endure the heat of the sun better than his soldiers can, and that he can endure cold better than they if it be in winter ; if the way lead through difficulties, that he can endure hardships better. All this contributes to his being loved by his men." (Cyrop. I, vi, 25.)

which maintained the best discipline, just as cash prizes are given to the best gun-crews in the United States Navy. And the captain who invented the sham battle of clods or cudgels to demonstrate the superiority of shock over fire was also rewarded suitably.* One of the honours bestowed upon merit by Cyrus was an invitation to dine at his private mess, and there he invited not only officers, but also meritorious soldiers † and, "whenever Cyrus entertained company at dinner he always took pains that the conversation introduced should be as entertaining as possible and that it should incite to good." Cyrus used also "to send . . . presents to those whose services on garrison duty . . . or in any way met with his approval ; in this way he let them see that he did not fail to observe their wish to please him."

This particular method of sending presents is not practical for the majority of officers. But, as Montaigne justly observes, it is precisely those rewards which have no intrinsic value in themselves, such as medals, titles, wreaths and commendation, that men of honour—and all soldiers are presumed to be such—regard most highly. Therefore, it is in the power of every officer to reward merit.

And there is another means of doing honour that lies within the power of every leader : "Whenever Cyrus wished to honour anyone, it seemed to him proper to address him by name," ‡ and the results of this policy were that his guests went back "to their tents, and, as they went, they remarked to one another what a good memory Cyrus had, and how he called everyone by name as he assigned them their places and gave them their instructions."

The value of this practice cannot be emphasized too highly. We can picture the voluble soldiers as they went to their tents commenting on one of the favourite topics of conversation among soldiers—the merits or demerits, the virtues or vices, the worth or the worthlessness of their officers—and Army Regulations notwithstanding. No regulation can ever stop this ; nor were it well that it should. It is human nature. Xenophon's way was to give them nothing but good to say, and thus the moral of his Army was cemented.

Have you ever been recognized promptly by a superior when he has not seen you for years ? Did you not feel warm inside to be called by name ? Even an utterly worthless general can "get by" on this alone ; the men will say : "The old boy isn't so bad at that"—and the allegiance which he can command may be worth

* See Cyrop. II, i, 23 and 24 ; II, iii, 4 ; II, iii, 17.

† See Cyrop. II, i, 30.

‡ See Cyrop. V, iii, 47.

more to the Service than ability on his part. If Cæsar could call his whole Army by name, and if Cyrus could do the same, a regimental commander ought to know every man in his regiment, and he can.*

Cyrus continually summoned his generals, staff officers and others into conference, but he himself commanded.

Moreover, Cyrus used his generals and his staff for special purposes, whether to halt a panic or to stimulate the moral of his Army; and each went back each to his unit filled with enthusiasm and infected his troops with it. This any officer who has studied Xenophon's system of command should be able to do. To be sure it is not fool-proof, and to be a success the officer must be known to his men or else the system be uniform throughout an army, and there is the danger that a weak officer may carry kindness to the point of relaxation. However, no system is fool-proof; and a weak, an insincere, a stupid or a vicious officer cannot succeed under any system. In the words of Sun, a contemporary of Wu: "By humane treatment we obtain obedience; authority brings uniformity. Thus we obtain victory."

We must not allow our ideas about Spartan discipline to lead us to think that it was in any sense Greek. Colonel Boucher of the French Army says: "There never was an army composed of soldiers of so fierce a spirit of independence, taking such advantage of both the liberty and the licence which their freedom allowed, and for that reason so difficult to command."

While the writer of these lines had probably never seen Tennessee or Alabama or Anzac troops, it holds good even considering such unruly spirits as they. The Greek troops of Cyrus the Younger were in addition soldiers of fortune and adventurers. They had a strong local patriotism and intense personal pride, but no formal discipline. They were all trained soldiers, but that made them all the more

* "Now Cyrus made a study of this; for he thought it passing strange that, while every mechanic knows the names of the tools of his trade and the physician knows the names of all the instruments and medicines he uses, the general should be so foolish as not to know the names of the officers under him." (Cyrop. V, iii, 46 and 47.)

"Further more, it seemed to him that those who were conscious of being personally known to their general exerted themselves more to be seen doing something good, and were more ready to abstain from doing anything bad." (Cyrop. V, iii, 48.)

"And when he wanted a thing done, he thought it foolish to give orders as do some masters in their homes: 'Someone to go get water!' 'Someone split wood!' for when orders are given in that way, all, he thought, look at one another, and no one carried out the order; all were to blame, but no one felt shame or fear as he should, because he shared the blame with many. It was for this reason that he himself spoke to everyone by name to whom he had any command to give." (Cyrop. V, iii, 49.)

difficult for any but a very intelligent leader to handle. Xenias and Pasion, generals, deserted after their troops had deserted them to go over to Clearchus.

Now Clearchus was a "hard-boiled" soldier, inflexible and irascible. Upon one occasion one of his men quarrelled with one from Menon's contingent, and, in settling the dispute, Clearchus lost his temper and struck the latter. Later, when he was passing through Menon's camp, a soldier who was splitting wood spied him and promptly threw his axe at the general, whereupon all the others swarmed about picking up whatever was handy to throw at him. Clearchus escaped, but only to call his men to arms and march on Menon's corps to wipe it out. It was only the firmness of Proxenus and of Cyrus which prevented a war then and there.

Later, the same general got into hot water with his own men who stoned him. Clearchus had to resort to trickery to maintain his hold over his fire-eating contingent. Clearchus was the type of officer of whom it is said: "He wouldn't last five minutes at the front," but who never shows up to better advantage than in a "jam." He was harsh and narrow, but, in action, he "was there." This was because, while he knew his business and therefore inspired confidence when an emergency arose, when the crisis was past there was nothing to call forth devotion. It was the Prussian system applied to free men, and it did not work.

We know to-day that the absence of formal discipline in the Prussian sense is not to be lamented, but to be applauded, and despite the fact that the troops of Clearchus and Menon may be said to have gone a bit far in their informality when they undertook to throw axes and stones and sticks at a general officer, nevertheless, in battle, "they called to one another not to pursue in disorder, but to keep the ranks intact." Every man was his own Napoleon, which is our own method to-day.

For the Greek soldier was intelligent. So is our own; and instead of attempting to repress intelligence, initiative and spirit, a true discipline should seek to encourage them: "But will he be brave who is not spirited, whether it be a horse, a dog, or any other animal? Or have you not observed that the spirit is insurmountable and invincible, by the presence of which every soul is, in respect to all things, unterrified and unconquerable?"*

Xenophon looked askance at the Spartan discipline, but he knew how essential real discipline was:—

"Bethink you, then, of this: what city that is hostile could be taken,

* See Plato, Republic II.

or what city that is friendly could be preserved, by soldiers who are insubordinate? What army of disobedient men could gain a victory? How could men be more easily defeated in battle than when they begin to think each of his own individual safety? And what possible success could be achieved by such as do not obey their superiors?" *

When Cyrus mentioned "praise and honour for the obedient, punishment and dishonour for the disobedient," Cyraxares objected: "But when people think that they are going to get into trouble if they obey, they will neither yield very much for punishment, nor will they be moved by gifts, for no one willingly accepts even a gift at the cost of trouble to himself." †

"Willing obedience," intelligent and cheerful obedience because obedience is in the soldier's interest, is Cyaxares' view, and Cyrus straightway recognized the excellence of the idea, and forthwith made it his own:—

"'Nay by the gods,' said he, 'I do not think that I should like to employ servants that I knew served me only from compulsion. But if I had servants who I thought assisted me, as in duty bound, out of good will and friendship toward me, I think I should be better satisfied with them when they did wrong than with others who disliked me, when they performed their tasks faithfully but from compulsion.'"

Xenophon also emphasized the value of keeping the men together as much as possible. If they lived together, he thought, there could be no charge of favouritism, and they would become better acquainted and learn to know their places in the ranks. If they messed together, they were less likely to desert each other: "For he had often observed that even animals that were fed together had a marvellous yearning for one another if anyone separated them." ‡

When we think of the significance of the term "bunkie" in the United States Army, and of the naval terms "ship-mates" and "mess-mates," we can understand the bond which unites men who live together.

There was another shrewd observation which influenced Xenophon's conception of discipline through sympathy: he thought in order that the men might enjoy their meals and keep in good health, and also in order that their bodies might be hardened and their comradeship strengthened, they ought to be made to sweat before every meal: "He thought that hardships conduced to their being more reasonable toward one another, for even horses that work together stand more quietly together." §

* See *Cyrop.* VIII, i, 2.

† See *Cyrop.* I, i, 28.

‡ See *Cyrop.* I, vi, 21.

§ See *Cyrop.* II, i, 29.

He noted, too, that the man who answered at a run and who never did anything without sweating made the whole section like him.

But Xenophon was not an idealist, despite the fact that he believed in a high standard of conduct ; he was essentially a practical man as his conduct of the retreat of the Ten Thousand demonstrates. Although he loved to picture an ideal army, he knew very well the feebleness as well as the strength of the human material which a military leader must use. He knew that there must be in every army undesirable characters, and in his system of discipline he made provision for dealing with them.

During a conversation at mess, one of Cyrus's officers alluded to a man of this description :—

“ ‘ For my observation is that he very good-naturedly consents to have a smaller share of hard work and other things of that sort than anybody else.’ ‘ Well then,’ said Cyrus, ‘ I am convinced that such fellows as this one of whom our friend has just been telling us must be weeded out of the ranks, if we are to keep our army industrious and obedient. For it seems to me that the majority of the soldiers are the sort to follow wherever anyone leads ; and the good and noble, I think, try to lead only to what is good and noble, and the vicious to what is vicious, . . . those who are poor companions in toil, and also extravagant and shameless in their desire for any advantage, these are likely also to lead others to what is vicious ; for they are often able to demonstrate that vice does gain some advantage. And so we must weed out such men at any cost. ‘ Let me assure you of this, too, my friends,’ he added, ‘ that the weeding out of the vicious will bring not only this advantage, that the vicious will be out of the way, but also among those who remain, the ones that have already been infected with vice will be purged of it, while the virtuous seeing the vicious disgraced will cleave more eagerly to virtue.’ ”

Even in countries where universal service is the rule, this weeding out of the vicious ought to be practised, if we are to believe that the moral factor in war is supreme, and that quality in troops is more important than quantity. And of this the battle of Cunaxa was a striking demonstration, as were those of Marathon, Thermopylæ and Platæa. Plassy, too, was an extraordinary example of this truth, as also have been many fights at sea. But much discrimination must be used. We cannot judge of the value of men by their origin. Even the gaols have, under a good leader, provided excellent troops. The material supplied to Clive in India was of the lowest, but he was a leader who knew how to appeal to the best in men and his troops performed prodigies of valour and of devotion to duty. Leaders must be keen, but not superficial judges of men. And, if this be true in a country where universal service rules, it is a

hundred times more important in countries, such as Great Britain and the United States of America, whose regular armies form a training nucleus for the development of the national strength in war. In an army of this kind every soldier is a potential leader, and selection and elimination cannot be too severe or, rather, too discriminating. When recruits join up for a war, each one looks to the old soldier as a model. He must be a good model.

Here is an additional reason why the system of Xenophon ought to be studied and adapted ; because Xenophon appealed to the intelligence, he lost no opportunity of demonstrating to the soldier the value of discipline. Upon every possible occasion he drew the attention of the men to an example of success or failure due to the presence or absence of discipline.

And we might learn also to instruct our men in discipline as Xenophon did ; as Socrates taught his pupils, and as Christ taught His disciples and the multitude ; by means of simple illustrations from every-day life ; by analogy with common things ; for this leaves a strong impression and is valuable.

Then, if there is occasion to go into battle, our men may enter upon that supreme test of manhood and character even as the Greeks at Cunaxa, or even as the Persians as described by Xenophon :—

“ And when the pæan was ended, the peers marched on well-disciplined, looking toward one another, calling by name to comrades beside them, and behind them, and often saying : ‘ On, friends ! On, brave fellows ! ’ ; thus they encouraged one another to the charge. And those behind hearing them, in their turn cheered the front line to lead them bravely on. So Cyrus’s Army was filled with enthusiasm, ambition, strength, courage, exhortation, self-control, obedience ; and this, I think, is the most formidable thing an enemy has to face.”

Naturally enough the ideas which Xenophon advocated for discipline were applied also in training ; for what is training if it is not the process of forming correct military habits with some additional instruction in those subjects in which habit is not essential ? Hence we find the same formula once more :—

“ But if it is ever necessary—as it may well be—to join battle in the open field, in plain sight of the enemy, with both armies in full array, why, in that case my son the advantages that have long since been secured are of much avail ; by that I mean, if your soldiers are physically in good training, if their hearts are well steeled and the arts of war well studied.” *

Similar passages could be quoted ; for Xenophon repeatedly laid stress upon these three factors. But he also insisted upon the

* See *Cyrop.* I, vi, 41.

duty of an officer to steel the hearts of his men for war by showing himself of value and advanced the doctrine that courage can be taught. This, too, Xenophon learned from Socrates, as an incident related in the "Symposium" shows: "The company may say what they please, said Socrates, but, if I am not mistaken, nobody will deny but courage may be learnt . . . a girl, you see, has the courage to throw herself through the midst of naked swords which I believe none of us dares venture upon."

Of course, we know this to-day. History shows some remarkable examples of extraordinary courage shown by the lowest types of men. The ragged rascals of Tilly and Wallenstein were cut down to the last man rather than give way one single pace, for honour held them where they stood; and Clive in India made excellent soldiers from the off-scourings of the gutters. To-day, or at least in the days before the World War, both the British and the American Regular Armies were largely recruited from material whose antecedents were dubious, and what service could show better soldiers than these? Familiarity with danger we are all aware breeds courage. Example also is a potent factor; and confidence in one's leaders induces steadiness. Confidence in one's own training and discipline is also a great factor: "At any rate, those who are conscious that they have been well drilled are certainly more courageous in the face of the enemy." *

Xenophon also touches upon two other matters of importance which a leader should inculcate in the training of his men—contempt for the enemy and eagerness to front him, two elements in their military education which help to shorten that corrosive of moral, delay:—

"Cyrus now saw that his soldiers were in good physical condition to endure the fatigue of military service, that their hearts were disposed to regard the enemy with contempt, that they were skilled each in the exercise adapted to his kind of armour, and that they were all well disciplined to obey the officers; accordingly, he was eager to undertake some move against the enemy at once, for he knew that generals often find some even of their best laid plans brought to nought through delay."

Physical health and the ability to withstand hardships in Xenophon's opinion promote men's courage, and according to Xenophon,† courage meant very much the same thing as we mean by moral.

What to-day we call moral was the keynote of Xenophon's entire doctrine. His thesis was the superiority of quality over quantity,

* See Cyrop. II, i, 29.

† See Cyrop. I, vi, 16 and 17; I, v, 11; II, i, 21 and 22.

and he considered that earnest and intelligent cooperation was the true road toward the development of quality.

Cyaxares asked Cyrus whether his teacher had taught him how to inspire his men with enthusiasm, adding that "in every project enthusiasm or faint-heartedness made all the difference in the world." One of the vital factors in securing good moral is justice.

Justice, or equal treatment for all alike, Cyrus carried almost to the length of absurdity, as in the case where part of his force was absent in pursuit and he would not allow those remaining in camp to eat until the absent had returned.

He believed in equality in those things which ought to be common, namely, in food and drink and sleep, of which all require a similar amount. But he did not believe in equality in those respects in which men naturally differ from one another; in intelligence, in strength, in courage, or in character. Hence officers were selected for their superior intelligence, courage and character; and those who were superior in courage alone were given decorations, and for these reasons :—

"... For he knew that common dangers make comrades kindly disposed toward one another, and that in the midst of such dangers there is no jealousy of those who wear decorations on their armour or of those who are striving for glory; on the contrary, soldiers praise and love their fellows even more, because they recognize in them co-workers for the same common good." *

Moreover, while he lost no opportunity of instructing his men or exhorting them to make themselves better men and thereby better soldiers, he did not rely upon exhortation alone :—

"... for no speech of admonition can be so fine that it will all at once make those who hear it good men if they are not good already; it would surely not make archers good if they had not had previous practice in shooting; neither could it make lancers good, nor horsemen; it cannot even make men able to endure bodily labour unless they have been trained to it before." †

"For even in the case of those whom we have kept and trained among ourselves, I, for my part, should not trust even them to be steadfast, if I did not see you also before me, who will be an example to them of what they ought to be and who will be able to prompt them if they forget anything. But I should be surprised, Chrysantas, if a word well spoken would help those wholly untrained in excellence to the attainment of manly worth any more than a song well sung would help those untrained in music to high attainments in music." ‡

* See *Cyrop.* III, iii, 10.

† See *Cyrop.* III, iii, 50.

‡ See *Cyrop.* III, iii, 55.

The above passages give the clue to Xenophon's idea, and this sums it up :—

"And then again, I think, there must be, in addition to the laws, teachers and officers to show them the right way, to teach them and accustom them to do as they are taught, until it becomes a part of their nature to consider the good and honourable men as really the most happy, and to look upon the bad and the disreputable as the most wicked of all people. For such ought to be the feelings of those who are going to show the victory of training over fear in the presence of the enemy." *

Thus did he aim to make doing the right thing a part of their natures. But he relied not upon precept and example alone ; he appealed also to those qualities which his men already had and made them serve his purpose. He knew that : "The Athenians are . . . of all people most eager for honour and most friendly in disposition, qualities which most effectually impel men to face danger in the cause of glory and of their country."

He appealed, therefore, to this sentiment :—

"How you, I take it, could make use of the night just as others do of the day ; and you consider toil the guide to a happy life ; hunger you use regularly as a sauce, and you endure drinking plain water more readily than lions do,† while you have stored up in your souls that best of all possessions and the one most suitable to war : I mean you enjoy praise more than anything else ; and lovers of praise must for this reason gladly undergo every sort of hardship and every sort of danger." ‡

Moreover, he taught them to help one another :—

"And it is a good thing for some of the strongest and most zealous to fall back sometimes and encourage the rest ; and when the column has passed by them, it is an incentive to all to hasten when these are seen running past them as they walk." §

And especially did he rely on the non-commissioned officers :—

"What he proposed was as follows : to the private soldier, that he show himself obedient to the officers, ready for hardship, eager for danger but subject to good discipline, familiar with the duties required of a soldier, neat in the care of his equipment, and ambitious about all such matters ; to the corporal, that, besides being himself like the good private, he make his squad of five a model, as far as possible ; to the sergeant, that he do likewise with his squad of ten, and the lieutenant with his platoon ; and to the captain, that he be unexceptionable himself and see to it that the officers under him get those whom they command to do their duty." ¶

* See *Cyrop.* III, iii, 53.

† Particularly applicable to American troops.

‡ See *Cyrop.* I, v, 12.

§ See *Cyrop.* II, iv, 29. The author is ready to bear personal witness to the high practical value of this practice, having used it to good effect on night marches.

¶ See *Cyrop.* II, i, 22.

Here is an example which shows the ideal sought by Xenophon :—

“ ‘ By Zeus, fellows,’ he answered, ‘ I will tell you. Every time that I have called him, whether by day or by night, he has never made any excuse saying that “ he had not time,” nor has he answered my call slowly, but always at a run. And as often as I have bidden him do anything, I have never seen him perform it without sweat ; and besides, by showing them not by precept but by example what sort of men they had ought to be, he has made his whole squad of ten just like himself.’ ”

Such, then, were the ideas of Xenophon with regard to moral ; and such his ideas with regard to the conduct of war. His was a good system. It aimed at a high standard ; but in that lay its excellency. If there was one mistake in training men for service in the World War which was greater than any other mistake, it was this—that the officers commonly under-estimated the potentialities of their men. The men constantly surprised their officers because the standard set upon their powers was not sufficiently high. The more reason, then, that attention should be given to the teachings of Xenophon. He proved himself a great soldier and a consummate leader of men. He was the pupil of a great philosopher, and the master who taught our forefathers the Art of War.

THE INFANTRY MAN-POWER PROBLEM

BY BREVET MAJOR G. S. BRUNSKILL, M.C., K.S.L.I.

IN 1806 the Prussian Army was utterly defeated by the newly raised French Armies. This defeat was largely due to the fact that the Prussians had not kept their military organization up to date, and one of the principal changes which they were obliged to make on the mobilization of their Army was the re-organization of their infantry.

To the writer the present organization for war of the British Infantry of the Line * does not appear satisfactory.

The defects appear to be :—(a) the general organization into corps ; and (b) the low man-power of the present establishments.

(a) *The Organization into Corps*.—The Regular portion of the Infantry of the Line is still organized on the system instituted by Lord Cardwell after the Crimean War. There are sixty-three regiments, each organized in time of peace into an overseas battalion, for garrison duty in India or in an outlying portion of the Empire, a dépôt for recruits and for a reservist rejoining centre, and a home battalion for training and draft-finding purposes. The home battalion had also to be ready to take its place in the Expeditionary Force.

In the writer's opinion the primary weakness of this organization in war is that each regiment is a separate corps. This means, in an Expeditionary Force of five divisions, that the infantry arm is sub-divided into sixty-three watertight compartments.

In the war of 1914–1918 it soon proved necessary to break down the rigidity of this system, in order to reinforce regiments which had exhausted their own reinforcements after heavy casualties. The solution adopted was the Compulsory Transfer Act which enabled the compulsory transfer of men between regiments. But it can be readily understood that the compulsory transfer of large numbers of men, made in a theatre of war to meet sudden requirements, caused the greatest confusion and, consequently, a loss of efficiency and of man-power.

It seems imperative, therefore, that some other solution should be found to this problem in time of peace and at once, which will

* Other ranks only are discussed in detail in this article because the officer problem is comparatively simple, and any changes in the organization of officers must be based upon those considered necessary for other ranks.

not impair the existing regimental traditions and *esprit-de-corps*. It should be possible to group regiments into corps of some twelve each, to combine their record offices, to enlist men into the large corps, to allow them in time of peace to serve all their time with the regiment they prefer, and in war to use them, if necessary, for other regiments of the corps.

The Territorial Army presents a further complication because its officers and men have been promised that they will certainly not be used to reinforce regular units, and they have really been given to understand that they will always serve, not only with their own regiment, but with their own unit. This means that the sixty-three watertight compartments will be increased to at least one hundred and twenty-six in a great war.

In view of the definite pledges which have been given and the effect upon Territorial recruiting of any deviation from them, it is difficult to find a solution to this further problem. It becomes all the more certain, therefore, that the Regular portion of the infantry must be made more elastic in regard to its man-power. This is all the more important in view of a further complication caused by the machine gunners who, with their special qualifications, at present form a separate man-power entity within each regiment. Many officers think that in the next war it will prove necessary to revert to a Machine-Gun Corps, although in time of peace it is probably better to have machine guns with battalions in order to foster close cooperation. If the Machine-Gun Corps is to be revived after mobilization, the manner in which the change is to be effected should be worked out in detail, so as to cause the least dislocation when it becomes necessary.

(b) *The Low Man-power of the Present Establishments.**—As each regiment is at present a separate corps, the man-power problem of the infantry must be considered from the regimental point of view only. The following figures show that the man-power of an average regiment of two battalions, in normal times, under the present organization will be considerably less than it was in 1914.

Owing to the considerable substitution of automatic weapons for rifles and bayonets it is not entirely sound to make the above comparison the basis for criticism. Criticism, to be intelligent, must be based upon the probable man-power requirements of a regiment in the next war.

* It is important to remember that the reserve strengths referred to in the following paragraphs are those which actuarial calculations infer that the present peace establishments can maintain in normal times. The actual strengths in the Army Reserve at the moment are considerably lower than those quoted.

Peace Establishments.	1913-1914.	Present Organization.
Battalion in India	1,003 (Estabt.)	878 (Estabt.) *
Home Battalion and Depôt ..	867 "	832 " *
Total serving soldiers ..	1,870 "	1,710 " *
Army Reserve Section B ..	725 (average available strength, 1.10.13)	513 (actuarial calculation of available strength)
" " D ..	265 "	257 "
" Total ..	990 "	770 "
Special Reserve (late Militia) ..	† 405 (average available strength, 1.10.13)	nil
GRAND TOTAL, man-power of regiment	3,265	2,480
War Establishment of a Battalion (exclusive of any reinforcements)	992	854

Each regiment must be able to produce, on mobilization, sufficient serving soldiers from the home battalion and depôt, and reservists in addition, to fulfil two requirements :—

- (a) to bring the home battalion up to war establishment ; and
- (b) to meet wastage in the battalion in the field whilst post-mobilization recruits are being trained.

As a basis for requirement (a) there is the war establishment of 854 other ranks drawn up by the General Staff, and based upon tactical requirements.

The total peace establishment of other ranks for the home battalion and depôt of a regiment is 832. The maximum number of these 832 serving soldiers likely, on mobilization, to be fit and available to proceed with the battalion will be approximately 535.†

On this basis 319 (854—535) reservists would be required to bring the home battalion up to war establishment. It must be remembered, however, that 535 serving soldiers would only be available if establishments were full, and this is never the case, even in October before drafting begins. It will, therefore, be sound to

* Peace establishments for 1924-1925 give the following establishments for other ranks of the Infantry of the Line :—

No. 277—Battalion at Home	763
No. 278—Depôt at Home	69
No. 279—Battalion in Colonies	853
No. 280—Battalion in India	878

† After allowing for 10 per cent. being unavailable owing to unfitness and failure to join up, and for a proportion being under age.

‡ Those interested in the details of these figures will find in Appendix A a rough idea of the state, on mobilization, of the home battalion and depôt.

assume a deficit of 50 on the establishment, which means that there will be 485 serving soldiers available and 369 reservists required.

Of the 297 (832-535) serving soldiers of the home battalion and dépôt not fit or available to proceed with the battalion, 109 will become fit for use as reinforcements before post-mobilization recruits are trained. These 109 serving soldiers, together with more reservists, will have to meet the initial wastage in the battalion in the field to which allusion is made above.

The number of available reservists must depend upon the reserve-producing power of the peace establishments and upon the terms of engagement.

The present peace establishment of a regiment is some 1,700 men whose term of engagement is for seven years with the Colours and five in the reserve. As regards this latter category, it stands to reason that the shorter the period spent with the Colours the greater the turn-over and the larger the reserve. But expense, and the need for seasoned soldiers in overseas battalions, has hitherto made it impracticable to reduce the period spent with the Colours.

On these figures it might be expected that the yearly run-out to the reserve would be $\frac{1700}{7} = 243$, and the strength on the reserve (Section B) $243 \times 5 = 1215$. Actually, however, in normal times a regiment can only maintain, in Section B, an available strength of 513 (after deducting 10 per cent. for unfits and failures to join up).

The reasons for the lower figure are that men serving overseas are generally held for an extra year with the Colours, that many extensions of service have to be allowed to produce experienced warrant officers and non-commissioned officers, and that there is a considerable wastage from premature discharges, deaths, desertions, etc. In fact, out of every 100 recruits only some 55 ever reach the reserve.

It has long been recognized, therefore, that the ordinary turn-over of "7 and 5 year" men is not capable of maintaining a sufficiently large reserve (Section B). Instead of increasing peace establishments, at great cost, so as to increase the turn-over, the expedient was adopted of allowing men completing their 12 years, either with the Colours or in Section B of the Reserve, to re-engage as reservists for a further 4 years (Section D). Actuarial calculations infer that, if 50 per cent. of these eligible to do so re-engage into Section D, the available strength in this section, in normal times, will be 257.

Since the war of 1914-1918 this Section D has been augmented

by direct enlistment from civil life of men with war experience, but this is naturally a purely temporary measure.

The total available strength of a regiment in Army Reserve in normal times, therefore, may be estimated at 513 in Section B, and 257 in Section D, giving a total of 770 men, of whom 369 will be required to bring the battalion up to war establishment. In order to meet the wastage whilst post-mobilization recruits are being trained there will, therefore, be available 109 serving soldiers, and 401 army reservists, a total of 510 men.

In framing the present peace establishment with a view to reserve-producing power, it was assumed that the wastage in a battalion in the field would be 10 per cent. per month, and that post-mobilization recruits could be trained in eighteen weeks (four months).

The following basis for the supply of reinforcements was accordingly decided upon :—

10 per cent. of war establishment to proceed with the battalion.			
10	"	"	to follow directly after.
10	"	"	" after one month.
10	"	"	" after two months
10	"	"	" after three months.
<hr/>			

Total 50 per cent of war establishment of 854—425 reinforcements required before post-mobilization recruits become available.

The 510 men provided for earlier in this article would seem amply to meet this requirement. This margin, however, cannot be relied upon, because the strength of the reserves in different regiments may vary by as much as 150 men, and the percentage of men re-engaging into Section D is dependent on the state of the labour market and on the degree of probability of mobilization for war or in aid of the civil power. It is also extremely doubtful in the writer's opinion whether post-mobilization recruits could be dispatched after eighteen weeks' training to take their places in battalions in the line.

As, then, there is such a narrow margin of safety on the above basis for reinforcements, it certainly seems desirable to analyse closely what a 10 per cent. monthly wastage really means. Experience of France in 1918 shows that the composition of an average 10 per cent. wastage in a battalion (*i.e.* 85 men) would be made up of 18 killed, missing and prisoners, 38 wounded, and 29 sick, a total of 85 men. If there happen to be good facilities for hospitals and convalescent dépôts in the theatre of war, and if, as was done in France in 1918, evacuations are reduced to a minimum, a proportion of the wounded and sick will be returned to their units. But such returns cannot be relied upon until the end of the second month

and will amount, at a maximum, to 28 men then, and to 28 more at the end of the third month, *i.e.* 56 in all. Twenty-nine sick in a month is less than 1 per day, and it does not, therefore, seem possible to increase the battle casualties to more than 56 out of the total of 85. But it is almost impossible to visualize a campaign, even against ill-armed enemies, in the rigorous opening stages of which battle casualties will be as low as 56 in a month. The experience of the war of 1914-1918, in all theatres, shows that in mobile warfare, against a well-armed enemy, battalion battle casualties of 200 in one engagement, and 600 in three months, are quite ordinary.*

These figures are apart from any sick, which in three months can hardly be less than 100, and they are exclusive of men taken for employments, which may well amount to 50.

A battalion, therefore, may well suffer a loss of 750 men in three months. Against this possible loss, provision is only made for a maximum of 425 reinforcements and 56 returns to duty of wounded and sick, or a total of less than 500.

Our failure in the Dardanelles Campaign has been largely attributed by Sir Ian Hamilton and by historians to the fact that wastage was not made good. And there is no doubt, especially with such a low war establishment, that the efficiency of an infantry battalion is seriously impaired if it is not kept up to strength.†

Fortunately, it may be possible to strengthen the man-power of a regiment without resorting to the costly remedy of increasing the regular peace establishments of serving soldiers.

The Infantry Special Reserve (late Militia), which provided an average of 405 additional reservists in 1914, might be resuscitated at comparatively little cost. The other ranks of this branch are not catered for in the recent revival of the Special Reserve in the form of the Supplementary Reserve. The Special Reserve battalions are still in a state of "suspended animation."

Now that the Indian battalion establishment is lower, and the annual draft required smaller, some infantry recruits might be taken on "3 and 9" year engagements to increase the turn-over and the reserve strength. And Section D men completing their sixteenth year might be allowed to re-engage for a further period

* Appendix B gives further details of the average disposals of the wounded and sick, and Appendix C is a detailed picture of the progress of man-power of a battalion in the field on the 10 per cent. reinforcement basis.

† It must also be remembered that in the event of a war in Europe our military resources may be still further called upon in the event of trouble in India, or elsewhere in the Empire. The establishment of British battalions in India has been reduced recently by about 100, on the supposition that reinforcements will be immediately sent from the United Kingdom in the event of operations.

in the reserve, if only for service at home, or to fill employments instead of battalions being denuded for them.

There is the situation as the writer sees it—to him it appears suicidal to accept this any longer in spite of the need for economy and the fact that the prospect of a war of any magnitude is still remote. Re-organization of the infantry as an arm, to meet the writer's first criticism, would cost little or nothing. As regards the shortage of man-power, militia-men or additional reservists cost only a shilling a day each. The cost of raising a Supplementary Reserve at this rate for certain technical services has been faced, but the need for meeting the shortage in the principal fighting arm has not been recognized.

The prospect of a "Great War" may be remote, but the defects of the present organization would be felt even in a small Expeditionary Force. There is, therefore, no time to be lost, for it takes months of careful work to plan sound changes in organization and years for the system to work smoothly and for the additional trained man-power to materialize.

APPENDIX A

ROUGH GUIDE AS TO THE STATE ON MOBILIZATION OF THE HOME BATTALION, PLUS DEPÔT, IF ESTABLISHMENTS ARE FULL

—	Fit, eligible and available to proceed with battalion.	Not fit, eligible or available to proceed with battalion.		Total.
		Will probably become fit, eligible and available within three months.	Will not become fit, eligible and available within three months.	
<i>Seasoned soldiers</i> (over 20 years of age and 1 year's service)				
(a) Left behind—depot, staff	—	—	68	68
(b) Left behind for training battalion staff or expansion nucleus	—	—	20	20
(c) Others	314	8	8	330
<i>Young soldiers with battalion—</i>				
(a) 19 years of age and over	221	5	5	231
(b) 18½ to 19	—	17	1	18
(c) Under 18½	—	—	18	18
<i>Recruits at Depôt—</i>				
(a) Over 18½	—	79	5	84
(b) Under 18½	—	—	63	63
Total	535	109	188	832

APPENDIX B

AVERAGE COMPOSITION AND DISPOSAL OF THE MONTHLY CASUALTIES IN A BATTALION

(Assuming that these casualties from all causes will average 10 per cent. of war establishment—(i.e. 85 out of war establishment of 854.)

Average composition of the 85 casualties struck off the strength of the battalion in the line.		Further disposal of the 38 wounded and 29 sick given in col. (1).				
		Nature of disposal.	Wounded.		Sick.	
			Disposal from hospital of the 38 wounded admitted.	Disposal from convalescent depôt of the 13 given in col. (3).	Disposal from hospital of the 29 sick admitted.	Disposal from convalescent depôt of the 15 given in col. (5).
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	
Killed 14	Deaths To U.K.	1	negligible	negligible	negligible	
Missing, prisoners 4	To Base Depôt—	23	"	10	"	
	Fit	1	12	4	11	
	Unfit	negligible	1	negligible	3	
Wounded 38	To Convalescent Depôt	13	—	15	—	
Sick 29	Back to Hospital	—	negligible	—	1	
Total 85	—	38	13	29	15	

APPENDIX C

PROGRESS OF MAN-POWER OF A BATTALION OF INFANTRY OF THE LINE DURING THE FIRST THREE MONTHS OF A CAMPAIGN
(Based on France, 1918, but with total casualties limited to 10 per cent. per month and reinforcements on the present basis of 50 per cent. in three months.)

Date.	Man-power in theatre of war (at date).						Man-power lost to theatre of war (to date).					Grand total to date.
	With battalion in line (See *).	In base depôts (ft).		In hospital and convalescent depôts (See †).		Total.	Killed, missing, and prisoners of war.	Wounded died.	Wounded evacuated.	Sick evacuated.		
		From U.K.	Returned sick and wounded from hospital and convalescent depôts.	Wounded.	Sick.							
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	
On arrival in theatre of war	854	85	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	939	
By end of 1st month after arrival	854	170	—	14	19	1,057	18	1	23	10	1,109	
By end of 2nd month after arrival	854	170	28	15	23	1,090	36	2	46	20	1,194	
By end of 3rd month after arrival	854	170	56	16	27	1,123	54	3	69	30	1,279	

* From this figure must be deducted men taken for extra-regimental employment, the nucleus left out of battle for purposes of reforming, those, such as transport and quartermaster's stores personnel, who are not available to fight, and sick and wounded not yet evacuated from medical units of the division.

† These figures include men discharged to base depôts unfit.

AN OPERATION OF WAR

(*With Map*)

BY BREVET LIEUT.-COLONEL R. H. BEADON, C.B.E., R.A.S.C.

REGARDED purely as an "operation of war," the move of the Franco-British Forces to Italy in November and December, 1917, after the disaster at Caporetto, furnishes a very complete and instructive example of "movement" on a grand scale. For two reasons the episode has not received the notice it has merited.

In the first place the greater events involved by the actual fighting have so dominated the stage of the world war as to leave but little room for anything subsidiary. Secondly, because rightly enough with a view to the future we have acquired the habit of analysing our mistakes and our failures to the exclusion of our obvious successes. Yet the history of the "operation" in question has no little educative value in the military sense. For the influence of the movement as far as the Italian theatre was concerned was a decisive one. The very fact that the Allied concentration in Venetia was effected early in December was in itself the limiting factor to the Austro-German advance. It is no disparagement of the Italian Army that this was so, for that Army had suffered losses in men and materiel alone that made it very doubtful whether a stand could be made on the line of the Piave river. That the enemy's advance was there arrested was due not so much to the impracticability of their forcing a passage, but rather to the fact that once such passage was effected his troops would almost immediately have to contend with the best part of two hundred thousand fresh French and British troops. These latter, therefore, without taking part in any serious fighting, at once changed the whole aspect of the campaign by their presence in the theatre. That their subsequent action in the major operations was a most important factor in the decisive successes obtained, is now a matter of history.

It is but seldom, especially in war, that great results are obtained by mere chance or opportunism. Too full a faith in a "lucky star" rather than in foresight and erudition is apt to prove dangerous. That fortune favours the wise, however, would seem very clearly brought out. Fortune in fact requires to be wooed by wisdom no

less than by courage. It was by no hazard that the transfer from France and the concentration in Italy of considerable French and British forces was so swiftly and expeditiously effected in face of the crisis which arose in October, 1917. Again, for various reasons that need not be entered upon here, the enemy had not reckoned with so sudden an intervention and this naturally did much to enhance its value.

The possibility of action in the Italian theatre had been foreseen by General Robertson, then C.I.G.S., early in 1917, when the Italian Army was yet in the heyday of success, but very few indeed, even among those in the best position to know, believed in the probability of any set-back of so serious a nature as ultimately occurred in the following October. Nor on the part of the Italian High Command was there any lack of confidence. No little delicacy was necessary, therefore, in the preparations which were made to anticipate evil.

In April, 1917, a small British Mission consisting of 5 officers was dispatched to Italy with general instructions to make, in conjunction with the Italian General Staff, all preliminary arrangements for the detrainment, concentration and employment of any British forces that might be sent, and to collect such information as might be subsequently useful to their British commander. Though not officially mentioned at the time, the force envisaged was about six divisions. Whilst it was anticipated that such a force, if sent, would not be likely to arrive until the enemy's attack had developed, it was believed that this attack would most likely be directed through the Trentino on Verona, Vicenza or Brescia, and this supposition was to be taken as a guide in the selection of areas of detrainment and concentration.

As a matter of fact the calculations as to the point of attack proved erroneous. The blow in October fell on the Isonzo front and broke the strongest portions of the Italian line. Yet, as a glance at the map will show, the preparations which had been made were in no way compromised by the unexpected course of events. The enemy drove so rapidly through Venetia that any original detrainment and concentration east of the river Adige would have been too hazardous. Areas, therefore, which were selected with the idea that the enemy's offensive was to come through the Trentino sufficed for the move on to the defensive line of the Piave.

In addition to the devising of a scheme of concentration, the British Mission was instructed to obtain all possible information as to the extent of the assistance which might be expected from the Italians as regards maps, guides, supplies, transport and all the varied

administrative arrangements, and was naturally empowered to select a base or alternative bases. Before the British Mission arrived in Italy that country had already been visited in February by a French Mission which had drawn up a plan of action for French troops in the event of their being called upon.

Having been first on the spot the French naturally had had first choice as regards an area of concentration, their lines of communication and a base, and consequently the British selection, so far as these matters were concerned, was limited. Nevertheless, the plan drawn up by the French staff proved of the utmost value for the information it contained.

It is not the purpose of the writer to follow the fortunes of the British Mission, but rather to set out generally the plans which were worked for the subsequent operation. The problem was the move at any given moment of up to one hundred and fifty thousand British troops from the north of France and Flanders to eastern Lombardy, their concentration and maintenance in that area. Two important factors influenced this problem, first, that of time—speed was essential ; and secondly, that involved by a simultaneous move by a similar number of French troops. For the British the mean distance was about seven hundred miles.

Of the three ways of approach into Italy from France, *i.e.*—road, rail and sea, the last could be ruled out as being too slow so far at any rate as troop movement was concerned. The sea route via the port of Genoa was only utilized, therefore, for supplies and heavy stores.

In 1859 when Napoleon III took his Army into Italy for the successful campaign which culminated at Solferino great use was made of the sea route. The Imperial Army then moved as follows : The Guard and I Corps embarking at Marseilles and Toulon landed at Genoa as did also the II Corps coming from North Africa. Of the three divisions of the III Corps, one moved by rail to St. Jean de Maurienne and thence marched by Susa. A second division detraining at Briançon marched via Pinserolo ; and a third marched by Modane and Mont Cenis. The IV Corps followed the III Corps, while the Cavalry Division moved by road via Genoa.

It was possible for Napoleon thus to effect his concentration in Italian territory because before a state of war existed between France and Austria—in fact even before the Austrian ultimatum had been presented—the railways had carried the troops to the Piedmontese frontier while large forces were assembled at Marseilles and Toulon ready for embarkation. In 1917 conditions were vastly

different. Nevertheless, a knowledge of the precedent of fifty-eight years before was not without its value for the preliminary appreciation.

Two "through" railway lines run between France and Italy, the southerly one via Nice, Ventimigla and Genoa, and the northerly one by Modane on to Turin. Sixteen trains in the twenty-four hours were available by the first of the above routes and twelve by the second.

The "through" capacity, therefore, daily was twenty-eight trains or approximately half a division. Now this rate of progress could not be accepted as satisfactory, especially if the enemy were to initiate an offensive during the spring or summer months when his progress, in view of the nature of the terrain in which the fighting was taking place, might be expected to be fairly rapid.

Ways and means of supplementing the "through" traffic had therefore to be explored.

So far as the southern route was concerned it was possible in addition to the sixteen trains which could go daily via Genoa, for six more to get as far as Ventimigla. At that point the troops would be detrained and move round to Savona where entraining again they could move north on the Italian system by Cairo and Acqui. This involved a march of one hundred and ten kilometres or approximately five days if no motor transport could be made available, and the move could be effected at all seasons of the year.

A further number of eight trains per day in addition to the above could be run as far as Nice daily and the troops in these detraining at the latter place could march by the Col di Tenda to get on to the Italian system at San Dalmazzo di Tenda and the stations farther north. This route was also open at all seasons of the year and involved from three to four marches from Nice to San Dalmazzo. Thus by the southern line a maximum of thirty trains a day could be dealt with as described above.

For the northern route matters were not so simple.

The twelve "through" trains daily by Modane could only be supplemented at all seasons by six trains which could reach the railhead at Briançon each day. From there, four marches, some eighty-seven kilometres via the Col de Sestrieres, lead to Pinerolo where re-entrainment could take place. Six trains in addition to the twelve "through" could daily reach Modane which road is three marches (sixty-three kilometres) from Susa via Mont Cenis. At Susa re-entrainment could take place. This last route, however, was only practicable from the beginning of April until

about the middle of October. Finally, the railway terminus at Bourg St. Maurice on the French side could take eight trains in the twenty-four hours. Detrainment at this station would involve a march of some eighty-seven kilometres by the St. Bernard Pass to Aostata on the Italian system. But it was not until the beginning of June that the road was open and then only for some four months in the year.

Thus on the northern line also a maximum of thirty-two trains could be dealt with per day, but "for all seasons" this number would have to be reduced to eighteen. To sum up, therefore, capacity for movement—sixty trains per day under the most favourable circumstances—could be moved to the frontiers of France and Italy of which twenty-eight could proceed straight through.

The moves by road as indicated above naturally required organizing in the sense that quartering and supply arrangements had to be worked out for the troops in transit by them and this involved close reconnaissances of all the routes.

As it eventually turned out the Bourg St. Maurice Aosta and Modane-Susa routes could not have been used as the enemy's offensive was made in the last week of October, when it was unexpected. Not only, therefore; did the Austro-German blow fall on the most unlooked-for point of the front, but it was delivered at a season of the year when the natural difficulties apart from hostile action were considerable. This last condition naturally acted both ways.

So much for the actual entry into Italy. There is now to be considered the movement within Italy to the areas of concentration. To describe this in any detail would require a good deal more space than is here available.

It will suffice to say that the "movement" was worked out on the two different hypotheses of a simultaneous move by French and British and for the case in which one followed the other. The first of these was the only one that naturally presented any complications. Generally speaking, the lines corresponding to the northern route were confined to the French and those of the southern to the British. A central artery that lay in the line Alessandria-Torrebretti-Pavia-Corteolona-Codogno-Cremona-Mantova-Monselice-Padova was to be common to both the French and British.

So far as the British were concerned areas of detrainment and concentration were reconnoitred as under.

(a) Padua-Poiana-Montagnana-Rovigo.

The northern portion of the area was fed by the double line,

Verona-Vicenza-Padua, and the southern portion of the single line from Legnago to Rovigo.

Laterally a double line connected Padua and Rovigo.

The high ground about Monti Berici and Colli Euganei covered the greater portion of the eastern face of this area as did also the river Bacchiglione.

There was ample space too for the accommodation of six divisions and corps and army troops.

(b) The second area lay immediately west of the first, being that enclosed within a line drawn between Poina-Vicenza-Verona-Montagnana.

(c) The third was selected on the supposition that backward concentration would have to be effected and lay within that enclosed by Milan-Abbiategrosso-Pavia-Lodi well served by forward and lateral communications. Milan itself was excluded as this was within the French zone.

The selection of a base presented considerable difficulties once Milan had been allotted to the French. It was obviously of great importance to have easy communications from the ports on the Mediterranean and both Savona and Genoa were examined, but found unsuitable as lacking storage accommodation. Finally, *faute de mieux*, a place called Aquarta on the main line between Genoa and Milan and about forty kilometres north of the latter place was selected.

Such in very general outline were the arrangements arrived at, and the reconnaissances and the agreements reached with the Italian staff which were completed by the end of July.

Less than three months elapsed before the results were to be tested.

On the 24th of October, 1917, the Austrians and Germans attacked at Caporetto with complete success and came pouring on to the Venetian plain. Within the space of a few days the Italian Second Army which occupied that sector had practically ceased to exist. On its right the Third Army commanded by the Duke of Aosta which was holding the line down to the sea found its position entirely compromised and was compelled to conform to the backward movement. It was a catastrophe of the first magnitude. All the successes won at such a cost in the various battles of the Isonzo had to be abandoned. Not least among the misfortunes was an immense loss of war material. For some two weeks it was impossible to say where the retreat would be stayed. The Germans entered Udine on the 29th of October. It was hoped that it would be possible to stand on the line of the river Tagliamento, but so rapidly did the enemy advance that this hope soon had to be

abandoned. Furious assaults were being delivered against the northern of the Italian line in the direction of Monte Grappa. Any break through at this point would mean that the whole of Venetia would be lost and the mass of the Italian Armies would have found themselves herded in between the mountains and the sea. But the northern front though dented and sore beset held firm.

By the 9th of November the Italian forces were behind the Piave and it remained to be seen whether they would be able to withstand the enemy's attempt to force a crossing.

While these events were taking place the Allies in France had been by no means idle spectators. As soon as the magnitude of the disaster was grasped, instant steps were taken to meet it. The headquarters of the XIV Corps under Lord Cavan was dispatched from France on the 28th of October.

With the Italian Armies in full retreat and the situation still obscure it was naturally determined to effect a "backward" concentration and the Pavia-Lodi area which had been already reconnoitred was selected.

But before the British troops had begun to arrive the situation had sufficiently cleared to enable a detrainment and concentration farther east to be effected with comparative safety. Corps headquarters accordingly moved to Mantua about the end of the first week in November and the incoming troops were detrained on the lines west, east, and north-east of that town. The actual detrainments of the bulk of the force were effected just west of the zone (b) mentioned above, but the troops moving forward went directly into this latter zone and subsequently into zone (a) regarding both of which fairly complete information was naturally available.

Subsequent movements do not come within the scope of this article, as they more properly belong to the operations.

It remains, however, to be seen how the move from France was effected. During the month of November the following British forces were dispatched: headquarters XIV Corps; headquarters XI Corps; headquarters Second Army; 23rd, 41st, 7th, and 48th Divisions; certain heavy artillery; certain L of C units.

The divisions arrived in the order given and the total time that elapsed between the beginning of the entrainment of the 23rd Division and the end of the detrainment of the 48th Division was twenty-five days, *i.e.* from the 6th to the 30th of November.

The 5th Division which was delayed by events in the Cambrai offensive on the 28th-30th of November, reached Italy by the 21st of December.

The time taken by each of the first four divisions including the artillery from the time it began to entrain in France to the time it completed detrainment in Italy, averaged thirteen days.

The number of trains used for each division (each train being the standard one of forty vehicles) averaged sixty-one.

Twenty-four trains were allotted for heavy and siege artillery, and fourteen for army field artillery brigades.

During all this time it must be remembered that the French were moving simultaneously, generally being confined to the route via Modane, while the British moved by the southern railway via Ventimiglia.

An average of three trains a day only were allotted to the British on the northern route and fourteen by the southern.

The road movement was confined to the mechanical transport units.


These began to move from France on the 31st of October, 1917, arriving in Italy on and after the 15th of November.

The journey was from one thousand and sixty-five miles (shortest route taken) to one thousand one hundred and eighty-four miles and occupied from sixteen to twenty-two days at an average of sixty-seven miles a day. One day's journey of one hundred and thirty miles and four of over ninety miles were reported. The route generally followed was via Amiens, Senlis, Meaux, Troyes, Dijon, Chalons, Lyons, Valence, Avignon, St. Raphael, Nice, Bordighera, Savona and then via Ovada or Genoa to Cremona and Camposampiero.

Such very briefly was the operation which moved the British Army to Italy in the winter of 1917. In its way it furnishes an excellent example of what a sagacious looking ahead means in war. The fact that those responsible insisted on a complete plan, especially on the administrative side, being drawn up in case of eventualities which seemed indeed unlikely to arise, meant very possibly the whole issue of the Italian campaign and even perhaps that of the war.

It is not difficult to imagine the chaos and delay that might have ensued had such an operation in which time was so decisive a factor been attempted without any previous preparation.

A detailed study of all the arrangements and their execution is of great educative value in the military sense from the "movement" and administrative points of view, and would indeed furnish a very useful exercise in the form of a scheme. In any case, those who took part in the actual work have good reason to know the valuable experience obtained.



[To face page 382.

BATTALION ORGANIZATION IN TIME OF PEACE

A REPLY TO CRITICISM

BY CAPTAIN M. BECKWITH-SMITH, D.S.O., M.C.,
Coldstream Guards

AFTER the shock of finding my first effort at journalism heavily criticized, I may perhaps be excused in feeling a sense of gratification in learning that my effort has been read by even one of my brother officers—even more so that it has produced a written answer.

I am indebted, therefore, to Lieutenant Clarke for his criticism of my previous article, and, as it is not unlikely that those who took the trouble to read my article and Lieutenant Clarke's rejoinder may have already forgotten their contents, I propose to begin this reply to his article by a short summary of our respective points of view.*

In my first article I tried to point out that for various reasons there was a considerable shortage of men in infantry battalions at home and that in consequence of this shortage, aggravated as it is by the smallness of our peace establishments, the present internal organization of an infantry battalion did not provide the best or most economical method of training and administering a battalion. In order to avoid purely destructive criticism I suggested that a remedy might be found in caderization within an infantry battalion either of sections or of platoons, or even of whole companies, preferably the last-named system.

In reply Lieutenant Clarke, whilst admitting the shortage of numbers on parade, ascribed this deficiency entirely to the system of employing men "on work which is not training for war." He did not attribute the shortage "either to lack of numbers or to the organization of the battalion."

Now it was never my intention to blame the organization for the shortage. I merely attempted to draw attention to the existence

* Captain Beckwith-Smith's article appeared in the *Army Quarterly*, April, 1924, and that of Lieutenant Clarke was published in July, 1924.

of the shortage and to point out that so long as it continued the present organization was ineffective for the training for war or for the carrying on of the daily routine of a battalion. Lieutenant Clarke did not deny the truth of these opinions. In these circumstances, therefore, it seems to me perfectly legitimate to question the value of the present infantry battalion organization, for it does not fulfil two of the main objects for which our military organization in time of peace exists.

It is no doubt true that some of the troubles of which infantry officers now complain would be removed if, as Lieutenant Clarke suggests, a solution could be found for the "employed men" problem. But how this particular problem can be solved without some increase in peace establishments, and consequently in the Army Estimate, Lieutenant Clarke has not explained. It is because the solution of the employment problem without an increase in the cost of the Army seemed to me to be so remote that I endeavoured to find another way out of the difficulty.

Turning now to Lieutenant Clarke's criticism of my proposals, it seems to me that he is justified in pointing out that I did not make clear the reasons for my preference for the caderizing of companies rather than of platoons, although the ability with which he demonstrated the immediate difficulty that would arise, if sections were caderized, proves that the objections to that particular solution of the problem were sufficiently obvious. I did not give the reasons for my preference because I was anxious to anticipate the criticisms which I felt might be raised against my proposal on grounds of general policy; I had no desire to dogmatize as to which of the three expedients might provide the best solution to the problem. Lieutenant Clarke apparently does not object to caderization on major grounds, but rather on points of detail—which are quite important enough, however, to deserve a word or two in answer.

One of the advantages which I claimed for the cadre company system was that it would relieve company commanders of the necessity of having to train their subordinate leaders "how" to command at the same time as they were actually supposed to be "in command." Lieutenant Clarke in his article laid the blame for such a state of affairs existing on the company concerned and not on the organization, and then went on to quote "Infantry Training," Vol. I, sect. 135, para. 10, which anticipates the actual situation which both he and I agree should be avoided.

Whosoever the fault may be, it cannot be denied that this

situation does very often arise. Now surely prevention in this case, as in every other, is better than cure—a cure, too, which in practice can seldom be applied to this particular disease. For, in practice, when a company is training, it seldom has adjacent areas allotted to it; and, even if it had, the remedy suggested in “Infantry Training” would mean that the company would have to complete its training by dinner-time so that the officers and non-commissioned officers would be free to study the scheme and to go over the ground for the next day’s exercise during the afternoon. Granted, however, that the remedy were applicable in every case, it might be questioned whether it is sound training always to take the leaders over the ground beforehand. In war it must be remembered that leaders are seldom able to carry out any but the briefest reconnaissance, and very likely are not even in possession of small scale maps. Yet Lieutenant Clarke cries out—“what are we to do in war if in time of peace we are thrown out of gear by the sickness of a platoon commander?”

Again every infantry officer is in entire agreement with the necessity for avoiding such an eventuality at all costs, but, whereas in war the strength of a battalion is such as to make the organization workable, in time of peace this is not the case—a fact which I hoped that I had made clear in my original article. During peace training with the numbers available there is no spare non-commissioned officer in the section available to take the place of a sick or absent non-commissioned officer probably not even in the platoon—possibly not in the company. The result is that the section is supposed to be commanded by the old soldier who has no authority in camp or barracks and no training as a leader in the field. The result, therefore, is that in barracks the organization breaks down as a means of administration whilst on the training ground the platoon commander is busied with teaching the old soldier how to lead his section instead of being able to busy himself with the collective training of his platoon.

It is of no use to argue that there should be a second-in-command of every section trained and ready to take over its command. In time of peace neither the numbers nor the material nor the opportunity exist. Yet the cadre company would fill the gap, and nowhere is it laid down that transfers from one unit to another for purposes of command are forbidden.

One other important question raised by Lieutenant Clarke in his article remains to be answered, namely, the rôle of the cadre company (or companies) during battalion and other collective

training. I, like Lieutenant Clarke, can visualize it acting as a skeleton unit, although, if the other companies happen to be over strength, I can see no objection in certain circumstances to "attaching" some men from these companies to the cadre company. True, as a cadre, it will provide poor exercise in administration although in this respect much will depend upon the ability and intelligence of its commander. As an exercise in "how" to command for those who have never done a collective training in command of their respective units it will be invaluable. Even the platoon commanders who have commanded platoons during a previous collective training will find a new outlook towards this annual period and perhaps an added interest in it, for instead of being chiefly concerned with the correct handling of their own units, they will have to give almost the whole of their attention to the instruction of their subordinates in the handling of theirs. In fact they will maintain the rôle of teachers throughout the period of collective training instead of becoming pupils once platoon training has been brought to an end.

TALES OF INTELLIGENCE

No. 7

CROSS-CHANNEL TRAFFIC

BY "JABB" (late of the Intelligence Corps)

IN the earliest and half-forgotten days of the war, civil and military passengers used to be conveyed by the same train and by the same boat to France. Officers travelling on business or on leave thus mingled with the ordinary public on their way to or from the French ports whence a daily express still ran to Paris or even to Italy. So it happened that Major Lynch, of Intelligence at G.H.Q., returning from an urgent conference regarding censorship held at the War Office in February, 1915, found himself wedged among a crowd of officers and civilians all waiting for the gangway to be put across to the steamer after it had reached the quay at Boulogne. It was past five o'clock and growing dark, but as Lynch neared the narrow exit in the crush he could just discern two speakers winding up a conversation.

"Good-bye, sir," said the first voice from beneath a military staff cap surmounting a fur collar, "if you can do anything to help us, we shall owe you a deep debt of gratitude."

"Well, I ought to thank you," replied the other figure in a heavy ulster and a soft felt hat, "for the valuable facts you've put before me. Official reports are so dreadfully lifeless; they squeeze out all the details worth knowing. It's only by meeting people like you, who have experience of the real thing, that we can learn what's wanted. Good-bye, but we shall meet again before long."

Lynch, mindful of the problems he had heard discussed in London, was momentarily puzzled by these few sentences, but soon forgot the incident in the rush for his car across the darkened quay.

Two days later there reached him at G.H.Q. a series of extracts taken from the technical press of neutral countries, with a request that he might investigate the outlet whereby certain details concerning defects in our new artillery ammunition had been secured by these journals. Similar inquiries were on foot in London and

in Paris. The indiscretions betrayed considerable technical knowledge and could only have been obtained by witnesses of the guns in action or on the proof-ground. Lynch's investigations yielded little result. Censorship precautions were sharpened and a G.H.Q. circular was sent to artillery units emphasizing the urgent need for greater discretion in public.

With this and other censorship matters still uppermost in his mind, Lynch went walking down the streets of Mordagne, the headquarters of XXVIII Corps, one evening. Suddenly he seemed to recognize the military voice that he had heard in front of him at Boulogne. The coincidence struck him, so he decided to probe the matter. The speaker gained on him, then vanished into a house. Lynch followed through an open door, when he soon ascertained that he stood in the Corps H.Q. artillery mess. Quickly he tracked down the voice to one Major Dursley, staff officer to the artillery commander. On being approached by one of equal rank and in a manner revealing an official motive, Dursley at first resented Lynch's inquiries. But the latter stuck to his point, until Dursley consented to grant him further conversation in private. There matters took a more satisfactory turn and Dursley ended with the following statement :—

"I travelled back from leave with the man you saw. As a matter of fact we struck up conversation at Victoria. I soon discovered him to be a director in some of our chief munition factories. He knew every blessed detail of our ammunition supply and was extraordinarily interesting. He ended by asking my opinion about certain improvements he wishes to introduce into our armament. Well, you know how we gunners are always cursing Whitehall for not giving us all we want ! Here, I thought, was *the* man who could set things right, so I confess I talked freely. Now, may I ask, what harm there was in speaking to such an authority on these questions ? "

Lynch explained how similar details had percolated into neutral journals, a leakage which could only be regarded as serious.

"Where was this fellow going ? " he then inquired.

Dursley, now more subdued, did his best to assist.

"He was going to Paris, so he told me. Next he was returning to London, but talked of coming over to G.H.Q. in a few weeks ; he promised to let me know when so that I might go over and dine with him."

This seemed better. Still Dursley could not recollect, or had not discovered, his chance acquaintance's name, so Lynch obtained a rough description of the man and left. The incident clearly

demanded further measures, since, however genuine Dursley's companion might be, what guarantee existed as to his discretion? or that the information so acquired might not make its way further afield? The matter could not be dropped: it revealed a real source of danger. Next day, therefore, Lynch spoke to his chief, General Stockham. Then, after a conference with the artillery staff at G.H.Q., a second circular went round to all artillery units pointing out the necessity for the strictest caution in the discussions of technical questions in public.

Shortly after, Lynch, being again in London, visited the munition supply experts, and descanted upon the inadvisability of allowing eminent manufacturers, when on their travels, to hold uncontrolled conversations with officers going on or returning from leave. Not only did this practice give rise to the gravest risk of impersonation, but, so he added, it must be remembered that men fresh from the trenches might readily exaggerate details and glorify their own idiosyncrasies. His hearers agreed, but foresaw difficulties. The industrial magnate, whose identity was clearly known to them, was not to be betrayed. Lynch was informed that this gentleman was the mainspring of the entire British munition supply: it would not be easy to place any restriction on him: he was of a ticklish temper, but loyal . . . yes, loyal to the core: he could be trusted—implicitly. Thereupon Lynch went elsewhere to plead for a stricter supervision over officers and men proceeding on or from leave. He was assured the matter would receive attention; that the necessary steps would be taken to secure the discretion of all ranks travelling on this side of the port of disembarkation.

Still dissatisfied, Lynch on reaching Boulogne instituted an inquiry of his own. The identity of the great munition manufacturer soon stood revealed, whereupon his personal description was shortly obtained from the Passport Office in London. This same description was next sent round by artillery headquarters at G.H.Q. to all brigade commanders in a third and very, very, secret circular letter. So far so good: it seemed as if the susceptibilities of all parties had been spared, whilst a more discreet attitude on the part of artillery officers, when still aglow with the excitement of battle, would be obtained. But the mills of official correspondence grind small and slow, while the resultant substance trickles down devious channels and may engender unexpected friction on its course.

* * * * *

Much as Lynch had disliked the old-fashioned handling of the case, he could only acquiesce in the measures adopted. He had

even begun to forget his disappointment, when at four o'clock one afternoon, as he was leaving his office for tea and exercise, the telephone rang. His expression grew more serious when he heard the voice of Magilvray, Port Intelligence officer at Boulogne, excitedly stating that an artillery brigadier had just come off the boat with the suspected manufacturer of munitions under arrest. . . . At this point the line was cut. Lynch tried to get on again, but complete paralysis seemed to have seized the entire telephonic system. His language grew florid : he tried the instrument next door . . . over the way . . . no result ! He was swearing volubly, when through the open door there entered General Stockham, waving a ruler in one hand and his spectacles in the other. Demeanour and speech denoted great perturbation.

"What have you gone and done ? What instructions did you send Port Control at Boulogne ? D'you know they've been and arrested Mr. . . . as a spy while on his way to see the Chief ? The A.D.C. just rang me up ; the Chief's perfectly furious with us ! "

"Who, sir, did you say had been arrested ? " asked Lynch, scarcely comprehending his general's emotion. Suddenly it dawned upon him that it was Mr. . . . , a Cabinet Minister at the moment responsible for the whole munition supply of the British Armies as well as for such as was being sent to our Allies. Simultaneously, an aide-de-camp arrived in a whirlwind demanding the General's presence in the Chief of the Staff's room. All agog Lynch ventured to follow. He soon realized that G.H.Q. was in a paroxysm. The incident at Boulogne was being broadcasted along every wire. It was gradually to assume exaggerated shape, until the sergeants' messes were palpitating with the news that the Prime Minister had been arrested at the Commander-in-Chief's order and was to be shot for treason next morning. Meanwhile, every line that led from G.H.Q. to the port by any route, however devious, had been appropriated. The Chief himself was apostrophizing the Military Secretary whom he had sent to Boulogne to welcome the honoured visitor. The Chief of the Staff had annexed a line for castigating the Base Commandant. The Adjutant-General was demanding reasons from the Provost-Marshal. The Quartermaster-General was taking to task the Transport officer. The Major-General, Royal Artillery, was panting for the blood of his errant brigadier. Alone Intelligence had failed to secure a wire in the stampede for news. Even the war seemed forgotten.

Little by little things returned to normal. The Cabinet Minister was retrieved by the Military Secretary, and he was now

being brought to G.H.Q. in the Chief's car. At last Lynch obtained from Magilvray a clear account of the affair. It transpired that an artillery brigadier had chanced to seat himself on the deck of the steamer next to the great man. The latter, recognizing an artillery general, had asked several questions regarding the supply of ammunition at the front. Mindful of the G.H.Q. homilies and fired by laudable zeal, the gunner had beguiled his listener with discreetly harmless information. But deep down in his heart he formed the resolve to seize the earliest opportunity of verifying the probity of his interrogator's motives. So, as soon as he landed from the steamer, the brigadier had followed his victim and cunningly lured him into the Military Landing officer's shanty where he might test his identity and his intentions. Leaving the stranger safely seated within, he dashed out to assemble the Port Intelligence officer, the Military Landing officer and the Provost-Marshal in order to examine his suspect with due ceremony. At that time brigadiers were still scarce and great personages.

Somewhat nonplussed by this incomprehensible delay in a stuffy little office, Mr. . . . had imagined that he would himself find the appointed car. But to his amazement his exit was barred by the Intelligence policeman on duty. The great man's indignation was sudden and vigorous. Fortunately the belated arrival of the Military Secretary, unpunctual but tactful and apologetic, averted a scene of the first magnitude. Profuse regrets finally extorted a smile of mollified acidity. The great man and his escort, on leaving the office, were met by the artillery brigadier, the Port Intelligence officer, the Military Landing officer and the Provost-Marshal, aghast at the colossal mistake that had been perpetrated. To the accompaniment of much repentant saluting, the honoured visitor was whirled off in a lordly motor.

Early next morning General Stockham and Major Lynch were summoned to see the Chief. They found him sitting in conclave with the Chief of the Staff, and Sir Stephen Walbrook, Major-General of Royal Artillery at G.H.Q. The latter gave but a frigid nod to his colleague of the Intelligence. The Cabinet Minister then appeared smiling. All explanations had already been accepted and he now insisted on a full pardon.

"It's old Bardsley Carswick, the explosive magnate, you're after," he concluded, "is it? Well, be thankful you caught me by mistake, for he's a touchy old fellow. But why on earth did that Brigadier pitch upon me? . . . Oh! you circulated Carswick's passport description, did you? . . . That's it, is it?" and he

glanced at a proffered paper. . . . "Well, it fits me vaguely, I suppose, but I know Carswick well and a child could tell that he's got a clear-cut bald patch at the back of his head—which, thank Heaven, I've not—and he shows three heavily gold-crowned upper teeth when he talks . . . No, I fancy you must revise your methods. And I advise you to be careful, for if you accuse Carswick unjustly of any malpractices, it might lead to an outburst that would jeopardize the work of all our munition factories. So please reflect as to what you do : that's my advice and I know it's sound."

The interview ended with instructions. Steps were then taken, by the Chief's explicit orders, to prevent any recurrence of such an error. A fresh, lucid, tersely-worded circular was brought to the notice of every artillery officer for future guidance and observance. But Intelligence, though disappointed, remained determined to clear up the mystery.

* * * * *

Just as on a duckpond, into which a large stone has been thrown, ripples and counter-ripples go on crossing till they die down, so the sensation provoked by this monumental blunder faded away at G.H.Q. But Intelligence grievously took to heart the whole episode ; bitterly it resented the limits henceforth imposed on its activities with regard to the control of travellers in general and of Mr. Bardsley Carswick together with his coadjutors, in particular. Consequently, when a fortnight later, the Inter-Allied Press Service in Paris forwarded some extracts taken from newspapers recently published in Rome, containing allusion to serious defects now coming to light in British ammunition, Lynch hardly knew how to act. He sought General Stockham, who remained equally perplexed. They both foresaw that difficulty might be encountered, since there still prevailed a certain coolness between Intelligence and artillery headquarters as the result of the previous unfortunate episode.

"It's very hard to see how we are to proceed," concluded the General, "it's difficult for us to go near the gunners with this matter after the last fiasco. Then we have to observe the instructions we've received from London and from the Chief. Lastly, the Italians are neutral, so we can't ask them for assistance. On the other hand, we can't let the matter slide."

"Well, sir," answered Lynch, "something we are bound to do ! Though if we do move at all, it's got to be done on different lines and more unobtrusively. Circular letters and that sort of rubbish won't do. I'll get down to it myself. Then, if we want

anything in London, I can now get it from old Brinsley who's just got an Intelligence job there from India. Brinsley's an old friend of mine and won't let us down."

The General authorized Lynch to act "within the prescribed limits."

The latter set to work on a plan of his own. His very first step was to visit Colonel Winsley at artillery headquarters. This officer had gained a reputation for great common sense and discretion, besides knowing intimately the whole tribe of gunners and their ways. After some preliminary remarks Lynch put the earlier cuttings before Winsley.

"You've seen all these before, of course," he said, "what d'you really make of them?"

Winsley smiled as he recognized them: "Yes, I recollect them right enough. The first lot struck me at the time as not worth making a fuss about. But the second bunch is curious, since, between you and me, this stuff might be written by old Carstairs himself—you know the funny old stick who commands the XXVII Corps Artillery. In some ways he's a mere crank, but he's a fine soldier and he's got a biggish influence in the regiment. These are some of his own pet fancies, in which nobody really believes. Fortunately, he doesn't put his theories into practice, but he's for ever holding forth about them."

"Could he have aired his views to the press?"

"Well, only when on leave at home, I should say. Journalists don't usually go down to the XXVII Corps as you know."

"What about these things?" continued Lynch, producing the latest Roman indiscretions. Winsley listened as Lynch translated their contents.

"No: there's nothing in this new lot that could be attributed to any gunner with the slightest degree of certainty: I know all our theorists! I don't think there's much in them in any case."

Lynch as a final "long shot" inquired the dates of any of Carstairs' journeys to England on leave. These were turned up by a clerk:—

"General Carstairs . . . here it is . . . private affairs, once: conference, War Office, once, sir. Sixth to tenth of December and twenty-first to twenty-fourth of January."

This interview was duly reported to General Stockham, Lynch adding a few suspicions of his own. The General was so far impressed that he called on Sir Stephen Walbrook. With a little hesitation he made known the object of his visit.

"D'you mind, Sir Stephen, my asking whether you can rely on the discretion of Brigadier-General Carstairs?"

"Why! bless my soul! whoever would question it? He's one of the best artillery commanders we've got. Talks a bit about his own fads, which are peculiar, for he's capable of recommending the re-introduction of muzzle-loaders, I know; but that means nothing."

"That may be all very well, General, but d'you think he'd know when to hold his tongue?"

"Certainly I do—if he thought it a matter of duty."

"Well, may I go further and ask if you consider he would be discreet in the presence of journalists?"

A shadow of irritation crossed General Walbrook's usually placid features.

"Look here, Stockham," he began with a tinge of asperity, "if there's any question of involving old Carstairs in one of your Intelligence scandals, I'm not with you. The censorship's there, and if you can't prevent the press getting hold of camp gossip, well, Intelligence had better overhaul its methods. No: I shall appeal to the Chief if anybody wants me to go behind Carstairs' back. So that's that."

General Stockham, feeling that there was nothing more to be gained, took his leave.

Lynch, also, was disappointed. His ardour was further damped when there arrived two more communications bearing indirectly on the same subject. A report from French Intelligence stated that a whole system had been discovered whereby secret details of the Allied armaments had been smuggled into Italy, whence it was being transmitted to the enemy, though some had leaked out into the Roman press. The second communication, from our censorship authorities, drew attention to the numerous very indiscreet, though seemingly innocent, letters then being detected in the mails of a new Overseas division freshly arrived and serving with the XXVII Corps. Lynch ruefully reflected that this was Carstairs' Corps and that these letters were being addressed to North America. Truly his case seemed crumbling away, not only for want of evidence, but even more owing to probable opposition from higher authority.

Next day, however, he was greatly cheered on receiving a letter from Brinsley, which read:—

MY DEAR OLD LYNX,

So glad to hear that you're enjoying the salubrious atmosphere of France. As you know, I'm now safely interned with the pharisees, publicans and dug-outs in Whitehall. Of course you can rely upon

my help. I agree with you entirely. The correct thing unquestionably, would be to put, first old Carstairs, next Carswick, "through the hoop." But I can smell the snags even from here! To cross-examine a corps artillery commander is a bit steep—unless, of course, you're on special low gear and got a red-hot case in hand! Then the other bird enjoys a permanent close season! No: your's is the old story of "*quisque suos patimur*," isn't it? You remember the old tag at Eton. How did we translate it? "We all suffer for the crimes of others"—very true it is, too, in the Army. Meanwhile I've begun by seeing the Munition pundits for you. They say they know all about Bardsley Carswick's travels. It appears B. C. spent 48 hours in New York on a very urgent matter about the 18th of December; he was also in Rome quite lately. But I'll get the correct dates, never fear. In these matters one's got to go about like Blondin and Agag rolled into one; so it may take a few days. So long!

Yours to the bone,
BRISTLES.

Lynch put some dates and facts on paper but it all seemed rather hopeless. In his perplexity he went to see Dursley at Mordagne. The latter did his best to assist, but failed to recognize any echo of his own conversation with Mr. Carswick, though he identified Carstairs' opinions, in the various cuttings. His visitor returned to G.H.Q. to think things out. A glimmer of hope crossed his mind, as he imagined he found some justification for these deductions: first, that this leakage of information into American and Italian papers was the work of the same agency; second, that these indiscretions might be connected with Mr. Carswick's journeys on munition work; third, that at least one of these indiscretions coincided with the first of Carstairs' journeys to England. Lastly, there was possible ground for suspicion that Carstairs might also have been the source of these other revelations. Nevertheless, the hard fact remained that he was debarred from examining either Mr. Carswick or Carstairs. Lynch felt that he must trust to his own ingenuity with a little possible help from Brinsley. Thereupon he sent for Murray of the Intelligence Corps, and evolved a plan of action with him.

"You remember, Murray, the row there was a fortnight ago over the arrest of that politician? Well, the incidents that led up to it are cropping up again. As a result of that old mess they laid down certain limits which we were not to overstep, but within those limits we are free to act. You remember all about it—right. I now want you to join Magilvray at Boulogne. You two, and more especially you, will have to travel pretty freely backwards and forwards to London and report to me what sort of indiscretions are

being committed by officers on their way home or back. You'll hear plenty, I'm sure. That's to be your first and ostensible job. But beside that I really want you to watch the civilian traffic and, from time to time, we might signal some individual to you who may require special observation. That's quite plain, isn't it? Yes: but mind you, there's to be no arrest nor nonsense of that kind. We've had enough melodrama! Telephone to me for authority if there should be real need to act. Now arrange things with Magilvray and come to see me again in a few days."

Murray and Magilvray accordingly devised their plan of campaign, and a week later Murray reported progress to Major Lynch. The two Intelligence officers had been able, through the Provost-Marshall, to set some check on the garrulity of certain young officers and on the inquisitiveness of civilian travellers. Otherwise nothing really startling had been discovered. It seemed, so Murray said very justly, that this sort of business was scarcely the true concern of Intelligence. Lynch none the less persevered, though he kept his reasons for so doing to himself.

* * * * *

With some relief Murray and Magilvray at length received a confidential order for one of them to travel daily by every steamer sailing from Folkestone, as Mr. Bardsley Carswick was expected at G.H.Q. during the next three days. They were to ascertain with whom Mr. Carswick consorted on his journey and to note what topics might be discussed by him. Two days later Mr. Carswick reached Folkestone in company with a major-general, who was no other than Sir Richard Palmer, a well-known authority on gun construction. The pair went on board together; they were followed by a secretary carrying two despatch cases and a portable typewriter. Murray, waiting at the gangway with the embarkation officer, found little difficulty in picking out Mr. Carswick.

The sea on that day was technically described as "moderate," so Mr. Carswick and the general decided to sit on deck to leeward of the chart house. Being good sailors both produced cigars, and settled down for the crossing with the help of Mr. Carswick's secretary, who then vanished. It was eight o'clock when the boat sailed and so quite dark. No lights being allowed after leaving the dimly lit quay, it was impossible to see much on deck. Murray sat down not far from his quarry but, owing to the whistling of the wind, failed to overhear what was being said. By this time he had learnt to overcome all remaining squeamishness as to eavesdropping, so he slowly edged and wriggled his way towards the two great men.

Having crawled up as near as he dared—half sitting, half lying, on the wet deck—he at length caught the drift of the conversation being conducted in low tones. It was of a highly technical nature and dealt with the construction of heavy howitzers on the basis of recent war experience. Murray was growing cold and wet. It seemed to him that he had fulfilled his mission. Consequently, he decided that he might leave the two great men whilst he went below to warm himself. It was his intention to return shortly. On preparing to retreat, he suddenly noticed against a ray of light that came from the chart-house door as it was opened by the captain, that something was moving from among the hand baggage piled beside the deck chair in which Mr. Carswick was settled. As the door closed he strained his eyes. Suspicion grew into certainty. Quietly he himself lurched across the slippery deck to the other side of the chart house ; he was too late to distinguish more, but farther aft he just distinguished a figure vanishing through the door of the upper deck smoke room. Moving towards it, he peered through a scuttle, painted blue and protected by curtains that swayed with the motion of the ship. Through a scratch in the paint he at length managed to discern most of the interior. He decided to go in, and on entering the room he noticed in the far corner a man who was writing and seemed to be immersed in his task. His appearance instantly aroused Murray's attention. The man's overcoat was damp, the right sleeve was wet : he had obviously come in but a short time before. For some minutes Murray watched him from across the smoke room. Then suddenly the door opened. Mr. Carswick with Sir Richard Palmer entered, went up to the bar counter and asked for two whiskies and sodas.

"It's getting too cold and wet to stay out there much longer, Palmer. We're halfway across, so we may as well sit it out in here."

The occupants of the room looked up at Sir Richard ; in those days a major-general in uniform was a certain "cynosure of wondering eyes." Only the man in the corner seemed too busy to look up. He bent down over his book, but Murray saw that he had stopped writing. Turning round Mr. Carswick at length observed his secretary.

"Hullo ! Perkins," he exclaimed jestingly, "what are you doing in here ? I thought you'd be down below again keeping a firm grip on your dinner !"

Perkins had clearly been startled by the arrival of his employer, still more by the remark thus directed towards him. He shut up

his book with a jerk and crammed it into his overcoat pocket. "Well, sir," he mumbled, "I thought I'd try a drink this time to help me to stand it, sir."

"Oh!" resumed Mr. Carswick, "if you're strong enough to get about now, would you perhaps mind fetching in the despatch cases we left outside by our chairs? Sir Richard and I will stay in here till we get in."

Perkins soon returned with the cases but went out again, remarking to Mr. Carswick that he would look after the hand baggage at Boulogne and bring it in to the Hotel du Nord in the car that should be waiting for them on the quay.

Mr. Carswick and his companion remained in the smoke room, mostly discussing artillery questions but not revealing anything of a recondite nature. Murray sat and listened: it was a very ordinary conversation. But his thoughts were no longer absorbed by the two men before him. Finally the ship slowed, rolled heavily, and reversed to enter port. It was drizzling outside and pitch dark. There was no incentive to move till it was necessary. A sudden swirl of the propellers, combined with the tremor of the hull and the squeaking of a tautening hawser, announced that the moment had come for the travellers to get ready to go ashore. There was not a great crowd on board and no hurry was displayed. The smoke room emptied. Murray followed Mr. Carswick and Sir Richard Palmer. The secretary came in, collected the despatch cases, then rejoined Mr. Carswick. Murray, as he stepped out into the dark behind Sir Richard, finally screwed himself up to chance everything on one throw. The sight of Magilvray's face, standing under the shaded lamp on the quay, backed by two or three Intelligence policemen, nerved him to make the attempt. Pushing his way closer to the trio and treading on toes, regardless of elbows and abuse, he finally jostled up close behind and to the right of the unsuspecting secretary. Then, at the critical moment, as the man was just about to step on to the gangway, Murray leant forward and his hand darted into the right-hand pocket of the overcoat before him. Unpractised though he was, the attempt succeeded, but, to his horror, the cupboard was bare! He felt he had not a moment to lose. With a push worthy of the football scrum, he swung over to the man's other side and boldly repeated the attempt. This time he felt the object of his search, but the intruding hand was perceived by Perkins who made a wild grab at the book as he felt it leaving his possession. Fortunately, in order to do so, he had to drop one of his employer's despatch cases;

this checked his movement and Murray had just time to elude the man's desperate clutch that closed on empty darkness. Then with a final shove he retreated with his prize behind a burly major. The latter, uttering a loud imprecation about his toes, by a powerful thrust of the elbow sent Murray swinging back against an open cabin door. Perkins turned towards the sound of the major's fulmination. The light from the shaded quayside lamp had fallen on Murray's face, who felt he must be recognized. But the book remained in his hand : as for the rest he no longer cared : the die was cast. So he slunk into the empty cabin and hid till the last passenger had landed. Creeping ashore he sought Magilvray. To his relief he ascertained that no claim for any stolen property had been made to the Military Landing officer. The fact only served to strengthen his suspicions. At eleven that evening he managed to get a lift in a car proceeding to G.H.Q.

Next morning the transcript of the notebook lay before Major Lynch, to whom Murray had already recounted his adventure of the previous night. Lynch was in the best of humours, for, on the previous evening, a voluminous file dealing with the case in hand had arrived from Brinsley. A full list of all Mr. Carswick's journeys since the 1st of October, 1914, was contained therein ; even the time of his departures from London was stated in schedule form. Still better, there was a police report relating to Perkins, Mr. Carswick's secretary. The notebook seemed to complete the whole chain of evidence. Carefully putting into sequence the press cuttings and the new information, Lynch, taking Murray with him, gaily went to General Stockham. The latter listened with the greatest satisfaction to the whole story : the case was perfectly clear, so thought the General. But it would be dangerous to act precipitately. The Chief of the Staff must clearly be consulted, and an appointment was made for the same afternoon. Once more Lynch went through his case point by point. Ordering his car a little later, the Chief of Staff took the two officers and their documents to call on Mr. Carswick, who was staying in a specially reserved billet. He chanced at the moment to be entertaining no other than Sir Stephen Walbrook to tea, and winding up the business which had brought him to G.H.Q. Very gingerly the Chief of the General Staff broached the subject of the recent indiscretions of the neutral press concerning British artillery ammunition. General Walbrook instantly showed irritation, while Mr. Carswick expressed a wish to dismiss the matter as moonshine. Lynch, however, who had carefully thought out his line of action, then suggested that Mr.

Carswick might call up his secretary at Boulogne to verify certain points in the extracts. He had found out during his employer's trip to G.H.Q. that Perkins was to remain at the port with a quantity of documents unessential to the present visit, but of probable importance to Mr. Carswick's affairs in Paris. Yet even Lynch was startled by the result of the call. After an awkward pause which finally extended to several minutes, an answer came from the Base Commandant to Mr. Carswick that Perkins had left Mr. Carswick's apartment at the Hotel du Nord at 6 a.m. Utilizing the special pass issued for Mr. Carswick's journeys to France, he had returned to London by the first steamer on the plea that his master had instructed him to take back some urgent documents to Whitehall. General Stockham let fly an imprecation, while Lynch inwardly cursed his own lack of courage.

The scales gradually fell from Mr. Carswick's eyes. Without a word he read the transcript of Perkins' shorthand notes which General Stockham next handed to him. It constituted an accurate précis of the conversation Mr. Carswick had held with Sir Richard Palmer on the deck of the steamer during the crossing. Lastly, he listened in silent consternation and fidgeting with the tell-tale cuttings to General Stockham's further statement.

"These extracts, Mr. Carswick, appeared in the American press a few days after each visit you paid to New York in December and January last. The latter batch reproduces quite accurately some rather fallacious arguments concerning heavy howitzer fire which were strongly, but unsuccessfully, advocated by a somewhat self-opinionated corps artillery commander about that time. How he made them known to you I fancy you may be able to elucidate. I suggest you may have met him on his journey to England on leave when you were returning from Paris? Again, these other extracts appeared in Rome almost immediately after your recent journey to Italy to conclude a contract for the supply of sulphur from Sicily. I think I am right in saying, Mr. Carswick, that your secretary, Perkins, went with you on either occasion to the States and again to Rome. I believe, moreover, that you were over in the States only 48 hours on either visit. In Rome you did not stay more than 16 hours. Your stay was long enough, in any case, for your secretary to do much harm to you personally as a manufacturer, as well as to our cause. Lastly, I might inform you that, only yesterday, we received a police report through our people in London that Perkins, already for some time past, had become involved in heavy debts arising out of the extravagance of a frivolous wife. The rest

of the story is so obvious as to need no explanation. If you require further proof of my statements, they are here at your disposal."

General Walbrook, who had been an astonished listener to his colleague, could not repress an expression of wonder.

"Marvellous! . . . Stockham, my apologies for the lack of courtesy which I fear I showed you the other day; I shall talk to Carstairs myself to-morrow."

Mr. Carswick continued silent, overwhelmed but angry. Then he reflected and glanced carefully at the papers. At length he mastered all resentment.

"Well, General," he remarked, "your information and your conclusions appear perfectly sound. I had suspicions as to Perkins' domestic troubles but, believing him to be a faithful servant of sixteen years' standing, I trusted him accordingly. I beg you not to bring him to justice. Also I would be glad if this whole wretched subject were never mentioned to me again. I feel guilty myself. I have been a trusting victim and a chattering old fool. But I think you have cured me of the latter failing! I little thought you soldiers would teach me this very bitter lesson."

As Major Lynch reached his office next morning, he received a wire from Brinsley which stated that, on the police attempting to arrest Perkins late on the previous evening, the man had shot himself. A subsequent examination of his papers and bank account revealed that for some years he must have been selling many of his employer's commercial secrets in New York. The war, it seemed, had further lifted these malpractices on to a different and more dangerous level.

A MATTER OF IZZAT

BY "TĀLIB"

GUL BAZ KHAN, Pathan of the Kabul *Khel* of Waziris of the Kurram Valley lay at his ease behind a massive rock, which sheltered him from the rays of a June sun at midday.

From where he lay he could see, several miles distant, the white tents of the British camp. In front of him stretched a rugged expanse of rock-strewn country, broken by ravines and the bouldered bed of a river almost dry at that season of the year. Here and there were patches of thorn, and a poor growth of coarse grass thinly sprinkled with dark evergreen bushes. Close to the river-bed straggled small terraced fields, from which the crops had been removed.

In rear of him, at the top of a steep rocky slope, was the *kila* of Jandola, the village of which he was the *Malik*. It could scarcely be called a *kila*, being rather a stone watch-tower than a fort. At the base of it clustered low-roofed houses, built mainly of mud and stone, extending down to the small leafy mulberry grove in which was the *ziārat*, the village burial-ground. Over the fruit fallen from the mulberry trees hummed and buzzed myriads of flies; and lizards basked in the sun on the stones of the torrent-bed at the bottom of the ravine below the *ziārat*.

Unlike most Waziris who, though sturdy and compact of build, are not of great stature, Gul Baz Khan was tall and deep-chested, with the muscular legs of a mountaineer. His head was bare, and on either side of his keen, hawk-like face, with the large curved nose and piercing eyes, the well-oiled locks hung down almost to his shoulders. Though his years numbered but little over forty, there was a streak of grey in his "*ghabzeh*"—the "handful" of beard worn by the more orthodox Mohamedans.

His clothing was simple—a faded khaki jacket, coarse cotton shirt and voluminous cotton pantaloons narrowing in at the ankles. On one sleeve of the jacket still remained the tattered stripes of a *Havildār*; for Gul Baz Khan had once held sergeant's rank in

a regiment of the *Sirkār*. Round his neck was a cord threaded through a flesh-coloured cornelian—the favourite stone of the Prophet—engraved with the name of one of the twelve *Imāms*.

From his worn leather belt protruded a long knife and a curved sword ; and within easy reach of his hand lay his rifle. Looted by night from a British guard-room, it had cost him many rupees across the border ; and he tended it as a father would his son :—not without reason in a country where every family has its blood-feud, and by custom a life must be paid for with a life.

The white tents towards which his gaze was directed were those of the punitive force, which, earlier in the year, had made its way up the Kurram to deal with the latest bit of trouble on the frontier. The tribesmen of Waziristan are noted robbers—worse even than those of the Hedjāz, who harass the pilgrims on their journey to Mecca the Holy. Raids into British territory had become too frequent ; and the carrying off of fat Hindu money-lenders and women and cattle had reached a point which the gods who rule India from Delhi and Simla could no longer view with equanimity.

As he lay and watched, his quick ear caught the sound for which he waited—the droning of an aeroplane's engines. Daily during the past week he had heard it, as the 'plane, passing low over Jandola—too small a hamlet to trouble about—had headed up the defile to Robat, a large village where there was a great gathering of the tribesmen. Its work was mainly observation. Now and again it dropped a bomb on Robat, doing but little damage, since the inhabitants took to the caves on its approach, and houses of mud and stone are easily rebuilt.

Gul Baz Khan sighted the aeroplane as it rose and circled over the camp before departing on its journey, and slid forward a hand to his loaded rifle. On came the machine like a huge dragon-fly, dropping lower as it neared Jandola with the evident intention of picking up any information that might prove useful. Now it was so close that he could see the pilot and observer : and, as it passed within rifle-shot a little to the right of him, the Pathan leapt to his feet, raised his rifle and fired. He saw the pilot drop forward on his seat, as the aeroplane out of control swooped downward and crashed into a ravine. Then came a spurt of flame, and the shouts of men running from the village, and the noise of exploding bombs. Flung clear of the wreckage the observer lay unconscious on the ground, his white face staring up at the sky.

* * * * *

It was not until early next morning that Jim Fordyce recovered

consciousness in a small bare mud-plastered room at the foot of the tower. His head and a cut on one arm had been roughly bandaged ; but, though bruised all over, he found that no bones had been broken. Someone had spread under him a coarse quilt of red cotton stuff, and there was water in an earthen pitcher which quenched his intolerable thirst.

Gradually, he recalled the events of the previous afternoon—the start from camp, the short flight to Jandola : then, the rifle-shot and the crash into the ravine.—Poor old Vincent !—a first-class pilot and one of the best of pals. It was rotten luck to have ended like that after flying for three years in France. But, more than other men, an airman “ takes his luck.”

About himself Fordyce felt no especial concern. It was, he supposed, a question of ransom or an exchange of prisoners. Not long before, another aeroplane had had to make a forced landing ; and the pilot and observer had been well treated and had been handed over by arrangement.

Through the partly-open door he could see his guard squatting on the ground—a young, sullen-faced Waziri, armed with a long-barrelled *jezail*. The *muezzin* chanted from a mosque the sonorous call to prayer ; and the guard prostrated himself. As the summons ended he rubbed his eyes with his fingers—the customary sign of weeping and contrition for past sins.

Then, from somewhere in the village, came the sound of *sarnais* piping a Pathan love-song ; and the guard joined in :

“ *Rāsha, rāsha, Dilbara, rāsha !* ” *

Raising himself stiffly on his elbow, Fordyce called to him, asking the name of the *Malik* of the village ; and the sullen young Waziri answered :

“ Gul Baz Khan is *Malik*.”

“ Send word to him that I am hungry, and would eat. Also, that I would speak with him after I have eaten.”

The guard grunted sulkily, but passed on the message to some one outside.

Dried meat, dates and sweet Pathan bread were brought on earthen plates : and soon afterwards the *Malik* entered the room.

Fordyce rose to meet him, and for a moment the two men stood gazing at each other.

Waziris are shrewd judges of character ; and Gul Baz Khan looked with approval at the tall figure in tattered stained khaki.

* “ Come to me, come to me, Heart's Beloved ! ”

The steel-grey eyes of the Sahib were those of a *Billa*—a man with cat's eyes. Such eyes had Kitchener Sahib, who had been *Jangi Lāt* ; and one should deal warily with a *Billa*.

Fordyce, on his part, approved the keen rugged face and soldierly appearance of the *Malik*, but looked curiously at the tattered stripes on the left sleeve of the khaki jacket.

Without ceremony the Pathan sat cross-legged on the mud floor of the room. Fordyce seated himself on the quilt, and his first inquiries were for his pilot. The *Malik* shook his head.

"There was nothing to be done, Sahib. The flame of the burning air-carriage was too strong. He was a brave man—and it is thus in war !"

"Surely," Fordyce assented, "it is thus in war."

"For you, Sahib, it is a matter of a ransom. As for the amount, it will be fixed by the *spīngirai* (greybeards) when they meet in *jirga*. The village is poor, and there is great need of money."

"Was there ever Pathan who did not need money ?" Fordyce smiled as he put the question.

"Our lands are not good for crops," returned the *Malik*. "Also, the last time that the troops came our rice and corn were taken, and our trees were ringed, so that they died and bare no fruit."

Fordyce spoke sharply : "Whose fault was that, Gul Baz Khan ? You should keep your young men from raiding over the *Sirkār's* borders." Then he laughed. "Is it a new tale to you, the story of the Dauri Pathan who swallowed his twenty rupees to save them from raiders ?"

A Waziri dearly loves a jest ; and the *Malik's* stern face relaxed.

"Tell me the tale, Sahib !"

"The doctor at the hospital with much skill and labour cut the rupees from his stomach ; and he became well and accused the Doctor Sahib of stealing two of them !"

Gul Baz Khan laughed heartily. "It is a good tale !" he cried. Then, contemptuously, "A Dauri would do such a thing ! Dauris are descendants of sweepers.—Sahib, how come you to speak Pushtu like a Pathan ?"

"That is a simple matter. I was born in Peshawar, and my father was colonel of a regiment. As a child I played with the Pathan orderlies."

There was a tone of pride in the *Malik's* voice, as he said : "I also was once in a regiment."

Fordyce leaned forward and spoke his next words deliberately. "That was not hidden from me, oh Havildār !" He pointed at

the sleeve with the tattered stripes. "Across the border we call deserters *nimak harām*—traitors to their salt!"

For a moment Gul Baz Khan scowled angrily, and his hand went to his belt. But he recovered himself: this was a Sahib who could understand.

"It was a matter of *izzat*, Sahib.—Listen! Fifteen years I served with the regiment, fighting twice for the *Sirkār* against my own people, and becoming *havildār* of my company. Moreover, I stood well in the favour of the Colonel Sahib, and looked for promotion. Does a man lightly throw away the labour of fifteen years? Then, there came to the company a new Sahib, young and hot-headed, a 'yesterday's child' with the milk still on his lips. One day on parade before all the men of the company he abused me, calling me by names that were not to be borne, and saying that it were fitting that I should drill with the recruits . . ."

He paused, and looked across at Fordyce. Fordyce nodded gravely: "Assuredly, it was hard," he said.

"There be men whose tongues sting like the sting of a scorpion," resumed the *Malik*. "Such was the tongue of the young Sahib. It is true that the Colonel Sahib, when he learned of it, was angry: but the men of the company did not forget—and my *izzat* had gone. Wherefore, taking two months leave of absence, I came to my home—and I did not return."

Fordyce could understand his feelings. Only a few years before, a police officer, a friend of his, had been killed by his Pathan orderly for a piece of ill-judged sarcasm uttered thoughtlessly in public.

"Doubtless, it was a hard matter for a Pathan to bear," he agreed. "With us the *izzat* of a man lies in keeping faith and abiding by agreements."

"I am a Waziri," returned the *Malik*, "and I do according to the customs of my people. The Prophet (with whom be Peace!) has written: 'A bad wife, a wicked animal and a narrow house with unfriendly neighbours, these things try the temper of a man.' Sahib, if there be aught equal to these, it is ridicule. When the face of a man has been blackened by shame, even the sweepers may spit on him . . ."

He broke off suddenly, and they heard the faint droning of an aeroplane flying high on its way to Robat. As they sprang to their feet, there came the splitting detonation of high explosive, followed by shouts and cries from the village. The aeroplane had sighted the wreckage of the machine in the *nullah*, and by way of reprisal had dropped a bomb on Jandola.

Gul Baz Khan glanced towards the doorway, where the guard was still sitting impassively, and Fordyce divined his thought.

"Go, *Malik*," he called, "and take your man with you ! There will be work for all." . . . "And I go also," he added. "There may be danger to women and children, and with them we war not willingly."

For an instant the *Malik* appeared to hesitate. In the confusion it would be easy for a prisoner to escape. But Fordyce spoke hotly :

"Will you doubt the word of a Sahib, oh Pathan? . . . There is need for haste. I swear to you that when all is finished, I will return here !"

Gul Baz Khan looked him in the eyes. "Come, Sahib !" he said, and led the way to the village.

For more than an hour the two men—prisoner and captor—worked together extinguishing the flames of the burning houses. None had been killed, and but few injured : but thatched roofs were on fire, and it was Fordyce who organized the gang of men working with goatskins and earthen pots filled with water from the *nullah*. One old lady he himself dragged from a burning house to a place of safety, where, seated on the ground, she loaded her *Kāfir* rescuer with all the abuse she could lay her tongue to !

The work completed, Fordyce walked slowly back to the room at the foot of the fort—a grimy-looking object, with hair singed and hands and face blackened by smoke.

He looked up, as Gul Gaz Khan appeared in the doorway. "According to my promise I have returned," he said.

The Pathan smiled. "You have returned, Sahib . . . and now, you are free to go ! Between us there shall be no question of a ransom. A *badraga* of the young men is ready for escort to the camp."

Fordyce knew better than to offer him words of thanks, but he held out his hand.

"I shall not forget, oh *Malik*," he said. "And, if Allah wills, we will meet again."

"If Allah wills," repeated the *Malik* earnestly. "For, Sahib, we be men—you and I—and it was truly spoken that the *izzat* of a man is the keeping of his word !"

NOTES ON FOREIGN WAR BOOKS

[THE most important books of the quarter are General Sukhomlinov's Reminiscences and M. Mermeix's "Au sein des Commissions" which are placed at the head of the Notes.]

RUSSIA

The reminiscences of General Sukhomlinov, the Russian Minister of War at the outbreak of hostilities in August, 1914, although written in his own language, have been published first in a German translation: *Erinnerungen* (Berlin, Hobbing). It will be recalled that the General was removed from his post in May, 1915, and arrested and tried in May, 1916, on the charges that he was responsible for Russia's unpreparedness for war as regards material, and for the delays in making the lack of material good; that he furnished Germany and Austria with information through the medium of certain spies; that he put German agents into positions in which they could acquire information; that he withheld from the Tzar information of the progress of the revolution in the Army; and that he accepted bribes. He was found guilty and sentenced to imprisonment for life, but was released in 1918 by Lenin in the general amnesty of Tzarist prisoners. He is now living in Germany, and a German Privy Councillor, named Cleinow, contributes a preface to the book, in which he endeavours to argue that Russia began general mobilization before Germany.

The work therefore appears under German auspices. It covers the whole of Sukhomlinov's life. The most interesting portions, it need hardly be said, deal with the preparations for war. The General's line of defence is that he had never been on good terms with the Grand Duke Nicholas Nicholaievich or the majority party in the Imperial Duma (Guchkov being his open enemy), and that they combined to make him the scapegoat for Russia's disasters in 1914-1915. He makes out a very good case; for as Chief of the General Staff in 1908-1909 and subsequently as Minister of War he did a very great deal, and it is beyond doubt that the Russian Army of 1914 was a very different instrument to what it was at the opening of the Japanese war, ten years earlier.

Sukhomlinov had a most distinguished career in the Army. Born in 1848, the son of a civil official, he entered the Corps of Pages at eleven, and eight years later received a commission in the Life Guard Uhlan Regiment. After passing through the Staff College he was appointed to the General Staff of the Guard Corps, served with it in the Russo-Turkish War, 1877-1878, receiving the "Gold St. George's sabre" for reconnaissance work at Plevna. Later, he was on the staff of General Skobelev the elder, and General Gourko. From 1878 to 1884 he was an instructor at the Staff College under General Dragomirov; then after two years in command of a dragoon regiment, he became head of the Officers' Cavalry School for twelve years, where Brusilov was one of the instructors and foremost both as a practical and literary soldier. Again he went back to the Army to command a cavalry division for three years in the Kiev Military Government under Dragomirov. In 1900 he became Chief of the Staff to Dragomirov, then his assistant, and then commander of the troops in the Kiev district. On his chief's death in 1904 (when the civil and military duties were divided), he succeeded him as Military Governor; but from 1905 to 1908 was Governor-General. Thus Sukhomlinov did not serve in the Manchurian War.

On the outbreak of that war, Kuropatkin asked him to be his Chief of the Staff, but knowing nothing of the theatre of hostilities, the General refused, but offered to take a subordinate command under Kuropatkin. Dragomirov on being told said: "What he wants is a Skobelev, to whom he can be a good and industrious Chief of the Staff."

Of Admiral Alexeiev, the Viceroy, the author says: "He was a genuine Great Russian squire, fond of good food, and without the slightest inclination to do a job of work."

The first reforms in the Army instituted after the Japanese War were a failure. They were the work of an Imperial Committee of Defence under the presidency of the Grand Duke Nicholas Nicolaievich, and on it served the inspectors of the various arms and "an illustrious company of unemployed Grand Dukes, supernumerary senators, new-time statesmen and others."

They set about copying German methods without understanding them. The Minister of War nominally remained the highest military authority, but they made the Chief of the General Staff, General Palitzin, his equal and gave him direct access to the Tzar—and he was a mere creature of the Grand Duke Nicholas. Even the Tzar became aware of the unsatisfactory state of affairs; in

August, 1908, he removed the Grand Duke from the Committee, and in November begged Sukhomlinov, who was then sixty years of age, to take the appointment of Chief of the General Staff and put matters right. The General accepted on condition that the C.G.S. again became subordinate to the Minister of War. Early in 1909 he was himself appointed Minister of War. His first difficulty was to find reliable coadjutors, and in the following five years he tried no less than four Chiefs of the General Staff, and he had to struggle against the vested interests of the Grand Dukes and Inspectors of the various arms, who opposed all change that reduced their influence. He placed before himself four main objectives : first, the reduction of the staff, estimated at three weeks, which the German mobilization arrangements had on the Russian ; secondly, the utilization of technical and scientific progress in the interests of the Army ; thirdly, the re-creation of the spirit of the Army lost on the Manchurian battlefields ; and fourthly, the organization in peace of the supply and reinforcement of the Army in war. Some of the measures he took were to make recruiting truly territorial ; to reduce the enormous fortress garrisons—out of which he formed no less than six divisions, besides heavy artillery, balloon and wireless units ; to increase the number of machine guns ; to add 249,000 men per annum to the recruit contingent ; to reduce staffs and the number of officers idling on standing committees, and augment the total number of officers ; and to improve the food and clothing of the soldier.

Every year the Chiefs of the General Staff of the French and Russian forces met to exchange their views. The protocols of the conferences in 1911, 1912 and 1913 are reproduced in the book verbatim. The following are the main points :—

“ 1911. The two Chiefs (Russia being represented by General Jilinski and France by General Dubail) unanimously declared that the expression ‘ war of defence ’ must not be interpreted to mean that the war must be conducted defensively. They declare, on the contrary, that it is indispensable that the two Armies should take the offensive vigorously, for the destruction of the German Army is the first and main object of the Allied forces.

“ They confirm the agreement made in 1906 that on the first news of the mobilization of the German Army, Russia and France are bound to mobilize all their forces simultaneously, without previous discussion ; but in the case of a partial German mobilization, or a general mobilization of Austria or Italy, such a discussion appears necessary, and they agree to bring the point to the notice of their Governments.

"They agree in the views of their predecessors that Germany will use the main portion of her troops against France and only a minimum force against Russia.

"The Chief of the French General Staff then stated :—

"From what is known of the German plan for mobilization and concentration, it may be deduced that the first great collisions will probably take place in Lorraine, Luxembourg and Belgium between the 15th and 18th days. The French will by that time have 1,300,000 men. It is accepted that the Germans will carry out their opening operations with vigour, in order to impose their initiative on the French, to achieve a decisive victory or force the French to stand on the defensive. Should they be successful, it will be possible for them to throw a great part of their troops against Russia at a selected time. General Dubail recognized the great progress made by the Russian Army in the past three years, and General Jilinski stated that the Army would be ready to take the offensive on the 18th day, and with considerably more men than the 800,000 originally agreed on. But as the progress made by Austria had been considerable, she would be ready before Russia, and that it would not be for two years that Russia would be ready to wage war with Germany with any chance of success. He hoped to hold at least five or six German corps as the French General Staff required. Arrangements were made for communications and ciphers."

"1912. At the Conference in 1912, at which General Joffre, assisted by General de Castelnau, represented France, the proceedings of the previous meeting were accepted.

"General Jilinski pointed out that Germany might drag Sweden into the war ; and that large detachments would, in view of Turkey's preparations, be required to watch the Asia Minor frontier. General Joffre agreed, but said the main matter was to defeat Germany : her defeat would quickly settle all danger from her Allies. The improvement of the railways in France and in Russia was brought to notice."

"1913. At the 1913 meeting, Colonel Berthelot took the place of General de Castelnau. It was agreed that if Germany before mobilization attacked either of the contracting Powers, that they would both mobilize without previous discussion. General Joffre called attention to the fact that the German Army Law for 1913 would shorten the period of mobilization in Germany. She would therefore have more time to deal with France before she turned on Russia, and that it was all the more important to attack her simultaneously with the maximum combined force. He stated that France would have 200,000 men more than the 1,300,000 agreed on ; concentration would be completed on the 10th day and operations commenced on the 11th.

"General Jilinski said that the Russian figures were as before, 800,000 men on the 15th day, but by the end of 1914 the Army

would be able to move about two days sooner. General Joffre said, without questioning the necessity of Russia holding forces in hand to watch Sweden and Turkey, that a defeat of Germany would lighten her task elsewhere ; whatever it cost, the destruction of the German Armies must be the main object directly hostilities commenced, and for this purpose the times of mobilization and concentration must be reduced, and it was important that the French Armies should have numerical superiority over the forces Germany could send against her. It was also important to threaten Germany directly by keeping a large force of Russian troops in the Warsaw district in peace time. General Jilinski said that there was a project for this."

On the 25th of July, 1914, in view of the threatening situation, a Crown Council was held by the Tzar, at which both the Grand Duke Nicholas and Sukhomlinov attended. It was agreed to begin the "Preparatory Period" next day, and if this had no effect on the diplomatic situation, to declare a partial mobilization against Austria. The General declares that he knows nothing about a general mobilization being ordered instead of a partial one, and that if such was the case, the change was carefully hidden from him. He states that the Chief of the General Staff warned him by telephone between 1 and 2 p.m. on the 30th of July that Sasonov had given him orders for general mobilization. He does not think that news of the German mobilization left Berlin until the evening of the same day, but the Ambassador who sent it, Sverbiev, is dead. He left a statement, however, that he heard of the news of the order for mobilization published in the Extrablatt of the Localanzeiger at 2.25 p.m. and telegraphed it at once to Petrograd. It reached there at 4 p.m. The two telegrams sent shortly after with a *démenti* were held up in Germany. The times are obviously important, and Sukhomlinov's statement that Russia's mobilization was ordered before 2 p.m.—that is two hours before the news from Germany came in—is admittedly made from memory.

On the 2nd of August the Tzar asked Sukhomlinov to become Commander-in-Chief, but the War Minister felt it would be a mistake to change rôles at the last moment, but said that he would take the post if the Grand Duke Nicholas refused.

The author makes no bones about the weakness of the Tzar and the ignorance and incapacity of the Grand Duke Nicholas. In general, the book leaves a very favourable impression of the man and his work. Unfortunately the memoirs of M. Paléologue, the French Ambassador at Petrograd, and General Sir Alfred Knox, the British Military Attaché, in his book "With the Russian Army,

1914-1917," speak by no means favourably of him; the former condemns his "baneful and mysterious ways," and the latter hints that he owed his advancement to the fund of good stories which he possessed.

WESTERN FRONT

M. Mermeix, a writer who claims to have had access to secret documents, has already published six books on the war, of which *Joffre—1^{re} crise du commandement, Nivelle et Painlevé—2^e crise du commandement*, and *Le Commandement unique*, are well known. The seventh, *Au sein des Commissions (Paris, Ellendorff, 10 francs)*, in spite of its 450 closely printed pages and its unattractive title, is the most interesting of them all. It describes, well supported by documents, the relations of the French Parliament and its Army, and shows the difficulties inherent in the control of military forces by a democracy.

The pictures M. Mermeix draws reveal a very unsatisfactory state of affairs. Universal service made many of the deputies, some of the senators, and even members of the Cabinet, liable to be called up on mobilization; but in 1914 it had not been legally decided which duty should have precedence, the Parliamentarians being unwilling to use their powers to declare themselves exempt. General Boulanger, when War Minister, had wisely ruled that on mobilization a member of Parliament should elect whether he would continue in his seat or join the Colours; but having once declared his choice, in the interests of discipline, he could not change it and revert to his other status. This arrangement was altered when Doumer became Prime Minister and General Ebener War Minister. Parliamentarians liable for service, they decided, should have seven days' leave on mobilization, then join the Colours, but subsequently be permitted, on request, to attend sittings of the legislature. Thus arose the most undesirable state of affairs that individuals subordinate in the field as soldiers were from their places in the Chamber able to criticize their military superiors, and, to the detriment of the Service, use political pressure to injure the prospects of officers who had had the misfortune to command them.

No preparations had been made for the public authorities to pass from peace to a state of war. In the opening months of the war the Government left the control of affairs in the *Zone des Armées* and *Zone de l'Arrière* entirely to General Joffre, or to "Chantilly" (the town where G.Q.G. established itself), to use the phrase that soon

became current. This authority very soon placed its zones out of bounds for members of Parliament, and they on their side began to agitate for the establishment of constitutional control of military operations. A definite struggle for supremacy began. In peace time both the Senate and the Chamber had its "Commissions," formed of members of all parties which had traditional powers of criticism and inspection over the various departments of State. In particular there were the Commissions of the Army, of the Navy and of Foreign affairs. General Joffre put special difficulties in the ways of the Commission of the Army visiting the troops, on the grounds of discipline. The War Minister, M. Millerand, backed up Joffre, and closed the Ministry of War to all civilians, including members of Parliament, alleging truly that, as his staff was working at high pressure, it had no time to give to visitors. For information, therefore, the Chamber and Senate had to rely on their serving members. Of these, one, M. Abel Ferry (a platoon commander, subsequently killed), who was a member of the Government, appointed himself a sort of *commissaire aux Armées*, and proceeded to address memoirs on the subject of operations to the President of the Republic. G.Q.G., for a technical mistake, transferred him to the Nieuport sector, where all was then quiet. It was not until another deputy, Lieut.-Colonel Driant (subsequently killed at Verdun), in December, 1915, represented the undefended state of the Lorraine sector that the Parliamentarians in their campaign got a real lever against "Chantilly."

To make clear to the present generation the relations of Parliament, the Ministry of War and the Army, M. Mermeix has to recall the revelations in the Dreyfus case as regards political influences, and the system of *délation* (denunciation) instituted by General André when Minister of War. Under this system, secret reports on officers were obtained through the civil *Préfets* (who employed the police, servants, tradesmen, etc., to get material)—and, the author asserts, through the Freemason Lodges. Even anonymous letters were accepted and acted on. To obtain promotion it did not help that an officer was specially recommended by his army corps general (the highest military authority) and even put down as best of his rank; he must be a "good republican," not merely neutral, and anti-clerical. One excellent republican found himself passed over, however, because he sent an invalid nine-year-old child to a convent school. Naturally, all sorts of abuses crept in. It became notorious that officers were divided into two categories, known in the Ministry as "Carthage" (*delenda est*) and "Corinth." Then

arose out of this scandal a great personality, M. Charles Humbert, who was to exercise extraordinary power in military matters over a succession of Ministers. Obtaining a Commission from the ranks, he was determined to rise, and, losing nothing by not asking for it, eventually got himself employed in the "Cabinet" of the Minister of War. Coming to words with General André in 1902 over a case in which the Minister refused to punish a second-in-command who had endeavoured to ruin the career of his commanding officer by means of anonymous letters, Humbert was turned out of his job. But he found protectors, obtained a well-paid civil appointment, became a deputy and eventually a senator. He laid himself out to take up the cases of officers and soldiers who had grievances, and in the course of time was recognized as a great authority on the Army. In 1914 he was the *rapporteur* of the Commission on the Army in the Senate. In this capacity in July, 1914, he made the celebrated speech on the unpreparedness of the Army, and, in the name of the Senate, demanded enormous credits to bring armament, equipment, fortresses, etc., up to date. Throughout the war he continued to exert great influence both as an individual and as a member of the Commission of the Senate, on the whole for good, though the author unkindly hints his own interests had always a foremost place.

Why France was not ready is the subject of a special chapter :

"Why [says the author] did France, so rich, lack in 1914 guns, ammunition, rifles, aeroplanes, tractors, even boots [he gives details], all things to be had by the simple process of paying for them? " It was due to "the chimera of universal peace."

Year after year the military estimates were cut down through socialist influence, not because the Left were bad patriots, but because they declined to believe that war was possible ; when Germany's ever-increasing armaments were pointed out, they hinted mysteriously that their brothers in the Fatherland would see to it that the Kaiser never went to war. In view of the influence of secret reports, few officers dared raise their voices, and there even appeared a school of political soldiers who openly maintained that the superior "doctrine" of the French Staff would be sufficient to overcome Germany's material superiority. When the crisis came in July, 1914, credits were voted without demur. But the then Minister, M. Messimy, an ex-soldier turned politician and anti-military, and one of the members most energetic in cutting down the Army vote, had to admit that to realize the programme required

would take six years ; and, further, that the statement he had made that armament firms had been warned to be ready to manufacture certain stores, was untrue. Indeed, it turned out that of the three firms that had manufactured the Lebel rifle, two had "scrapped" their plant.

The difficulties of the French in getting the manufacture of munitions under way were greater even than our own. One of the great centres of supply of coal and iron, the Briey basin, fell at once into the hands of the enemy ; labour was lacking, and everybody of military age had been mobilized regardless of his trade or profession :—captains of industry, managers, foremen and skilled artisans were all in the ranks ; and it took a long time to extract those not already casualties from the clutches of the Army. The parliamentarians laid on the soldiers the blame for the delays—of which they themselves were the cause—and—like Generals von Donop and Girouard here—General Baquet, appointed Director of Artillery in October, 1914, and General Sainte-Claire-Deville, Inspector of Stores, were made the scapegoats : the one nominally because he stopped the manufacture of guns for which there were no shells, the other because he had passed shells of simplified pattern, some of which proved defective. But the expansion of factories had been planned on sound lines ; the women of France, in huge numbers, turned from the making of hats, clothing and trifles to that of munitions, and, though the French Army never revelled in the superabundance that the British enjoyed, there was sufficient. M. Mermeix provides appendices with details of every sort. It is interesting to find that the French reserves of material were smaller even than our own—for instance only 1390 rounds per field gun (in 4-gun batteries and firing six times as fast as ours), as against our 1500 (for guns in 6-gun batteries).

To return to the campaign of the Parliamentarians against Chantilly. In December, 1915, when Briand became Prime Minister and Galliéni, Minister of War, the Socialists, headed by M. Accambray, commenced a definite attack, claiming the right to discuss operations, effectives and nominations to high commands. An organization of control was demanded, which the Government met in July, 1916, by increasing the power of the Commissions of the Senate and the Chamber, and making them the delegates of the house. Joffre was shelved. Then Painlevé became Minister of War, and during the preparations of the Nivelle offensive, members of Parliament were allowed to go anywhere they liked, with the result that "eleven blackcoats encumbered the head-

quarters of the principal executant, General Micheler, on the day on which the Nivelle offensive was begun."

The sequence was mutinies. This civil interference continued until 1918, when Clemenceau and Foch came into power. They would stand no nonsense. The task of control was reduced to seeing that the reserves of stores for the supply of the Army were well kept up; "so the Socialists under Renaudel tried to get Foch 'sent to Limoges' [removed from command] in May, 1918—Clemenceau resisted."

M. Mermeix points out that the Commission of the Army of the Senate was the only real and effective instrument of control, and the only one to which any attention was paid. It was presided over first by Freycinet, then by Clemenceau; it contained M. Doumer, *le laborieux*, two graduates of the *École Polytechnique*, several ex-under-Secretaries of State and men of eminence, including M. Humbert. The Commission of the Chamber had no such names, M. Tardieu being the only one at all well known; but it rejoiced in two men notorious as the *dupes du pacifisme*, who had voted persistently against all military credits: "Of those guilty of the unpreparedness for war, if guilt there was, were they not amongst them?"

Les chemins de fer de l'Est et la guerre de 1914-18 (Paris, Berger-Levrault, 40 francs), by M. A. Marchand, *Inspecteur Général à la compagnie*, is a bulky volume of over 600 pages; but it is by no means a dull technical account of the operations of the *Est* railway in the war. It is a living record by a man who played an important part in the administration of the railway most affected by the war, and an interesting compendium of experience. There are 12 photographs of damage and repairs to bridges and 37 diagrams showing regulating and other stations, and incidence of traffic at critical times.

The *Est* railway system covers a great area, averaging 250 by 120 miles, included by a line Paris—Soissons—Sedan, the frontier to Nancy and Belfort, and the line Dijon—Sens—Montereau to Paris again. It was the only railway concerned in the original concentration of the French Armies, and served the greater part of the French front.

The first part of the book deals with mobilization and concentration, and the evacuation of civil inhabitants, and the preparations made for these operations, including the guarding of the lines, bridges and stations. It is pointed out that the dear old "G.V.C." told off for the purpose were quite useless; they had no technical

knowledge to help them to discover damage, or to describe it if they did notice it, and no means of communication except by word of mouth. In the next war, when railways will undoubtedly be attacked from the air during the period of mobilization and concentration, means must be provided for fighting aeroplanes and for quickly repairing damage done, for which purpose there must be material ready loaded on motor lorries.

The second part, entitled *La vie des armées*, deals with regulating stations, transport of supplies and munitions, and evacuation of sick and wounded. By 1918 a properly organized regulating station—of which a description and plan are given—was able to despatch eighty trains, each made up to suit the requirements of the destination stations. Whereas in 1914 fifty trucks a day provided for all the wants of 100,000 men, by 1918 three times the number were required. France began the war with only five properly equipped hospital trains, and in August, 1914, 78 trains were run for medical evacuation purposes. This number rose gradually to 664 in September, 1915, and fell to 78 again in February, 1918, with a jump in April, 1917, to 429 for the Nivelle offensive. From March, 1918, it rose rapidly to a peak of 934 in October. The number is a fair indication of France's effort at different periods.

The third part is concerned with transport of troops. There is an interesting diagram of the trains westward to Flanders in 1914 :—543 trains passed through Noisy le Sec (near Paris) and 693 by longer routes south of Paris. The author says :

“ A few British troop moves [six divisions ; the cavalry marched by road] passed over the lines of the company in the region of Fismes ; they were of little importance and represented only 128 trains. But the entraining was difficult, as the requirements of the British troops were considerably superior to those of French troops, and their discipline as regards train movements, considerably inferior.”

Leave trains for the French Army gave more trouble than strategic movements : by July, 1918, there were 2,600 a month, and special “leave-junctions” were constructed where men were collected and dispersed, with suitable accommodation, including cinemas.

“ The absence of discipline among the leave men was prejudicial to them ; they travelled very often on the steps and roofs of the carriages ; copious good advice had no effect, and there were numerous accidents every day.”

The American railway staff from civil railways was a failure.

The American railwaymen came to France thinking they knew everything. One of them admitted in the middle of 1918 :

" We arrived with the idea of revolutionizing the French railways, but I now say that after what we have seen previously and what I have seen now, we can't do better than do as you do."

The French military commissioner then said : " As far as railway work is concerned, our troops have never failed of supplies since the beginning of the war."

To which the American replied : " We should be proud if we could say as much."

The author remarks that the American subordinate staff was " unfortunately little qualified : its chiefs themselves admitted that it was difficult to make their men obey orders."

Robbery and thieving in the American section were everyday occurrences, whilst the troops stormed the first-class carriages instead of entering those assigned to them.

The concluding parts deal with operations and life on the *Est* system (different periods of the war, commercial traffic, repairs and extensions, material and finance). It is recalled that early in 1917 a 4th Bureau (the existing ones being what we call Adjutant-General's Branch, Intelligence, Operations) was formed in each large staff. The bureau became the channel for correspondence with the railway regulating commissioner in all railway matters, transport organization of the front, troop movements, transport of supplies and munitions, and evacuation—in fact, a " Q " Branch on British lines.

The author thinks that too little attention has been paid to the extraordinary services of the railway *personnel*, who worked day and night throughout the war, without hitch of any importance, and without any of the praise so lavishly bestowed on other departments of the national service.

The sub-title of *Les origines de la Victoire (Paris, Renaissance du Livre, 20 francs)*, by J. M. Bourget, is *Histoire raisonnée de la guerre mondiale*. Recommended in a preface by Lieut.-Colonel Herscher, Sub-Director of Studies at the French Staff College, the 580 pages present a singularly clear and, from the French standpoint, accurate epitome of the war. The author had special opportunities for collecting material : severely wounded early in the war, he was employed in the Military Secretariat of the Minister of War, which was charged with following the operations in all theatres, and with

the liaison between the General Staff and the Cabinet of the War Minister. The book, therefore, deals with operations and says very little about industrial and economic organization. In other respects it is very complete, for M. Bourget seems to have read every important book written on the war, except those in English which have not been translated into French.

He describes the French General Staff up to the outbreak of war as hypnotized by fear of a sudden attack by Germany, and emphasizes the lack of unity of command both on the side of the Allies and the Central Powers. Both in Germany and France sentiment played a considerable part in the final plans adopted : " We see that both adversaries had desires and schemes based on metaphysics and mysticism, but neither had consistent strategic plans."

Bülow's confession that in the battle of the Marne his right was forced to retire owing to enemy action, is given with the footnote :

" This enemy was the British, whose movements, however, developed *bien tard*, and the left of the French Fifth Army.

" It must, however, be recalled that the first news of the success was reported to our Armies of the East under the form of a ' victory of Montmirail ' the 10th of September, 1914 " [that is the day after Bülow—and Kluck—had gone back].

There is the further comment that

" Marwitz's cavalry corps, which had been amusing the British between Kluck and Bülow since the 7th, continued its success in masking the breach still in existence between them. It is for this reason that the victory of the Marne remained incomplete and the exploitation and the pursuit were so quickly stopped by the enemy."

Yet the fact is incontrovertible that the British were across both the Marne and the Aisne before the French.

As regards the transfer of the B.E.F. from the Aisne to Flanders in October, 1914, we learn that it was proposed by Sir John French for fear that the Germans should gain possession of the French coast, and, with heavy artillery disposed along it, command the Straits of Dover and threaten England. Says the author :

" Note as we pass that the British Army henceforward ceased to be an expeditionary corps sent by courtesy to the assistance of an Ally. . . . it was Old England that the British troops had to defend against invasion on the plains of Artois and Flanders."

The old story is repeated that General Foch persuaded Sir John French not to retire from Ypres. The years 1915 and 1916 are well

described, but the author seems to misunderstand the battle of the Somme, which he thinks merely demonstrated that "patriotism and courage can do nothing against machine guns and guns."

The year 1917 he characterizes as one of separate efforts and dispersal of force. The failure of Nivelle's offensive he ascribes to that general relying for success on new tactical methods. "Marshal Haig only followed the directions of Nivelle with mental reservations." So far from appreciating that "Passchendaele" was fought to keep the Germans from attacking the French during the progress of Pétain's reorganization of the Armies, M. Bourget says :

"It is untrue to say that the French left the British to act alone. In May, June and July the French Army was engaged on the Chemin des Dames in incessant combats against the German Army . . . our offensives of Verdun (August), St. Quentin (August) and Malmaison (October) gave the British a certain amount of relief. The enemy would have suffered much more if the British operations had been given a form comparable with the French, and if between the French stroke at Verdun and Malmaison, blows similar to them had been delivered between Ypres and St. Quentin."

The battle of Cambrai is treated as a mere imitation of Nivelle's methods.

In narrating the events of 1918, the correct view is taken that Ludendorff's attack against the British Third and First Armies failed, and he then turned to the "secondary operation of reaching Amiens."

Finally, M. Bourget will not admit that there was ever "unity of command." The command of General Foch suffered many limitations. Except General Pétain, none of the great Allied chiefs resigned himself to be a subordinate. "The British cheerfully accepted the reinforcements sent by Foch, his *directives* less gladly." General Pershing and General Diaz receive even harsher criticism. It is to be hoped that the French official account will soon appear and put matters in the right light.

General Ditte, Governor-General of Calais from November, 1914, until the end of the war, and well known to many British officers, has written an account of his command, entitled, *Calais 1914-1918* (Paris, Fournier, 10 francs). It should prove of interest to the many British who passed through the port. He had a very cosmopolitan gathering to control. Calais early became an asylum for refugees from the battle zone, a Belgian base, a base for French troops fighting near Ypres, from the 5th of April, 1915,

onwards a British base (when part of the Belgian base moved to Gravelines) and a Portuguese base. With a peace-time population of 70,000, there were soon 35,000 Belgians in the town, and eventually over 60,000 British, whose camps, sheds, workshops and dumps extended for miles around. When in April, 1918, the first American troops arrived, General Ditte had great difficulty in collecting Frenchmen to receive them. "At all costs, the Americans on landing on French soil must not get the impression that they are disembarking at a British port."

He ordered every Frenchman in Calais who had a military uniform to attend. The British, however, gave him no trouble. He says :

"neither a *personnel* of 60,000 men, of whom 12,000 were native labourers, nor the passage of innumerable leave-men and reinforcements caused serious inconvenience, nor complaints on the part of the inhabitants."

This he ascribes to the spirit of method, good discipline, peculiar honesty in paying up, severity of punishment, and the influence of the Y.M.C.A. and similar societies. He mentions that the women of the W.A.A.C. and motor service were careless about veiling lights at night, and that the difficulties as regards supply of water and electricity to the huge new population were considerable. Some space is devoted to bombardments and air raids, from which the town suffered heavily. It had no anti-aircraft guns until the 10th of November, 1915. There is a map of the town showing where shells fell, which indicates that it was fairly well sprinkled.

General Ditte lost both his sons in the war ; one, a cavalry officer, being killed whilst acting as interpreter with a British battery.

The life of the late "*General Maistre*" (*Paris, Crès, 3.50 francs*) by Henry Bordeaux is hardly satisfactory from the military point of view. It makes one wonder, as Bordeaux's novels are high favourites with French women folk, what the life of a British army commander written by, say, A. E. W. Mason or Stanley Weyman would be like. A few facts about the General's career are eked out by an account of some of his schoolmasters ; the career of an uncle—a priest who got into trouble with his clerical superiors by reason of suspected liberalism ; extracts from the General's one book *Spichenen* ; one of his instructions when commander of a group of armies ; and the author's personal impressions of the defence of Fort Vaux at Verdun.

Paul Maistre was born on the 20th of June, 1858, at Joinville,

his father being a *réceveur des contributions directes*, that is a tax collector, and 54 years old when his son came into the world. Educated at a clerical seminary, young Maistre was always a professing Catholic. He passed first out of St. Cyr and entered the 60th Infantry Regiment. Later, he was third in his class at the Staff College; was employed in the 2nd Bureau (Intelligence) of the General Staff, as he was a good German scholar; and as assistant instructor of tactics under Foch at the Staff College. He was deprived of this appointment and his promotion delayed for "political reasons," and he did not become colonel until 1909. In 1912 he was put in temporary command of a brigade at Dijon and shortly afterwards promoted *général de brigade*. On mobilization he became Chief of the Staff of the Fourth Army (de Langle de Cary). After the battle of the Marne he was placed at the head of the XXI Corps, without having commanded a division. His corps was next to the British at the battle of La Bassée in 1914 and of Loos in 1915. He stayed with the XXI Corps for thirty-two months, taking it to Verdun in February, 1916. From April to August it held the line in Champagne, and was then moved to the Somme, where it remained until January, 1917, when it was sent to a quiet sector in Alsace. General Maistre, therefore, took no part in the Nivelle offensive; but when M. Painlevé removed General Mangin from the command of the Sixth Army, he appointed Maistre in his place. The General commanded the troops employed in the battle of Malmaison, a battle with limited objectives towards the end of 1917, the aim of which was to revive the drooping spirits of the French Army. After this he went to Italy under Fayolle, to command the Tenth Army, and later commanded the French contingent there from February to March, 1918. Recalled to France with the Tenth Army, he was first near Doullens, then in June at Villers Cottérêts, but, on the 12th of that month, was appointed commander of the Group of Armies of the Centre, in place of General Franchet d'Esperey, who went to Salonika. What he did in this capacity is not apparent from the book, but "he ended the war at Sedan." He died in July, 1922, after an operation for appendicitis.

Dr. Hermann Koetzle's "*Das Sanitätswesen im Weltkrieg, 1914-1918*" (Stuttgart, Berger), an official Württemberg publication, deals with the medical work in the 27th Division and 26th Reserve Division, in which he served. He gives a description of the organization of the service in a division, which does not seem to differ essentially from our own, except that bearer divisions and tent

divisions, instead of being amalgamated into field ambulances, were kept separate as "sanitary companies" and "field hospitals." In the early years of the war bearer divisions (*sanitätskompagnien*) were commanded by captains of the train, and the medical officers were "attached"; but in the winter of 1916-1917, the Germans adopted our system and made the senior doctor the commanding officer. Originally, too, the medical service was directly under the corps, but again it was soon found necessary to follow our method of allotting the units to divisions. We learn that the first German motor ambulance appeared in the field at the end of August, 1914; the British got theirs two months later.

The interesting portion of the book is the statistics given for the battle of the Somme when the 26th Reserve Division met the British on the Ancre on the front Beaumont—Ovillers. Between the 1st and 2nd of July, 1916, 4,454 wounded, plus 338 British, were dealt with at the two divisional dressing stations. Two additional bearer divisions were allotted to the division, and until it was relieved in October one of the four divisional dressing stations alone dealt with three to four hundred wounded daily. The division was in the line four months, and then was only moved to a sector south of Arras, leaving three battalions and its artillery still in. "That was the rest that our brave Swabians got after these battles."

In the 26th and 27th Divisions of the XIII Corps between the 1st and 27th of August:

"Sanitary Company 3 attended to about 2,000 severely wounded cases; Sanitary Company 2, 3,200 (including 62 British and about 100 Bavarians of a neighbouring division). Five hundred to seven hundred men of the XIII Corps passed daily through the collecting station at Fins."

Sickness also thinned the ranks in the winter of 1916-1917. In the period the 6th of December, 1916, to the 16th of March, 1917, the medical services of the 26th Division dealt with 3,065 sick, of whom 1,200 had to go to hospital. Lightly sick dealt with regimentally are not included. In the 27th Division in November, 1916—January, 1917, there were 5,468 sick; companies were down to 80 men apiece. In February, 1917, when the XIII Corps withdrew to the Hindenburg line, it had 728 wounded and 1,303 sick in bed, who had to be removed by hospital trains.

In the Arras battle the losses were:—26th Division, 9th to 30th of April, 1,635, including 389 dead; 27th Division, 10th of April to 6th of May, 3,118, including 573 dead.

In the Flanders battle in 1917, both divisions were in the line

from the middle of August to the middle of November, with a four-weeks' break. The 27th Division in eight weeks lost over two thousand, with 25 per cent. dead. "The total of the 26th Division was nearly as much." Between the 22nd to 25th of March, 1918, in the Cambrai sector, the 27th Division lost 298 dead, 1,690 wounded and 377 missing.

Up to July, 1918, the Württemberg ambulance trains carried home 156,698 sick and wounded, but the total number of Württembergers sent back to their native State was 634,187, plus 21,488 sent elsewhere. Of those sent home, 5,678 died.

La France de la Guerre, three volumes (*Paris, Bossard, 30 francs the three*), by A. Albert-Petit, is a reprint of the articles contributed by him to the *Journal des Débats* from August, 1914, to July, 1915. Portions deleted by the censorship are now given in brackets; they are singularly few. Written from day to day during the war, the articles, which include many proclamations and public documents, are material for history rather than history, and like Mr. John Buchan's volumes published by Messrs. Nelson & Co., reflect the atmosphere, feelings and opinions of the times. M. Herriot appears as the anti-clerical Senator and Mayor of Lyons, the advocate of education without religious instruction.

For those who want the war in a nutshell General Thevenet (commander during the war of the fortified region of Belfort) has written a small volume of 220 pages: *La Grande Guerre, 1914-1918. Préface du Maréchal Foch* (*Paris, Armand Colin, 5 francs*). It is a singularly clear and impartial account, and little complaint can be made in respect to his mentions of British participation. When he does err, as he does in 1914, he can quote British writers as authority for his misstatements. He shows that the battle of the Somme drew off the Germans from Verdun and thus gave opportunity for the French counter-attacks. He omits all mention of Passchendaele, passing from June to November, 1917, but gives a page to Cambrai. The text leaves it doubtful whether the French or British lost Kemmel. He dates the "Great offensive" from the 8th of August, 1918, with the "battle undertaken under the orders of Marshal Sir Douglas Haig," and not, as so many French writers do, from Mangin's attack of the 18th of July. There are a number of sketch maps and the book is excellently printed on good paper for 1s. 3d.

AUSTRIA

Der Krieg im Tirol, 1915-1916 (Innsbruck, Pohlschröder), by Field-Marshal-Lieutenant C. Pichler, who was Chief of the General Staff of the Tyrol Defence Command, forms a volume in the History of the Tyrol that is being published under the editorship of Dr. R. Granich-Staedten-Czerva. It deals with the Italian attacks on the Tyrol in 1915 and the Austrian offensive in the spring of 1916, but is chiefly interesting as showing how, when deeply engaged in Russia, Serbia and on the Isonzo, the Austrians gradually built up a defence force in the Tyrol.

The Austrian XIV Corps had been especially trained for mountain warfare and earmarked for the defence of the Tyrol against Italy; but on the declaration of war against Serbia it was sent to the latter theatre. In August, 1914, even the frontier guard companies of *Ersatz* reservists were ordered to the main theatre, so that Field-Marshal-Lieutenant Können-Horak, who was appointed to prepare and organize the defences of the Tyrol, found he had at his disposal only one *Landsturm* regiment (three battalions), which was employed to garrison the defences, a *Landsturm* brigade and the local garrisons of the barrier forts, 10,000 men in all. At the end of September part of the *Landsturm* brigade went to Galicia and its place was taken by 7 battalions formed from the labour detachments (men not entirely fit) of two Serbian and Hungarian-Rumanian regiments. By the end of October, 1914, both *Landsturm* regiment and brigade were withdrawn, as every available man, rifle and gun was required elsewhere. Some local reserve battalions were collected, but there were no arms for them, and there were no other men available except the unorganized *Standschützen*. These latter were the members of local rifle clubs, which in May, 1913, had been legally included in the armed forces in order to give them the status of combatants. They were organized into 47 battalions, electing their own officers. At this time even the elderly men detailed for the guarding of bridges and railways were formed into 10 *Landsturm* battalions, and every available man was put to work on defence lines. These lines blocked the gaps between the existing barrier forts, but were sited at some distance from the frontier, in order not to provoke the Italians.

When Italy declared war in May, 1915, there were actually available in the Tyrol a force of 35,000 rifles (of whom 18,000 could be employed in the field), 146 mobile and 539 fortress guns. The frontier to be defended was 220 miles long, so that there were about

160 men per mile. To assist her Ally, Germany now sent the Alpine Corps. The figures do not of course give a true impression of the situation, as the author admits that there were only six lines of any importance by which the enemy could attack, and all these six converged on the town of Trent.

For the offensive in May, 1915, the Austrians brought up six corps, with a total of 203 battalions, 648 light, 182 heavy and 62 super-heavy guns.

Only a page and a half are given to communications, which near the front depended on ropeways, pack animals and man-carriage. The sketch maps are poor.

BALKANS

L'Italia nei Balcani (Turin, *Libreria Italiana*, 10 lire), by A. G. Girelli, with 147 official photographs and a map, is a popular account of the doings of the Italian Expeditionary Force in the Balkans.

GERMANY

Zusammenbruch. Die Tragödie des deutschen Feldheeres (Collapse. The Tragedy of the German Field Army), by Police-Colonel Dr. H. Schützinger (*Leipzig, Oldenburg*), is a somewhat remarkable book. The author sets out to warn his countrymen that if they will not realize that they were "beaten for purely military reasons, that it was not the homeland but the fighting forces of our opponents which brought our Armies to ruin," Germany will only be heading for another fall in a very short time.

"The feeling of superiority over the military and technical efforts of our former enemies must be rooted out and destroyed by knife and fire. . . . We collapsed in August, 1918, and on the battlefield, not in consequence of the revolution in the homeland, which only followed the collapse."

Colonel Schützinger describes the tactical and strategic leading of the German Army as

"the mother of the collapse," and "the era after Moltke [the elder] as the chief source of the stupidity and arrogance of the German military leading, which, when all is said and done, are the causes of the defeats."

He analyzes the causes of victory in 1866 and 1870 as due to numerical and technical superiority: "our opponents were in no

way equal to us (*ebenbürtig*), and daily violated the principles of strategy in the most absurd manner."

Yet from these easy successes arose "a mighty over-estimation of our powers and an under-estimation of our enemies." Moltke, "by press, literature and art, was raised to the class of Alexander, Cæsar and Napoleon."

The professors bore their share in fostering this legend and prepared the German people to accept the wild doings (*tollheiten*) of its generals "with beer-philosopher's calm and contemptible beer-shop comment."

He makes scathing comments on German training and tactics, particularly ridiculing the field artillery :

"A German battery wasted its time in its garrison in aping the cavalry, and on the practice ground in tricks of driving and pedantic target practice";

whilst the "class-caddishness" of the various arms led to the heavy artillery being looked down on as a "foot service."

The only strategic ideas were attack and envelopment; to these are due the final defeat and the loss of millions of irreplaceable lives. The Schlieffen plan, made in 1906, did not fit the conditions of 1914. It took no account of England entering the war. When she did so, the German right wing should have been made even stronger than Schlieffen proposed.

The author then proceeds to exhibit the series of mistakes of the German leading. He recalls the hideous waste of life of the attacks against Ypres. The useless sacrifice of thousands by clinging to the trench lines in 1915 and 1916; the strategically unfruitful offensives in Russia; the madness of Verdun; and the idea-lacking passive defence of 1917; but he reserves the greatest sarcasm for 1918, and says: "German strategy in the decisive year 1918 was a complete fiasco," and ascribes Ludendorff's failure to his deceiving himself into the belief that the Army of 1918 was the same sharp and reliable instrument as that of 1914, and could be manœuvred in the same way.

He sums up the failure of the German leadership in the sentence :

"the first and second 'miracle of the Marne,' which compelled a tactically unbeaten army to retreat and to surrender, consisted in the triumph of brains and ideas over the conception of brute strength and force."

He begs German youth to see that the days of carrying on war by mere "senseless bestiality" are past for ever, and to prepare

themselves to fight ; but only for the defence of their fatherland and the maintenance of the rights of peoples and individuals.

The opinions expressed by Major-General Seely in his articles in the *Daily Express* as to Germany's love of peace and peaceful intentions are somewhat discounted by the publication of *Die deutsche Wehrmacht (Charlottenburg : Offene Worte)*, edited by Lieut.-General Schwarte. It opens with a portrait of General von Seeckt, the commander of the *Reichswehr*, who has written under it Fichte's call to the German people after the collapse of the Prussian Army at Jena. It contains a full account of the new army and navy and their various branches and activities, except the staff and the training of officers. It is illustrated with nearly 400 photographs depicting the training and the life of troops : quite a number of them show Germans engaged in games (not cricket), sports, running, swimming, boxing and races, matters quite unknown before the war.

The chapter on the "Cult of Tradition" contains the following :—

"The spirit of our ancestors, the remembrance of the glorious history of the old Army must continue and develop. Every company, squadron or battery of the *Reichswehr* has therefore the task of preserving the traditions of one or more units of the old Army. This is comparatively easy in the infantry and cavalry, which have remained so strong that a company or squadron corresponds to every regiment of the old Army ; but in the seriously reduced artillery and engineers, a battery or company often represents three regiments or battalions. Instruction is given in the regimental history of the traditions of the unit . . . close touch is kept with the former members of the mother unit. . . . In earnest conversation the young soldier learns more from the war experiences of his elders than in weeks of instruction . . . in great cupboards hang the old uniforms . . . everywhere are Army museums available for instruction in the history of armaments . . . a spur to the *Reichswehr* soldiers to become like our fathers so that Germany may again blossom in her old might and strength."

It is maintained throughout that Germany was only beaten by numbers—even in August, 1914, it is stated, the Allies had 40 per cent. more trained men than the Central Powers !

Hinter den Kulissen des Weltkrieges (Behind the Scenes of the World War), by Paul Lehmann (*Leipzig, Hammer*), is an interesting pamphlet. The author starts with the premise that Germany was the best organized State in the world and her Army the finest, not a mere machine, but a trainer of the nation in discipline and orderliness. Germany led the way in social reforms, *e.g.* old-age pensions, health insurance and employers' liability, and was in all such matters

much ahead of so-called democratic States like France and America. Why, then, did she collapse? He traces it to the rise of banking corporations and limited companies in place of small employers; to the peasants leaving the land and migrating into the towns, where they lived overcrowded amidst the noise of traffic and machinery; and to commercial and material success in peace time making Germany eager for colonies for her superfluous population, and for markets. Germany's policy should have been to make friends with Russia, but the Kaiser's Jewish advisers prevented this, as they hated Russia and resented her bad treatment of their co-religionists. What led more than anything else to the disruption of the State were the promises of the Socialists, which could never possibly have been fulfilled, and the Socialists opposing the increase of the Army and openly preaching that they would prevent war. (The author states that on the 28th of July, 1914, the Social-Democrat deputy Müller was in Paris to assure the French Socialists that his party would stop the war.) Finally, he says that the German revolution was merely brought about to ensure that the old régime should not return to power. He asserts that the most influential Socialists now admit that "the Militarism killed by the Allies is a weapon Germany cannot do without."

PRISONERS OF WAR

In *Von England festgehalten* (Stuttgart: Engelhorn) Professor Dr. Albrecht Penck, professor of Universal Geography in Berlin University, relates his three-months' detention in England in 1914. He has no complaint of his treatment whilst detained: he says that he has often stated this and "now prints it." His grievance, set forth with a great deal of acidity, is that he was detained at all. His case was a peculiar one. In June, 1914, he went to Australia to the meeting of the British Association as the guest of the Commonwealth Government. Whilst he was there war broke out. By his own account, his behaviour and speech after this event—which made him an alien enemy—were by no means discreet. He continued to take photographs and make notes, claiming that he did so only for scientific purposes, and that as he had never served in the German Army, they could be of no military value. Instead, therefore, of being allowed to proceed home via the Dutch Indies or other neutral route, as other Germans were, he was shipped to London. Arrived there, his baggage, with his photographs, maps, sketches and notes, were examined by the police authorities, and as the information he had collected would have been of use to the enemy cruisers then

still at large in the Pacific, and could have been wirelessly to them from Berlin, he was ordered to remain in London. The only restriction placed on him was that he must not go more than five miles from his lodgings or hotel. He states that his letters, outward and inward, were never interfered with by the censor ; at the same time he shows how he and his wife (in Germany) managed to send news to each other by using slang and veiled terms. Thus she told him of the fight at the Falkland Islands by writing, " we have lost 3 *schinaggl*. We are all much distressed because they were such beautiful things." *Schinaggl* is the Vienesese for a small flat-bottomed boat, and the professor suggested the censor thought it meant a dachshund (*Dackel*). There is a sidelight on German habits : as in describing (by hearsay) the bad treatment of German prisoners in England and their demand for a certain necessity, he says : " Newspapers are not permitted in the prisoners' camps, which explains the request for toilet paper."

In spite of his alleged lack of military training, the professor has something to say about recruiting in England and the training of the New Armies. Drilling in plain clothes offended his Teutonic eyes, and he shows his " universal " knowledge by informing his compatriots that there is in peace time " organized military training at the Universities." He refers to the frequent " knife fighting " in the Canadian contingents ! It may be added he jeers at the ignorance of history displayed by his English friends on page 189, whilst on the previous page he recalls that " in the year 1806 the Prussian [sic] fleet was sunk by the English." Possibly this Berlin professor of Universal Geography regards Copenhagen as a Prussian dependency. He thinks that the news of the loss of H.M.S. *Audacious* was concealed because the mine that sunk her was laid by the Irish.

The Royal Geographical Society closed its doors to him whilst he was detained in London, but the Geological and other museums permitted him to make use of their resources, and his many friends in London treated him with kindness. Eventually, early in 1915, when the German cruisers at large had been accounted for, Professor Penck was permitted to proceed to Germany. He thinks that his detention was due to someone " putting a spoke in his wheel." He admits in his book to " scientific " excursions to England with his students before the war, but he does not refer to his detection in an attempt to take photographs near Rosyth, and in general to do " his bit " for the Fatherland by collecting information about the British colonies.

REVIEWS AND NOTICES OF RECENT BOOKS AND ARTICLES ON MILITARY SUBJECTS

The Civil War in America. By WALTER GASTON SHOTWELL.
2 volumes. London : Longmans. 36s. net.

IN his preface the author expresses the hope that the perusal of his work will prove a pleasure to the reader. This hope will probably be realized. For the narrative is written in a simple yet lively style, diversified with picturesque incidents, and may be trusted to carry the reader along with it. It is the more likely to do so, because his attention need not be distracted by having to refer to maps or pay attention to footnotes. He will not have to trouble himself with acrimonious controversies about the way in which battles were fought, won and lost, because the author excludes the discussion of such controversies and simply pronounces sentence without presenting the evidence. When dealt with on these lines, military history is likely to prove a pleasant employment alike for author and reader.

But is it likely to prove as profitable ? Will the military student gain anything of permanent value beside the pleasure, which a well-written account of stirring events can rarely fail to afford ? Unquestionably a concise history of any great war, which presents simply judgments without evidence, possesses a certain value, provided that there is reason for believing that those judgments are in the main sound. But in the case of this history there is little such reason. The entire absence of all references to authorities for the statements made would naturally excite the suspicions of the critical reader. The preface assures us that the author's materials have been the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies. This sounds reassuring, but is not really so to any one acquainted with the nature of those records. They do not in any way represent what to-day is called an official history of the war. They merely form the subject-matter from which with infinite labour an official history might possibly be constructed. The most conflicting theories could alike find support in them. Their value as an authority depends upon the spirit in which the historian uses them, and that spirit must be one of absolute impartiality.

One might pardonably entertain some doubts of the impartiality

of a biographer of Charles Sumner. A perusal of these pages will confirm those doubts. Mr. Shotwell is a thorough-going Federal partisan. He sets out to demonstrate a theory, viz. that the Federals owed their victory, not to their greater numbers or their overwhelming superiority in material resources, but to the superior fighting qualities of their troops and to better generalship. His methods of demonstration are his own. Take for instance the first battle of Bull Run. He quotes the figures for the Union losses in killed, wounded and prisoners. He only gives the numbers of the Confederate killed and wounded. "These figures show that it was by no means an unequal battle." But if the 1,460 prisoners taken by the Confederates were set against the 13 Confederates missing, the reader would be likely to draw a somewhat different conclusion. He seeks to show that in this battle the Federals were outnumbered. By deducting one of McDowell's divisions, which that general had deliberately left to guard his line of communications, and by adding together the whole of Beauregard's and Johnston's forces, though one of the latter's brigades only arrived on the afternoon of the battle, he proves to his own satisfaction that McDowell was outnumbered by 4,000 men. In describing the decisive struggle for the Henry House hill, he twice conveys the impression that half of McDowell's Army was fighting the whole of the Confederate forces. Yet four pages on he writes that only eight of Beauregard's regiments were engaged there and finally admits that it was Johnston's Army which "actually fought and defeated McDowell."

Similarly, in trying to minimize the extent of Grant's defeat on the first day of Shiloh, he is at some pains to prove that the fall of the Confederate general had little effect upon the day's results. He writes that at the moment of A. S. Johnston's death "the sun was already declining and darkness would soon close the short April day." But on the preceding page he has said that "his death occurred at half-past two o'clock."

The author is a confirmed "westerner." In his view the decisive theatres of the war were the valleys of the Mississippi and the Tennessee and Grant's successes at Vicksburg and Chattanooga determined the fate of the struggle. He is naturally led to this belief, because it was in the west that the Federal successes were mainly won. Hence he has adopted a curious arrangement of his subject-matter, setting aside the chronological order of events. After describing the first Bull Run campaign, he devotes twenty chapters or more to the operations in the west, carrying the course

of events in that theatre down to the close of 1863. Then he suddenly turns back to December, 1861, in the east and allots ten chapters to the Army of the Potomac, breaking off at the point where Grant crossed the James. The narrative then returns to the west. Three chapters treat of Sherman's and Thomas' campaigns in 1864. The story of the struggle round Petersburg and Richmond and Lee's retreat to Appomattox Court House, covering a period from the middle of June, 1864, to the beginning of the following April, is relegated to the final chapter of the book. This arrangement shows a perverse sense of proportion. The author seems to ignore the fact that the Federal victories in the west would have availed but little, if the Army of Northern Virginia had succeeded in capturing Washington. That Army was the spearhead of the Confederacy, and until it was worn out by Grant's methods of attrition, the Union triumph was not assured.

The successes of 1863 in the west did not prevent the summer months of the following year, when Grant was incurring tremendous losses in his attempt to crush Lee, from being the supreme test of the North's power of endurance.

Mr. Shotwell shows the same prejudice in his estimate of Federal leaders. Grant, Sherman and Sheridan are his heroes. For McClellan he has no mercy. The recognition (ii. 148) of his integrity and loyalty comes too late from a writer who, a few pages before, was denouncing him as having deliberately caused Pope's defeat. But Pope had won his laurels in the west. Therefore his defeat in the east must be explained away as due to McClellan's and Porter's jealousy and insubordination. To uphold Pope's reputation Mr. Shotwell gives a curiously distorted version of the second Bull Run campaign. He credits Pope with having located the positions of Jackson and Longstreet earlier than he actually did. He makes no mention of Jackson's attack on King's division late on the 28th of August, though this was of vital importance. It was the only way in which Jackson could bring back Pope into Lee's clutches. By substituting "Lee's army" for "Jackson's corps" he conveys the impression that Pope was attacking Lee's whole force on the 30th, whereas he was only renewing his previous day's attack upon Jackson, whom he believed to be retreating.

Porter, like Lanrezac in the Great War, paid the penalty for realizing the position more clearly than his commander. Mr. Shotwell says that if Porter had attacked at any time before 8 p.m. on the 29th, he would have crushed and captured a large part of Jackson's force. The truth is that if Porter had attacked that

evening, it would have been not Jackson but Wilcox's division of Longstreet's corps, that he must have struck. The author alludes to the reopening of Porter's case, but refrains from quoting the finding of the new court. "It is not possible that any court-martial could have condemned such conduct, if it had been correctly understood. On the contrary, that conduct was obedient, subordinate, faithful and judicious. It saved the Union army from disaster on the 29th of August."

He is forced to be unfair to Buell, a favourite of McClellan, in order to find grounds for praising Halleck. Similarly, he depreciates Meade in order to extol Sheridan. At the end of his account of the latter's Shenandoah campaign, he conveys a false impression by the statement that "Sheridan's infantry soon went to Grant and formed one of the best fighting units in closing the struggle with Lee," as if the Sixth Corps, to which reference is made, had not always belonged to the Army of the Potomac and fought all through the Wilderness and Spotsylvania battles under Meade.

Lack of space makes it impossible to follow Mr. Shotwell through all the campaigns of the war. But in his account of Chancellorsville he repeats the long-exploded legend of Pleasanton's wonderful feats, and does not appear to be acquainted with Colonel W. R. Livermore's or Major Bigelow's work on the subject. As regards Gettysburg, he fails to state the actual date on which Hooker crossed the Potomac, but suggests the idea that he crossed several days earlier than he really did, by the use of the very loose expression, "while the Confederate cavalry was occupied with Pleasanton." Nor is he apparently aware that Stuart took with him on his ride round Hooker's Army only three of his brigades, leaving the other two with Longstreet.

Certain statements made by the author are plainly inaccurate. Lee was not sent to the Crimea (i. 111), nor was McClellan a captain of artillery in 1857 (i. 112); all his services had been in the engineers. Elzey (i. 134) was not killed at the first Bull Run. The commander of his brigade was Kirby Smith, who was severely wounded, and on his fall Elzey succeeded to the command. In the following year he was serving under Jackson in the Shenandoah Valley.

The author has not been fortunate in his proof-reader. Misspellings of proper names are far too numerous. Parke, commanding the Ninth Corps in the Army of the Potomac, is spelt in three different ways. In two places Pope, the Federal general, is disguised as Polk, the Confederate Bishop.

Outline History of the Russo-Japanese War, 1904. Up to the Battle of Liao-Yang. By P. W. London: Sifton Praed & Co. 4s. 6d. net.

This little pamphlet is frankly nothing more than a "cram book" for the use of officers preparing for military examinations. It gives very brief narratives of the operations, followed by sets of questions arising out of each section of the narrative, in an appendix and notes for answers to these questions. Of its kind it seems to be quite well done, though the narratives are perhaps rather too much compressed to provide all the data required for the understanding of the operations; a student who endeavoured to work out his own deductions before consulting the answers to the questions might derive some benefit from it and get useful hints from the "notes for answers," but it is very doubtful if educationally such ready-made answers can lead to any serious or permanent advantage, and the list of books given in the Preface does not seem very discriminating. The maps are clear and seem to mark all the places mentioned in the text, which is more than they do in some more pretentious works.

The Staffordshire Knot. The Regimental Annual of the South Staffordshire Regiment. No. 1, 1923. Printed and published by Gale & Polden, Ltd., Aldershot.

This new addition to the steadily increasing number of regimental magazines and annuals makes a good start with a very varied bill of fare, including full accounts of the doings, military and athletic, of the two Regular battalions and of the dépôt, several historical articles, varying from inspection returns and reports of the 38th Foot in the eighteenth century to letters from an officer of the 80th in the Indian Mutiny, reviews of books of interest to the Regiment, and other articles mostly of a lighter character. It is hoped in future to include within its scope the Militia and Territorial units and to make the publication a full and complete record of all the Regiment's doings for the benefit of future historians. If it keeps up to the level of its first number, it will be a distinct addition to the list of regimental annuals. The only addition that seems to be needed is the reproduction from the *Army List* of the list of officers at the beginning of the year with notes on changes occurring in the period covered.

Memoirs of General Sir George Richards Greaves, G.C.B., K.C.M.G. Written by himself. London: John Murray. 1924.

General Sir George Greaves, who entered the Army three years before the death of the Duke of Wellington, being gazetted to the

70th Foot in November, 1849, survived to watch with the keenest interest the events of the war of 1914-1918, dying in April, 1922, in his ninety-first year. He had relinquished his last command, that of the Bombay Army, as far back as 1892, and it must be admitted that to most officers of the Army in 1914 his name was unfamiliar. But in his day he had been one of those who worked hardest for the reform of the Army, to whose work in improving its training and administration a great debt is due, who played important parts in preparing the Army for the greatest struggle in its history. Lord Haig, who contributes a Foreword, speaks of him as having "brought to bear upon the military questions of his day a practical, clear-thinking mind, which yet possessed foresight and imagination in many ways in advance of his time. I cannot name any other general," he says, "from whom I learnt more practical soldiering," and the book contains many tributes to Sir George's knowledge of the working of our Army system, to his sound judgment and sagacity : some of them no doubt are "official" tributes, published in Orders and more or less formal in character, but there is a unanimity about them which is far more than a formal testimony. Lord Wolseley's very interesting letters, contained in an Appendix, are of special interest in this connection. Sir George had been closely associated with him in his fight for military reforms, and was one of the very few of Lord Wolseley's helpers who were privileged to see the full fruit which their labours bore.

Sir George's Memoirs, written by himself shortly before his death and now published, have no small interest. They do not perhaps constitute a very important contribution to military history, for they are informal and personal in tone, full of anecdotes about individuals, quite as much concerned with sport and favourite dogs and horses as with military matters. However, they give a vivid picture of the subaltern's life in pre-Mutiny India, and they make easy and pleasant reading. Sir George never held any high command on active service : his best work was done as Deputy Adjutant-General at the Horse Guards in the "Seventies," and in India, where he was Adjutant-General during the Second Afghan War and subsequently commanded the Meerut Division and the Bombay Army. Considering the amount of fighting during the period covered by his career, Sir George did not see much active service : he missed the Crimea by going straight out to India in 1850, during the Mutiny his regiment was at Peshawar, and though it did good service in holding the Punjab came in for no serious fighting. He saw active service in New Zealand in 1862-1863, was with Lord Wolseley in

Ashanti, but missed the Zulu War through being in Cyprus, and the Afghan and Egyptian wars through being on the Headquarter Staff in India. Indeed, his nearest approach to command in the field was that he was Chief of the Staff at Suakin in 1885. But, if he was denied many chances of distinction, he did good service all the the same, and his Memoirs leave the impression of a man of vigour and character and a real leader of men.

The Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry Chronicle.
1922. London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, Ltd.

To those outside the Regiment the special interest of this admirable annual lies in the continuation of Colonel Fuller's account of Sir John Moore's system of training. The topics dealt with in this instalment are "Organization and Interior Economy," "Discipline" and "The Moral Training of the Men." It is extraordinary how modern the fundamental ideas of the system are: the form and language in which they are expressed are very different from the way things are put nowadays, but the principles are the same. Whether it is system and order in messing, cleanliness and tidiness in quarters, a proper distribution of duties, the necessity for the young officer to know his men and the details of their work, the systematic training of the individual soldier so that when left, as the Light Infantryman even of that day so often was, to depend on himself and to decide for himself he should be able to do so—all these and many other things of a like nature were fully appreciated and given their place in the training. There is an interesting account of General Jarry, chief instructor and commandant of the old Royal Military College at High Wycombe, an officer in whom the Duke of York placed special confidence. He wrote a treatise on the instruction of light infantry, and though himself too much of a theorist to please Moore, his teaching provided a good theoretical background for the more practical instruction given by Moore at Shorncliffe. The whole account is of considerable value because it does help one to understand why it was that the Light Division stood out in so remarkable a fashion in the Peninsular Army. It had been trained on enlightened and reasonable lines, on "knowledge, confidence and respect," at a time when too many regiments were governed by the lash and learned their work mechanically and unintelligently.

Air Power and War Rights. By J. M. SPAIGHT. Longmans, Green & Co. 25s.

Conducted in two elements, war certainly contained a sufficiency of horrors to merit the attention of those who would confine its evils within limits by some form of common law binding on all belligerents. To-day we are in the presence of war in a third element ; moreover, one in which the possibilities of destruction appear to be almost incalculable. It was, we believe, M. Louis Renault who predicted that sweeping attempts to limit the application of science to warfare were foredoomed to failure ; and it must be confessed that the experience of the last war tends to confirm his prediction. If, however, modern civilization is to escape destruction, we must hope that the rules of air warfare will be more fortunate than their predecessors of the sea and land in the severity of their interpretation.

Than Mr. Spaight, it is probable that there is no person in England better qualified to speak with authority on the rules of air warfare. As the author of " War Rights on Land " and " Aircraft in War," a work in which the legal aspect of aeronautics was first examined, we are already familiar with his pen. Moreover, he was the principal representative of the Air Ministry among the Commission of Jurists who met at the Hague in 1923 to consider and to report upon the rules of war, a Commission whose principal task concerned the air.

The author examines in detail the entire legal aspect of air war, opening, as might be expected, with its principal feature—the bombardment of cities and towns. This aspect of air attack has been considerably restricted by Article 24 of the Rules of Air Warfare. On the question of legality he examines the possibility of bombarding, for example, the City of London by night when its population has dropped from the crowded offices of daylight to a mere matter of 14,000 residents whose evacuation would present little difficulty. It will be remembered that in July, 1915, in his negotiations with Admiral Bachmann in regard to air attack on London, Bethmann Hollweg had something of this kind in view. He pressed the naval staff to restrict bombardment of the City to week-ends only, unfortunately without success.

The author believes that one of the most hopeful factors in the regulation of air bombardment will be " the high standard of honour and professional conduct to be found in the Air Services themselves." Certainly this is a noble argument, but it is one upon which we should

be reluctant to place any great measure of reliance. The pilot must obey his orders ; bombing is, and will be for some time, a comparatively inaccurate science. It is not to chivalry but rather to our own preparations for defence, to the quality of our aircraft, to the skill of our pilots and to the ability of their leaders that we must look for protection against air attacks. It is true that a certain spirit of chivalry marked the conduct of air fighting in the last war, but it is a long step from the spirit of Fontenoy to that of war in the twentieth century.

Mr. Spaight does not consider that the use of *flechettes*, or man-killing darts, is illegal ; nor do we query his opinion. He does not mention, however, that, in the attack on London on the night of the 31st of May, 1915, Hauptmann Linnarz of L.Z.38 dropped a considerable quantity of these weapons in the East End ; a dastardly attempt on the lives of civilians typical of this particular officer. In justice to the German Airship Service we must admit that Linnarz's action appears to have been unique.

Mr. Spaight's final chapter is devoted to the right of aircraft "to visit and search" merchant vessels at sea, which, in the issue, involves the right of aircraft to attack and sink merchant shipping. On this particular problem the Delegates of the Hague were unable to reach agreement. In our view the position of aircraft in this matter is similar to that of the submarine, whose activities are definitely restricted by the Root Agreement of 1922. Aircraft, like submarines, are unable to guarantee the safety of a ship's crew after their vessel has been sunk. Apart altogether from the predominant question of humanity, we feel strongly that British opinion should be unanimous on this point. Aircraft should be totally prohibited from attack on merchant shipping ; we have suffered enough from the submarine.

While we may hope that the author is correct in his general conclusion that air power, so far from being a menace to humanity, is a positive blessing, we still await conviction. Much of Mr. Spaight's reasoning is founded upon a belief in humanity and a belief in the restraining powers of rules which, unfortunately, we do not share.

Space forbids a further examination of Mr. Spaight's brilliant contribution to a subject of universal interest. His book should be read by every student of aeronautics and, in particular, by officers of the Service with which his work is primarily concerned.

The War Effort of New Zealand. Edited by Lieut. H. T. B. DREW, N.Z.E.F. Auckland, New Zealand: Whitcombe & Tombs, Ltd. 8s.

This volume, the fourth, concludes the official New Zealand War History, and is concerned with all those activities which could not well find a place in the records of the Dominion forces which fought in Gallipoli, Palestine and upon the Western Front. Every chapter is the gratuitous work of a writer who knows his subject well, and Lieut. Drew has written a very informative preface in addition to his other contributions.

The contents of the book—embracing the narratives of minor operations, the work at the bases overseas, and the war work of New Zealand at home—are as varied as they are interesting; and its significance is great, for such concentrated effort, sustained devotion and willing sacrifice of a free people, domiciled so far from the scene of hostilities, could never have been called forth to aid in a war of aggression.

As regards the supply of reinforcements during the war, it is related with justifiable pride that in 1916 public opinion insisted upon universal service, and that no less than 42 per cent. of New Zealand's male population of military age eventually embarked for active service. The Maori contingent is well known to fame, but it is interesting also to read that from many of the South Sea Islands came volunteers who proved themselves excellent soldiers.

There is an account of the occupation of Samoa, the first portion of German territory to fall into British hands. This was achieved without bloodshed, although the expedition had to risk encounter with the squadron of von Spee. New Zealanders also participated in the operations against the Senussi on the western frontier of Egypt, and the tale of minor operations concludes with the work of H.M.S. *Philomel*, New Zealand's first naval unit, which, although a light cruiser of obsolete type, did valuable service during the first three years of war. A note in the preface mentions the Pack Wireless Troop which reached Basra in April, 1916, and served in Mesopotamia and Persia until, after many vicissitudes, its survivors departed in June, 1918, to join the New Zealand Division in France.

After a chapter on the devoted service rendered by the New Zealand Army nurses comes a description of the work of the hospitals in Egypt, Salonika and the United Kingdom, and of the Dominion hospital ships. The Dental Corps, as is clearly shown, was one of the most efficient of the New Zealand units.

An extremely interesting contribution is that concerned with the training, employment and settlement of the repatriated soldier. It explains how whole-heartedly the Dominion has met, and is meeting, her obligations to her fighting men. An account of the Peace Conference at Versailles, and the part played by the New Zealand delegates, is quite appropriately included, though it is not clear why this chapter should take precedence of such sections as those on educational work in the New Zealand forces, war finance and the training camps established in the United Kingdom.

As the editor observes, the narrative of New Zealand's war activities is by no means exhaustive: no more, indeed, than a general outline of each phase has been attempted. But it is good to have placed on record, within such a reasonable time, a popular account of the part played by the Dominion in the great struggle.

The volume is profusely illustrated.

Simplified Organization and Administration, with Diagrams. By Capt. R. H. D. BOLTON. Gale & Polden. 4s. 6d.

This textbook, which is used by the cadets at the Royal Military College, forms a comprehensive summary of Army organization and administration, made clearer by the use of diagrams. The war establishments of every combatant unit up to and including divisions are thus given—though the mnemonic is not easy to memorize—and there are chapters on the organization of the Army at home and in India. Such items of interior economy as clothing, equipment and messing arrangements do not lend themselves readily to graphic elucidation, but the principles are clearly set forth in every case. In another section the organization and the duties of staffs are concisely stated. When it is remembered how many regimental officers have had trouble with that old enemy the pay and mess book, the chapters dealing with Army accounts and its system of book-keeping may be considered the most useful of all. Although, of necessity, much of the matter is elementary, Capt. Bolton can hardly have failed of his intention to assist those reading for the Staff College and promotion examinations. The official publications, which are referred to throughout, form the basis of the book.

The Military Side of Japanese Life. By Capt. M. D. KENNEDY. Constable & Co. 21s.

The author, severely wounded on the Western Front and thereafter unfit for active service, went to Japan in 1917, when the system

of sending officers to that country to study the language was revived after having been allowed to lapse since the beginning of the Great War. Possessed, from the outset, of a very genuine interest in Japan and Japanese institutions, Capt. Kennedy's powers of observation and eagerness for new experiences have stood him in good stead ; and he appears to have been a conscientious diarist.

His first year, which was spent attached to the British Embassy in Tokio and was devoted, primarily, to a close study of the language, is of comparatively mild interest. But there followed a six months' attachment to an infantry regiment. Capt. Kennedy writes with great appreciation of the manner in which he was received into their daily life by the Japanese officers of all ranks. An officers' mess bears little resemblance to its counterpart in the British service, for it is described as "in most cases a great barn-like room with bare whitewashed walls, and bare wooden tables with wooden benches on which to sit—no table linen or decoration of any sort." This is indicative of the Spartan mode of living which Capt. Kennedy found to prevail in the Japanese Army. Frugality is looked upon as one of the greatest military virtues, and as he elected to live in the Japanese style, instead of keeping a special table which would have been provided for him, his popularity was assured. That he deserved some reward may be gathered from the fact that the food at a divisional "banquet" merely consisted of rice and raw fish, lotus root and pea-nuts.

It is shown that the training of the Japanese soldier is arduous in the extreme : he exercises and bivouacs in all weathers and has little of ease or comfort at any time. Loyalty to the Emperor is the great ideal. Stories of bravery and devotion, taken from Japanese history, are frequently recited to the troops and no political literature is allowed to be brought into barracks. Yet there are practically no minor punishments—it is not considered a "crime" to go for a week without shaving—and consequently no daily company and battalion "Orderly Room." Capt. Kennedy affirms that "if a British drill-sergeant came on to a Japanese parade ground he would have a fit. Three days' or four days' growth of beard, boots much patched and quite unpolished, clothes badly fitting and badly patched, and dirty buttons." Appearances are indeed deceptive, for there is no question but that the Japanese infantryman is well disciplined and a first-class fighting man.

An attachment to the Infantry School at Chiba must have proved no less interesting. Here again was hard work and frugal living, but the author met officers from Japan's overseas garrisons—

Korea, Manchuria, Siberia and North China—as well as from all parts of Japan itself. Several had seen something of the Great War on the various Allied fronts and commented freely upon their experiences. Some said they had been greatly impressed by the fact that the nearer the British troops were to the front line the better their discipline appeared to be. This seemed to be quite the reverse of Japanese expectations.

Capt. Kennedy missed none of the annual “Grand Manœuvres” during the three years that he spent in Japan, but he forbears to write at any length upon the performances of the troops and commanders engaged, or to offer much professional criticism. He finds their tactics out of date and an absence of most of the technical and mechanical equipment found indispensable by the post-War armies of the West. Still, much has been accomplished in the last four years and more is planned for the future to remedy these deficiencies in material.

The next subject of interest is a tour of all the Japanese islands—the Ainus of Hokkaido were, as may be imagined, well worthy of a visit—and Capt. Kennedy travelled more or less alone and explored many places away from the beaten track. He also managed to see something of Korea and those territories of Siberia, Manchuria and China which were occupied by the Japanese at the time. This trip included Port Arthur and the principal battlefields of the Russo-Japanese War. He gathered many interesting impressions, both Japanese and foreign, regarding the foreign policy of Japan, and is at some pains to defend the attitude of the latter concerning China. He has something less than liking for the Chinese, but is always prepared stoutly to defend his hosts.

In one of the concluding chapters is discussed the influence of the naval and military chiefs who, by virtue of the Constitution of the country, hold a unique position in the government of Japan.

Occasionally, there is talk of the taking of photographs. Perhaps the author was unsuccessful with his camera, for this is just the kind of book which should be illustrated.

A Study of War. By Admiral Sir REGINALD CUSTANCE. Constance & Co. 12s.

To set forth a theory of war, illustrating each principle by examples drawn from naval and military history, is no light task. In his attempt to “remove the vagueness and ambiguity in which the theory of war is usually enveloped, and by so doing to explain

the cause of the difference between the political and military points of view, and in some degree to reconcile them," Sir Reginald Custance can only be said to have succeeded in so far as his ancient and modern instances are apt illustrations of the principles laid down.

With the latter, based upon the British doctrine of the "will to security," few will be disposed to quarrel; but the lessons to be drawn from the conduct of any particular campaign are not always so easily deduced as the Admiral appears to believe.

Thus it is hardly sufficient to ascribe the defeat of the Allies by the French Revolutionary Army in 1794 to the fact that the former substituted territory for armed force as the military aim. The contributory causes of failure—of which may be mentioned divided counsels and the inferior quality of most of the troops engaged—had so much influence on the result that they cannot be ignored. There was no *guillotine* set up in rear of the Allied forces.

We are told that when, in 1798, Napoleon elected for the expedition to Egypt that he was "about to sin against the military light," inasmuch as he was pursuing a political object—the conquest of territory—instead of aiming at the destruction of the armed forces of England. The point is a more than doubtful one, when all the circumstances are considered, and perhaps this is why Sir Reginald is afterwards at some pains to justify Napoleon.

In writing of the revolution in British naval strategy contemporary with the rise of Nelson, the Admiral is on surer ground, and his detailed contrast of the two schools of thought would have gained by the provision of a map.

One chapter is devoted to a brief discussion of the relations between the Navy, the Army and the Air Force which is called "Aery." Like most sailors and soldiers Sir Reginald views an independent Air Force with disfavour and his argument is well put.

In the course of considering some of the political and military reactions during the Great War the Dardanelles operations claim the author's attention. Not every one will agree that "the political school was alone represented on the War Council," and no allowance is made for the fact that Russian cooperation was counted upon when the project was formulated. Moreover, if the passage of the Dardanelles had been successfully accomplished by the British Fleet, it was intended to support it, before Constantinople, by a military force.

The four maps are of the Schooneveldt, to illustrate the struggle at sea in 1673 between Prince Rupert and de Ruijter; of the Ægean for the Peloponnesian War; of the Austrian Netherlands for the 1793-1794 campaigns; and of the Western Front in the Great War.

All the World's Aircraft. Founded by FRED. T. JANE. Edited and compiled by C. G. GREY (editor of the "Aeroplane"). London : Sampson Low, Marston & Co., Ltd.

For those who are familiar with "Jane's Fighting Ships" and with the previous thirteen issues of "All the World's Aircraft" there is a surprise in the 1924 Edition of this work. The oblong form so well known to Service readers has been abandoned. With the Editor we agree that, in its new form, the book is more convenient to handle, more easily stored and less easily damaged. A work of this kind devoted to aircraft as opposed to ships does not require the oblong shape demanded by full-page photographs of fighting ships.

In its 1924 Edition "All the World's Aircraft" maintains that reputation for accuracy and for detailed information which has given it a definite place in the aeronautical world. There is, too, continued progress in the standardization of forms of specification which we have urged for the past two years. On the other hand, we feel that there are one or two features of the publication open to criticism. For example, in the Preface in which Mr. Grey reviews the year's progress of all branches of aviation within and without the Empire, he develops those theories on the great Slav war with which we are acquainted through the pages of the "Aeroplane." However interesting such theories may be, however probable or improbable their eventual materialization, we think that they are best omitted from a work which is essentially a reference to facts and not to political possibilities in Europe and Asia.

As to the merits of the technical experts at the Air Ministry the Editor and the technical editor apparently disagree. While the former believes that, by an endeavour to impose their own ideas on aircraft designers, these experts impede our chances of possessing the "world's best aircraft," Captain Sayers points out in his excellent technical review that "the Air Ministry by its somewhat conservative policy in technical matters has helped to lay a sound foundation for the future."

Much of the detail of foreign air services and of foreign aircraft has been supplied by representatives of the Powers concerned. Unfortunately, in some instances applications for particulars have either been refused or ignored. We do not believe, however, that any useful purpose is served by recording under the heading, "Poland : " "though the Polish Army owned some aeroplanes it

neither knew how to maintain, fly nor use them. It is therefore to be supposed that flying is not done by the Poles in Poland." This, in fact, is not so. Poland is the master of a small but useful air service which is, as far as we know, quite efficient. We shall not be surprised if there is again a lack of information about Poland in the 1925 Edition.

We would suggest that more space could be profitably devoted to the organization of the Royal Australian and Canadian Air Forces. Of the former in particular we feel that more knowledge is obtainable. It is probable that the service representatives of these two Dominions, permanently maintained at the Air Ministry, would be more than willing to supply complete details.

The compiler is to be congratulated upon the extent and accuracy of his information concerning the French air services, in spite of the confusion attendant upon their recent re-organization.

ARTICLES IN REVIEWS

The National Review, October, 1924. "Delhi—the Eleventh of May, 1857," by Major-General Sir George MacMunn, K.C.B.

The Quarterly Review, October, 1924. "The Disarmament of Germany and After," by Brigadier-General J. H. Morgan.

The Nineteenth Century and After, December, 1924. (1) "The Ex-Service Man," by J. R. Griffin (Assistant-Secretary, British Legion). (2) "A Soldier Saint," by Lieut.-Colonel A. G. Baird Smith, D.S.O.

This article recalls the Life and Diary of Lieut.-Colonel J. Blackader, who was an officer in the Cameronians in Marlborough's campaigns in the Low Countries.

LIST OF BOOKS RECEIVED

"The Naval History of the World War. Offensive Operations, 1914-1915." By Thomas G. Frothingham. Published by Oxford University Press. 18s. net.

"Imperial War Museum. 7th Annual Report, 4th Report of the Board of Trustees, 1923-1924." Published by His Majesty's Stationery Office. 1s. net.

"The Geographical Aspect of Eugenics." By Vaughan Cornish, D.Sc.

"The English Conquest of Normandy, 1416-1424." A Study in Fifteenth Century Warfare. By Richard Ager Newhall. Published by Oxford University Press. 18s. 6d. net.

"A Study of War." By Admiral Sir Reginald Custance, G.C.B., K.C.M.G., C.V.O., Hon. D.C.L. Published by Constable. 12s. net.

"Outline History of the Russo-Japanese War, 1904, up to the Battle of Liao-Yang." With Questions and Notes for Answers. By P. W. Published by Sifton Praed & Co., Ltd. 4s. 6d. net.

"The 1st and 2nd Battalions The Sherwood Foresters (Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire Regt.) in the Great War." Compiled by Col. H. C. Wylly, C.B. Published by Gale & Polden, Ltd. Cloth, 12s. 6d. net; paper, 9s. net.

"The Military Side of Japanese Life," By Capt. M. D. Kennedy. Published by Constable & Co., Ltd. 21s. net.

"Memoirs of General Sir George Richard Greaves, G.C.B., K.C.M.G., etc." Written by himself. Published by John Murray. 15s. net.

"The Undiscovered Island." By E. M. Tenison. Published by John Murray. 7s. 6d. net.

"Elementary Imperial Military Geography." By Capt. D. H. Cole, M.B.E. Published by Sifton Praed & Co., Ltd. 10s.

"The Military Uses of Astronomy." By F. C. Molesworth. Published by Longmans, Green & Co. 3s. 6d. net.

"The Odds at Monte Carlo." Analysed by Scrutator. Published by John Murray. 5s. net.

"The Royal Navy as I saw it." By Capt. G. H. A. Willis, C.B., R.N. Published by John Murray. 16s. net.

"The Staffordshire Knot." The Regimental Annual of the South Staffordshire Regt. Published by Gale & Polden. 3s. net.

"Air Power and War Rights." By J. M. Spaight. Published by Longmans, Green & Co. 25s.

"The Empire at War." Edited for the Royal Colonial Institute. By Sir Charles Lucas, K.C.B., K.C.M.G. Volume III. Published by Oxford University Press. 21s. net.

"The Life of Lord Wolseley." By Major-General Sir F. Maurice and Sir George Arthur. Published by Wm. Heinemann, Ltd.

"Tibet, Past and Present." By Sir Charles Bell, K.C.I.E., C.M.G. Published by Oxford University Press. 24s. net.

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